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Property-led development and the relations between local authorities and private 
sector developers are topics that have formed the subject of much theoretical analysis in 
socio-legal studies, town planning literature and urban studies. However, there has been little 
examination of the network of contractual arrangements that underpin a property-led 
development project. These contractual underpinnings are important because they can 
facilitate the assembly of a development site. In addition, this network of contractual 
arrangements commonly stipulates both the terms on which a local authority transfers land it 
owns or has acquired to a private sector developer and a series of conditions to be discharged 
before a developer becomes obliged to commence construction of a development project.  
This research, therefore, offers an original contribution to knowledge through a 
detailed study of this network of contractual arrangements. It does so by asking research 
questions that are specific to a property-led development project in a small city called 
Winchester, situated in the southeast of England. Alongside these specific questions, the 
research considers broader questions designed to provide insights into property-led 
development and legal practices beyond the confines of the case study. The research 
particularly examines the use of contractual arrangements as an instrument of land assembly, 
and analyses the role of law and legal technologies in property-led development. By drawing 
upon recent scholarship in socio-legal studies, the research also questions the extent to which 
‘time’ functions as an ordering device in the contractual arrangements commonly deployed in 
property-led development practice, and considers the extent to which this network of 
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Property-led development1 has performed a significant role in reordering 
landownership in many British towns and cities since the mid-1980s, beginning with initiatives 
to regenerate large tracts of industrial land on the edge of central urban areas.2 Since the mid-
1990s the focus of much property-led development has shifted towards central urban 
locations3 and recent academic studies have noted an ongoing dependence on public sector 
bodies to create a property market and to induce private sector developers and investors to 
participate in that market.4 Property-led development remains highly topical and notable 
recent case studies include Doak and Karadimitriou’s work on property-led development in 
Paddington Basin,5 Layard’s analysis of a similar project in Bristol6 and Henderson’s study of 
property-led development in Wolverhampton.7 These projects have generally involved a form 
of ‘retail-led regeneration’8 of apparently under-utilised commercial buildings through the 
construction of new shops and connected entertainment and leisure facilities.9  
The idea of ‘retail-led’ town and city centre property development is not new, as 
Turok’s work shows,10 and two assumptions underpin this type of project. The first is a belief 
                                                          
1 I will explain what I understand by the term, ‘property-led development,’ in this chapter. 
2 See, for example, Patsy Healey, 'Urban Regeneration and the Development Industry' (1991) 25 
Regional Studies 97; Rob Imrie and Huw Thomas, 'The limits of property-led regeneration' (1993) 11 
Environment and Planning C-Government and Policy 87; Mike Raco, Steven Henderson and Sophie 
Bowby, 'Changing times, changing places: urban development and the politics of space - time' (2008) 40 
Environment and Planning A 2652. 
3 Anna Minton, Ground control: fear and happiness in the twenty-first-century city (Penguin Books 2009), 
15-17. 
4 Raco, Henderson and Bowby, 'Changing times, changing places: urban development and the politics of 
space - time', 2660. 
5 Joe Doak and Nikos Karadimitriou, '(Re)development, complexity and networks: A framework for 
research' (2007) 44 Urban Studies 209. Raco and Henderson also discuss the Paddington Basin 
development in Mike Raco and Steven Henderson, 'Flagship Regeneration in a Global City: The Re-
making of Paddington Basin' (2009) 27 Urban Policy and Research 301 and Steven Henderson, 
'Developer collaboration in urban land development: partnership working in Paddington, London' (2010) 
28 Environment and Planning C-Government and Policy 165. 
6 Antonia Layard, 'Shopping in the Public Realm: A Law of Place' (2010) 37 Journal of Law and Society 
412. 
7 Steven R. Henderson, 'City centre retail development in England: Land assembly and business 
experiences of area change processes' (2011) 42 Geoforum 592. 
8 Layard, 'Shopping in the Public Realm: A Law of Place', uses the term ‘retail-led regeneration’ in her 
case study of land assembly for the purposes of the Cabot Circus development in Bristol. 
9 Alastair Adair, Jim Berry and Stanley McGreal, 'Financing property's contribution to regeneration' 
(2003) 40 Urban Studies 1065, 1069. 
10 Ivan Turok, 'Property-led urban regeneration - panacea or placebo' (1992) 24 Environment and 
Planning A 361, 374. Turok’s work refers to out-of-town retail and leisure developments at Meadowhall 
in Sheffield and MetroCentre in Gateshead, among others. More recent studies have considered retail-




that the construction of new retail areas will leverage the construction of other buildings, such 
as urban housing, as part of or alongside the proposed development. The second is predicated 
on the hope that retail property development will bring associated benefits to the town or city 
in question through the creation of jobs, an enhancement in land values and, consequently, 
financial investment in the area.11 These assumptions mean, Henderson has argued, that many 
local authorities treat retail property development ‘as a public interest objective’ that takes 
priority over ‘the interests of affected landowners, occupiers and consumers.’12 
Property-led development occupies a contentious and often controversial place in 
academic literature. Various academics have described this type of development work as 
‘property-led’ because the ostensible goal is the construction of new buildings on a 
‘preselected’ site.13 Underlying this goal is a belief that the privately-funded construction of 
new buildings might enable local government bodies to address or at least to be seen to be 
addressing ‘wide-ranging urban problems,’14 including a perception of urban decline and the 
inability of local authorities to fund initiatives designed to reverse that decline.15 Proponents of 
property-led development thus suggest that job creation from building-related activities will 
boost employment rates and spending power in the region in question and new buildings will 
accommodate the expansion of existing businesses and the arrival of new businesses.16 These 
outcomes, they suggest, will enhance the attractiveness and the ‘investability’ of a location 
and produce economic benefits that will ‘trickle down’ to the local populace.17 
My research studies a property-led development project in a small city called 
Winchester, situated in the southeast of England. My study of this project begins with a report 
that Winchester City Council’s18 planning officers commissioned in 1997 to evaluate 
development options in the area and traces that project through to its collapse in 2016. I seek 
                                                          
11 See, for example, DTZ and BCSC, 'Retail-led Regeneration: Why it matters to our communities' 
<https://www.bitc.org.uk/system/files/retail-led_regeneration_study.pdf> accessed 17 September 
2017). A development seems to be classed as ‘retail-led’ when a significant component of the buildings 
to be constructed as part of the development will be used for retail purposes. 
12 Henderson, 'City centre retail development in England: Land assembly and business experiences of 
area change processes', 599. 
13 Nikos Karadimitriou, Claudio de Magalhães and Roelof Verhage, Planning, risk, and property 
development: urban regeneration in the England, France, and the Netherlands (Routledge 2013), 206. 
See also Layard, 'Shopping in the Public Realm: A Law of Place', 417. Allan Cochrane, Understanding 
urban policy: a critical approach (Blackwell 2007), 31 also refers to a predominant urban policy approach 
predicated on ‘targeted’ interventions in preselected areas.  
14 Turok, 'Property-led urban regeneration - panacea or placebo', 363. 
15 Adair, Berry and McGreal, 'Financing property's contribution to regeneration', 1072. 
16 ibid, 1068. 
17 ibid, 1068. See also Raco, Henderson and Bowby, 'Changing times, changing places: urban 
development and the politics of space - time', 2653; Minton, Ground control: fear and happiness in the 
twenty-first-century city, 26. 
18 The local authority responsible for Winchester city centre and the surrounding area. I abbreviate the 




to provide an understanding of the processes that WCC deployed in partnership with a private 
sector development company to facilitate that project. This research examines how WCC and 
its development partner sought to ‘assemble’ a multiplicity of landholdings and individual land 
interests into a unified whole that was ready for development.19 The role of WCC’s power to 
compulsorily purchase privately-held land will be analysed, as will the interplay between the 
array of contractual arrangements deployed to enable the use of those powers.  
This chapter begins with a discussion of recent academic work on property-led 
development and introduces the strategies through which local authorities and developers 
have historically sought to prepare land for development. Having done so, I set out the 
statutory basis from which a local authority can exercise compulsory purchase powers to 
acquire land interests for the purposes of this type of project. I then present a chronology of 
the property-led development process that took place in Winchester20 to illustrate how a 
Development Agreement21 facilitates the exercise of a local authority’s compulsory purchase 
powers. This equips me to explain why my examination of the Winchester DA contributes both 
to existing research into property-led development and to two recent theoretical 
developments in legal studies. After identifying the principal focuses of my research, I then 
conclude the chapter by summarising my research aims, setting out my research questions and 
providing an outline of my thesis. 
Property-led development and retail-led regeneration 
Academic research into property-led development has generally involved case studies 
of single developments. Imrie and Thomas’s examination of property-led development in part 
of Cardiff docks22 provides a notable example of a case study considering a project typical of 
the emphasis, from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, upon apparently under-utilised industrial 
land close to a city centre. Their work evaluated the policy choices made at a central UK 
government level that permeated property development decision-making at a local level. They 
analysed the relations between property developers and local authority officers and addressed 
a perception among practitioners that private sector developers and financial institutions drive 
property-led development in industrial areas. Notwithstanding that perception, they also 
                                                          
19 The concept of ‘land assembly’ is one that I take from Minton, Ground control: fear and happiness in 
the twenty-first-century city and Layard, 'Shopping in the Public Realm: A Law of Place'. 
20 Throughout this thesis, I refer to that project as ‘the Winchester Development.’ Many of the WCC 
documents to which I refer in this thesis call the Winchester Development, ‘Silver Hill.’ This is because 
one of the roads crossing the development site, marked on the plan in Appendix C, is called Silver Hill. 
For the sake of simplicity, I use the term ‘the Winchester Development’ to signify the location in which 
the development took place. 
21 I will use the acronym ‘DA’ each time I refer to a Development Agreement. 




revealed that these projects are often ‘highly dependent on the public sector’23 acting in a 
‘proactive, and consenting’ way.24 The mechanisms through which local authorities have 
sought to do this have been varied and have included the formation of ‘enterprise zones,’25 
which offer incoming businesses tax incentives, or ‘streamlined’ planning approvals to 
repackage ‘unmarketable’ land as both developable and investable.26  
In addition, a significant focus of local authority efforts to stimulate property-led 
development in the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s addressed what Harding called ‘the 
ownership log-jam.’27 This involved, she explained, local authorities using their compulsory 
purchase powers to develop and mobilise ‘coalitions’ with developers and investors against 
local individuals and companies with land interests on a site earmarked for development.28 
‘Fragmentation’ in landholding was seen as an obstacle to property-led development and 
would arise if ownership of those land interests was spread across a disparate range of 
different owners.29 State intervention proved ‘necessary’ to address this insofar as local 
authorities, developers and investors assumed that consolidating those interests into a single, 
unified whole ready for construction would be impossible without the capacity of local 
government bodies to take those land interests from their existing owners. 
Addressing ‘fragmented’ landownership remained a focus of property-led 
development practice throughout the 1990s and has continued to be essential to projects in 
the twenty-first century.30 A series of recurring themes seem to characterise this type of 
development. A local authority and a developer collaborating on a property-led development 
project will often seek to create a retail ‘destination,’31 preferably of a sufficient scale to 
‘dominate’ pre-existing, neighbouring retail areas.32 The developer will attempt to identify and 
                                                          
23 ibid, 88. 
24 ibid, 93. 
25 Both in relation to industrial sites and other central urban areas. For a discussion of this, consider 
Turok, 'Property-led urban regeneration - panacea or placebo', 368; Adair, Berry and McGreal, 
'Financing property's contribution to regeneration', 1069; David Adams, Alan Disberry and Norman 
Hutchison, 'Still vacant after all these years - Evaluating the efficiency of property-led urban 
regeneration' (2017) 32 Local Economy 505, 507. 
26 Imrie and Thomas, 'The limits of property-led regeneration', 89. 
27 Ann Harding, 'The rise of urban-growth coalitions, UK- style' (1991) 9 Environment and Planning C - 
Government and Policy 295, 314. 
28 ibid. 
29 Imrie and Thomas, 'The limits of property-led regeneration', 93; Henderson, 'City centre retail 
development in England: Land assembly and business experiences of area change processes', 594. 
30 Erwin Heurkens, David Adams and Fred Hobma, 'Planners as market actors: the role of local planning 
authorities in the UK's urban regeneration practice' (2015) 86 Town Planning Review 625, 642.  
31 Henderson, 'City centre retail development in England: Land assembly and business experiences of 
area change processes', 596. See also Mike Biddulph, 'Urban design, regeneration and the 
entrepreneurial city' (2011) 76 Progress in Planning 63, 75. 
32 Henderson, 'City centre retail development in England: Land assembly and business experiences of 




swiftly incorporate one or two department stores to ‘anchor’ the development and attract 
complementary retailers.33 Those retailers, according to the predominant model described in 
the urban regeneration literature, would be multisite or chain retailers34 with similar shops in 
neighbouring retail areas and in locations across the United Kingdom.  
These features of retail-led regeneration and property-led development rely upon 
some form of public-private partnership based on a variety of contractual arrangements,35 
which require a local authority to use its compulsory purchase powers to make the land 
acquisitions deemed necessary for the assembly of a development site.36 In return for the local 
authority’s promise to exercise its compulsory purchase powers, the contractual arrangements 
will require a private sector developer to construct, own and maintain buildings on the site, 
enrol prospective retail tenants interested in taking units on the development site and recruit 
financial institutions equipped to fund land acquisition and construction. In that sense, 
contemporary retail-led regeneration practice is a continuation of the approach to 
redevelopment of industrial areas throughout the 1980s and 1990s. This approach has proven 
attractive to policy-makers, planners and developers because it enables a ‘comprehensive’ and 
‘coordinated’ approach to property-led development deemed necessary to ‘join up’ policy, 
decision-making, landownership and schemes of development into a seemingly coherent and 
overarching whole.37 As a result, it has been common in the past three decades for local 
authorities to enter into a variety of contractual arrangements with property development 
companies to facilitate this type of development.  
The land earmarked as suitable for property-led development and retail-led 
regeneration will often include a plot to which the local authority owns the freehold title.38 But 
the earmarked land will usually also cover freehold and leasehold estates held by private 
owners, which are thus outside the ownership and control of either the local authority or the 
local authority’s chosen development partner. Although I have stated that local authorities 
have utilised compulsory purchase powers since the 1980s to assemble a development site out 
of previously developed industrial land, these ‘land assembly’ strategies were, Minton argues, 
                                                          
33 ibid, 593. See also Heurkens, Adams and Hobma, 'Planners as market actors: the role of local planning 
authorities in the UK's urban regeneration practice', 641; Biddulph, 'Urban design, regeneration and the 
entrepreneurial city', 86. 
34 Henderson, 'City centre retail development in England: Land assembly and business experiences of 
area change processes', 593. See also Doak and Karadimitriou, '(Re)development, complexity and 
networks: A framework for research', 222. 
35 Clifford Guy, Planning for retail development: a critical view of the British experience (Routledge 
2007), 216-8. 
36 Henderson, 'City centre retail development in England: Land assembly and business experiences of 
area change processes', 593. 
37 Cochrane, Understanding urban policy: a critical approach, 31-7. 




initially ‘something of a novelty.’39 They have since, she suggests, become widely used to 
address the likelihood that a private owner with an interest in land earmarked for 
development might refuse to give up that interest.40  
In 2001, the UK government encouraged local authorities to use compulsory purchase 
powers to ‘make things happen’41 in urban areas characterised by a downtrodden property 
market and a lack of ‘investability.’42 To that end, Lord Falconer, the Minister for Housing and 
Planning, stated that ‘[l]and assembly, through compulsory purchase powers’ had a 
particularly ‘important part to play.’43 The initial stages of the Winchester Development took 
place between 1997 and 2002 in the context of these central government efforts to nudge 
local authorities towards greater use of their compulsory purchase powers. 
Since 1997, many local authorities have used these compulsory purchase powers in 
conjunction with other legal mechanisms and the consequences of this central government 
nudge have been studied in the urban regeneration and socio-legal studies literature. That 
process has continued up to the present, as exemplified in Layard’s study of the privatisation 
of space in Bristol city centre as part of the Cabot Circus retail-led regeneration project.44 The 
land assembly process for that project began, according to Layard’s analysis, with a planning 
permission, a Compulsory Purchase Order45 and a consent permitting the stopping up of 
highways.46 The process reached its culmination, she argues, in the grant of a long leasehold 
title of the development site from the local authority to its chosen development partner.47 But 
her examination of the legal mechanisms operative in this process did not extend to an 
investigation of all the contractual arrangements between the local authority and its 
development partner. The contractual arrangements that I analyse in this thesis preceded and 
facilitated the grant of a long leasehold estate that was similar in form and effect to that which 
Layard analyses, as well as enabling a planning permission, the making of a CPO and the award 
                                                          
39 Minton, Ground control: fear and happiness in the twenty-first-century city, 11. 
40 ibid, 11. See also Henderson, 'City centre retail development in England: Land assembly and business 
experiences of area change processes', 594. 
41 Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Minister of State for Housing and Planning), '2001 Speech to the British 
Retail Consortium. 27 November 2001' <http://www.ukpol.co.uk/lord-falconer-2001-speech-to-the-
british-retail-consortium/> accessed 24 July 2017. 
42 Adair, Berry and McGreal, 'Financing property's contribution to regeneration', 1068. 
43 Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Minister of State for Housing and Planning), '2001 Speech to the British 
Retail Consortium. 27 November 2001'. 
44 Layard, 'Shopping in the Public Realm: A Law of Place'. 
45 Hereafter referred to as a ‘CPO’. 
46 Stopping up is a technical term that refers to the practice of closing existing public highways to enable 
development to occur (as discussed, in relation to the Winchester Development, in Christine Thorby, 
CPO Report to the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government; SUO Report to the 
Secretary of State for Transport. 17 December 2012 (Appendix B, Document 3.03), paragraph 6.1-6.5. For 
a critical discussion of this process, see Layard, 'Shopping in the Public Realm: A Law of Place', 424. 




of an order allowing the stopping up of highways. My research aims, therefore, to address a 
lack of research in this area and examines a wide array of contractual arrangements and the 
role that those arrangements perform in property-led development. 
Although the principal focus of my research is on the Winchester Development, I draw 
findings from that project that are pertinent to wider property-led development. I do so 
through archival research and analysis of documents produced in conjunction with the 
Winchester Development. Alongside this, I examine the transcripts of 18 semi-structured 
interviews48 that I carried out with property development professionals.49 Although the 
discussion in these interviews did not pertain directly to the Winchester Development, the 
data that the interviews generated does enable me to provide an examination of the complex, 
interlocking processes underpinning property-led development. 
This combination of methods equips me to examine both the extent to which the 
form, content and effect of contractual arrangements deployed in Winchester were a product 
of and shaped connections and networks in the area, and the extent to which the 
arrangements were a product of prevailing property-led development practice. I ask what 
those contractual arrangements, the connections that produced those arrangements and the 
associations produced by them tell us about property-led development. The issues that this 
research investigates thus encompass an interdisciplinary enquiry into how law is performed, 
the ‘legal technologies’50 that materialise in a property-led development process and what 
those legal technologies become and do as a property-led development project progresses. 
Land assembly: making, confirming and exercising a Compulsory Purchase Order 
One of the most important legal technologies that this research considers is the 
operation of a CPO. A local authority can utilise its compulsory purchase powers by making and 
exercising a CPO if it deems that the ‘development, redevelopment or improvement’ of land to 
be acquired would be ‘likely to contribute to’ social, economic or environmental benefits to 
the local authority’s area.51 The procedures for the making and exercise of a CPO are set out in 
a range of statutes, cases, circulars and guidance documents.52 Only a body, such as a local 
                                                          
48 I explain this term in chapter three. 
49 Appendix D to this thesis contains some limited biographical details explaining who these 
interviewees are and when I met them. 
50 I explain that I mean by ‘legal technologies’ in chapter two. 
51 As set out in sections 226(1)(a) and 226(1A) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. 
52 I refer in the next section of this chapter to two circulars that provide central government guidance 
for local authorities on the exercise of compulsory purchase powers. Of particular importance to this 
research is the central government Circular 06/2004, published on 31 October 2004 (The Office of the 





authority, granted compulsory purchase powers by statute, may make a CPO, and this type of 
body cannot exercise those powers purely in the interests of a third party, although it can 
make a CPO with the intention that a private developer will carry out a development.53 As a 
consequence, a local authority can acquire land using a CPO and then transfer an interest in it 
to a private sector developer to enable that developer to construct and market a property-led 
development project.54 
Before transferring land acquired through a CPO, a local authority seeking to exercise 
compulsory purchase powers must first identify the plots of land to be acquired and then 
make a CPO. It should publicise the CPO, the extent of the land to be acquired and the purpose 
for the acquisition in a local newspaper55 and serve notice of the making of the CPO on all 
ascertained owners, lessees and occupiers of the land to be acquired,56 inviting objections 
from those individuals or organisations to the making of it.57 In the event that objectors 
challenge the making of the order, the local authority should seek confirmation from the 
Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government of the validity of the CPO.58 To 
enable the local authority to justify its making of a CPO and to enable objectors to challenge 
this justification, the Secretary of State will ‘cause a public inquiry to be held.’59 If the Secretary 
of State then confirms the CPO a local authority does not automatically acquire the land but 
must exercise its confirmed powers within three years of the confirmation date.60 I refer to this 
statutorily-imposed deadline as the ‘CPO Exercise Date’ and the time pressure flowing from 
this deadline is an important topic in my analysis of the Winchester Development.  
Exercise of a CPO occurs through service of a ‘notice to treat’ on affected owners, 
lessees or occupiers of the land or on the making of a ‘general vesting declaration.’61 On 
serving a notice to treat or making a general vesting declaration, a local authority exercising a 
                                                          
53 Section 233 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 makes it clear that a local authority that 
exercises compulsory purchase powers need not be the party that carries out the actions that lead to 
development, redevelopment or improvement. 
54 As discussed in, for example, J. Cameron Blackhall, Planning law and practice (3rd edn, Cavendish 
2003), 368. 
55 Acquisition of Land Act 1981, s11. 
56 Acquisition of Land Act 1981, s12. 
57 Acquisition of Land Act 1981, s12(2)(d). 
58 Acquisition of Land Act 1981, s2(2). 
59 Acquisition of Land Act 1981, s13(2). 
60 See section 4 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965. For a further discussion of this point, see Barry 
Denyer-Green, Compulsory purchase and compensation (10th edn, Routledge 2014), 75. 
61 The law related to the exercise of compulsory purchase powers is highly technical and generally set 
out in the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 and the Compulsory Purchase (Vesting Declarations) Act 1981. 
I do not propose to analyse this area of law because WCC made a CPO that the Secretary of State 




CPO must start negotiating and paying compensation to dispossessed owners.62 This illustrates 
the important distinction between a CPO that a local authority has made, a CPO that the 
Secretary of State has confirmed and a CPO that has been or is being exercised.63 In essence, a 
local authority cannot take land through the exercise of compulsory purchase powers until the 
Secretary of State has confirmed the justification for the making of a CPO. 
Following the local authority’s acquisition of the earmarked plots, the local authority 
will allow the developer to access the land to commence construction. Once construction has 
reached a stage close to completion, the local authority will usually then transfer the 
assembled site to the developer. This can take place through one of two mechanisms. The 
local authority will package the acquired interests together with any land already held by the 
local authority and then either transfer to the developer the freehold title to the entire site or 
grant the developer a long leasehold estate of the entire site.64  
Both of these mechanisms effect a privatisation of and impress a ‘developer-led’ sense 
of place upon land acquired through the exercise of compulsory purchase powers.65 Layard 
describes this as a use of ‘legal mechanisms to subdue multiple, heterogeneous, and diverse 
senses of place.’66 Other recent research into the exercise of compulsory purchase powers for 
property-led development focuses on the experiences of these heterogeneous private 
landowners dispossessed during the process.67 Similar work has also recently considered the 
justificatory strategies that local authorities employ to legitimise the exercise of a CPO in these 
circumstances.68 These analytical accounts inform my work by illuminating some of the 
                                                          
62 If the acquiring authority cannot reach agreement with a dispossessed owner, any dispute as to the 
value of the compensation can be referred to the Upper Tribunal of the Lands Chamber pursuant to 
section 6 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965. 
63 I will revisit the distinction between making, confirming and exercising a CPO in chapter 10 when I 
discuss the CPO that WCC made for the purposes of the Winchester Development. 
64 WCC intended to utilise the leasehold mechanism for the Winchester Development (see Winchester 
City Council, Appendix to CAB1030. Broadway Friarsgate - Development Agreement. Report of Chief 
Estates Officer. 8 February 2005 (Appendix B, Document 1.12), paragraph 15). I discuss the leasehold 
arrangements operative in the Winchester Development throughout this thesis and note that WCC also 
considered the sub-division of the development site into separate plots with the grant of a lease to the 
developer on the completion of construction of each plot (Winchester City Council, Appendix to 
CAB1030. Broadway Friarsgate - Development Agreement. Report of Chief Estates Officer. 8 February 
2005 (Appendix B, Document 1.12), paragraph 15). 
65 Layard, 'Shopping in the Public Realm: A Law of Place', 415. As also discussed by, among others, 
Minton, Ground control: fear and happiness in the twenty-first-century city, 42. 
66 Layard, 'Shopping in the Public Realm: A Law of Place', 415. 
67 See, for example, Henderson, 'City centre retail development in England: Land assembly and business 
experiences of area change processes'; Debbie Becher, Private property and public power: eminent 
domain in Philadelphia (OUP 2014) and Neil Gray and Libby Porter, 'By Any Means Necessary: Urban 
Regeneration and the "State of Exception" in Glasgow's Commonwealth Games 2014' (2015) 47 
Antipode 380. 
68 Brett Christophers, 'Geographical knowledges and neoliberal tensions: compulsory land purchase in 




tensions running through property-led development and inviting questions about the extent to 
which the contractual arrangements deployed in these circumstances might address, 
exacerbate or side-line these concerns. My research aims to answer these questions and I 
detail my specific research questions later in this chapter. 
From initial negotiations to a DA and a CPO: An overview of the Winchester Development 
I now provide some background to the Winchester Development and a basic 
chronology of some key events related to the DA and the CPO deployed there. I have drawn 
this background information from WCC documents, public records and press reports. I 
catalogue my sources in chapter three and provide more detailed and fully referenced 
accounts of the events in the Winchester Development in later chapters where those events 
are relevant to my analysis.  
WCC has a published constitution that explains how the Council implements its 
functions and discharges its powers. The Council’s principal decision-making body, or 
‘executive,’ is the Cabinet,69 consisting of the Leader70 and no more than nine other councillors 
who the leader has appointed.71 The Cabinet is, therefore, responsible for the day-to-day 
discharge of the Council’s functions,72 although the constitution permits the Council to employ 
officers to enable the Council to fulfil its various functions.73 Those officers are organised 
according to a hierarchy consisting of various specialist officers, led by the Chief Executive, 
who is the Council’s most senior officer.74  
In terms of the decisions that were necessary to enable the Winchester Development 
to take place, this meant that the councillors who sat on the Council’s Cabinet had to pass a 
formal resolution approving both the making of a CPO and the signing of the associated 
contractual arrangements. However, those councillors made resolutions in response to 
recommendations presented to them by the Council’s Chief Estates Officer or the Head of 
                                                          
69 Winchester City Council, Constitution of the City Council - Part 2 - Articles of the Constitution (Appendix 
B, Document 2.10), Article 7.0. Section 13(2) of the Local Government Act 2000 requires a local authority 
to establish ‘executive arrangements’ for the discharge of the local authority’s function.  
70 The Leader is the individual appointed by the full Council, which consists of the 45 individuals elected 
to serve as councillors (see ibid, Article 7.02). See also, Winchester City Council, Constitution of the City 
Council - Part 1 - Summary and Explanation (Appendix B, Document 2.09), 2. The leader will, therefore, 
usually be a councillor from the political party with a majority of representatives elected to the Council. 
71 Winchester City Council, Constitution of the City Council - Part 2 - Articles of the Constitution (Appendix 
B, Document 2.10), Article 7.02. 
72 Winchester City Council, Constitution of the City Council - Part 3A - Responsibility for Functions 
(Appendix B, Document 2.11), section 2. 
73 Winchester City Council, Constitution of the City Council - Part 2 - Articles of the Constitution (Appendix 
B, Document 2.10), Article 12.01. 
74 Winchester City Council, Constitution of the City Council - Part 7 - Management Structure (Appendix B, 




Estates,75 the Council’s Director of Development Services76 and the Council’s Corporate 
Director (Service Delivery). The Corporate Director (Service Delivery) is, alongside the Chief 
Executive and the Corporate Director (Professional Services), a member of the three-person 
senior management team and the officer responsible for management of ‘major projects’ such 
as the Winchester Development.77 
The Council’s current constitution states that the ‘Assistant Director (Estates and 
Regeneration)’ is the individual responsible for ‘maximising the return of the [Council’s] estate 
and seeking to implement regeneration opportunities in the District.’78 It appears that this is 
the job title for the individual previously labelled either the Chief Estates Officer or the Head of 
Estates. This role is different from the role of the ‘Assistant Director (Built Environment),’ who 
is the Council’s Chief Planning Officer and the individual responsible for administering 
decisions on planning applications.79 This distinction reflects the way in which many local 
authorities treat the exercise of compulsory purchase powers as one of their landholding and 
estate management functions. The performance of local authority planning officers as 
‘development actors’ has been considered in case studies of property-led development80 but 
there is a relative paucity of research into the role of local authority estates officers as active 
participants in the preparation of land for development. Harding has, however, noted that 
local authorities, consisting of councillor-led committees and officer-managed project teams, 
are ‘fragmented.’81 This means, Adams et al suggest, that analytical accounts of a local 
authority’s activities cannot sensibly treat a local authority as a ‘single, undifferentiated 
actor.’82 For this reason, I examine interactions between WCC councillors and officers in 
relation to the Winchester Development. 
The district under the control of WCC is an area of around 250 square miles in the 
southeast of England, consisting of Winchester itself, as well as three smaller towns.83 The 
population of the district as a whole was, in 2013, approximately 118,000, with the population 
                                                          
75 These titles appear to have been different labels used at different times to define the same role. 
76 The post of Director of Development Services seems to be a job title that the Council no longer uses, 
although it appears that this was the label given to the officer responsible for managing the Council’s 
planning, design and project management team.  
77 Winchester City Council, Constitution of the City Council - Part 7 - Management Structure (Appendix B, 
Document 2.14), 4. 
78 ibid, 1. 
79 ibid, 5. 
80 Heurkens, Adams and Hobma, 'Planners as market actors: the role of local planning authorities in the 
UK's urban regeneration practice', 630. 
81 Harding, 'The rise of urban-growth coalitions, UK- style', 296. 
82 David Adams, Robert Croudace and Steve Tiesdell, 'Exploring the 'Notional Property Developer' as a 
Policy Construct' (2012) 49 Urban Studies 2577, 2587. 
83 Winchester City Council, 'Summary district figures' <http://www.winchester.gov.uk/data/facts-and-




of Winchester amounting to approximately 39,000.84 As such, Winchester is a relatively small 
city but it is also one of the wealthiest cities in England, with exceedingly low levels of 
unemployment, high average house prices and low levels of deprivation.85 Nonetheless, in 
1997, WCC’s officers commissioned Llewelyn-Davies, a property development consultancy, to 
evaluate development options in the area and the consultancy’s report identified parts of the 
city centre that it viewed as under-developed.86  
That report, which I call ‘the Llewelyn-Davies Report,’ focused on a site centred on a 
bus station in Winchester city centre and incorporating land that the Council owned and land 
that a property developer called John De Stefano87 owned through various holding companies. 
The Llewelyn-Davies Report assumed that the redevelopment of the area would be 
‘dominated by the provision of a large retail store on the site of the bus station,’88 with 
additional retail development on parts of the De Stefano land,89 a car park on the Council’s 
land90 and residential development adjacent to the bus station site.91 Appendix C to this thesis 
is a plan illustrating the earmarked development site and pinpointing the bus station, the 
Council’s landholdings on the development site, and De Stefano’s landholdings. 
After publication of the Llewelyn-Davies Report, a property developer called Tony 
Marcus92 formed a company, called Thornfield Properties plc, which his family and Lehman 
Brothers, the well-known bank, jointly owned.93 Soon after incorporation, Thornfield 
                                                          
84 ibid. 
85 ibid. 
86 Llewelyn-Davies, Central Winchester Study. Final Report. November 1997 (Appendix B, Document 
2.01), paragraph 10.1.7.  
87 According to the compilers of The Sunday Times Rich List, John De Stefano was, at one point, the 879th 
richest person in the United Kingdom. His property company held property assets estimated, in 2008, to 
be worth around £79million (see Philip Beresford and Stephen Boyd, 'Rich List 2008. Rankings 841-915' 
The Sunday Times (27 April 2008)). 
88 Llewelyn-Davies, Central Winchester Study. Final Report. November 1997 (Appendix B, Document 
2.01), paragraph 7.3.1. 
89 ibid, paragraph 7.3.7. 
90 ibid, paragraph 7.4. 
91 ibid, paragraph 7.5.1. 
92 Tony Marcus was another person who featured on The Sunday Times Rich List. He was a property 
developer whose family, in 2004, owned an estimated 28% stake in Thornfield Properties and had an 
approximate net worth of £70million (see Ian Coxon, 'The Sunday Times Rich List 2004. Rankings 568=' 
The Sunday Times (18 April 2004)). 
93 For details of the incorporation of Thornfield Properties, please see the Companies House online 
overview (available at https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/03516056 [last accessed 1 
October 2017]). Various documents refer to the ownership of Thornfield Properties. The footer on 
Thornfield Properties’ stationery between 1998 and 2002 confirms that the company was a joint 
venture with Lehman Brothers (see Matthew Bodley, Proof of Evidence of Matthew Bodley. Appendix 
10. Extracts of correspondence relating to London and Henley group of companies. Letter from Karen 
Hawes to John De Stefano (26 August 1998) (Appendix B, Document 3.10.02)). By May 2002, Thornfield 
Properties had entered into some form of debenture with Bank of Scotland, which meant that Bank of 
Scotland had become a participant in the joint venture arrangement (as noted in the footer to 




Properties appears to have entered into a joint venture94 with Stagecoach (South) Limited,95 
the owner of the Bus Station in Winchester city centre. Thornfield Properties’ directors then 
attempted to acquire some of the land interests adjacent to the Bus Station and approached 
WCC’s Director of Development Services to pitch a proposal for a development project centred 
on the Bus Station site.96 While WCC’s director indicated that the Council was receptive to 
Thornfield Properties’ proposals, he encouraged the company’s directors to make further 
efforts to acquire land interests in the vicinity of the bus station.97  
As negotiations related to land acquisitions progressed, Tony Marcus established a 
special purpose company, Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited, in August 2000, to enter 
into land acquisition agreements with third party landowners and to carry out the Winchester 
Development.98 However, the negotiations did not enable Thornfield to acquire De Stefano’s 
land or all of the other land interests deemed necessary to create a suitable development site. 
                                                          
Proof of Evidence of Matthew Bodley. Appendix 10. Extracts of correspondence relating to London and 
Henley group of companies. Letter from Michael Capocci to John De Stefano (9 May 2002) (Appendix B, 
Document 3.10.08A)). At some point between 2002 and 2006, Lehman Brothers appears to have 
withdrawn from the joint venture arrangement (as demonstrated in the footer to Thornfield Properties 
correspondence. See, for example, Matthew Bodley, Proof of Evidence of Matthew Bodley. Appendix 10.  
Extracts of correspondence relating to London and Henley group of companies. Letters from Michael 
Capocci to Nigel Wright (11 January 2006, 8 February 2006 and 13 April 2006) (Appendix B, Document 
3.10.16)). 
94 A ‘joint venture’ is a mechanism in which two or more organisations agree to co-operate in a shared 
enterprise by pooling resources such as land, capital and, in the case of property-led development, land. 
For a discussion, see, for example Lexis PSL Property, 'Joint ventures in property transactions - overview' 
<https://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/lexispsl/property/document/393788/5B3H-CJP1-F18C-43M7-00000-
00/Joint%20ventures%20in%20property%20transactions%E2%80%94overview> accessed 5 September 
2017.  
95 Hereafter referred to as ‘Stagecoach.’ Stagecoach (South) Limited is a subsidiary of Stagecoach Group, 
a multi-national public transport company (see http://www.stagecoach.com/about/our-
companies/overview.aspx accessed 12 February 2018). 
96 As recorded in a letter from Karen Hawes, one of Thornfield Properties’ development directors, to 
John De Stefano, one of the landowners who held interests on the land adjacent to the Bus Station. See, 
Bodley, Proof of Evidence of Matthew Bodley. Appendix 10. Extracts of correspondence relating to 
London and Henley group of companies. Letter from Karen Hawes to John De Stefano (26 August 1998)  
(Appendix B, Document 3.10.02). 
97 As reported in Claer Lloyd-Jones, A Perfect Storm - Report on Silver Hill (Appendix B, Document 2.08), 
43. 
98 Hereafter referred to as ‘Thornfield’. The use of a special purpose vehicle for property-led 
development purposes is closely linked to the joint venture mechanism. In summary, a special purpose 
vehicle is a company or partnership created to carry out a specific function. Conventional property-led 
development practice deems that a special purpose vehicle, established to acquire land and construct 
and manage a project, is desirable because the structure of the company or partnership can shelter the 
parent company or shareholders from the financial risks of the project failing. For a practitioner 
perspective on the utility of special purpose vehicles, see PwC Consulting, 'The next chapter: Creating an 
understanding of Special Purpose Vehicles' 2011) <https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/banking-capital-
markets/publications/assets/pdf/next-chapter-creating-understanding-of-spvs.pdf> accessed 5 
September 2017 and Forsters LLP, 'Buying and selling a property SPV: An overview of the key 
considerations for property investors' (2015) 
<http://www.forsters.co.uk/sites/default/files/What%20to%20consider%20when%20buying%20and%2




As a result, Thornfield’s directors encouraged the Council’s officers to seek Cabinet approval 
for a CPO. Instead of seeking immediate approval for the making of a CPO, however, WCC’s 
officers sought and obtained approval for the formation of an Exclusivity Agreement99 with 
Thornfield in March 2003. That EA functioned as a precursor to the DA, which was signed on 
22 December 2004 and which was expected to facilitate the making of a CPO. I draw a number 
of conclusions by analysing the EA and the proposed land acquisition agreements between 
John De Stefano and Thornfield, focusing upon the role these preliminary agreements 
performed in stabilising an emerging ‘development trajectory.’  
The bulk of my analysis, however, examines the DA. WCC, Thornfield and Thornfield 
Properties100 were all parties to this DA, which contained various baseline specifications, called 
‘required elements,’ for the type of buildings to be constructed as part of the development. 
Between 2004 and 2009, WCC, Thornfield and Thornfield Properties made repeated attempts 
to rewrite the original agreement. These attempts stopped, in January 2010, when Thornfield 
Properties’ principal lender, Halifax Bank of Scotland, placed the company into administration. 
This did not end the Winchester Development process because Henderson UK Property Fund 
acquired Thornfield, renamed it Silverhill Winchester No1 Limited,101 and WCC and Henderson 
used the pre-existing DA to facilitate the making of a CPO in November 2011.102  
The DA that WCC, Thornfield and Thornfield Properties had negotiated reflected 
aspects of central government guidance on making, obtaining confirmation for and exercising 
a CPO. The Department for Communities and Local Government issued new guidance in 
2015103 but that guidance consolidated an earlier circular, Circular 06/2004, published on 31 
October 2004 and referred to in the previous section of this chapter.104 Since WCC had 
entered into its DA with Thornfield and Thornfield Properties on 22 December 2004 and 
because WCC eventually made its CPO in November 2011, Circular 06/2004 is the relevant 
guidance for the purposes of this thesis. The circular stated: 
                                                          
99 Hereafter referred to as an ‘EA.’ 
100 Thornfield Properties plc, as parent company to Thornfield, entered into the DA as guarantor of its 
subsidiary’s obligations in the DA. 
101 The ‘developer’ for the purposes of the DA thus remained the same legal entity although, to reflect 
the change in overall ownership, I refer to ‘the developer’ from June 2010 as onwards as ‘Henderson.’ 
Where it is necessary to distinguish between the Henderson entity acting as developer and the 
Henderson entity acting as guarantor, I make the distinction clear. 
102 As discussed in Thorby, CPO Report to the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government; 
SUO Report to the Secretary of State for Transport. 17 December 2012 (Appendix B, Document 3.03). 
103 The current government guidance on the making, confirmation and exercise of a CPO is Department 
for Communities and Local Government, Guidance on Compulsory purchase process and The Crichel 
Down Rules for the disposal of surplus land by, or under threat of, compulsion (2015). 
104 The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, ODPM Circular 06/2004. Compulsory Purchase and The 




If an acquiring authority does not have a clear idea of how it intends to use the 
land which it is proposing to acquire, and cannot show that all the necessary 
resources are likely to be available to achieve that end within a reasonable time-
scale, it will be difficult to show conclusively that the compulsory acquisition of 
land included in the order is justified.105 
The reference in Circular 06/2004 to the ‘resource’ implications of making, confirming and 
exercising a CPO primarily concerned the compensation payable to dispossessed owners and 
the Circular made it clear that a local authority should be able to demonstrate that ‘adequate 
funding would be available’ for the land acquisitions.106 Moreover, because the Circular stated 
that the making of a CPO should be a ‘last resort’ when other land assembly efforts had 
failed,107 either a local authority seeking to make a CPO or the local authority’s development 
partner needed also to have attempted to acquire that land by negotiation with the 
landowners. And while Circular 06/2004 did not specify that a development proposal had to be 
supported by a granted planning permission, it did point out that there should be no ‘planning 
impediments’ to the development of the land.108  
The Winchester DA had imposed a conditional obligation on Thornfield to construct a 
development in accordance with pre-agreed design specifications that would take effect if 
WCC made and obtained confirmation for a CPO. In return, the DA had envisaged that 
Thornfield would, within a time-frame specified in the DA, take the steps that would enable 
WCC to show that it had, through the actions of its development partner, achieved satisfaction 
of the requirements set out in Circular 06/2004. After Henderson replaced Thornfield and 
Thornfield Properties, they became obliged to satisfy these requirements. The actions that the 
DA required from first Thornfield and then Henderson included, among other things, 
negotiating the acquisition of land interests on the earmarked development site, securing 
agreements for lease with prospective retailers, entering into funding arrangements with 
financial institutions and obtaining planning permission for the development.  
Land acquisitions and the commencement of construction in Winchester did not 
immediately follow the making of the CPO, however, because Henderson then sought to 
renegotiate the terms of the DA to make the development proposals ‘viable.’109 While WCC’s 
Cabinet initially approved a rewriting of the DA, that decision formed the basis for a judicial 
review into the lawfulness of doing so.110 I analyse that judicial review in chapter 10 of this 
thesis because it compelled WCC’s officers and Henderson’s directors to abandon their 
                                                          
105 ibid, paragraph 19. 
106 ibid, paragraph 21. 
107 ibid, paragraph 24. 
108 ibid, paragraphs 22-23. 
109 The question as to what constitutes a ‘viable’ development is one to which I return repeatedly 
throughout this thesis. 
110 R (Gottlieb) v Winchester City Council [2015] EWHC 231 (Admin), [2015] ACD 74. 
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attempts to rewrite the DA in a way that both parties deemed necessary. This failure to 
renegotiate the DA in a manner acceptable to both parties led to the termination of the DA on 
10 February 2016 and the expiry of the CPO by effluxion of time on 19 March 2016. Table 1.1 is 
a timeline showing the key events in the Winchester Development, accompanied by a signpost 
to the chapter in which the events are examined. 
Table 1.1 Timeline illustrating the key events between the publication of the Urban Design 
Report and the expiry of the CPO intended to enable the Winchester Development to take 
place 
Date Event Chapter 
November 
1997 
Publication of Urban Design Report 4 
c. February 
1998 
Thornfield Properties plc formed enters into joint venture 
arrangement with Stagecoach (South) Limited. Thornfield Properties’ 




Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited incorporated to acquire 
land on the development site and carry out the Winchester 
Development 
4 
March 2003 WCC enters into Exclusivity Agreement with Thornfield 5 
December 
2004 
WCC and Thornfield enter into Development Agreement 5 
January 
2010 




WCC’s Cabinet approves Henderson UK Property Fund’s purchase of 
Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited and Henderson’s 
replacement of Thornfield Properties plc as Guarantor 
6 
November 
2011 WCC makes CPO 7 
June-July 
2012 Public inquiry leads to confirmation of the CPO in March 2013 7 
January 
2015 High Court hearing in R (Gottlieb) v Winchester City Council
111  10 
10 February 
2016 Termination of the Development Agreement 10 
19 March 
2016 Expiry of the CPO 10 




This case study is, therefore, a case study of failure because the DA did not lead 
directly to the construction of buildings on the development site. Nevertheless, the process did 
endure, in one form or another, from 1997 to 2016. The longevity of the development process 
enables me to draw out a number of key themes that emerged in the development. 
Investigating the content of a DA enables me to make an original contribution to knowledge in 
this field because this has not formed the subject of detailed analysis elsewhere. In addition, 
examining the actions that a local authority and a developer take to enable the making of a 
DA, their attempts to renegotiate a DA and the manner in which a DA facilitates the making of 
a CPO results in a novel approach to the study of property-led development. 
The focus of the research: Time, trajectories, projectisation, law and the pursuit of 
unconditionality 
My research analyses the contractual arrangements deployed in Winchester and asks 
if these arrangements were an outcome of prevailing assumptions about how a local authority 
and a developer should ‘do’ property-led development. I also examine how the Winchester DA 
functioned as a device designed to ‘carry around’112 the means for WCC and a developer to 
assemble a development site, side-line other developers and rival landowners and, through 
what they presented as a sequence of ratcheting motions,113 create the conditions for a 
profitable development. In particular, I investigate the extent to which the contractual 
arrangements deployed in Winchester facilitated transit from initial, somewhat open-ended, 
tri-partite negotiations between WCC, Thornfield and third party landowners through the land 
assembly process to the moment at which WCC would grant Henderson a lease of the 
assembled site.  
One of the key themes of my discussion is this sense of travel along a clearly-defined 
development trajectory. As a corollary of this, I examine the role of the contractual 
arrangements in producing a sense of ‘irreversible progression’ along that path.114 But my 
focus in this thesis is also on the discrepancy between appearance and practice. I consider 
whether the DA and the other contractual arrangements operated as a ‘carefully scripted’115 
program for the actions that would carry WCC and its development partner to the culmination 
of the development process or a loosely-defined set of broad parameters designed to 
                                                          
112 Emilie Cloatre, Pills for the poorest: an exploration of TRIPS and access to medication in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Palgrave 2013), 181. 
113 The idea of progression through ‘ratcheting’ is drawn from Bruno Latour, We have never been 
modern (Harvard University Press 1993), 72, which I discuss in chapter two. 
114 Carol J. Greenhouse, A moment's notice: time politics across cultures (Cornell University Press 1996), 
20. 
115 Annelise Riles, Collateral knowledge: legal reasoning in the global financial markets (University of 
Chicago Press 2011), 65. 
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accommodate an awareness that property-led development rarely involves straightforward 
progress through land assembly to the commencement of construction. Part of my 
contribution to knowledge thus comes from an exposition of what WCC, Thornfield Properties, 
Henderson and their respective subsidiaries did with their contractual arrangements as they 
moved through the phases of the land assembly process. I consider aspects of fluidity and fixity 
within that trajectory by, for example, examining changes to the contractual arrangements 
that WCC and its development partners entered into alongside the relative permanence of 
longstanding and deeply embedded landownership interests in the area.  
My research provides, therefore, new insights into aspects of property-led 
development but I also offer a contribution to recent theoretical advances in legal studies. 
Approaches initially pursued in Actor-Network Theory116 and more recently applied in socio-
legal studies117 emphasise the need for careful consideration of presumptions about the way in 
which legal texts perform in practice. Taking my lead from Cloatre’s research into the 
implementation of legal texts and the operation of legal technologies in local settings,118 I ask 
how the individuals and groups involved in the Winchester Development engaged with the 
contractual arrangements deployed there. In doing so, I examine the extent to which those 
arrangements prescribed the way that WCC’s officers and councillors, directors acting for 
Thornfield and Henderson, as well as consultants and legal advisors that those officers and 
developers engaged, performed their roles.  
Observing the ways that human actors deployed, and the reasons for the deployment 
of, these legal technologies also necessitates some consideration of the ways in which this 
deployment has become ‘routinized.’119 To that end, I ask why developers, local authority 
officers and property development consultants assume that the production of a sequence of 
contractual arrangements is the most appropriate way to ‘do’ property-led development. This 
prompts me to enquire into the extent that developers, local authority officers and property 
development consultants share the same expectations about the deployment of these 
contractual arrangements. Where there are divergences in expectations, I mine these for 
insights into the complexity of the relationships between these groups.  
                                                          
116 Referred to throughout this chapter as ‘ANT.’ I discuss my understanding of ANT and its theoretical 
and methodological relevance in chapter two.  
117 See, in particular, Cloatre, Pills for the poorest: an exploration of TRIPS and access to medication in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
118 ibid, 6. The legal technologies that I discuss include land acquisition agreements, the EA, the DA, the 
planning permission granted for the development, the CPO designed to complete the land acquisition 
process and also such things as legal advice notes. 
119 Emilie Cloatre, 'Fluid Legal Labels and the Circulation of Socio-technical Objects: the Multiple Lives of 
'Fake' Medicines' in David Cowan and Daniel Wincott (eds), Exploring the 'Legal' in Socio-Legal Studies 




My reference here to property development consultants and legal advisors points to 
another underlying thread in this thesis, which also draws from ANT-inspired research. These 
consultants perform often unseen work to enact property development processes ‘in an image 
of projectness’120 that contributes to a preoccupation with viability concerns and the 
‘projectisation’121 of property development. Creating ‘a world fit for projects,’ Law suggests, 
involves a consolidation of action into ‘a singular time-space box defined by the ticking of the 
clock’122 and this concern with the temporality of a project world merges with another 
theoretical development in legal studies from which I draw inspiration and to which I 
contribute. Recent work on ‘legal temporalities’123 overlaps with ANT-inspired socio-legal 
research and explores the complex relationship between law, time and, in Grabham’s research 
in particular, a range of different material ‘objects.’124 I turn to this work to help me examine 
the extent to which the DA and the other contractual arrangements deployed in Winchester, 
as well as the contractual arrangements that my interviewees discussed, did interesting things 
with law and with time. By exploring the uses of time and temporal concepts in these 
contractual arrangements, I present findings that add to the theoretical insights that Grabham 
and others have recently offered.  
My examination of ‘time’ as an ordering device focuses particularly on the manner in 
which the Winchester DA adopted the concept of an ‘Unconditional Date’ as the moment that 
the developer’s contractually-imposed obligation to commence construction would become 
unconditional. Alongside this analysis of the examination of the significance of an 
Unconditional Date, I explain why the DA contained ‘required elements’ that stipulated, 
among other things, the amount of retail floor-space, the number of residential units and the 
proportion of affordable and social housing to be incorporated into the development. This 
enables me to examine how Thornfield and Henderson both used the pursuit of 
unconditionality to encourage WCC’s officers to seek Cabinet approval for changes to the 
required elements. 
Focusing on these required elements leads me to ask why some DAs set baseline 
specifications and why other DAs might not contain the same level of specificity. To 
understand how a developer and a local authority anticipate and address the need to change 
                                                          
120 John Law, Aircraft stories: decentering the object in technoscience (Duke University Press 2002), 7-8. 
121 I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer of an article I submitted to the Journal of Law and Society 
for using this term to describe property-led development processes. 
122 Law, Aircraft stories: decentering the object in technoscience, 197. 
123 Emily Grabham, Brewing Legal Times: Things, Form, and the Enactment of Law (University of Toronto 
Press 2016), 14. Other examples, which I discuss in chapter two, include Mariana Valverde, Chronotopes 
of law: jurisdiction, scale and governance (2015) and Sarah Keenan, 'Smoke, Curtains and Mirrors: The 
Production of Race Through Time and Title Registration' (2017) 28 Law & Critique 87. 




baseline specifications written into a DA, I analyse a variations clause written into the 
Winchester DA and refer to my interview data to explain how developers, local authority 
officers and property development consultants might deploy this type of clause. Analysing 
variations to the contractual arrangements also necessitates looking outside the Winchester 
Development to consider the implications of European Union procurement law on the 
operation of pre-agreed change mechanisms.125 Although I make no recommendations about 
the shape of procurement law in the event that the United Kingdom exits the EU,126 my 
research does demonstrate some of the ways in which EU legislation and jurisprudence 
impinges upon property-led development in the UK.  
Investigating the Winchester Development leads me, therefore, to explore the ways in 
which WCC, Thornfield Properties, Henderson and their respective subsidiaries navigated 
procurement requirements in different ways at different stages of the Winchester 
Development in response to an emerging area of law. My discussion encompasses rewritings 
of the DA that culminated in the judicial review that I mentioned earlier in this chapter and 
that examined WCC’s failure to comply with procurement requirements.127 Analysing the 
outcome of this judicial review is an important part of this thesis. It provides a novel 
opportunity for me to examine what a local authority and a developer do when they face a 
challenge to the contractual basis for a mutually agreed property development trajectory 
while simultaneously continuing to pursue that trajectory towards unconditionality. 
Research aims 
My research aims, therefore, to offer a multi-disciplinary contribution to existing 
knowledge in legal studies and property-led development. It does so through an ANT-inspired 
research approach128 and by asking research questions that are specific to the Winchester 
Development and that relate to the contractual arrangements that either supplemented or 
went into the formation of the Winchester DA, the content and operation of the DA and the 
making of the CPO. Alongside these specific questions, I consider broader questions designed 
                                                          
125 See, for example, Case C-454/06 Pressetext Nachrichtenagentur GmbH v Austria [2008] ECR I-4401. 
Regulation 72 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015, SI 2015/152 (implementing Directive 
2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement 
and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (2014) OJ L94/65) states the current law in this area, partly 
replicating the Pressetext principles on contract modification. 
126 For a discussion of the role of legal mechanisms in regulating the award of public contracts following 
Brexit, consider Sue Arrowsmith (Sue Arrowsmith, 'The implications of Brexit for public procurement law 
and policy in the United Kingdom' (2017) 26 Public Procurement Law Review 1) and, in the event that 
the United Kingdom leaves the EU without a trading agreement in place, Phil Wang (Phil Wang, 'Brexit 
and the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement ("GPA")' (2017) 26 Public Procurement Law 
Review 34). 
127 R (Gottlieb) v Winchester City Council (n110). 
128 I explain my understanding of ANT in chapter two and my research approach in chapter three. 
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to provide insights into property-led development and legal practices beyond the narrow 
confines of my case study. In chapter two, I explain my case study-based approach and how 
my approach enabled me to generate both findings specific to the Winchester Development 
and findings of more general importance.  
My research questions are: 
1. How did the contracting parties use the Winchester DA and the other contractual 
arrangements to assemble a development site, and what does this tell us about the role of 
law and legal technologies in property-led development? 
2. Does ‘time’ function as an ordering device in property-led development and to what 
extent did the temporal framework set out in the Winchester DA and the other contractual 
arrangements shape the relations between the developer, the local authority and third 
parties involved in or affected by the development process? 
3. Were there other ways in which the Winchester DA plotted a trajectory for or otherwise 
scripted actions in the development process, and what does this reveal about the 
approaches that developers, local authority officers, councillors and property development 
consultants take to property-led development?  
4. How do developers, local authority officers, councillors and property development 
consultants regulate change within a property-led development project, and how did the 
development trajectory anticipated in the Winchester DA, and the temporal framework 
that the DA purported to impose, change during the development process? 
In exploring these questions, I also ask why a developer and a local authority deploy a DA to 
assemble a development site, and why a development trajectory anticipated in a DA might 
change. These questions enable me to combine a detailed analysis of the dynamics 
underpinning the Winchester Development with a more general examination of what 
contracts do and what development directors, local authority officers and councillors do when 
their organisations are party to those agreements. The questions thus address issues pertinent 
to current urban regeneration research and socio-legal studies.  
To answer these questions, I separate this thesis into eleven chapters.  
Chapter Outline 
The first two chapters expand upon the theoretical work I have discussed in this 
introduction and explain how I conducted my research. Chapter two situates my work within 
current research into property-led development, law and time and law and ANT. I discuss 
other writing on property-led development, note the merits of that research but explain how 
that work fails to address the contractual arrangements underpinning property-led 
development projects. I explain how recent theoretical literature addressing the complex 
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relationship between law and time can help address some of the gaps in our understanding of 
the role, operation and effects of the contractual arrangements that I have described. Having 
done so, I discuss theoretical insights developed in ANT and identify reasons why ANT invites 
an empirical analysis of the complex processes at work in property-led development.  
I then use chapter three to explain why documentary analysis, coupled to interviews 
with participants in other property-led development projects, enables greater understanding 
of those contractual arrangements and property-led development more broadly. In addition, I 
set out both my reasons for choosing the Winchester Development as the object of my 
analysis and how I carried out this research. I present the documentary sources from which I 
drew my findings regarding the form, content and effect of the contractual arrangements 
deployed in Winchester and introduce my interviewees, explaining how I enrolled these 
individuals as participants. Having done so, I note the lessons I learned from the way I carried 
out my research and identify limitations in the research design. 
Chapters four to 10 then answer my research questions and present the findings that 
my research generated. Chapter four asks how WCC and Thornfield Properties initiated the 
Winchester Development. It explains how WCC and Thornfield Properties established a 
‘development trajectory’ before they had entered into any form of mutual contractual 
arrangements. A feature of this phase of the Winchester Development was the land assembly 
activity that took place prior to the formulation of contractual arrangements between WCC 
and Thornfield Properties so this chapter examines the way in which the latter produced draft 
or ‘nearly legal’ land acquisition agreements to induce WCC to enter into formal contractual 
arrangements.  
An issue that overlaps chapter four and chapter five is the manner in which EU 
procurement law requirements affect the formation of property development contracts. 
Chapter four presents some initial commentary on the efforts local authority officers, 
developers and property development consultants make to place their contractual 
arrangements beyond the reach of procurement law and chapter five offers further analysis of 
these manoeuvrings. It does so in the context of a further examination of the formation of the 
Winchester DA and asks why developers and local authority officers insist on some progress 
with land assembly prior to entering into a DA. In analysing the efforts that WCC’s officers and 
Thornfield Properties’ representatives made to assemble a development site and avoid 
procurement law requirements, I point to stresses that became locked-in to the development 
process and that the DA then carried around.  
Chapters six to 10 of this thesis then consider what I call the ‘conditional phase’ of the 
Winchester Development. Chapters six and seven focus on the period between the date that 
WCC, Thornfield and Thornfield Properties entered into the DA and the conclusion of the 
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public inquiry that followed WCC’s making of the CPO that, its officers hoped, would enable 
them to complete the land assembly process. During this period, Henderson acquired and 
renamed Thornfield and replaced Thornfield Properties as guarantor of the latter’s obligations 
in the DA. 
Chapter six provides an exposition of the content of the DA that WCC, Thornfield and 
Thornfield Properties entered into, focusing specifically on the conditions and the required 
elements that I referred to earlier in this introduction. I probe the concept of conditionality as 
a phase to be passed through to enable progress along an agreed development trajectory. To 
complement this analysis, chapter six also examines the operation of temporal concepts such 
as a ‘Long Stop Date’ and an Unconditional Date and considers the circumstances in which the 
parties to a DA might change pre-agreed Long Stop Dates or otherwise rewrite the contents of 
an agreement. Of particular importance here is the manner in which WCC and Henderson 
sought to perpetuate the currency of the DA when Thornfield Properties’ bank placed the 
company into administration. My discussion reveals the fluidity of both temporal parameters 
and required elements that had appeared to be fixed from the moment that WCC, Thornfield 
and Thornfield Properties entered into the DA and the ways in which a local authority and a 
developer might attempt to hold procurement law requirements at arm’s length when 
changing a DA. 
Chapter seven builds on this analysis, providing more detail about what happened in 
the conditional phase of the Winchester Development process. Using data obtained in my 
interviews, I explore the presumption that the pursuit of unconditionality is best achieved 
through the methodical discharge of conditions in a manner akin to the ratcheting that Latour 
has memorably described.129 At this point, I explain that the majority of the conditions in the 
DA could only be discharged through the actions of the developer, although I also point out 
the function of a ‘site assembly condition,’ which WCC had to discharge by making a CPO and 
obtaining confirmation of the validity of that CPO by defending it in a public inquiry. I 
demonstrate that discharge of the site assembly condition occurred before Henderson had 
carried out the actions required to discharge the conditions for which it was responsible. The 
implications of discharge of the site assembly condition form the basis for much of the analysis 
in subsequent chapters. 
The remaining chapters, therefore, examine the Winchester Development from the 
moment at which the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government confirmed the 
validity of the CPO. I consider this phase in three chapters. In chapter eight, I consider the 
extent to which the acquisition of key land interests on the Winchester development site 
                                                          
129 Latour, We have never been modern, 72. 
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functioned as a milestone or monumental event in the overarching development trajectory, 
marking progress along the ‘journey’ that WCC’s officers and Henderson’s directors presented. 
I complicate this analysis, however, by illustrating the continuities and discontinuities between 
the development proposition before confirmation of the CPO and the development 
proposition after the CPO. In particular, I examine the ways in which Henderson’s directors 
obtained WCC Cabinet approval for significant changes to the Winchester DA after the CPO 
had been confirmed by informing WCC’s officers that unconditionality could only occur if the 
Cabinet agreed to those changes. 
While chapter eight focuses on changes to the DA, chapter nine involves a more 
detailed analysis of the question of ‘viability’ in property-led development. I examine how 
developers and property development consultants produce viability appraisals and the way 
that these appraisals guide action in a property-led development process. I analyse the extent 
to which viability appraisals are a product of poorly understood backroom deals while pointing 
out that a DA usually depends for its emergence as a legally binding agreement on a viability 
appraisal.  
In chapter 10, I continue my examination of the way that ‘law and legality emerge.’130 I 
do so by conducting an analysis of legal ‘action’ in property-led development. This involves a 
study of actual or threatened court challenges to the Winchester development trajectory and 
the Winchester DA, the role of human ‘legal’ actors, such as barristers who provide legal 
advice, and the way that ‘law’ acts upon the parties through such things as the statutorily-
imposed three-year deadline for the exercise of the Winchester CPO. By discussing the role of 
the ‘CPO Exercise Date,’ I explain why this legal and temporal construct had different 
implications to the Long Stop Date in the DA or the concept of an Unconditional Date. I also 
revisit some of the stresses locked-in to the DA by land acquisition and procurement decisions 
that WCC and Thornfield Properties had made at the time they entered into the DA. As an 
extension of this, I demonstrate how Councillor Kim Gottlieb, an elected member of WCC, 
turned the DA against the council in judicial review proceedings that quashed the council’s 
decision to approve the viability-led changes to the DA. 
My conclusion then draws my thesis together by answering the research questions 
directly, discussing the implications of my findings and explaining how my analysis of the DA 
and the other contractual arrangements deployed in Winchester contributes to 
understandings of property-led development.  
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Property-led development, Actor-Network Theory and Time 
Analytic accounts considering property-led development discuss a concept that has 
reshaped urban space in the United Kingdom since the 1980s.1 Through a case study approach2 
focusing upon a property-led development project, which I call the Winchester Development,3 
I aim to address a lack of research in this area by examining the contractual arrangements 
deployed during that development and the role that those arrangements perform in property-
led development. Addressing these concerns raises questions, as Cowan has put it, about ‘the 
way that law and legality emerge.’4 The answers to these questions are, however, complex and 
messy5 but understanding the emergence of law and legality in property-led development was 
an essential aim of this research. 
To that end, I draw upon ideas that researchers working with Actor-Network Theory 
(ANT) have developed. The first half of this chapter addresses some of the central tenets of 
ANT, focussing on processes of network-building and the interplay between human and 
nonhuman actors.6 I discuss research that has examined the connections that enable those 
actors to perform or that provoke an adaptation in them, and explain how researchers have 
recently opened the ‘ANT toolbox’7 to find ideas and methods that equipped them to 
scrutinise law and legal technologies. I analyse research that investigates the connections that 
make legal and ‘quasi-legal’ technologies8 perform in different networks at specific moments 
and that reveals how that performance differs depending on, while simultaneously reshaping, 
                                                          
1 I discussed these accounts in detail in chapter one. 
2 I discuss my methods and methodology in chapter three. 
3 This development took place in Winchester, a small city in the southeast of England. I introduced the 
Winchester Development in chapter one. The local authority engaged in promoting the development 
was Winchester City Council, which I refer to in this chapter as ‘WCC.’ 
4 David Cowan, 'Housing and Property' in Peter Cane and Herbert M. Kritzer (eds), The Oxford handbook 
of empirical legal research (Oxford University Press 2010), 332. 
5 Law and Singleton discuss ‘messiness’ in the context of diagnostic and treatment practices in UK 
hospitals (see John Law and Valerie Singleton, 'Performing technology's stories - On social 
constructivism, performance, and performativity' (2000) 41 Technology and Culture 765). Like Law and 
Singleton, Mol also explains why hospital practices might look ‘messy’ but how practitioners develop 
techniques that do not resolve complexities in diagnosis, prevention and treatment but enable a 
sufficiently stable understanding of each incidence of a disease (see Annemarie Mol, The body multiple: 
ontology in medical practice (Duke University Press 2002). I explore the idea of ‘messiness’ again later in 
this chapter. 
6 As I explain in this chapter, ANT-inspired researchers have been keen to explore the performance of 
‘things, objects, [and] beasts’ in network-building and social interactions (see Bruno Latour, We have 
never been modern (Harvard University Press 1993), 13). 
7 Emilie Cloatre, Pills for the poorest: an exploration of TRIPS and access to medication in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Palgrave 2013), 2. 




the associations present. I conclude the first half of this chapter by noting the merits of 
alternative approaches but explain why ANT is particularly well-suited to an examination of 
instantiations of law that are precarious and fluid assemblages, depending for their effects on 
multiple connections.9 In the second half of this chapter, I explain why some recent legal 
research has scrutinised the interplay between ‘time’ and legal processes.10 I examine this 
research, explain what it tells us about legality and how it might help with an understanding of 
the contractual arrangements operative in property-led development. 
An introduction to ANT 
ANT-inspired research projects have generated findings in many fields. Seminal ANT 
texts include analyses of scallop fishing11 and attempts to develop an electric vehicle,12 
fifteenth-century Portuguese maritime exploration and the problems of coordinated global 
navigation,13 the practices of laboratory science14 and the multifarious connections, 
associations and alliances that transformed the work of Louis Pasteur into a driver of major 
social change,15 methods of economic calculation and how they perform markets,16 the 
manner in which water pumping devices take shape and adapt as the networked effect of 
various users’ everyday needs,17 the diagnosis and treatment of disease18 and the complicated 
                                                          
9 Cloatre, Pills for the poorest: an exploration of TRIPS and access to medication in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
29. 
10 Emily Grabham, Brewing Legal Times: Things, Form, and the Enactment of Law (University of Toronto 
Press 2016); Mariana Valverde, Chronotopes of law: jurisdiction, scale and governance (Routledge 2015); 
John Harrington, 'Time as a dimension of medical law' (2012) 20 Medical Law Review 491; Sarah Keenan, 
'Smoke, Curtains and Mirrors: The Production of Race Through Time and Title Registration' (2017) 28 
Law & Critique 87; Davina Cooper, 'Time against time: Normative temporalities and the failure of 
community labour in Local Exchange Trading Schemes' (2013) 22 Time & Society 31. 
11 Michel Callon, 'Some elements of a sociology of translation - domestication of the scallops and the 
fishermen of St-Brieuc Bay' in John Law (ed), Power, action, and belief: a new sociology of knowledge? 
Sociological Review Monograph (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1986). 
12 Michel Callon, 'The Sociology of an Actor-Network: The Case of the Electric Vehicle' in Michel Callon, 
John Law and Arie Rip (eds), Mapping the dynamics of science and technology: sociology of science in the 
real world (Macmillan 1986). 
13 John Law, 'On the methods of long-distance control - vessels, navigation and Portuguese route to 
India' in John Law (ed), Power Action and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge? A Sociological Review 
Monograph (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1986). 
14 Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory life: the social construction of scientific facts (Sage 
Publications 1979). 
15 Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France (Harvard University Press 1988). 
16 Michel Callon, 'An Essay on Framing and Overflowing : Economic Externalities Revisited by Sociology' 
in Michel Callon (ed), The laws of the markets (Blackwell Publishers 1998). 
17 Marianne de Laet and Annemarie Mol, 'The Zimbabwe Bush Pump: Mechanics of a fluid technology' 
(2000) 30 Social Studies of Science 225. 




hybrid that veterinary surgeons, epidemiologists, farmers and politicians enacted as a 
Cumbrian sheep at the height of the UK’s ‘foot and mouth crisis.’19 
These ANT studies show that social action rarely plays out within a settled 
configuration of structures or systems,20 although this finding is not, of course, limited to ANT. 
Others working within the broad field of Science and Technology Studies21 also challenge the 
prevalence of terms such as context, circumstance, situation or setting as explanatory staples 
when analysing an event or a particular set of interactions.22 While ANT and other STS 
approaches note that ‘invocations of context’ are unavoidable,23 they show that the origin and 
meaning of social action cannot adequately be explained by reference to these terms. 
According to Latour, diverse and multi-level associations produce agency, structure and power, 
as well as all other aspects of social life, with none of these things preceding those associations 
as some sort of raw material.24 ANT theorists seek, therefore, to demonstrate that social action 
emerges from chains of association that form between human and nonhuman actors.25 In 
doing so, they deploy a broad conception of nonhumans26 that views the capacities of these 
things to perform in networked situations as an essential component of social action.  
In common with other ANT scholars, Law and Mol characterise an actor as any entity 
that makes a difference to a state of affairs or an ordering of associations.27 But they show that 
the capacity to exert influence that an actor possesses is neither permanent nor ‘given in the 
order of things’28 but an often temporary effect of a web of associations and connections with 
other actors that are repeatedly and continually made, remade, suspended or severed.29 
                                                          
19 John Law and Annemarie Mol, 'The Actor-Enacted: Cumbrian Sheep in 2001' in Carl Knappett and 
Lambros Malafouris (eds), Material agency: towards a non-anthropocentric approach (Springer 2008). 
20 As discussed in detail in Bruno Latour, Reassembling the social: an introduction to actor-network-
theory (Oxford University Press 2005). 
21 Hereafter abbreviated to ‘STS.’ 
22 Steve Woolgar and Javier Lezaun, 'The wrong bin bag: A turn to ontology in science and technology 
studies?' (2013) 43 Social Studies of Science 321. 
23 ibid, 327. 
24 Latour, Reassembling the social: an introduction to actor-network-theory, 64. 
25 Bruno Latour, 'Technology is Society Made Durable' in John Law (ed), A Sociology of monsters: essays 
on power, technology and domination (Routledge 1991), 110.  
26 Encompassing the ‘things, objects, [and] beasts’ to which I have already referred (see Latour, We have 
never been modern, 13). 
27 Law and Mol, 'The Actor-Enacted: Cumbrian Sheep in 2001'; Annemarie Mol, 'Actor-network theory: 
Sensitive terms and enduring tensions' (2010) Kölner Zeitschrift Für Soziologie Und Sozialpsychologie 
253. 
28 John Law, Aircraft stories: decentering the object in technoscience (Duke University Press 2002), 152; 
Mol, The body multiple: ontology in medical practice, 6. 
29 John Law, 'After ANT: complexity, naming and topology' in John Law and John Hassard (eds), Actor 
network theory and after (Blackwell 1999), 5; Cloatre, Pills for the poorest: an exploration of TRIPS and 
access to medication in Sub-Saharan Africa, 29. Cloatre explains, for example, that ‘actors are events 
that happen only once, and are constantly made up’ (see Cloatre, Pills for the poorest: an exploration of 




Agency, in Latour’s rendering of it, thus becomes a complicated fusion of distinct associations 
that gather together intentionally or inadvertently to produce different effects.30  
ANT, as Mol has put it, offers a ‘repository of terms’ for exploring these ideas.31 One of 
these terms is ‘enactment,’ and Law and Mol summarise this idea when they state that ‘active 
entities’ are not only relationally linked but ‘make a difference to each other: they make each 
other be. … [T]hey enact each other.’32 Their notion of enactment is crucial to much ANT-
inspired research and suggests that actors come into being to the extent that other actors 
perform them into being. This means, therefore, that if any entity that is capable of making a 
difference is an actor, each actor must itself be exposed to the difference-making capacities of 
other actors.  
A similarly influential idea is the concept of ‘translation.’ As Cloatre explains, ‘[t]he 
“translation” of multiple connections into a new actor with a sense or appearance of stability is 
at the core of much of this research.’33 It is a concept originally developed in Callon’s 
examination of a project established to address a decline in scallop population in northern 
France.34 For Callon’s purposes, the scallop conservation project was not interesting because it 
revealed important information about fishing techniques or conservation strategies. Rather, 
Callon examined processes of network-building by arguing that the project, and the identities 
of the marine biologists leading the project, were defined and redefined in a ‘battle’35 with 
other actors present in the network. These others included the wider scientific community, 
fisherpersons and the scallops themselves. The biologists sought to position themselves as 
persons equipped to ‘say what the scallops want and need’36 but attaining this position could 
only follow a process ‘during which the identity of actors, the possibility of interaction and the 
margins of manoeuvre are negotiated and delimited.’37 
My interest in this thesis is in the ‘time-in-between’ the formation of an idea and the 
stabilisation of connections around that idea. For that reason, Callon’s work is helpful because 
he suggests that this network-building activity involves four overlapping phases. First, he 
                                                          
30 Latour, Reassembling the social: an introduction to actor-network-theory, 45. See also Bruno Latour, 
'On recalling ANT' in John Law and John Hassard (eds), Actor network theory and after (Blackwell 1999). 
31 Mol, 'Actor-network theory: Sensitive terms and enduring tensions', 262. 
32 Law and Mol, 'The Actor-Enacted: Cumbrian Sheep in 2001', 58. 
33 Cloatre, Pills for the poorest: an exploration of TRIPS and access to medication in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
14. 
34 Callon, 'Some elements of a sociology of translation - domestication of the scallops and the fishermen 
of St-Brieuc Bay'. 
35 ibid, 212. 
36 ibid, 224. 




suggests, the ‘primum movens’38 seeks to establish itself ‘as an obligatory passage point’39 for 
all interactions in the emerging network and to form ‘alliances’ with actors with shared 
interests40 before attempting to lock those allies into place in the emerging network. This part 
of the process is fluid, Callon explains, as the interested actors define and redefine their 
identities and wants in a system of coproduction. The ‘actual enrolment’ of the various actors 
does not occur until after the ‘multilateral negotiations, trials of strength and tricks’ that 
stabilise these identities and desires.41 
Various planning and urban studies academics have applied Callon’s ideas, including 
Tait and Jensen, who explain that the process of stabilising the identity and roles of the actors 
to be enrolled in property-led development often occurs through the production of brochures, 
planning briefs and development plans.42 But while these documents carry a form of material 
agency, they explain that this enrolment also involves the slow disentanglement of existing 
landowners from their position within the network. The disentanglement of pre-existing 
property rights in a development site has been a longstanding focus of research into urban 
regeneration, as I mentioned in chapter one, and is an issue that I explore in detail here.43  
The documents that Tait and Jensen analyse drew various actors into specific forms of 
relationship with each other and guided action in a particular direction.44 These observations 
invoke a sense of an emerging development trajectory as actors are drawn to network 
                                                          
38 In Callon’s work, the ‘primum movens’ were the marine biologists who instigated the network-
building processes. 
39 Callon, 'Some elements of a sociology of translation - domestication of the scallops and the fishermen 
of St-Brieuc Bay', 205. 
40 ibid, 206. 
41 ibid, 211. 
42 Malcolm Tait and Ole B. Jensen, 'Travelling Ideas, Power and Place: The Cases of Urban Villages and 
Business Improvement Districts' (2007) 12 International Planning Studies 107. Other planning research 
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'Modalities of Planning: A Reflection on the Persuasive Powers of the Development Plan' (1999) 70 The 
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relationships and enrolled in property-led development. Raco et al offer a similar sense of 
strategic enrolment as a technique of property-led development when they state: 
Regeneration, after all, is concerned not only with what is constructed but also 
when particular objectives should be prioritised and at what point(s) in the 
development process different groups and interests could and should have their 
needs and priorities addressed.45 
This observation implies that there is a moment in property-led development at which certain 
groups and interests should be drawn more closely into the network of relationships or held at 
arm’s length. My research seeks to investigate these moments and the role that legal 
technologies perform in creating, stabilising or severing specific connections. 
A focus on moments in property-led development suggests a temporal flow marked 
with significant events. Like Raco et al, Doak and Karadimitriou note the directional aspect of 
enrolment in property-led development networks and ask if these assemblages of people, 
organisations, documents and ideas ‘have their own trajectories, negotiated and inscribed into 
the practices’ of the actors engaged in a process.46 This is a point that Johns emphasises too in 
her work on collaborations between public bodies and private sector companies on large-scale 
infrastructure projects. She explains why a public body comes to think like a ‘deal-maker,’ with 
the effect that: 
Each deal tends, for those participants, to generate or lay claim to more or less its 
own sources of momentum, its own set of roles and means of inspiring loyalty, its 
own trajectories for change and paths for negotiation, and its own determination 
of limits.47 
Johns does not suggest that her work is part of any corpus of research that might be described 
as ANT-inspired but I mention it here because she explores network-building and the 
stabilisation of ‘roles’ in a development process. She argues that large-scale infrastructure 
projects move forward through ‘a succession of deals’ that provide a sense of progression 
towards pre-agreed goals while also forcing the participating actors to redefine their roles.48 
The sequence of deals simultaneously draws a public body and its private sector partner closer 
together and inspires ever greater ‘loyalty’ to the deal-making process.49 Throughout this 
thesis, I link these ideas to the ‘projectisation’ of property-led development practices, and 
draw on the observation that most project management techniques treat fragmentation as ‘a 
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problem’ that can be avoided as long as the participants sustain a ‘coordinated perspective’50 
based on simplified processes  and ‘more or less unambiguous goals.’51 In addition, Riles’ 
research into ‘material and procedural knowledge practices’ in Japanese investment banking 
provides a helpful example of documentary processes and institutional governance 
mechanisms that produce collaborations between market participants that follow ‘carefully 
scripted routines.’52 Scripted and routinized action53 characterises property-led development 
and is a theme of this thesis. 
In chapters four to 10, I analyse how WCC and its property development partner 
enacted the Winchester Development as a sequence of overlapping and routinized processes 
marked by apparently specific goals and each involving different types of ‘deal.’ These 
processes involved the coproduction of a development trajectory, the enrolment and 
disembedding of various actors, the formation of contractual arrangements and other legal 
technologies, and adaptations to the actors’ capacity to act. Ideas developed in ANT-inspired 
research provide a productive theoretical frame for this analysis because of ANT’s focus both 
on complexity and fluidity and on the connections, associations and relations that produce a 
state of affairs. 
Scripts, fluidity and technologies 
A theme of ANT-inspired work is the idea that an actor gains the capacity to act as a 
product of connections and associations. So far in this chapter, I have considered Callon’s 
analysis of the ‘multilateral negotiations [and] trials of strength’ that condition that capacity to 
act54 but I have not considered the ‘tricks’55 that one entity might deploy to guide those 
negotiations and trials. Some early ANT-studies investigated, for example, the strategic 
manoeuvres through which the designer of a technological device might ‘inscribe’ onto the 
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device assumptions about the world in which the device will operate to ‘prescribe’ the actions 
of a user who takes up the device.56 In doing so, Akrich suggests, the designer must not only 
make assumptions about the current predilections of the desired users but must also make 
predictions about the way that those or other actors will take up the device in the future. 
Akrich explains that these definitions, assumptions and predictions become inscribed on the 
device and the device transports these as a ‘script.’57  
As Cloatre shows, the processes of inscription, prescription and take up of 
technologies are interesting because of the negotiations that take place between the 
designer’s projected user and the actual individual actors who encounter the ‘script.’ The 
tension between designer, projected user and actual user also emerges in Callon’s analysis of 
the tools that two companies used to define demand for their services, develop customer 
loyalty and condition the manner in which employees delivered those services.58 Unlike the 
metaphorical rendering of written scripts that Akrich invoked, Callon refers to devices such as 
employee handbooks and customer questionnaires that are painstakingly written and 
rewritten and that inscribe and re-inscribe expectations about user behaviour.59 Callon shows 
how these devices performed a valuable organisational role by enabling the organisations to 
refine their services, their employees’ behaviour and their users’ demands through ‘a method 
of successive adjustment.’60 These linked rewritings meant that the organisations, Callon 
argues, produced an adaptable type of employee, an adaptable service and a particular type of 
consumer. They did so by using their written materials to carry around a script. This is a theme 
that appears often in ANT-inspired research and is important for my work. I draw particularly 
on Cloatre’s analysis of transnational legal texts that transport ordering mechanisms into 
various contexts and settings.61 These tools offer methods of long distance control62 and I 
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examine the extent to which the contractual arrangements deployed in property-led 
development processes might offer a similar sense of control. 
Adjustment, variation and change are also themes in ANT-inspired work. An example 
of this is de Laet and Mol’s account of the take-up of a water pumping device in communities 
in Zimbabwe. Their account notes how designers scripted the use of the pump: 
As a technology, the Zimbabwe Bush Pump ‘B’ type is expected to perform. It 
must act, do something. It must be made to work. And it is made to keep on 
working. Designed for simplicity, ease of maintenance, and assisted by manuals 
and instructions, it is created to survive.63 
A pump ‘survives,’ not because its original manufacturer produced effective guidance but, de 
Laet and Mol show, because it is designed to be adaptable and ‘fluid.’64 In her own analysis of 
de Laet and Mol’s research, Cloatre explains that this demonstrates that ‘the strength of the 
technology is to be adaptable to the various resources available to its users.’65 Asking whether 
or not the adapted pump is the same as the original pump is moot as long as the pump 
continues to do its job. As I will demonstrate, adaptability is a trait that many local authority 
officers, property developers and private sector consultants deem to be desirable in a 
Development Agreement,66 although statutory requirements do mean that asking if a varied 
DA is sufficiently similar to an original DA is an important question. There is a balancing, 
therefore, which I examine in this research, between producing a DA that is ‘robust enough’ to 
operate as a legal agreement while being ‘plastic enough’ to be adapted to meet the needs of 
a local authority and its development partners.67  
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The balance between the need to produce a thing that has ‘lasting’ properties but it 
also ‘quickly replaceable’68 has been fruitful for many researchers. Another way of thinking this 
through is by reference to Mawani’s portrayal of historical archives as things ‘in an ongoing 
state of creation and production through translation, interpretation, elaboration, dismissal, 
and disavowal.’69 All of the ideas that I have discussed here have helped shape my thinking 
about property-led development practices. Of particular significance is the observation that 
the performance and use of a technology emerges ‘in the confrontation between the real user 
and the projected user.’70 Anticipating the manner in which a projected user will deploy a 
particular technology necessitates assumptions about the passage of time that I address later 
in this chapter and throughout this thesis. But the production of a suite of contractual 
arrangements for the purposes of the Winchester Development included the formulation of a 
DA between WCC and its development partner that would be primarily used by those parties 
to sustain their preferred development trajectory. The primary projected users of the DA were 
future versions of WCC and its development partner, but, when the DA no longer served the 
original purposes of WCC or its development partner, they sought to collaborate in rewriting 
the agreement. Callon’s analysis of the rewriting of organisational documents helps me to 
understand this better and I also use an image from Latour of ‘plug-ins’ that can be installed on 
a computer system to activate new or under-utilised capacities.71 This is a productive image for 
my research because WCC and its development partners repeatedly sought to bolt other 
documents on to their original agreements to change their contents and make them, as they 
saw it, fit for their purposes.  
These insights help me to explore contractual relations between WCC and its 
development partners that are constantly in flux.72 But the choices that WCC’s officers and 
their development partners made in their use of the DA compelled them to take into account 
how other users might take up the DA. If, as Akrich and Cloatre suggest, the way in which users 
deploy a technology only emerges through patterns of behaviour playing out over time and in 
places ‘far beyond the frontiers of the laboratory or the workshop,’73 it becomes necessary to 
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examine how closely the users are following the script and whether or not unexpected users 
take up the device and use it in surprising ways. It is also, as Callon shows, essential to 
investigate the mechanisms that exist for changing the rules inscribed in a device if those rules 
no longer fit their original purpose. These are particularly pertinent issues for me because I am 
interested in identifying the extent to which the contractual arrangements, Compulsory 
Purchase Orders,74 planning permissions and land acquisition agreements deployed in a 
property-led development process stabilise and carry around a vision of an appropriate 
development trajectory. Linked to this is an interest in the manner in which these mechanisms 
bring outsiders into line with a predefined development trajectory.  
Contractual Relations and Power – alternative approaches? 
My focus in this thesis is on the way that the contractual arrangements deployed in 
the Winchester Development opened new ‘paths for negotiation’75 and participated in 
network-building processes.  I am also interested in the ‘trials of strength and tricks’76 through 
which one of WCC’s development partners enrolled the Council as an ally in a forward-facing 
property-led development. But I also examine how local authority officers, development 
directors and the array of consultants and experts performing the Winchester Development 
negotiated with law and legal principles. In particular, I examine the manner in which local 
authority officers and their legal advisers encountered regulations implementing EU 
procurement directives77 and deployed contractual arrangements purported to have ‘legal’ 
effect.  
These encounters with ‘law’ involved detailed meetings with legal advisers, the 
preparation of strategies for the formation and implementation of contractual arrangements 
and tricks either designed to reduce the extent to which legal restrictions governed the 
behaviour of the parties or to give the impression that draft contractual arrangements were 
close to having binding effect. During my analysis, I refer to Galanter’s influential observation 
that wealthy, professional ‘repeat players’ tend to bend encounters with law to their benefit.78 
But the interplay between WCC, its development partners, the contractual arrangements and 
the law was a complex and changing one and attempts that the Council and its development 
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partners made to present their contractual arrangements as ‘legally binding’ and ‘legally valid’ 
provoked a trial of strength with outsiders who infiltrated the network. These actors sought to 
present alternative readings of EU procurement law and the content of the contractual 
arrangements, thus challenging the stability of the network that WCC and its development 
partners had formed. 
The comments in the previous paragraph suggest that a theoretical approach 
investigating power imbalances and a tri-partite power struggle between WCC’s officers, its 
development partners and outsiders might have been productive. I do not consider the power 
struggle between WCC’s officers and its development partners in detail but I do consider 
Foucault’s reading of ‘discipline’ as ‘a type of power, […] comprising a whole set of 
instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, [and] targets.’79 Understood in this 
way, discipline is, Foucault explains, a ‘technology’ of power.80 Interpreting the Winchester DA, 
for example, as an ‘unceasing’ disciplinary technique helps to reveal the manner in which parts 
of the Council were reshaped through subjection to the operation of the contractual 
arrangements and the way in which the contracting parties sought to discipline unruly 
outsiders.81  
ANT-inspired researchers have explored understandings of power and, as Cloatre has 
put it:  
The irreductionist approach of ANT has invited authors to focus on the specific 
material connections that enable the production of networked patterns of power 
and the maintenance of relationships of dominance, or control, at a distance.82  
Similarly, Latour argues that ‘[p]ower and domination have to be produced, made up, 
composed.’83 The key issue for Latour, is to identify where power imbalances come from and 
what it is that produce them. This preoccupation with the things that produce and perpetuate 
‘power’ are, as Latour and Cloatre both note, Foucauldian concerns.84 An ANT-inspired 
approach emphasises, however, that ‘power’ is ‘not a reservoir, a stock, or a capital that will 
automatically provide an explanation.’85 This observation offers a reminder that social science 
should examine both ‘the stuff’ that is the source of power and the consequences of the 
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exercise of power.86 The implications of this for my research are that power struggles between 
local authority officers and private sector development directors, for example, can only be 
understood by looking at the techniques deployed, the processes through which those 
techniques were produced and implemented and the connections that shaped the way that 
those techniques performed.  
The techniques I examine included the formation and implementation of contractual 
arrangements. While ANT-inspired research has shaped my approach to the analysis of these 
things, there are other theoretical frames that might have generated interesting findings about 
contractual relations. Macaulay’s well-known analysis of contracting behaviour demonstrated 
that businesses often use contracts to provide the time and space to nurture deals in private.87 
This work also suggested that many contracting parties prefer arrangements based on trust, 
cooperation and flexibility, rather than strict implementation of the terms of an agreement, 
even when they have in place detailed and carefully planned contractual arrangements.88 
Macneil has since developed Macaulay’s ideas under the broad rubric of relational contract 
theory89 and discussed how contractual arrangements of various types often facilitate long-
term relations between parties rather than setting out the terms of singular, discrete 
transactions.90  
Macneil has also shown that most transactions take shape in response to social, 
cultural and economic relations that exist outside the negotiated terms of an agreement.91 
Applying these ideas to contracts deployed to facilitate partnerships between public bodies 
and private sector companies, Vincent-Jones demonstrates that those contractual 
arrangements rely upon ‘a hybrid combination of mechanisms of public and private 
ordering.’92 An approach grounded in either RCT or Vincent-Jones’s analysis of public contracts 
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might have generated insights into the interplay between the strict terms of a DA and the need 
for flexibility in the manner in which a local authority and its development partner seek to 
implement that DA. These approaches might also have illuminated aspects of the negotiations 
that took place between the local authority and its development partner to form the contract. 
I am keen to examine contract formation and the interplay, as Mitchell has put it, between the 
real and the paper deal,93 as well as the web of connections and associations that shape 
contractual relations. But while RCT and Vincent-Jones’s analysis of public contracts both invite 
an examination of the relations between contracting parties and third party human actors, 
ANT suggests that this analysis should go beyond a consideration of how humans interact to 
encompass an examination of the ‘things’ that make up networked relations. For this reason, 
an ANT-inspired approach promises a richer set of findings. 
Law and legal technologies 
In the previous section, I noted Foucault’s observation that discipline is a ‘technology’ 
of power.94 ANT enables me to evaluate how WCC and its development partners deployed 
legal technologies that shaped the interactions taking place within the Winchester 
Development. It is helpful, therefore, to consider the meaning of the term, ‘legal technology.’ 
In the most significant piece of research applying ANT techniques to studies of law, Cloatre 
suggests that the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement (TRIPS), an 
instrument of international law, is an example of a legal technology because it is a ‘set of 
official rules carried on paper’ that was ‘expected to have a predefined impact’95  by converting 
patents into ‘compulsory tools’ for the take up of medication and by shaping ‘new legal spaces’ 
in countries far from the sites at which those patents were granted.96 She demonstrates that 
most accounts of TRIPS critiqued the agreement on the basis of an assumption that its 
implementation would thus lead to the formation of mechanisms established in less developed 
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countries to protect intellectual property rights established in developed European countries 
to the detriment of access to essential medications.  
But Cloatre’s ethnographic account first analyses how the effect of TRIPS was heavily 
contingent on the level of legal expertise in those less developed countries. Secondly, she 
shows how activities and practices in existing pharmaceutical, medical and import networks 
performed patented medication as a desirable alternative to more affordable medications 
regardless of any direct effects of efforts to implement TRIPS.97 For example, she shows that, 
in Ghana, the prevalence of and suspicion towards counterfeit medications pushed consumers 
‘towards a limited number of (principally Western) producers’98 and provoked a backlash 
against all unpatented drugs.99 Access to medication was, Cloatre shows, a product of the 
connections that formed around drugs patented and branded at a particular time and in a 
particular place but transported to, ‘translated’ and entangled in local daily routines.100 This 
shows that the action of picking up and doing something with the ‘scripts’ embedded within 
patents performed an important role in the formation and stabilization of those networks. In 
particular, she explains how these scripts reinforced the legitimacy of patented drugs and the 
illegitimacy of generic medications.101 On the other hand, however, TRIPS carried around a 
script for the formation of mechanisms designed to uphold pre-existing intellectual property 
rights but produced effects in Ghana and Djibouti that were different from those expected. 
Although he does not use the term, Cowan similarly explains how the Human Rights 
Act 1998 is a legal technology that ‘ushered in a new discursive juridical relation through which 
the Supreme Court and the ECtHR interact.’102 As a consequence of the manner in which this 
interaction has been performed, the ECtHR ‘is now largely absent’ from possession 
proceedings related to residential tenancies,103 as Cowan puts it, although the relations 
between the Supreme Court and the ECtHR are constantly being remade, producing ‘moments 
of tension and contradiction, of networks in the making.’104 There is an overlap here with Riles’ 
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discussion of ‘technicalities.’105 These technicalities are, Riles suggests, ‘what makes law’106 and 
she focuses her attention on the methods that legal practitioners use to determine a legal 
dispute that has multi-jurisdictional elements. In this thesis, I examine the methods that legal 
practitioners deploy in property-led development, and consider the effect of ‘technicalities’ 
such as the statutorily-imposed rules for making, confirming and exercising a CPO. 
Asking questions about the origins and effects of legal processes, and exploring the 
role of law in ‘networks in the making,’ is not new. For Cotterrell, studying the action of law in 
its everyday settings should reveal more than focusing solely on the content of legal 
materials.107 This would, in Cotterrell’s view, enable scholars to explore the multiple ways in 
which law is:  
Used […] to guide and structure social relations, engineer deals and 
understandings, define lines of authority, make provision for future contingencies, 
facilitate projects, distribute resources, promote security, limit risks, and 
encourage trust.108  
Such an approach might, however, reveal the structuring qualities of law but risks succumbing 
to a form of ‘law-first’ approach, assuming that law has some form of inherent authority and 
overlooking the ways in which individuals participate in creating, defining and shaping legal 
practices and legal meanings.  
By contrast, Ewick and Silbey produced a notable exposition of the interplay between 
individual agency and legal practices in their investigation of ‘legal consciousness.’109 They 
located the individual as an active agent able to participate in but also constrained by legal 
practices that function as ‘a social structure actively and constantly produced in what people 
say and do.’110 In a subsequent article analysing the concept of legal consciousness, Silbey 
explained that this approach enabled scholars to explore ‘how “we the people” might be 
contributing to the law’s systemic effects’ and suggested that the character of legal action is 
not pre-determined but an effect that emerges from the ebb and flow of interactions and 
associations.111 However, she also criticised the type of legal consciousness study that, as she 
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perceived it, simply ‘tracks what particular individuals think and do.’112 Instead, she advocated 
an analytical approach that looks past this ‘individual-level variable’ to consider how people 
participate in the ‘process of constructing legality.’113 
An ANT approach, inspired by Latour’s work studying the roles and effects of the 
materials scientists deploy in developing scientific knowledge,114 suggests that analyses of law 
should not stop at a consideration of how people participate in the process of constructing 
legality and invites consideration of the role of nonhuman actors. Pottage, for example, notes 
the merits of this when he observes that legal knowledge ‘involves materialities of various 
kinds – space, bodily hexis, databases or archaic loose-leaf binders, forensic models, files, 
sketches, inscriptions.’115 An example can be found in an analysis of the regulation of tobacco 
and medicinal nicotine products in the UK, which shows how different regulatory regimes 
enacted tobacco and nicotine as different types of legal object.116 As these substances 
emerged with a new legal identity and various people picked up these products and used 
them, they both fed back into the regulatory regime. As a result, the regulations themselves 
became shaped by the networks they occupied and the objects that they purported to define. 
Thus, tobacco, medicinal nicotine and the regulations became co-dependent and constantly 
redefined as the practices emerging around them collided and created multiple effects. Seen in 
this way, law, in instantiations such as legislative texts and legal objects, is ‘both the result of 
socio-technical assemblages and becomes part of the specific materials.’117 Regulations make 
the entities ‘into something specific’ by enrolling them within regulatory networks and 
travelling ‘with them as scripts both enabling and constraining their actions.’118 But, since 
regulations exist in fragile networks, the effect of the regulations becomes precarious and the 
result of a contingent process. 
Other legal studies grounded in an ANT approach take a similar view of legislative 
texts. In his analysis of the European Union’s Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products 
Regulation, Faulkner notes how legal texts might ‘encapsulate’ a variety of interactions, logics 
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and competing visions and hold them together in an apparently stable form.119 When a legal 
text ‘works,’ whether the text is a statute, a contract or a licence, it does so, McGee suggests, 
by condensing the messy processes of interaction that go into its production and by limiting 
the capacity of other actors to act.120 Meanwhile, a legislative text might produce unexpected 
connections, as Cowan and Carr have shown.121 Their case study assumed that a group of 
private landlords were so diverse that they were effectively ungovernable by any central 
representative agenda or logic. Their analysis showed, however, how a government initiative 
to impose regulations on landlords provided the setting around which the landlords shared 
opposition to the regulations, although they did not necessarily adopt a shared voice. 
Various accounts thus illustrate how socio-legal objects contribute to the formation of 
networks, and I discuss this research throughout this thesis when I illuminate the gathering of 
connections that generated the contractual arrangements deployed during the Winchester 
Development and that enabled those arrangements to act. I treat this gathering as dynamic, 
messy and involving connections that are constantly made, remade, severed and patched-up. I 
explain how these interactions conditioned the performance of legal documents such as 
leases, land acquisition agreements and CPOs. While I examine the circumstances in which 
these documents operated with ‘a directive quality’122 that regulated action within the 
development process, I also scrutinise the more unexpected and unpredictable consequences 
of the operation of these legal materials.123 I also consider what it means to think of a process, 
mechanism or device as a ‘legal’ technology. As Cowan and Wincott put it, ‘the boundaries of 
legality have proved a particularly fertile research resource for socio-legal studies.’124 This 
invites questions, to which I have already alluded, about the connections and associations that 
enable legal technologies to have effect and the connections and associations that mean that 
legal technologies have unexpected or non-existent effects.  
In addition, this also invites an examination of the production of legal effects. In his 
ethnography of episodic ‘law-making’ practices in France’s Conseil d’Etat, Latour examines 
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‘quasi-legal’ forms, materials and processes that are, he suggests, ‘capable of producing 
law.’125 His focus is on the way lawyers, clerks and administrative assistants transform 
everyday documents and events into a ‘legal’ case. The process of making a case, he shows, 
occurs over time and requires inputs from a variety of sources. Before a case reaches a legally-
trained practitioner, Latour explains, the files must be left to ‘ripen’ before they become 
‘judgment-compatible.’126 He likens this process, somewhat quaintly, to the maturation of 
carefully selected fruit: 
In the same way that our grandmothers slowly let their apples turn ripe – and 
sometimes go bad – during winter on wooden racks, the secretaries of the sub-
section let the files turn ripe – and sometimes go sour! – on wooden shelves.127 
The files, as Latour shows, do not usually ‘go sour’ because administrative officials monitor 
their ripening by periodically reviewing and adding to the files. Through gathering documents 
and legal opinions an official can thus create ‘a network of […] nudges in the right direction.’128  
Once a file has ripened sufficiently it will be presented to the lawyers who adjudicate 
the case. A process of legal reasoning then begins, which involves a series of ‘episodes’ during 
which judges meet to state the law.129 But instead of straightforwardly applying the law to a 
set of facts, the judges will often pause or hesitate before reaching a decision. Latour explains 
that any account of judicial legal reasoning is incomplete ‘if we eliminate from it the 
hesitations, the winding path, the meanders of reflexivity’ that enable judges to reach a 
decision.130 But Latour is careful to emphasise that statements of law do not materialise 
through a judge applying his or her analytical skills to it. Judicial decision-making is, Latour 
argues, a product of the juxtaposition between many things, including both the documents 
and other material artefacts that go into a file and the judges’ understanding of existing legal 
principles.131  
Law-making, in the sense described by Latour, is a necessarily ‘slow and tortuous’ 
process.132 The example of law-making in the Conseil d’Etat is a very specific example of legal 
practice, however, and Cloatre points out that identifying and defining law ‘outside of the 
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specific institutions that produce it is a different question.’133 This is undoubtedly true but 
Latour’s work is important in showing why boundaries between what is and what is not ‘legal’ 
might be ‘blurry.’134 I analyse this by examining how local authority officers and development 
directors produce and present contractual arrangements. In particular, I scrutinise the way 
they use documents that they declare to be on the threshold of legality to create new 
connections, sever existing connections and instil a sense of an irreversible development 
trajectory. 
Trajectories, chronotopes and travel 
The idea of a development trajectory suggests that property-led development follows 
a straightforward route. As I will show, travel metaphors abound in the documents that local 
authority officers produced about the Winchester Development and in the accounts about 
property-led development that my interviewees provided. A way to unpick these images is 
through Valverde’s use of Bakhtin’s narrative theory, particularly through the concept of a 
‘chronotope.’135 A chronotope is the device through which time, space and action are rendered 
in relation to each other in a novel to produce meaning. Bakhtin explains that: 
In the literary chronotope, spatial and temporal indicators are fused into one 
carefully thought-out, concrete whole. Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, 
becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to 
movements of time, plot and history.136 
Chronotopes, Bakhtin suggests, take many forms. For example, the ‘chronotope of the road’ 
refers to the use of the open road as a device to move a narrative forward by providing the 
setting for encounters between ‘people who are normally kept separate by social and spatial 
distance.’137 The chronotope of the road is also, Vice suggests, the ‘clearest expression of the 
link between time and space’ because ‘time spent means ground covered.’138 These ideas help 
draw attention to how a local authority and a developer attempt to establish a sense of 
progress by invoking metaphorical milestones on the ‘journey’ that they undertake in carrying 
out property-led development. 
Valverde explains that her interest in Bakhtin stems directly from his fusion of 
temporality and spatialization, and she provides an example in her discussion of judicial 
proceedings. The physical space of a courtroom blends, she explains, with a judge’s ability to 
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start, suspend or halt proceedings in a manner that produces a sense of ‘the official time of 
law’ during which significant ‘legal’ moments must inevitably occur.139 The ‘court of law’ is, 
according to Valverde, thus a form of legal chronotope. In other work, Valverde has developed 
similar ideas and compared the temporality and spatialization of both crime detection and 
crime prevention work.140 Detective work requires ‘the retrospective reconstruction of a crime 
that took place in the past’ and attends to ‘the scene of the crime and radiates out from 
that.’141 By comparison, crime prevention work ‘looks to the future’ and ‘encompasses an 
indefinite series of possible future events’ that might take place in indistinct settings ranging 
from a house to a park to larger urban areas.142 Valverde’s point is that the temporalities are as 
important as the spatializations for understanding detective work and crime prevention.  
In this thesis, I explain the mechanisms that a local authority and a developer use to 
establish markers of progress or to designate moments as legally consequential. In his detailed 
ethnography of bureaucratic practices in Islamabad’s municipal government, Hull accounts for 
the ways that paper and electronic record-keeping practices, designed to simplify bureaucratic 
processes, move through different settings and often introduce unexpected complexities to 
the processes that they are designed either to govern or to simplify. He notes, however, how 
‘paper’ was initially utilised in an attempt to curb corruption through methodical record-
keeping and controlling access to information: 
The solution was to give paper some of the qualities of discourse, people, places, 
and time through the use of signatures, dates, stamps, and interartifactural 
references.143 
The Winchester DA and other contractual arrangements contained ‘interartifactural 
references’ to planning briefs, viability assessments, CPOs, planning permissions and leases, 
which combined to give different aspects of the contractual arrangements meaning. These 
documents enabled a gathering together of elements decided upon and drawn up in other 
times and at other places and thus were tools used, as Hull puts it, to ‘engage with, or 
constitute realities “in the world”.’144  
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The Winchester DA also blended people, places and time through the signatures, dates 
and stamps that gave the agreement ‘legal’ effect. More interestingly for my purposes, a 
sequence of dates written into the DA laid out a series of deadlines by which the parties to the 
agreement intended to have satisfied various conditions set out in the agreement. I examine 
these deadlines to establish if they ensured that the Winchester Development merged the 
multiple temporalities of land acquisitions, planning applications, negotiations with tenants 
and funders, the developers’ business plans and the Council’s election cycles.145 
The dates written into the DA gave the Winchester Development a set of temporal 
coordinates, introduced some of ‘the qualities’ of time146 and had the potential to become 
emblematic of ‘ground covered.’147 As Rakoff explains, temporal coordinates perform 
important ordering functions: 
[W]e need to be able to “tell time” – that is, we need to place people and events 
in relation with each other, so that we can coordinate what they do. Indeed, the 
careful coordination of the time of many individuals, so that their efforts are 
either synchronous or carefully sequenced, is a hallmark of modern societies.148 
I examine the usefulness of a sequence of contractually-embedded deadlines to a local 
authority seeking to demonstrate progress on a property-led development project and for a 
developer seeking to generate actions from its local authority partner ‘on time.’  
Dates and deadlines can, as Grabham notes, have a disciplining effect.149 If dates 
introduce ‘baseline norms’ for the completion of various actions, they might also acquire 
‘considerable moral force’150 as well possible legal consequences insofar as a failure to carry 
out the necessary actions might give rise to specific redress mechanisms. For the purposes of 
my research, this invites questions about the extent to which the contractual arrangements 
deployed in Winchester operated as a public guarantee that progress along the development 
trajectory would occur in a ‘timely’ manner. In addition, I examine the extent to which, in the 
event that timely progress did not occur, mechanisms in the contracts would be used to hold 
either party to account. 
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The usefulness of dates written into the DA as accountability mechanisms is analysed 
in this thesis because, as Hull observes, ‘[w]riting is usually seen to nail things down, but it can 
also set them in motion.’151 I examine the extent to which WCC and its development partners 
simply rewrote their agreements to deploy different dates instead of subjecting themselves to 
the effect of the passing of dates ostensibly chosen as deadlines for the completion of various 
actions. I contrast, therefore, self-selected dates, which could be changed, and deadlines 
imposed by statute, which could not be changed. I explore the differing ways in which these 
dates and deadlines shaped the Winchester Development and the implementation of the 
contractual arrangements. 
Trajectories and linearity 
As well as inviting a sense of distance to be travelled, the idea of a development 
trajectory suggests an element of linearity must be inherent to property-led development. In 
his discussion of ‘projectness,’ Law explains that many project management techniques rest 
upon an assumption that most types of development necessarily follow a linear trajectory, 
founded upon, measured against and sustained by progress against temporal coordinates.152 In 
doing so, Law touches upon themes considered by other scholars. Of particular significance to 
this thesis is Greenhouse’s account of the ways in which constructions, representations and 
understandings of time become embedded in and reproduce cultural practices.153 Various 
others have discussed the concept of ‘time’ as an ordering device and a social construct154 and 
Greenhouse’s point is that ‘Western’ understandings of time assume the ‘linearity of time,’ 
involving a ‘geometric connection’155 between an originary moment and ‘some fixed (though 
unknown) point in time.’156 
Other theorists of time and social relations have investigated these cultural 
assumptions and have analysed their effects. In his work on the Grenadian revolution, Scott 
examines the teleological assumptions underpinning ‘modern historical time’: 
As is well enough known, modern historical time – the collective time of nations 
and classes and subjects and populations – has been organised around a notion of 
discrete but continuous modular change, in particular, modular change as a linear, 
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diachronically stretched-out succession of cumulative instants, an endless chain of 
displacements of before and after. Such succession, moreover, is progressive: 
change is improvement. Change, therefore, not only has a formal, built-in rhythm 
of movement and alteration but also a built-in vector of moral direction.157 
The richness of this passage offers an array of analytical prompts, particularly when considered 
alongside Johns’ examination of public-private collaboration on large-scale infrastructure 
projects. Scott discusses the ‘rhythm’ of change in a way that mirrors Johns’ observation 
regarding the ‘deal-specific rhythm’ that structures an infrastructure project.158 Similarly, 
Scott’s point that this process establishes a ‘moral direction’ brings to mind Johns’ suggestion 
that the deal-orientation of infrastructure projects invests ‘the decisions that flow from [the 
deals] with an autonomous logic that insulates them from particular types of inquiry.’159 In 
both instances, the belief that there is a moral direction or an autonomous logic to the action 
functions as a self-justifying ordering device enabling both the production and destruction of 
certain connections and associations. Finally, Johns’ representation of the ‘succession of deals’ 
that move a public-private partnership from the start of an infrastructure project to its 
culmination160 expresses these ideas in a way that is similar to Scott’s examination of the 
assumption that nation states and classes change through moving through a ‘succession of 
cumulative instants’ linked together in a ‘chain.’ 
These points aid my analysis because, as Latour puts it, they critique a sense of time 
that ‘passes as if it were really abolishing the past behind it.’161 In this thesis, I study the sharp 
differentiation between the conditional phase in property-led development, during which the 
developer’s duty to construct a development is ‘non-binding’ and expressly open to further 
negotiation, and the unconditional phase, during which the duty is binding and ostensibly non-
negotiable. The actions to be carried out in accordance with dates written into the DA and 
deadlines imposed by statute, and the actions that would follow those dates, projected WCC 
and its development partners forward to the moment at which ‘unconditionality’ would 
occur.162 As well as giving WCC and its development partners an apparently ‘shared temporal 
coordination,’163 the dates incorporated into the DA used a cultural understanding of the 
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passage of time in a way that is quintessentially ‘modern’ and rests upon a belief that 
humanity is on a path of irreversible progress.164  
This modern temporality assumes, Latour argues, sharp distinctions between before 
and after, with the effect that ‘[t]he present is outlined by a series of radical breaks, 
revolutions, which constitute so many irreversible ratchets that prevent us from ever going 
backwards.’165 Latour’s image of a ratcheting motion is an important image for my research 
and informs my analysis because mechanical metaphors abound in the ways that property 
developers, local authority officers, councillors and property development consultants talk 
about property-led development. The image of a ratchet is also extremely rich because the 
idea of property-led development, as I mentioned in chapter one and earlier in this chapter, 
depends upon a belief in irreversible forward motion. 
Another helpful concept outlined in the excerpt from Latour quoted in the previous 
paragraph relates to the sorting of events to reinforce a sense of progress.  Scott makes similar 
observations in his account of political, artistic, social and cultural discourse before, during and 
after the Grenadian revolution. He considers post-revolutionary restorative justice 
mechanisms and explains how those mechanisms appeared to separate a time-before from a 
time-after: 
These novel ends of justice are thought of as being served by the legitimating 
subjection of both perpetrators and victims to the technologies of ‘truth and 
reconciliation’ and, moreover, as serving the broader horizon of a political 
transition from authoritarian or illiberal rule.166 
The value of a truth and reconciliation commission lies, in this reading, in the opportunity it 
affords a society to consign political misdeeds to a discrete temporal moment.  
Scott critiques the myth of transition, however, and similarly critical analyses can be 
found in two other recent accounts of temporal ordering techniques. In work analysing the 
experiences of transgendered people of sex/gender classifications in UK law, Grabham shows 
that the Gender Recognition Act 2004 ‘poses the act of claiming recognition as a monumental 
one-off event.’167 The moment of official recognition of the subject’s ‘“acquired” gender’ 
means, Grabham argues, that transgendered people seeking gender recognition experience 
‘an imminent sense of the forthcoming,’168 an impression of ‘arrival into citizenship’169 and the 
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promise of a new beginning. In similar research analysing political controversies surrounding 
an ‘apology’ from the Australian government to displaced indigenous people, Bastian explains 
how the government presented the apology as ‘a new point of origin from which all 
Australians might set out together.’170 Bastian criticises the presentation of a new beginning as 
somehow generative of a new identity because the ‘rush to turn the page’ was also an attempt 
to close discussions about the nation’s past171 and to reduce past injustices to part of the ‘all-
encompassing flow’ of the country’s temporality.172  
I consider these concerns about the use of ‘monumental’173 events in my analysis of 
the Winchester Development. I examine the extent to which unconditionality is an event that 
marks the passing of time, draws the contracting parties closer together, makes backward 
steps appear impossible and encompasses the messiness and disorder of the conditional phase 
into the ‘flow’ of the development process. 
Staged improvements 
The passage that I quoted from Scott in the previous section, in which he states that 
‘modern historical time […] has been organised around a notion of discrete but continuous 
modular change,’174 invites scrutiny of the organising function of time. This is an important 
point and the extent to which temporal qualities perform organising roles is a theme of this 
thesis. In his work on the use of an array of documents and document production practices in 
the IMF, Harper noted how these documents and practices performed a type of temporal 
ordering. He explained, for example, how some documents enabled practitioners to re-assess 
the past or ‘glimpse the future’ to evaluate the desirability of that future.175 These documents 
were simultaneously forward and backward facing, and I examine this documentary technique 
in my analysis of the Winchester Development. I scrutinise viability modelling techniques that, 
as Henderson explains, enable a developer to perform a trajectory leading towards a ‘desired 
future state.’176  
The preoccupations with viability held by WCC’s officers and directors working for both 
of the Council’s development partners are a feature of ‘viability-led’ development predicated 
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on a developer achieving a desired level of profitability from the development.177 Recent 
research examines the ways that developers use viability modelling to rewrite past 
commitments and side-step obligations imposed upon them as a condition of the grant of a 
planning permission.178 Of particular importance in that research is an exposition of the use by 
developers of ‘viability concerns’ to reduce their commitment to incorporate community 
benefits into their projects.179 That research examines the implications of viability modelling in 
the context of planning decisions whereas my research investigates the consequences of using 
the DAs deployed in property-led development to carry around viability modelling techniques.  
Viability assessments are, as Christophers argues, ubiquitous, with outputs that 
‘format’ contemporary urban space.180 I examine the use of viability modelling as a technique 
of long distance control,181 which favours repeat players182 with the expertise to manipulate 
modelling outputs. But viability assessments also encourage preoccupation with producing 
development proposals that are acceptable to third-party investors.183 As Christophers,184 
Flynn,185 Watt and Minton,186 and others187 explain, preoccupation with ‘investability’ can also 
be exploited by a developer and their consultants to produce the changes in a development 
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project that they deem desirable. I will investigate how property developers use the products 
of these modelling techniques to direct a development project and pre-existing contractual 
arrangements through processes of what Johns has called ‘highly moderated change.’188 
One of the strategies that I analyse is the differentiation, by a developer and its 
consultants, between viability assessments produced in the past and assessments produced in 
the present. This simple mechanism has an important effect in performing new connections, 
reproducing existing connections and severing unwanted connections. It is a mechanism that 
functions, as Bastian has put it, by ‘conceptualizing time as being made up of a series of nows’ 
and by constructing phases in the development process as a ‘flexible medium in which to 
legitimate whatever connections or disconnections are preferred.’189 The time-in-between 
these ‘nows’ is, as I demonstrate, the source of this ‘flexible medium.’  
There are various ways to approach the ‘time-in-between’ the moments and events 
that mark change. For example, Lee and Brown address this in their examination of the 
‘passing phases’ of childhood development.190 Similarly, Grabham examines waiting periods to 
be endured before the moment of ‘accession’ at which past complexities might be made to 
appear to have been resolved.191 In the context of the moment of accession that the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004 generates, this means that individuals seeking official recognition of their 
‘acquired’ gender must wait for a period of two years while, as Grabham puts it, they ‘amass 
sufficient time living in their assumed gender’ to satisfy a gender recognition panel of their 
commitment to their gender identity.192 This ‘administratively ambiguous state’193 shapes 
many of these individual’s experiences of time, marked particularly by what Grabham calls the 
‘legislated waiting periods contained within the Gender Recognition Act.’194 I examine waiting 
periods, expectation of the forthcoming and experiences of ‘accession’ in property-led 
development. 
Another way of thinking about these things is by examining property-led development 
as a process that is both staged and that moves forward through stages. I draw out the double-
meaning of a ‘stage’ and, in investigating the staging of property-led development, I am 
influenced by Ricoeur’s work on narrative forms that present history as a continuous 
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movement through one stage of a story to the next in a succession of ordered and orderly 
steps. This type of narrative proceeds, he explains, through a series of ‘rule-governed 
transformations.’195 I am also guided here by considerations of performance and 
performativity,196 although I barely touch upon the richness of these ideas in my thesis. I do, 
however, consider how actors in the Winchester Development performed assumed roles and 
how documents such as the Winchester DA were performative, in the sense that they 
generated actions, events, connections and associations.  
Similarly thought-provoking is Cooper’s recent interpretation of Speaker’s Corner in 
Hyde Park as a ‘dramaturgical structure’ offering an identifiable and well-known location that 
becomes a marketplace of ideas and staged performances on a weekly basis.197 These stages 
are platforms for action and Greenhouse also invokes this idea when she argues that ‘Western 
notions of time imply that human action unfolds in time and place’ and that, as a consequence, 
‘time and place are treated as empty stages, awaiting human drama.’198 
Serres and Latour have encouraged researchers to explore ‘the conditional space and 
time for transporting messages back and forth’199 and I seek to examine the conditional 
phases, the pauses, the intervals and the staged action that went into the formation and 
recalibration of, as well as the progression along, a desired development trajectory. 
Acting ‘as if’ 
The final analytical thread that I explore in this thesis concerns the way in which a legal 
technology can enable actors to act ‘as if’ the technology will produce predictable future 
effects. Helpful here is the ANT concept of a ‘black box’.200 This is an idea that originates in 
systems engineering whenever a process is too complex for a technician to understand. When 
a technician is only interested in starting a process and generating results from it, he or she 
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will, Latour explains, ‘draw a little black box’ that stands in for the ‘complex inner 
workings’201and that lets the technician focus upon the necessary inputs and the resultant 
outputs rather than the process itself. These black boxes are ubiquitous, Latour suggests, and 
do not materialise only in specialist fields:  
The humblest technique – this lamp, this ashtray, this paper-clip – mixes periods, 
places and totally heterogeneous materials; it folds them into the same black box, 
causing those who use them to act, by diverting the course of their action.202  
The users of a lamp, an ashtray or a paper-clip rarely question the mixings that go into the 
making of the materials, or the way that those mixings condition their actions, so these 
observations suggest that opening up these black boxes to further analysis might produce 
interesting results. The concept of black boxing has been fruitful for studies of regulatory 
techniques, as Cloatre and Dingwall203 and Bellanova and Duez204 show in their depiction of the 
assemblage of institutions, regulations, relationships, materials, values and technologies that 
go into the making of socio-legal objects.  
Contractual documents, McGee argues, operate like a black box and as a form of 
‘cooled-down’ legal technology205 that efface the messiness of the actions required to produce 
them, present a stable and apparently settled set of relations and generate an impression of 
processes being worked upon behind the scenes. But there are pauses and hesitations, as well 
as ‘segments, intervals, and moments,’206 in the negotiation and implementation of 
contractual arrangements during which the contracting parties adopt contrasting or conflicting 
positions. To help think through the pauses, hesitations, segments, intervals and moments 
during which WCC’s officers and their development partners held their differences apart and 
postponed their resolution, I refer to Mol’s work on conflicting approaches to the diagnosis 
and treatment of lower-limb atherosclerosis in a Dutch hospital, which shows that differences 
in opinion as to causes of and treatments for the disease were ‘distributed’ to enable patients, 
pathologists, clinicians and administrators to coordinate their approach to each incidence of 
the disease.207 Distribution, in those circumstances, did not ‘expunge messiness but shifts it. 
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Pushes it along’208 and prevents ‘distribution from becoming the pluralizing of the disease into 
separate but unrelated objects.’209  
Earlier in this chapter, I referred to Scott’s critique of notions of the time of the nation 
state moving forward through periods of ‘discrete but continuous modular change’210 and this 
idea, together with Mol’s point about ‘distribution,’ helps with an analysis of the weaving 
together of the conditions in a DA and the changes that take place within the conditional 
phases of a property-led development. I ask if a conditional DA enables not only continuous 
change but also onward progression towards unconditionality because it is a type of modular 
object211 consisting of detachable components that can be worked upon at different times and 
in different places. This discussion suggests that a modular form enables control over a 
complex process by facilitating a series of simplifications that must be sustained to prevent 
complexities from ramifying until the components are ready to be fitted together and I explore 
this in my examination of the Winchester DA. 
In her ethnography of drafting practices within UN conferences, Riles reveals how 
delegates situated a document drafted in one conference within the wider ‘trajectory’ of an 
overarching ‘platform for action’ by linking preparatory conferences and resolutions 
anticipated at future conferences.212 At one particular conference, when faced with an 
unexpected controversy over the inclusion of a particular term in a document, the delegates 
had temporarily placed that term ‘in brackets’ while negotiations on the document’s content 
continued. This meant that the delegates could discuss the content of the rest of the 
document while acknowledging that they had not resolved the use of the controversial term. 
For the delegates tasked with resolving the controversy, bracketing the term created a 
moment of ‘temporal and analytical gridlock’ but this sense of stasis was, according to Riles, 
only ever ‘perceptible from the perspective of one caught in the moment.’213 Where those 
delegates were temporarily burdened by having to revisit earlier discussions regarding the 
meaning of the term in question, the eventual un-bracketing of the term meant that other 
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delegates and outsiders looking in could act both as if there had been no momentary 
hesitation and as if no similar controversy would emerge in future conferences. 
A point worth revisiting here is the one that Callon has made regarding the 
‘multilateral negotiations, trials of strength and tricks’ through which identities and desires of 
actors stabilise.214 Bracketing a controversial term is a type of trick and other examples 
abound. In her discussion of Japanese investment banking practices, Riles analyses the use of 
‘collateral,’ the practice of a party to a transaction providing some form of security for a debt, 
exercisable in the event of a future default in payment.215 She explains, however, how banking 
practices have evolved to enable the party benefiting from the security to use the collateral in 
other transactions before there had been any default in the original transaction.216 This 
practice is ‘rehypothecation,’ which relies upon a ‘special kind of pause’ and a ‘fiction that the 
future moment of the swap’s completion has already arrived.’217 It is, therefore, ‘a command, 
or a mutual agreement to act “As If”.’218 A type of fiction also characterises the succession of 
deals that constitute a public-private infrastructure project, according to Johns, in that the 
‘socio-legal architecture’ of the project ‘encourages [the public body and its private sector 
partner] to conduct themselves as if the deal were more or less a stand-alone field of work, set 
apart from surrounding circumstances and constituencies.’219  
These ‘as-ifs’ appear to perform important roles. As well as enabling the parties to a 
transaction to assume the occurrence of a future event, they help to formulate a ‘world fit for 
projects,’ predicated on a prevailing and largely unchallenged assumption that these projects 
depend for their progress on devices that conceal controversies and seclude the project from 
the world outside.220 But this project-oriented outlook involves a ‘gradual approach that 
favours adjustments and corrections’221 and that depends upon the project’s ‘ability to isolate 
itself, [to] take its distance.’222 These efforts originate in a widely-held belief that what takes 
place in a secluded meeting room, office, workshop or laboratory might be messy or 
contentious but that these controversies can gradually resolve while protected from outside 
intervention. 
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But this also assumes that outsiders need not worry themselves about what goes on 
during these conditional phases. And while opening up a black box, examining the discussions 
that take place while a contentious term is ‘bracketed’ or scrutinising an ‘as if’ in an academic 
setting might generate interesting findings about ‘processes in the making,’223 it can be 
disruptive for designers and technicians engaged in network-building if black boxed processes 
fail, settled meanings of a term become contentious  or the assumptions underpinning an ‘as 
if’ are challenged. In his analysis of Électricité de France’s attempts to construct a project world 
for the VEL, its proposed electric car, Callon focuses particularly on the difficulties that EDF’s 
engineers faced in establishing hydrogen fuel cells as a stable component of its design. 
Elements of the fuel cell became ‘appallingly complex’ when a black box ‘whose operation had 
been reduced to a few well-defined parameters gave rise to a swarm of new actors.’224 
Applying these ideas to my analysis of the Winchester Development equips me to examine the 
consequences of a failure, on the part of both WCC and its development partners, to gather 
together the components of a workable property-led development. 
Conclusion 
To answer the research questions I set out in chapter one, I draw upon findings 
developed in ANT and socio-legal studies to scrutinise ways in which the contractual 
arrangements deployed in property-led development generate actions. I scrutinise how the 
contractual arrangements that underpin property-led development utilise legal technologies 
but I also investigate the arrangements that extend a partnership between a local authority 
and a developer into non-legal fields by, for example, making it easier for a developer to 
secure development funding from third party financial institutions.225 In addition, Cloatre’s 
work226 helps me to illustrate how legal technologies are enacted in practices and provides me 
with tools to examine the role that the contractual arrangements performed in generating, 
strengthening or severing certain connections and associations. These insights also enable me 
to scrutinise the role that newly-formed or existing connections performed in shaping the 
content, form and effect of the contractual arrangements deployed in property-led 
development. Directing attention to the role of law as a hybrid assemblage asks questions 
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about what law is and the entities that create and constitute it, as well as those created or 
constituted by it. 
My analysis of the particular contractual arrangements in the Winchester 
Development will consider the extent to which those arrangements contributed to the 
production and reproduction of an overarching development trajectory. In analysing the 
Winchester DA, I apply concepts related to fluidity, adaptation and change to explore how the 
conditions in the DA functioned as a series of components that addressed separate but not 
unrelated accepts of the development process. I am also interested in exploring the manner in 
which local authority officers and development directors proposed and eventually attempted 
to gather together these modular units to create a DA ready to become unconditional. The 
theme of ‘ratcheting,’227 which helps to illuminate the acts of tightening planned to enable 
property-led development to move forward towards unconditionality, is an important one in 
this thesis. 
Underpinning my research is a critique of the belief that these processes could only 
progress if the actors attempting to guide those processes adopt a project-oriented outlook. 
The ‘image of projectness’228 that Law describes rests upon the performance of a technological 
development as a sequence of linked, closely controlled and carefully managed projects,229 
somewhat similar in form to the ‘succession of deals’ that Johns suggests many practitioners 
deem to be necessary to enable public infrastructure projects to move forward.230 Both 
approaches emphasise a presumption, held by many practitioners, that development projects 
of many types work best if they follow a linear trajectory, passing through ‘segments, intervals, 
and moments,’231 as well as pauses,232 hesitations,233 phases234 and ‘monumental events,’235 
designed or anticipated in advance and laid out to enable a sense of both ratcheting and 
‘accession.’236 I explore temporalities and temporal constructions present in the Winchester 
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Development and use the idea of time as an empty stage,237 and the double-meaning of the 
word ‘stage,’ as an important analytical tool. 
  
                                                          








Methods and Methodology 
The research questions that I answer in this thesis focus upon the operation of law and 
legal technologies in property-led development. I examine the form, content and effect of 
contractual arrangements and the extent to which those contractual arrangements enable a 
local authority and its private sector development partner to assemble a development site and 
to order a multiplicity of connections, associations and relations activated during the 
development process. To answer my questions, I used a combination of methods, which I 
explain in this chapter. My methods primarily involved a case study based upon archival 
research and documentary analysis, alongside semi-structured interviews with property 
development professionals. These methods were a necessary consequence of research 
questions that required an examination of what legal technologies do in property-led 
development and how property development professionals seek to utilise those technologies. 
Extensive archival research, detailed documentary analysis and broad-ranging interviews were 
also necessary to facilitate an Actor-Network Theory (ANT) inspired approach designed to 
investigate the complexity of the interlocking processes that underpin property-led 
development.  
The combination of methods utilised in this research enables me to contribute to 
existing knowledge in this area by providing new insights into the form, content and effect of 
the contractual arrangements commonly deployed in property-led development. There are 
two interlinked objects of analysis in this thesis. The first is a property-led development project 
carried out in Winchester1 and the second is the role and impact of contractual arrangements 
in property-led development. The Winchester Development involved easily identifiable events 
and a collection of tangible, legal materials. It also, however, involved a multiplicity of more 
intangible concepts. For example, the signing of the Development Agreement2 between 
Winchester City Council and its private sector development partner took place on 22 
December 2004 and the DA is a document that exists in a material form that can be viewed 
online. But while the text of the DA revealed most of the contents of the agreement, those 
contents did not explain much about the role and impact of the agreement or the way in which 
local authority officers, developers and property development consultants produced and used 
it. Similarly, the text of the DA provided an interesting insight into the use of temporal 
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concepts and the conditionality of the developer’s obligation to construct the development 
but did not explain the operation of these concepts in all their complexity. As a result, I have 
examined how local authority officers, private sector development directors and their 
respective professional consultants negotiate, interpret, use and implement a DA and other 
contractual arrangements. This chapter explains how I did this. 
My research has sought to explore, using Cowan’s phrase, ‘the way that law and 
legality emerge’3 in property-led development by highlighting the linkage between legal 
concepts and the things that people think about and do with contracts and other material 
manifestations of law such as Compulsory Purchase Orders.4 Given that I investigated legal 
phenomena in their operation, my work is a type of empirical legal research.5 The goal of 
empirical legal research is to ‘generate knowledge about law,’6 and, to that end, I examined 
‘formal legal documents,’ such as court decisions and statutory materials,7 and documents 
with a more ‘blurry legal definition.’8 All of these documents provided ‘observable and 
verifiable data’ in their own right.9 To access data about their operation within a broader 
property development context, I looked at what property development professionals wrote in 
public reports and private correspondence about contractual arrangements, court decisions, 
planning permissions, CPOs and other documents.10 I also asked some of those individuals to 
explain how they used the contractual arrangements commonly deployed in property-led 
development. My approach was, therefore, ‘qualitative’11 and I attempted to collect data in a 
‘systematic’ manner12 while retaining sufficient flexibility to enable me to ‘follow the actors.’13 
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Doing so is a feature of ANT-inspired research because, Latour argues, a researcher should not 
‘limit in advance the shape, size, heterogeneity, and combination of associations’ that they 
seek to study.14 For Cowan and Carr, applying this approach to legal studies is a ‘significant 
methodological advance because it enables us to make connections visible.’15  
In terms of generating knowledge about law, I consider legal processes, such as the 
making, confirmation and exercise of compulsory purchase powers, judicial review 
proceedings and the way in which local authorities prepare for those, and the mechanisms for 
varying contractual arrangements when those contractual arrangements are ostensibly 
governed by specific legal rules. Data explaining those processes came from formal legal 
documents,16 central government guidance and policy documents,17 existing academic 
literature in this field,18 ‘official’19 Council documents and the transcripts and notes of 18 
interviews that I conducted. From that data, I attempted to craft a ‘representative account’20 
of the Winchester Development and the operation of the contractual arrangements deployed 
there. While the events that happened, the contents of the contractual arrangements and 
some of the actions of the various parties are ‘matters of fact,’21 my interpretation of them is 
presented within what Latour has called ‘the mediating constraints of writing.’22 This means 
that those matters of fact have inevitably been repackaged in my attempt to generate 
knowledge within the time constraints of a PhD and to present that knowledge in a readable 
form. 
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The product of my research is, therefore, a narrative reconstruction of the Winchester 
Development that ‘conjures up’ those things in a particular way. But while this thesis does not 
purport to be a complete account of either the events that happened in Winchester or the 
deployment of the contractual arrangements, it is founded in the methodical approach that I 
describe in this chapter.23 In discussing my approach, I demonstrate that, notwithstanding the 
inherent limitations to any attempt to capture fluid and complex social processes, my research 
was sufficiently rigorous to produce dependable24 findings that offer a valuable contribution to 
knowledge about law and property-led development. 
In sections one, two and three of this chapter, I discuss the research design principles 
that underlie this thesis and explain the use of a case study. Section four then addresses my 
use of archival research and document analysis before the fifth section discusses the interview 
data that I assembled. In each of those sections, I explain how I generated data, my approach 
to data analysis, limitations to the research design and the ethical considerations that I took 
into account.  
Exploratory Research 
My desire to carry out doctoral research into property-led development was a 
product, at least in part, of experiences I gained between 2011 to 2013, while working as a 
solicitor specialising in planning and environmental law. The bulk of my work involved due 
diligence on behalf of companies purchasing other companies or companies purchasing land. 
This largely involved me reviewing documents such as planning permissions, planning 
agreements,25 and geotechnical, environmental and flooding reports to advise on the potential 
liabilities a client might face in completing a proposed acquisition. Another strand of my work 
involved the drafting of planning agreements and highways agreements26 and, in this capacity, 
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I became aware that local authorities and developers would also often enter into other forms 
of contractual arrangement before a local authority used its compulsory purchase powers to 
assemble a development site on behalf of a developer.  
Before working as a solicitor, I had contemplated embarking upon postgraduate study 
and had continued to consider that possibility while in private practice. Property development 
and the exercise by local authorities of compulsory purchase powers seemed like a topic area 
with the potential for further academic study. My initial research proposal, which formed the 
basis for this research, was that I would carry out a case study examining the use of 
compulsory purchase powers, seeking to identify reasons why construction of a property-led 
development does not automatically follow land acquisition. It is difficult to recall precisely 
how my research design emerged from this vaguely defined intention, although it is clear that 
the specific focus of my research changed as I investigated property development further. 
Change in research design is not, Webley suggests, unusual: 
In design terms, qualitative research unfolds – it develops as the researcher learns 
more; in other words the experiment is not usually set up and then allowed to run 
along a predetermined course. Instead, the research may be redesigned to meet 
changing conditions, perceptions and findings. This means that the research 
design may be relatively fluid; the parameters of the study and the approach and 
methods adopted may have to be amended to accommodate altered 
understandings and changing dynamics.27 
The focus of my research did not change radically but shifted incrementally from an interest in 
the compulsory purchase process towards an interest in the DAs between local authorities and 
their development partners.  
Academic texts that I read at this stage played an influential role in this change of focus. 
I mentioned a number of these texts in chapters one and two, and Valverde’s broad-ranging 
empirical research into ‘city governance’ practices contained the charge that ‘researchers will 
need to devise strategies’ to scrutinise contract details.28 While I was carrying out my 
exploratory research and at a similar time to reading Valverde’s text, I read Winter and Lloyd’s 
summary of the use of compulsory purchase powers for property development purposes, 
which refers to a DA as follows: 
The commercial terms are (at least in part) normally highly confidential, but it is 
not unusual at CPO inquiries for the acquiring authority to produce a redacted 
copy of those parts of the agreement which are not commercially sensitive and 
which are required to demonstrate the level of commitment of the parties 
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discussion of the operation of highways agreement, see ibid, 300-301. 
27 Webley, 'Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research', 932. 
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(particularly the developer) to carrying out the development and (where 
appropriate) to relocating owners and occupiers affected by the compulsory 
acquisition and redevelopment process.29 
While it is no longer possible for me to account for the influence of other readings at this stage 
in the research process, Winter and Lloyd appeared to point to a possible strategy for 
scrutinising the contractual arrangements between a local authority and a developer. My next 
step was to seek a complete or redacted copy of a DA and information about the contents of 
an agreement.  
To do so, I carried out a series of simple Google searches by typing the location of a 
development and the term, ‘development agreement’ into the online search engine. Typing 
‘winchester+“development agreement”’ into Google’s search engine did not produce a copy of 
the Winchester DA but did generate results directing me to reports discussing the DA that 
Winchester City Council’s officers had presented to councillors in committee meetings. Using 
the search function of the Council’s website enabled me to gather data from other committee 
meeting minutes and reports. At that stage, however, I was not focusing on a particular case 
but used this strategy to gather information about the various property-led development 
project including the Winchester Development. In doing so, I was concerned that writing about 
some property-led developments might create a conflict of interest because solicitors at the 
law firm at which I had worked had been instructed to advise members of the property 
development industry in some high profile developments. Although I had not worked on these 
developments myself, I had heard aspects discussed and had seen some documents pertaining 
to some developments that the parties involved would probably have deemed to be 
confidential. For that reason, it did not seem appropriate for me to focus upon projects in 
which I knew my former colleagues had been participants.  
Having ruled out the possibility of examining certain developments, I continued 
gathering and reviewing information about the Winchester Development and the East 
Street/Brightwells development in Farnham,30 with the intention that this data collection 
would help me to clarify my overall approach. My initial information gathering enabled me to 
ascertain some of the key components of the DAs operative in those settings. I established, for 
example, that these DAs did not oblige the developer to commence construction immediately 
following confirmation of the making of a CPO but that, even if a CPO had been confirmed, the 
developer’s commitment to commence construction remained conditional. Moreover, officers 
                                                          
29 Paul Winter and Richard Lloyd, 'Regeneration, compulsory purchase orders and practical related 
issues' (2006) Journal of Planning and Environmental Law 781, 791. 
30 For the sake of brevity, I refer throughout this chapter to ‘the Farnham Development’ and the 
development agreement deployed there as ‘the Farnham DA.’ Farnham is a small town in Surrey, about 
38 miles from central London, with a similar population to Winchester. 
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reporting to the local authorities’ committees each pointed towards the relevance of ‘Long 
Stop Dates’ and the concept of an ‘Unconditional Date’ as a significant marker of progress in 
the development process.  
While I was gathering information about these DAs, I carried out an exploratory 
interview with a property developer, who I refer to throughout this thesis as D2.31 I conducted 
this exploratory interview to ascertain the extent to which practitioner accounts of property-
led development might provide helpful insights into the form, content and purpose of the DAs 
that I had briefly encountered. McDowell explains that qualitative research, particularly 
qualitative research involving interviews, often relies on ‘luck and chance, connections and 
networks.’32 My exploratory interview took place in October 2014 and was arranged through a 
family connection who eased my access and facilitated a first step in the interviewing process.  
In this interview, I asked my interviewee about his experiences negotiating and 
implementing DAs, and to explain the components of an agreement that he deemed most 
important. He discussed the contents of DAs in some detail, provided some interesting 
commentary on the role of a DA in a particular development process and talked at length 
about his experience of the work that a developer needs to do to encourage a local authority 
to enter into a DA and to agree to exercise its compulsory purchase powers. The data 
generated from my exploratory interview and initial document analysis solidified my interest 
not only in the content of a DA but also in what property development professionals do with 
their DAs and how local authority officers and developers produce these agreements.  
Research Design 
Although my exploratory research had generated some interesting data, defining 
precise research questions and a research design to answer those questions depended on the 
information that I would be able to gather about the developments. I have already noted 
Winter and Lloyd’s observation that some local authorities produce redacted copies of their 
DAs at CPO inquiries.33 Waverley Borough Council34 and Winchester City Council35 had both 
recently made CPOs for their developments and both included copies of their agreements, 
with some financial details obscured, in their bundles of evidence submitted to the respective 
inquiries. Both local authorities had uploaded these versions of their DAs to their websites. 
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As of 28 September 2017, Waverley Borough Council still had electronic links on its 
website to copies of two documents that, taken together, form the Farnham DA. These were 
available at http://www.waverley.gov.uk/downloads/200349/view_and_comment36 and 
provided me with access to the contents of a DA and an insight into the way in which a local 
authority and a developer might adapt an agreement in response to the manner in which they 
carry out a development. The webpage containing links to the Farnham DA also has links to the 
other documents that Waverley Borough Council submitted to the CPO Inquiry.37  
Until early in 2017, Winchester City Council’s website also contained a webpage 
providing links to its CPO, the Council’s statement of case and statement of reasons for making 
the CPO, supporting documents and the submissions that individuals and organisations made 
to object to the CPO.38 Included in the supporting documents were a copy of the Winchester 
DA, a deed of variation dated 22 October 2009 and two further deeds of variation, both of 
which were dated 10 December 2010. Although WCC has now removed the webpage 
containing links to the DA and the CPO Documents, the DA and the various deeds of variation 
are still available online39 due to a request for publication that a member of the public made 
on 12 August 2014 using ‘access to information legislation.’40 This act of disclosure provided 
                                                          
36 Under the heading, ‘East Street development agreement’ are two links. The first is entitled ‘East Street 
Development Agreement – Part 1 – Deeds of Variation’ and the second is entitled ‘East Street 
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between the local authority and the developer varying the original agreement. Waverley Borough 
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parts of the text struck through by a single black line and replaced by new wording set out in an 
italicised, underlined typeface. The 2010 deed of variation also makes significant changes to the DA but 
these are not as extensive. 
37 These are collected under the following subheadings: ‘Brightwells Compulsory Purchase Order (CPO) 
Statement of Case,’ ‘Brightwells Statement of Case supporting documents,’ ‘Brightwells Statement of 
Case supporting documents – Objections,’ ‘Brightwells Purchase Order (CPO) Statement of Reasons,’ 
‘Brightwells Compulsory Purchase Order (CPO) and Plans’ and ‘Brightwells – minutes of pre inquiry 
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authority is a public body potentially obliged to confirm or deny the existence of requested information 
and potentially obliged to disclose that information. The FOIA 2000 applies to all information that a 
public body holds, while the EIR 2003 applies to information that relates to ‘land.’ Various exemptions 
exist that allow a public body to refuse to confirm or deny the existence of requested information and to 
refuse to communicate that information, including section 43 of the FOIA 2000 and regulation 12 of the 
EIR 2003, which permit a local authority to deem information exempt from disclosure if it deems that 
disclosure would interfere with a legitimate commercial or economic interest. WCC could not apply 




vital access to many of the key terms in the DA and to deeds of variation and side letters that 
WCC, Thornfield and Henderson used to vary the original agreement. 
This meant that I had gathered two DAs, a small number of Council documents 
referring to the DAs and the notes of an exploratory interview. This provided sufficient 
information for me to settle on the research questions that I set out in chapter one of this 
thesis, although I intended to answer those questions by writing about both the Farnham and 
Winchester Developments. To answer the questions, I planned to carry out a case study of 
both developments, although it was clear that observing the property development processes 
in Farnham and Winchester and the role of DAs and other contractual arrangements would, as 
Valverde has observed, be difficult without ‘privileged access to the backrooms’ where deals 
are made.41 I did not ask the local authorities or the developers involved to allow me to 
observe those meetings, however, because I felt that it was extremely unlikely that they would 
agree. Similarly, I did not expect that either local authority or their respective development 
partners would agree to be interviewed ‘on the record’ about those developments. Instead, I 
wanted to use interviews with property development practitioners to gather views of 
property-led development and the roles that contractual arrangements performed within that 
process. 
Despite these potential limitations, I felt that a case study approach was best suited to 
answering my research questions. Nonetheless, there are potential criticisms of the case study 
approach that must be addressed. In particular, a case study approach might contain inherent 
limitations if a narrow focus restricts the ‘generalizability’ of the findings.42 As a counterpoint, 
however, other appraisals suggest that typicality in a case is irrelevant and that a case study 
will often have merit simply on the basis that the approach has generated a rich, varied and 
informative dataset.43 This can mean that case study accounts of a phenomenon are often as 
descriptive as they are analytical, as Latour observes in a (presumably) fictional discussion 
between a professor and a doctoral student carrying out research into some form of 
‘organization’: 
S: [My supervisor] wants my case studies to ‘lead to some useful generalization.’ 
He does not want ‘mere description.’ So even if I do what you want, I will have 
one nice description of one state of affairs, and then what? I still have to put it 
                                                          
41 Valverde, Everyday law on the street: city governance in an age of diversity, 14. 
42 For a discussion rebutting some of these criticisms, consider Bent Flyvbjerg, 'Five misunderstandings 
about case-study research' (2006) 12 Qualitative Inquiry 219 and Eric W. K. Tsang, 'Generalizing from 
Research Findings: The Merits of Case Studies' (2014) 16 International Journal of Management Reviews 
369. 
43 Schwandt and Gates refer to the value of any attempt to generate a ‘detailed portrayal of some 
phenomenon’ (Thomas A. Schwandt and Emily F. Gates, 'Case Study Methodology' in Norman k Denzin 
and Yvonna S Lincoln (eds), The Sage handbook of qualitative research, 5th edn (Sage 2018), 346). 
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into a frame to find a typology, compare, explain, generalize. That’s why I’m 
starting to panic. 
P: You should panic only if your actors were not doing that constantly as well, 
actively, reflexively, obsessively. They, too, compare; they, too, produce 
typologies; they, too, design standards; they, too, spread their machines as well as 
their organizations, their ideologies, their states of mind. Why would you be the 
one doing the intelligent stuff while they would act like a bunch of morons? What 
they do to expand, to relate, to compare, to organize is what you have to describe 
as well. It’s not another layer that you would have to add to the ‘mere 
description.’ Don’t try to shift from description to explanation: simply go on with 
the description. What your own ideas are about your company is of no interest 
whatsoever compared to how this bit of the company has managed to spread.44 
Latour argues that this preoccupation with detailed description need not come at the expense 
of an attempt to analyse the processes being described. Rather, he suggests that rich 
description of the ‘sheer complexity’ will reveal ‘controversies’ from which a researcher can 
draw tentative conclusions.45  
Nevertheless, a researcher should, Gates and Schwandt suggest, ask what the 
‘instance’ that they are looking at is a ‘case of.’46 When I started looking at the Winchester and 
Farnham Developments, I was aware that neither would provide the basis for an in-depth 
investigation of a ‘complete’ property-led development because neither development had 
been concluded. If I had incorporated some analysis of a concluded property development 
process, I would have been able to analyse the moment that the developer and the local 
authority decided to work together on the development, through to the moment at which the 
local authority granted a lease of the development site to the developer. My initial 
documentary analysis of various completed developments revealed interesting findings 
regarding the manner in which a developer enrols a local authority as a participant in property-
led development, the way that a developer side-lines rival landowners and competing 
developers, and the collaborative efforts that enable a developer and a local authority to 
secure the participation of the retailers that would occupy an end development. 
My initial investigations into the Farnham Development also generated interesting 
findings, however, particularly related to local opposition to the development, delays to the 
development process apparently caused by ‘viability’ issues and the way in which the local 
authority and the developer adapted their contractual arrangements to respond to these 
concerns. Unlike the completed developments that I considered, the Farnham Development 
was ongoing so provided an opportunity to monitor property-led development in progress. 
The Winchester Development was a similar process in progress, with press reports of vocal 
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45 ibid, 16. 
46 Schwandt and Gates, 'Case Study Methodology’, 342. 
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opposition to the development proposals, progress towards the construction of the 
development that had been postponed on a number of occasions and a DA that the local 
authority had rewritten to recalibrate its sense of an appropriate development trajectory. In 
addition, however, extra features to the Winchester Development made it stand out as a case 
with the potential for rich description and analysis. In particular, the CPO process had been 
particularly controversial in Winchester, and the local authority and objectors to the making of 
the order had provided extensive evidence to the public inquiry, all of which was available 
online. Moreover, the Council’s original development partner had been placed into 
administration by the bank that provided much of the developer’s funding, meaning that a 
new organisation had taken on the developer’s responsibilities in the DA. Finally, the 
Winchester Development process was also the focus of judicial review proceedings into a 
decision that the Council made in 2014 to vary its DA.47  
From this array of initial findings, I had to select one or more ‘cases’ to study. I felt that 
studying property-led development processes in progress was a worthwhile approach so I 
initially intended to examine both the Farnham and Winchester Developments because I 
assumed that some form of comparative analysis would produce richer findings. I did not 
decide to work primarily on Winchester as a case study until I had carried out some further 
investigations into both developments, at which point I realised that a single case study would 
produce highly complex and original findings. Schwandt and Gates suggest that one principle 
for choosing whether to carry out a single case study or to add additional cases is that ‘the 
researcher continues to add instances until she or he stops learning something new about the 
phenomenon.’48 Each of the elements of the Winchester Development that I discussed in the 
previous paragraph offered an opportunity to learn something new and fed into my decision to 
make that development the focus of my thesis. I was confident, given the complexity of the 
Winchester Development, that studying it would enable me to contribute to existing research 
into property development practices. 
Case Study 
I provided a brief chronological summary of the Winchester Development in chapter 
one. In chapters four to six, I examine the contract formation process followed in Winchester 
and explain that the approach that WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors adopted is not 
unusual. I will also demonstrate that the Winchester DA contained concepts that are typical of 
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this form of property-led development. In particular, I analyse the conditions in the DA and the 
use of temporal concepts such as Long Stop Dates and an Unconditional Date. I also scrutinise 
variations to the DA that were similar in content and purpose to those enacted in 
developments like the Farnham Development. These factors meant that the Winchester 
Development offered what Bryman calls an ‘exemplifying’ case that would afford me the 
opportunity to describe and analyse the land assembly processes and contractual 
arrangements typically deployed in this type of setting.49 
Alongside the aspects of the Winchester DA that I mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, I also discuss the ‘required elements’ that Thornfield and WCC included in the 
agreement. This set of specifications was unique to the Winchester Development but activated 
aspects of procurement law that apply to all property-led development projects involving 
contractual arrangements between local authorities and private sector developers. 
Throughout this thesis, I discuss the circumstances that provoked WCC to authorise the 
rewriting of the pre-agreed required elements and the procurement law implications of doing 
so. This necessitates some discussion of the current tendency in property development 
practice for developers to construct or contribute to the construction of affordable housing 
but then to seek to avoid fulfilling that commitment. 
The Winchester Development is, therefore, a case that illustrates common property-
led development processes. But there are also elements of the Winchester Development that 
are more unusual that I seek to describe and analyse. In addition to the particular 
circumstances that led to the rewriting of the required elements in the DA, the development 
process became complicated when Thornfield’s bank placed Thornfield Properties into 
administration in 2010. This eventuality demonstrates one of the difficulties with Latour’s 
instruction that social scientists should ‘follow the actors.’ In the circumstances of the 
Winchester Development, Thornfield’s bank was clearly a significant actor but the need to 
produce timely doctoral outputs meant that it was impossible for me to investigate the 
relationship between Thornfield and its bank in any great detail. Instead, I seek to describe 
how the development process continued despite the insolvency of Thornfield’s parent 
company. In December 2010, Henderson UK Property Fund acquired Thornfield, changed the 
name of Thornfield to Silverhill Winchester No1 Limited and replaced Thornfield Properties as 
guarantor of the former’s obligations in the DA.50 Analysing the manner in which WCC and 
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Henderson used the existing DA as the basis for the making of a CPO in 2011 and for 
progression along the Thornfield-led development trajectory provides helpful insights into the 
role and effect of the contractual arrangements deployed in Winchester.  
The judicial review into the Council’s decision to agree to further variations of the DA51 
and the ‘Independent Review’52 the Council commissioned following the High Court’s decision 
in Gottlieb both provided further unusual access to the development process and revealed 
otherwise hidden aspects of the operation of this type of contractual arrangement. In 
particular, the Independent Review illuminated aspects of the Council’s preparation for the 
judicial review and the legal advice that it received on the operation of the DA. These are the 
type of discussions that usually remain confined to the ‘backrooms’53 but that unexpectedly 
came into view here. These aspects of the development process mean that the Winchester 
Development acts as a ‘revelatory’ case54 in that I probe aspects of property-led development 
that are typically not available for analysis. 
The Winchester Development was, therefore, a ‘multi-headed beast’55 that could be 
studied to gain an understanding of what a local authority and a developer do when they enter 
into contractual arrangements with a view to property-led development and what they do 
after they have entered into those arrangements. In writing up my findings, I wanted to 
produce an account of the negotiations and other actions that took place in Winchester before 
WCC and Thornfield Properties entered into their contractual arrangements, as well as the 
‘time-in-between’ the date that they signed their contractual arrangements and the judicial 
review proceedings that quashed the Council’s decision to approve variations to the DA. I 
wanted to understand what went into the DA, as well as examining the circumstances that led 
to the judicial review proceedings and the termination of the DA. 
These points justify my description of my research as a case study and my choice of 
the Winchester Development as the subject of my analysis. A case study approach is not, 
however, a method in itself. Webley describes a case study approach as an ‘umbrella 
strategy’56 and Bryman points out that: 
A case study entails the detailed exposition of a specific case, which could be a 
community, organization, or person. But, once a case has been selected, a 
research method or research methods are needed to collect data. Simply selecting 
                                                          
the ownership of Henderson in chapter six. Where it is necessary to distinguish between the Henderson 
entity acting as developer and the Henderson entity acting as guarantor, I make the distinction clear.  
51 R (Gottlieb) v Winchester City Council (n47). 
52 Claer Lloyd-Jones, A Perfect Storm - Report on Silver Hill (Appendix B, Document 2.08). 
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an organization and deciding to study it intensively are not going to provide data. 
Do you observe? Do you conduct interviews? Do you examine documents? Do you 
administer questionnaires?57 
To carry out my case study, I conducted further archival research into the Winchester 
Development. I also investigated ‘live’58 Council documents produced in conjunction with the 
development as WCC and its development partners continued with land assembly and 
preparations for the planned commencement of construction.  
Document analysis 
A starting point for my document analysis was the DA between WCC, Thornfield and 
Thornfield Properties. Alongside the copy of the DA submitted as evidence, the CPO 
Documents provided an important source of information about the Winchester Development 
and revealed some of the things that WCC, Henderson and their consultants deemed to be 
important about the DA. For example, WCC produced a ‘statement of case’ and a ‘statement 
of reasons’ that it presented to the CPO inquiry justifying the making of the CPO. The Council 
also submitted proofs of evidence from one of its senior officers, one of Henderson’s directors 
and five consultants from the array of experts who Henderson had instructed.59 In studying 
these documents, I particularly looked for passages that addressed the formation and use of 
the contractual arrangements as a tool of land assembly and started drawing out the themes 
that I discussed in chapters one and two. 
Appendix B to this thesis is a list of the primary source documents produced during the 
Winchester Development that I use in this thesis. This list includes the CPO Documents I 
referred to in the previous paragraph. When I began my research, these CPO Documents were 
freely available on WCC’s website. During the course of my research, however, WCC 
constructed a new website. In doing so, the Council moved some of its documents from its 
previous website to the new one although it does not appear to have transferred the CPO 
Documents to which I refer. Fortunately, I had downloaded copies of these documents and 
have retained electronic and paper copies on file. 
The CPO Documents submitted on behalf of WCC to the CPO inquiry were produced 
for the express purpose of securing confirmation of the CPO. Taking into account the purposes 
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for which documents are produced, Finnegan suggests, is an important part of document 
analysis60 and Bryman advises that researchers should exercise ‘caution’ before treating 
‘official’ documents ‘as depictions of reality.’61 Taking my lead from Atkinson and Coffey, I felt 
that these documents nonetheless represented an untapped ‘goldmine’ of rich data 
demonstrating what WCC and Henderson thought was important about the DA and the 
development process.62 For example, Matthew Bodley, the chartered surveyor Henderson 
instructed to provide evidence in support of the Council at the CPO inquiry, enclosed with his 
evidence correspondence between Thornfield’s directors and John De Stefano,63 between 
Thornfield’s directors and WCC’s solicitors and between Henderson’s directors and De Stefano, 
as well as file notes connected to that correspondence, all of which provided an insight into 
the formation of the DA.64 Similarly, the evidence that Martin Perry, Henderson’s director of 
retail development, submitted to the inquiry proved helpful by providing his perspective on 
the actions that Henderson had taken to discharge conditions in the DA.65 Moreover, the 
nature of a contentious CPO process meant that objectors also produced evidence that I could 
analyse for contrasting views of the development process. For example, John De Stefano 
objected to the making of the CPO and instructed Bruce Hartley-Raven, a planning consultant, 
to provide evidence on his behalf at the inquiry.66 This consultant submitted supporting 
documents that included correspondence between WCC’s officers and De Stefano that Bodley, 
Henderson’s chartered surveyor, had not disclosed. While combining these sources does not 
produce a complete picture, it does provide an opportunity to understand the data better. 
Alongside this analysis of documents deployed as part of the CPO process, I also 
gathered and reviewed documents produced for the purposes of WCC’s committee 
proceedings. I focused on three sets of internal WCC proceedings. First, I considered the 
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proceedings of WCC’s Cabinet between May 2002 and May 2016.67 In chapter one, I explained 
that the Cabinet is WCC’s primary decision-making body and was responsible for authorising 
officers to make the CPO and enter into contractual arrangements for the purposes of the 
Winchester Development.68 Specific officers were responsible for the formulation of a 
development strategy, made recommendations to councillors on key decisions about the 
development, and implemented the Cabinet’s decisions. I consider a variety of officers’ reports 
in this thesis, including reports from the Council’s Chief Estates Officer, Director of 
Development Services and Corporate Director (Service Delivery). These reports often 
contained significant annexes or appendices, including correspondence between WCC’s 
officers and directors working for both Thornfield and Henderson. While these officers 
produced these reports to justify particular recommendations, they provide another vital 
insight into the operation of the contractual arrangements and the considerations that these 
officers deemed to be important. In particular, they reveal the things that officers wrote and 
that councillors read about the contractual arrangements and the development process. 
In addition to looking at these reports, I also considered the minutes of Cabinet 
meetings to identify issues related to the development that councillors discussed during those 
meetings, the questions that they asked of senior officers and the factors that they considered 
in reaching their decisions. I also reviewed proceedings of the Council’s Overview and Scrutiny 
Committee, which was responsible for monitoring the Cabinet’s decision-making,69 meetings 
of the full Council70 and discussions involving the Silver Hill Informal Policy Group, which was 
set up specifically to discuss the development process. These groups provided a counter-
balance to Cabinet meeting reports, particularly when the Overview and Scrutiny Committee 
considered documents that were openly critical of the Cabinet’s decisions and the officers’ 
recommendations.71 Reviewing these documents afforded me an opportunity to explore other 
views about the contents, form and effect of the Winchester DA. 
                                                          
67 The Council’s online database provides results from May 2002 onwards. Henderson withdrew its 
decision to seek judicial review of WCC’s termination of the DA in April 2016. For the purposes of this 
thesis, this represented a logical end point. 
68 For a discussion of the Cabinet’s powers and duties, see Winchester City Council, Constitution  of the 
City Council - Part 3A - Responsibility for Functions (Appendix B, Document 2.11), 6-22. 
69 For a discussion of the Overview and Scrutiny Committee’s powers and duties, see Winchester City 
Council, Constitution of the City Council - Part 4 - Overview and Scrutiny Procedure Rules (Appendix B, 
Document 2.13). 
70 The body that consisted of all the councillors elected in Winchester, appointed the Cabinet, discussed 
Cabinet decisions and voted on any matters referred to it by the Cabinet (see Winchester City Council, 
Constitution of the City Council - Part 2 - Articles of the Constitution (Appendix B, Document 2.10), Article 
2). 
71 See, for example, Winchester City Council, OS104. Silver Hill Development Proposal. Report of Cllr Kim 




I began my analysis of these ‘official’ documents by looking for references to the DA 
and the other contractual arrangements deployed in Winchester. While these documents 
provided innumerable insights into those things, they also provided contextual material that 
was helpful in explaining why those contractual arrangements contained certain terms, how 
WCC used the contractual arrangements and what the Council did when it wanted to deviate 
from the agreed terms. To provide some sense of order and to structure my analysis, I 
constructed a detailed and regularly updated timeline, with extensive references, noting what 
appeared to be the key events in the development process. Rather than collating this 
information electronically, I decided to set out these key events, with additional contextual 
commentary, on a series of A1 flipchart pages. This rolling timeline started with the first 
reference that I found to Stagecoach’s intention to develop the bus station site and continued 
to Cabinet discussions in May 2016. I did not extend the timeline beyond that point because 
WCC had terminated the DA and I had already gathered a large amount of information on the 
Winchester Development. If I had chosen to continue my timeline, I would have included some 
of the ‘mopping up’ that one of my interviewees described as necessary when a local authority 
terminates a DA with a developer. 
I traced the development through these official documents by utilising the search 
function embedded on WCC’s website. This search function enables a member of the public 
with internet access to browse proceedings of the full Council, the Cabinet and the Overview 
and Scrutiny Committee by clicking on the date of a meeting. Clicking on the relevant date 
brings up a webpage summarising the business discussed at the meeting, with clickable links to 
the meeting minutes and reports. Each webpage also refers to any reports discussed in the 
meeting that officers deemed exempt from publication.72 In collecting my data, I clicked on the 
webpage for each meeting between May 2002 and May 2016, scanned the text for references 
to the Winchester Development and, in the event that there were references to the 
development, conducted a more careful reading of the minutes and any corresponding 
reports. I then added details to my rolling timeline, which I used to highlight emerging themes.  
The WCC documents to which I refer in this thesis were, like the CPO Documents I 
mentioned earlier in this section, freely available on WCC’s website when I started my 
research. Most of these documents have been transferred from the Council’s previous website 
                                                          
Overview and Scrutiny Committee was able to challenge Cabinet decision-making, however, a point that 
Coulson considers in relation to local government more generally (see Andrew Coulson, 'Scrutiny in 
English Local Government and the Role of Councillors' (2011) 82 Political Quarterly 102 and Andrew 
Coulson and Philip Whiteman, 'Holding politicians to account? Overview and scrutiny in English local 
government' (2012) 32 Public Money & Management 185). 
72 Where WCC’s officers deemed items certain items to be ‘exempt’ from publication, I was not, 
therefore, able to access those documents. 
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to its current website. Some, however, appear to be inaccessible as of 16 February 2018. All of 
the documents to which I refer are listed in Appendix B. I have paper and electronic copies on 
file of all the WCC documents to which I refer. 
There were, of course, some limitations to this approach. First of all, I referred in the 
preceding paragraph to reports that the Council deemed unsuitable for publication. This 
means that there are aspects of the development process that remain unseen, although I have 
already noted that this is an inevitable consequence of empirical research. Nonetheless, the 
published minutes and reports produced a rich source of data on the development in their 
own right. The second limitation to this approach is that I may have omitted interesting and 
important details from my timeline. However, my analysis of these documents involved a 
significant amount of looping as I revisited documents that I had read earlier in the process to 
clarify points that had since taken on a different meaning. This process also involved a 
significant amount of sideways reading, as I placed documents alongside each other so that I 
could cross-refer to issues discussed in a different time or at a different place. When I wrote up 
my findings, I treated my timeline as a resource that could be amended and the documents 
that I had reviewed as items that were available for further review. Reading and analysing 
these documents was, therefore, an ongoing activity. This meant that my timeline became a 
patchwork, with notes on additional sheets glued alongside existing text. 
I made a significant set of additions to my rolling timeline following publication in 
January 2016 of the Independent Review into the events that led to the judicial review of the 
Cabinet’s August 2014 decision to authorise variations to the DA. The solicitor appointed to 
carry out the Independent Review conducted 57 interviews with individuals involved in the 
Winchester Development and considered both publicly available and otherwise confidential 
documents.73 Like the official documents that WCC’s councillors and officers produced in 
conjunction with the development, the Independent Review was written with a specific 
purpose and was designed to enable the Council to address any procedural failings that led it 
to ‘lose’ the judicial review.74 Although the information presented in the Independent Review 
must be read in the knowledge that it has been filtered and interpreted by the author, it 
provides another rich source of data and is one of the unusual features of the Winchester 
Development that made it suitable for a detailed case study. A similarly illuminating document 
was the law report set out in R (Gottlieb) v Winchester City Council.75 This document, alongside 
other court proceedings that took place during the Winchester Development, provided a 
                                                          
73 Lloyd-Jones, A Perfect Storm - Report on Silver Hill (Appendix B, Document 2.08), 9-10. 
74 ibid, 3. 
75 As referred to at n47. 
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further perspective on the operation of the DA and the matters that WCC officers, councillors, 
representatives of the developers, and other interested parties deemed to be important about 
it. 
Analysing these documents offered one of the only ways available to ‘follow the 
actors’ in this development process. An example helps to illustrate this point. I began my 
analysis of the Winchester Development with no intention to discuss the manner in which 
procurement law requirements act upon property-led development. I assumed these 
requirements were so mundane as to warrant no further examination. However, as my 
document analysis progressed, I realised that this was an inescapable aspect of property-led 
development that could not be side-lined in my account. As a result, much of my writing in this 
thesis discusses the effect of procurement law requirements on the Winchester Development 
and on property-led development more generally. In addition, and for the reasons that I 
discussed in chapter two, I treated the documents deployed in the Winchester Development 
as actors in their own right. I sought to analyse the development, therefore, to ascertain how 
these documents functioned in specific circumstances.76 To do so, I looked for the roles that 
the DA, other contractual arrangements and Council documents performed in instilling a sense 
of an overarching development trajectory and keeping the development ‘on track.’77  
Semi-structured interviews  
While document analysis was my principal method of data collection in this research, I 
also carried out a series of ‘semi-structured’ interviews.78 The advantage of adding interviews 
to my document analysis was that I could explore the ‘everydayness’79 of the contractual 
arrangements deployed to facilitate property-led development and tap into the experiences of 
individuals who had produced, used and found their actions directed by these documents.80 To 
do so, I identified individuals who I thought would have stories to tell about their property 
development experiences, although I began the interview process aware that interviews do 
not necessarily provide ‘good data’81 on an interviewee’s experiences. In particular, I was 
aware that my interviewees would be recounting events that had happened in the past, with 
                                                          
76 Lindsay Prior, 'Doing things with documents' in David Silverman (ed), Qualitative research: theory, 
method and practice (2nd edn, SAGE 2004), 91. 
77 ibid, 88. 
78 I explain what I understand by this term in this section. 
79 Sarah Blandy, 'Socio-legal Approaches to Property Law Research' in Susan Bright and Sarah Blandy 
(eds), Researching property law (Palgrave 2016), 31. 
80 Webley explains that ‘[i]nterviews are extremely effective at garnering data on individuals’ 
perceptions or views and on the reasoning underlying the responses. They also provide an insight into 
individuals’ experiences’ (Webley, 'Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research', 937). 




the possibility that those individuals would be selective in the material that they recounted or 
would simply have forgotten certain details.  
Nonetheless, I set out to conduct at least 15 interviews with individuals I deemed to be 
‘property development professionals.’ I chose this number for temporal and analytical reasons. 
Carrying out significantly more interviews might have led me to spend less time preparing for 
or analysing the interviews.82 On the other hand, I was concerned that carrying out fewer 
interviews might have generated data that was less rich and varied so I initially sought to 
interview seven or eight local authority officers and seven or eight developers. This changed, 
however, when I carried out the exploratory interview with D2 to which I referred earlier in 
this chapter.  
In that interview, D2 recommended that I should also interview some property 
development consultants. He explained that a developer would usually engage consultants on 
a number of matters and, of these, D2 recommended that I should speak to as many chartered 
surveyors as I could because those individuals would often work for three or four different 
developers on the drafting and implementation of DAs. Prior to meeting D2, I had been 
advised that ‘snowballing’ is often an effective means to gain access to ‘elite’ groups,83 so I 
asked him to recommend consultants who might be willing to talk to me. Based on his 
recommendations, I made contact with two property development consultants, one of whom 
agreed to be interviewed. 
I took the same approach at the end of other interviews and asked each interviewee if 
he or she could suggest any colleagues, clients or business partners who might be willing to 
participate. Alternatively, if an interviewee explained that there were certain aspects of the 
discussion that fell outside of their expertise or experience, I asked if the interviewee was 
aware of a person who might be able to assist with that subject matter. In some 
circumstances, this produced helpful suggestions. For example, CON4 explained that a 
particular local authority officer had been proactive in establishing close links with a developer 
during a particular development process. I asked CON4 if he could introduce me to the 
individual. He did so, and the local authority officer agreed to participate in my research. 
Of the 18 interviews that I conducted, however, only four were the product of 
snowballing techniques. The other 14 interviews took place with individuals who I selected by 
                                                          
82 A potential problem that Kvale and Brinkmann identify (see Steinar Kvale and Svend Brinkmann, 
InterViews: learning the craft of qualitative research interviewing (2nd edn, Sage Publications 2009), 
113). 
83 Welch et al describe snowballing as a ‘method of locating information-rich key informants by asking 
other interviewees’ (Catherine Welch and others, 'Corporate elites as informants in qualitative 




reviewing magazines like Estates Gazette and Property Week and identifying property 
development companies, consultancies and local authorities then involved in property-led 
development projects as potential sources of participants. This meant that I did not attempt to 
select my interviewees entirely at random and I needed to be attentive to the potential for 
biases84  in the way that I selected potential participants from those organisations.  
This selection process was, in hindsight, somewhat time-consuming and might have 
been improved. Having identified development companies, consultancies and local authorities 
engaged in active projects, I accessed those organisations’ websites, looking for details about 
individuals acting in those projects. I looked for online résumés that detailed experience in 
negotiating and implementing DAs or in conducting land assembly through the use of 
compulsory purchase powers. Trawling through these websites for information about potential 
participants, and attempting to track down contact details for these individuals had the 
advantage that I could write personalised letters or emails to those people. A disadvantage of 
my approach was that I identified more senior individuals in these organisations simply 
because those individuals were more likely to have personal profiles on their organisation’s 
website. This was a consequence of my approach that I only realised after conducting the 
interviews, at which point it was too late to seek out opportunities to meet less senior 
developers, consultants or local authority officers. The benefit of discussing property-led 
development with less senior people might have been that those individuals could have 
spoken more clearly about the day-to-day challenges of contract formation, negotiation and 
implementation, as well as other everyday aspects of property-led development. On the other 
hand, those individuals might have been less well-equipped to comment upon strategic 
decision-making in larger organisations and the interplay of an array of contractual 
arrangements and other legal technologies. 
In total, I wrote 49 letters or emails. As well as introducing myself and explaining why I 
was writing to the individual in question, I used this correspondence to summarise the purpose 
of my research. When I introduced myself, I mentioned that I was both a PhD student and a 
former solicitor on the basis that the latter of these labels might have demonstrated to 
professional persons that I was approaching the topic area with some prior knowledge. With 
                                                          
84 McDowell, 'Elites in the City of London: some methodological considerations', 2137. One of the 
potential limitations to this study is that I primarily spoke to developers and property development 
consultants based in London, although their organisations were engaged in development projects 
throughout the UK. With only two exceptions, I contacted local authority officers and councillors 
working in towns and cities within three hours travel time from Sheffield. In addition, of the 49 letters or 
emails I sent to potential interviewees, 44 were sent to men. I have conducted no research into the 
gender of individuals employed as senior local authority officers, property developers or consultants. 
However, I was aware that most of the profiles that I encountered online referred to men, and the 
gender imbalance in the sample does not reflect a conscious attempt to target this group. 
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each letter or email, I enclosed or attached a Participant Information Sheet providing more 
detail on the purpose of the research, explaining that I would ask the individual to discuss their 
experiences of property-led development and the operation of contractual arrangements in 
those settings. In addition, I stated in my Participant Information Sheet that, if the individual 
agreed to participate, I would record and produce a transcript of our conversation that I would 
analyse and from which I would extract quotes. I also informed my potential participants that, 
if they agreed to be interviewed, I would endeavour to preserve their anonymity. 
I received 14 positive responses to my initial invitations. For the remainder, I sent a 
follow-up letter or email three weeks after my first invitation. From those, I received four 
positive replies, which gave a sample of 18 interviewees, consisting of six local authority 
officers, three councillors, four developers and five consultants. I contacted individuals at 
organizations involved in each of the developments to which I have referred in this chapter 
but, given that I promised each of my interviewees anonymity, it is inappropriate to state 
whether or not any of the interviews I conducted were with individuals connected to those 
developments. To ensure that my research is as dependable and replicable as possible, 
however, I have included some limited biographical details of my interviewees, which are set 
out in Appendix D to this thesis. 
I met with 15 of my interviewees in meeting rooms at their workplaces, two interviews 
took place by Skype85 and the final interview took place by telephone.86 17 of my interviews 
took place between October 2014 and April 2015. The exception was an interview in October 
2016, which I was able to arrange through a connection that I had made earlier in the research 
process. Each interview lasted between 60 and 80 minutes. Prior to meeting with these 
individuals, I had gathered as much information related to projects on which they were 
working as I could reasonably review. This meant that it took up to one day to prepare for each 
interview but this enabled me to ask questions of my interviewees that specifically related to 
the projects on which they had worked. 13 of my interviewees provided their consent to be 
                                                          
85 Bryman notes that conducting interviews by Skype has advantages for both an interviewee and an 
interviewer in allowing flexibility in the timing of the interview and enabling costs savings. He also 
suggests that there is ‘little evidence that the interviewer’s capacity to establish rapport is significantly 
reduced in comparison with face-to-face interviews’ (Bryman, Social research methods, 492). My 
experience of conducting interviews by Skype was that it was straightforward to establish rapport with 
these interviewees, although there are other circumstances that may have played into this. Both 
interviews took place while the interviewees were working from home. Establishing rapport may have 
been more challenging if the interviewees plugged in to Skype while sat in a meeting room at their 
workplace. 
86 I did not tape the telephone interview but conducted the interview using a telephone with a 
speakerphone. This enabled me to take extensive notes while the interview took place. My experience 
of conducting a telephone interview was less positive than my experiences of Skype interviews because 




recorded before I started recording but five did not.87 Moreover, consent is, as Mason puts it, 
ongoing.88 In two of my interviews, individuals made comments about a development process 
that they immediately caveated by stating that they did not want those comments to be 
quoted or noted down. As a result, I excised those passages from the transcripts that I 
produced. 
I asked each of my interviewees to describe the contents of the DAs deployed in 
projects on which they had worked and to provide their analysis of the way those agreements 
either facilitated or hindered land assembly and progress along a pre-agreed development 
trajectory. Although I sought to ensure that my interviewees addressed these points, I did not 
conduct the interviews with a set of questions that I had prepared in advance. My interviews 
were, therefore, intentionally semi-structured89 and I asked my interviewees to address 
themes that they felt were important in a conversational manner by encouraging them to 
recount their overall impressions of the development projects that they discussed. 
A beneficial outcome of this flexibility was that my interviewees often introduced 
topics and issues that I had not previously considered.90 For example, CON3 was a consultant 
whose firm had been engaged by a local authority to assist in the selection of a development 
partner for a particular project. The local authority had approached him with a proposal for a 
relatively small development but his firm surveyed the site, identified additional landholdings 
that they felt might be added to the land that the local authority had earmarked for 
development, and encouraged the local authority to engage in a project that was more 
significant both in terms of size and cost than the local authority had proposed. The local 
authority had, eventually, been convinced of the merits of CON3’s proposal, although he 
explained that some senior officers and councillors had remained strongly opposed. This was 
an aspect of property-led development that I had not considered at all before I spoke to CON3 
and was one of the revelations that meant I broadened my document gathering and analysis to 
                                                          
87 Although these individuals did not consent to being recorded, they did allow me to take notes of our 
conversation. I proceeded with the interviews on that basis. To ensure that the interview was as 
conversational as possible, I tried to limit my note-taking so that I only recorded the details of the 
discussion that I deemed to be most relevant. Of the interviews that I did not record, one individual 
explained that he would probably be more open if I did not record the interview. The other four 
interviewees did not agree to be recorded so I have used only short quotes from those interviews and 
observations drawn from my notes to corroborate points that other interviewees made. 
88 Jennifer Mason, Qualitative researching (2nd edn, SAGE 2002), 82. 
89 See Webley, 'Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research', 937 and Bryman, Social research 
methods, 467. 
90 Mason points out that ‘most qualitative interviews are designed to have a fluid and flexible structure, 





incorporate documents produced by and for WCC prior to the date on which it selected 
Thornfield Properties as its development partner. 
Immediately after my interviews had concluded, I made notes reflecting on my overall 
impressions. I then produced transcripts of the interviews that I recorded and spent a 
significant amount of time anonymising the data in the transcripts.91 It took me around a day 
to type each transcript but, as I was listening to the tapes, I added comments, questions and 
observations to the text in a series of footnotes. I tried also to reflect on my own role as 
interviewer in these situations. In particular, I was able to observe situations in which I may 
have missed a particular line of enquiry because I had been fixated on a different set of issues. 
Where possible, I tried to apply these lessons in future interviews.  
When I approached my interviewees, I advised them that I would not keep tapes of 
the interviews because those tapes would not be edited to remove identifying details. 
Promising anonymity and confidentiality creates problems with the validity of research data 
and the replicability of the research methods given that subsequent researchers should have 
no idea as to the identity of the individuals with whom I met and cannot listen to the tapes 
that I produced.92 While these points go some way towards undermining the reliability of the 
interview data I generated, McDowell notes that many of her interviewees ‘felt vulnerable’ at 
presenting their views to a researcher recording their comments.93 My experience of 
interviewing individuals from a ‘relatively small and close-knit world’94 was similar. 
Nonetheless, having typed out the transcripts of these interviews, I read through them 
several times, looking for themes that had already emerged in my document analysis or 
threads that I had not yet followed. As my research progressed, I continually referred back to 
the transcripts and looked for data from these interviews that might help my analysis of the 
Winchester Development. This meant reading across from the interview data to explore 
themes that emerged in both settings. In doing so, I was aware of using material from the 
interview transcripts as a means to supplement my analysis of the Winchester Development 
but justify doing so on the basis that my interviews generated data that could not be obtained 
through archival research and document analysis alone. I do not suggest that the data was 
                                                          
91 Each interviewee used the names of places, organisations and people that, if quoted, would identify 
the developments we discussed and might reveal the interviewees’ identities. When quoting comments 
that refer to specific developments I have, therefore, used a non-specific identifier, such as ‘DevCo’ for a 
development company or ‘the council’ where an interviewee referred to a particular local authority. 
92 McDowell talks openly about the ‘anxiety’ that comes from promising interviewees anonymity 
combined with the awareness that efforts to protect the anonymity of an individual might be ineffective 
(McDowell, 'Elites in the City of London: some methodological considerations', 2144). 
93 ibid, 2144. 
94 ibid, 2144. 
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always directly comparable, and both methods of data collection produced different, situated 
accounts of property-led development.  
My interview data was not just supplementary, however, and offers a rich dataset 
providing numerous insights into the decision-making processes that characterise property-led 
development. The combination of methods that I deploy in this research enabled me to draw 
out underlying themes more effectively and to explore the content, form and effect of the 
contractual arrangements deployed in property-led development in new ways. My interview 
data thus illuminates some of the contractual underpinnings for property-led development in a 
way that has not been done before. 
Conclusion 
This research utilised a mixture of qualitative research methods to generate 
knowledge about property-led development. By engaging with the DA and the other 
agreements that WCC and its developments partners deployed in Winchester, I was able to 
analyse the contractual underpinnings of that development. An ANT-inspired approach 
enabled me to mine my data for evidence of the complexity of property-led development. 
Detailed document analysis and extensive archival research was my principal method of data 
collection because this enabled a longitudinal examination of the operation of these 
contractual arrangements over the course of the development process. Semi-structured 
interviews with property development professionals and local authority officers and 
councillors complemented that data, and helped me to understand the contents of the 
agreements deployed in Winchester and provided a broader dataset than would have been 
obtained if I had limited my approach to a study of documents. 
Nonetheless, I recognise that my account of the Winchester Development and the 
operation of the Winchester DA is not a complete account of that process. In this chapter, I 
have discussed gaps or limitations in the research design that were either a result of the 
choices I made or unavoidable products of carrying out research in this area. Nonetheless, my 
research does offer an exploratory reading of a subject area that has not been considered in 









Pitches, projects, processes and performances 
Property-led development of the type that I am analysing is a process that often spans 
many years. Nonetheless, it is a relatively common undertaking and settled ideas direct the 
manner in which many local authorities and their private sector development partners carry 
out that process. But conceptualising property development as a process necessitates some 
consideration of the start of the process, the culmination of the process and the actions to be 
performed during the process. John Law has pointed out, however, that many analytical 
accounts of technoscientific development projects assume an underlying structure and he 
critiques the manner in which many researchers evaluating those projects search for an 
identifiable beginning and ending.1 The search for a beginning and an ending is 
understandable, however, given that many of these projects take place on the basis of a pre-
arranged programme for action involving the ‘routinized deployment’ of various resources2 
that plots a progression from a beginning, through a sequence of events, to a finite 
conclusion.3  
A local authority and a private sector developer both start a property development 
process with a sense of a desirable ending, which I described in chapter one, involving a 
completed development, buildings occupied by retailers, rental proceeds or the proceeds of 
the sale of buildings filling the developer’s coffers and the local authority basking in the 
prestige of a new development. Accompanying this focus on an ending is a desire to perform 
the process according to a ‘script’4 that has worked in other places at other times. And this 
script envisages a ‘set of processes in the making’5 performed on and as a series of stages, 
starting with attempts, led by a developer but supported by the local authority, to acquire 
ownership of land in the area earmarked for development.  
This sense of processes to be followed assumes that a local authority and a developer 
will reach their desired end-point through their own highly skilled work at, first, arranging this 
                                                          
1 John Law, Aircraft stories: decentering the object in technoscience (Duke University Press 2002). 
2 Emilie Cloatre, 'Fluid Legal Labels and the Circulation of Socio-technical Objects: the Multiple Lives of 
'Fake' Medicines' in David Cowan and Daniel Wincott (eds), Exploring the 'Legal' in Socio-Legal Studies 
(Palgrave 2016), 97. 
3 Madeleine Akrich, 'The De-Scription of Technical Objects' in Wiebe E. Bijker and John Law (eds), 
Shaping technology/building society: studies in sociotechnical change (MIT Press 1992); Bruno Latour, 
'Where are the missing masses? The sociology of a few mundane artifacts' in Wiebe E. Bijker and John 
Law (eds), Shaping technology/building society : studies in sociotechnical change (MIT Press 1992). 
4 Akrich, 'The De-Scription of Technical Objects', 208. 
5 David Cowan, 'Territory and Human Rights: Mandatory Possession Proceedings' in David Cowan and 




series of actions into a meaningful and measurable sequence, and, second, following that 
sequence through to its conclusion. But the local authority and the developer deploy and 
assign roles to a range of allies deemed fundamental to transition through the stages. Asking 
how a local authority and a developer initiate a development process and how they enrol 
these allies forms the basis of this chapter. I scrutinise this because the initial stage of 
property-led development is the period during which a local authority and a developer begin 
to activate people, corporations, legal technologies,6 documents and ideas to establish the ties 
that initiate a sequence of actions pointed towards a Development Agreement,7 land assembly 
and, as a component of land assembly, land acquisitions.  
But the ‘enrolment’8 of third party allies is only one of the aspects of the early stages 
of property-led development that merits examination. The process of enrolment can also 
involve efforts on the part of a developer to convince a local authority of the merits of a 
particular type of development. For these reasons, I begin this chapter by analysing accounts 
that some of my interviewees9 gave of developers and consultants attempting to enrol local 
authority officers and councillors as participants and advocates for a particular vision of 
property-led development. In addition, I also consider an account that one of my 
interviewees10 gave of a senior local authority officer’s attempt to enrol a reluctant councillor 
from the same local authority11 as a supporter of a set of development proposals.  
Having discussed these accounts, and to analyse the interactions between human 
actors in more detail, I then turn to focus specifically on a property-led development project 
that took place in Winchester between 1997 and 2016.12 I scrutinise the early stages of that 
                                                          
6 Emilie Cloatre, Pills for the poorest: an exploration of TRIPS and access to medication in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Palgrave 2013), 45. See also Helen Carr, 'Legal Technology in an Age of Austerity: Documentation, 
"Functional" Incontinence and the Problem of Dignity' in David Cowan and Daniel Wincott (eds), 
Exploring the 'Legal' in Socio-Legal Studies (Palgrave 2016) and Emilie Cloatre and Nick Wright, 'A Socio-
legal Analysis of an Actor-world: The Case of Carbon Trading and the Clean Development Mechanism' 
(2012) 39 Journal of Law and Society 76. These technologies include rights of landownership, existing 
and prospective contractual arrangements, orders for the compulsory purchase of third party land, 
planning permissions, EU procurement and state aid rules for public works contracts and public works 
concession contracts and agreements for lease with prospective tenants. The latter three of these 
technologies are at the margins of this chapter and will be considered in chapters five to 10.  
7 Throughout this thesis I have been abbreviating the term development agreement to ‘DA’. I continue 
to do so in this chapter. 
8 Michel Callon, 'Some elements of a sociology of translation - domestication of the scallops and the 
fishermen of St-Brieuc Bay' in John Law (ed), Power, action, and belief: a new sociology of knowledge? 
Sociological Review Monograph (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1986), 211. 
9 I refer to interviews with COU1, COU2, CON3 and LA4. Appendix D contains some limited biographical 
details explaining who these interviewees are and when I met them. 
10 I refer here to my interview with COU3. 
11 In chapter one, I explained the relationship between councillors and local authority officers. 
12 I call this development ‘the Winchester Development’ throughout this thesis. As I mentioned in 




development and consider negotiations between officers in Winchester City Council’s13 Estates 
and Development Services teams,14 directors employed by Thornfield Properties plc15 and 
landowners with interests in the site that WCC and Thornfield earmarked as suitable for 
development. In investigating these negotiations, I also seek to address the observation that I 
made in chapter one that a local authority is a ‘fragmented’16 body that cannot sensibly be 
described as a ‘single, undifferentiated actor.’17 To that end, I discuss the ways in which 
officers acted on behalf of the Council in those negotiations and the role that councillors in 
WCC’s Cabinet performed in affirming the actions that officers recommended following their 
negotiations with Thornfield’s directors.  
My focus in this chapter extends beyond interactions between human actors, 
however, so the presence and importance of third-party land will be analysed in detail, as will 
the question of what legal technologies ‘do’ at this stage of a property-led development 
process. In particular, I examine the interaction of humans and various documentary 
technologies and the staging18 of these interactions. I explore the initial phase in the 
Winchester Development by analysing it as a performance19 that unfolds in episodes20 that 
legal technologies and ‘nearly legal’21 technologies guide by embedding a standardising, 
underpinning logic and in which they participate by acting out various roles. I investigate how 
                                                          
Winchester Development, ‘Silver Hill.’ This is because one of the roads crossing the development site, 
marked on the plan in Appendix C, is called Silver Hill. For the sake of simplicity, I use the term ‘the 
Winchester Development’ to signify the location in which the development took place. 
13 Throughout the remainder of this chapter, I refer to Winchester City Council as ‘WCC’. 
14 In chapter one, I explained the relationship between WCC’s Cabinet members and local authority 
officers and the relationship between the Council’s Cabinet, the Full Council and committees such as the 
Overview and Scrutiny Committee. 
15 I introduced Thornfield Properties plc in chapter one. Thornfield Properties plc was Winchester City 
Council’s chosen development partner. For the purposes of the Winchester Development, Thornfield 
Properties plc incorporated a special purpose company on 22 August 2000, called Thornfield Properties 
(Winchester) Limited, to carry out the Winchester Development. In this thesis, I shorten the name of 
Thornfield Properties plc, to ‘Thornfield Properties.’ Where I discuss ‘the developer’ for the purposes of 
analysing the Winchester Development, I am referring to Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited, 
which I also shorten to ‘Thornfield’. 
16 Ann Harding, 'The rise of urban-growth coalitions, UK- style' (1991) 9 Environment and Planning C: 
Government and Policy 295, 296. 
17 David Adams, Robert Croudace and Steve Tiesdell, 'Exploring the 'Notional Property Developer' as a 
Policy Construct' (2012) 49 Urban Studies 2577, 2587. 
18 Carol J. Greenhouse, A moment's notice: time politics across cultures (Cornell University Press 1996), 
48; Davina Cooper, Everyday Utopias: the conceptual life of promising spaces (Duke University Press 
2014), 200. 
19 Judith Butler, Gender trouble: feminism and the subversion of identity (Routledge 1990). 
20 Bruno Latour, The making of law: an ethnography of the Conseil d'Etat (Polity 2010), 141. 
21 The term ‘nearly legal’ is one that I adopted after reading a blog post on a housing law website using 
that name (see https://nearlylegal.co.uk/). The blog post that I read was one of general interest and was 
not relevant to this research. I later realised that the term, nearly legal, was useful for conceptualising 




these technologies set the stage for further negotiations, stabilised an emerging ‘project 
world’22 and guaranteed forward momentum along a pre-defined development trajectory. 
I draw the bulk of my findings related to the Winchester Development in this chapter 
from two sets of documents. Reports that WCC’s officers produced for consideration by 
councillors at committee meetings provided revealing information on the negotiations that 
took place between officers and Thornfield’s directors and the recommendations that officers 
made to Cabinet members regarding the Council’s emerging relationship with Thornfield. In 
addition, documents submitted to the 2012 inquiry into WCC’s making of a Compulsory 
Purchase Order23 to complete the land assembly process gave me an insight into the attempts 
that Thornfield’s directors made to acquire land interests on the earmarked development site. 
The CPO documents that I examine included letters between 1998 and 2002 between WCC’s 
officers, Thornfield’s managing director, two of Thornfield’s development directors and a third-
party landowner. These letters contained copies of draft land acquisition agreements that 
Thornfield’s directors proposed to use to move the land assembly process forward and that I 
tie into my analysis. Taken together, these documents provide a valuable illustration of both 
the negotiations taking place at this stage of the land assembly process and the ‘legally 
binding’ and ‘nearly legal’ technologies underpinning those negotiations.24  
Alongside my analysis of these documents, I use the Independent Review that WCC 
commissioned in 2016 into its decision-making throughout the Winchester Development to 
clarify information available in the officers’ reports and the CPO documents.25 Similarly, the 
accounts of these processes that my interviewees26 provided help me to explain aspects of the 
Winchester Development and to place my findings within the context of wider property-led 
development practice.  
All the world’s a stage 
During my research, I asked my interviewees to explain the operation of the 
contractual arrangements that a local authority and a developer deploy to assemble a 
                                                          
22 John Law and Valerie Singleton, 'Performing technology's stories - On social constructivism, 
performance, and performativity' (2000) 41 Technology and Culture 765. 
23 I have been abbreviating this term to ‘CPO’ and continue to do so in this chapter. 
24 Appendix B to this thesis is a list of the primary source documents produced during the Winchester 
Development that I use in this thesis. 
25 Claer Lloyd-Jones, A Perfect Storm - Report on Silver Hill (Appendix B, Document 2.08). In chapter 
three, I explained the background to the Independent Review and the access that the author of the 
Independent Review received to otherwise confidential Council documents. 
26 In addition to the interviews with CON3, COU1, COU2 and COU3 that I mentioned in n9, I discuss 
material I gathered in interviews with D1, D2 and CON2. In chapter three, I explained that these 
interviews did not discuss the Winchester Development specifically but talked about property-led 
development more generally.  
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development site but I also examined the deliberations that preceded the formulation of these 
agreements. For example, LA4 told me that property-led development follows ‘a sort of 
standard template’ that assumes that a period of negotiation between a developer and a local 
authority will lead to the selection of that developer as the local authority’s preferred 
development partner. Following that period of negotiation, LA4 explained, the local authority 
and the developer will identify the land required for the development, test the feasibility of a 
range of different proposals for the planned development, and commence the land acquisition 
process. But before looking at land assembly and land acquisitions in detail, I want to address 
some of the ways in which developers and consultants working on behalf of developers enrol 
local authority officers and councillors in their vision of development. 
My interviews with developers, consultants, local authority officers and councillors 
indicate that this action often takes place behind the scenes. COU2 described the first meeting 
that she had with the property development company chosen to carry out a large property-led 
development in her area. During that first meeting, she explained, she had the ‘feeling of 
[PAUSE] of sort of [PAUSE] maybe, the charm being put on’. She remembered ‘quite a big 
meeting’ with ‘about five or six of them, you know, who had [ADOPTS HUSHED TONE] come to 
say hello and what their plans were and what they hoped to do.’ Her description of this 
meeting indicated her perception that the representatives of the development company 
viewed it as an opportunity to emphasise their commitment to the project and their interest in 
the area. 
This suggests a sense that this meeting was an important opportunity for a display of 
credentials, in which the developers were the performers and the councillors found 
themselves compelled to act as an attentive audience. A similar perspective appeared in my 
interview with COU3, who was an opposition councillor for a different local authority. She 
recalled briefings that she received that were related to a large property-led development 
proposal for her area and meetings with developers and senior local authority officers at which 
she received updates on the emerging development proposals. She described one of these 
briefings at which the council’s Chief Executive27 had informed the councillors that he had an 
announcement for them:  
[H]e sort of said, “I just want to tell you in advance, just to give you notice, before 
it’s announced [PAUSE FOR DRAMATIC EFFECT], the name [ANOTHER DRAMATIC 
PAUSE] of the development [FURTHER DRAMATIC PAUSE], it’s going to be called 
[FINAL DRAMATIC PAUSE],   .” He was trying to make it exciting for 
us that we got to know the name 24 hours before it went to the press. 
                                                          
27 COU3 was a councillor for a local authority whose most senior officer was referred to as the Chief 
Executive. By comparison, other interviewees discussed their experiences of working with local 
authorities whose most senior officers were referred to as the Chief Operating Officer. 
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It is noteworthy that the person performing here was a senior local authority officer seeking to 
impress the merits of a development on doubtful councillors. But in doing so, he was also 
attempting to enrol the councillors as an attentive audience. This meeting and the attempted 
theatricality of the advance announcement of the official name clearly failed to impress COU3, 
however, and COU2 similarly noted that the first meeting that she had with the developers 
hoping to carry out the development in her area had not left her particularly convinced that 
the development would proceed according to the proposed schedule.  
But my interviews did reveal instances in which private meetings did enrol hesitant or 
sceptical local authority officers and councillors as enthralled and active participants in a 
development process. While COU2 and COU3 doubted the merits of the pitches they received, 
COU1, my other councillor interviewee, presented a different point of view and explained that 
he felt that his role required him to advocate the merits of development proposals advanced 
by his council’s development partners. He explained that he would do so by reiterating his 
council’s positive attitude towards private development.  
By comparison, a more complex picture of the early stages of property-led 
development can be seen in a situation CON3 described, in which a local authority had 
engaged his firm, a large consultancy practice, to provide an analysis of property interests in a 
city’s main retail area. He recalled that his firm had seized this as an opportunity to promote a 
single large-scale property-led development in the city centre even though the local authority’s 
officers and councillors had initially favoured a series of smaller developments. CON3’s firm 
had argued that the officers and councillors ‘needed to be more proactive’ and ‘that what [the 
city centre] needed was a gargantuan amount of very boring, very conventional, multiple-
oriented retail on a large site led by a large department store.’28 He explained that ‘we had the 
process of the council telling us that there wasn’t a site and us insisting that, “Yes, there was a 
site.”’ The consequence, as he put it, was that ‘we identified the site and led the development 
competition that ended up with the appointment of a developer.’  
The local authority, in the example that CON3 gave, duly chose a developer based on 
the consultant’s recommendation, following a selection process that the consultant had 
initiated. CON3 explained that his motivation was not his own ‘munificence’ but the pursuit of 
an opportunity to generate monetary returns for his firm:  
                                                          
28 This model for property-led development is very similar to that described by, for example, Steven R. 
Henderson, 'City centre retail development in England: Land assembly and business experiences of area 
change processes' (2011) 42 Geoforum 592, 593 and Mike Biddulph, 'Urban design, regeneration and 




We’re a private company, with a commercial interest in earning money, and if I 
can persuade someone to do something that is considerably larger than they had 
in mind, I’ll earn a lot more money. 
The initial interactions between CON3 and the local authority’s officers and councillors had 
thus amounted to a successful sales exercise for CON3’s firm. This exercise involved a ‘pitch’ 
from CON3 to the local authority’s officers and councillors and, after ‘trials of strength’29 
between CON3 and the local authority’s representatives, a further series of pitches from 
interested developers to the local authority. This account helpfully illuminates some of the 
sequenced actions that take place at the ‘beginnings’ of a property-led development project. 
A ‘binding’ legal agreement 
In the previous section of this chapter, I considered some of the ways that a developer 
might perform in front of a local authority, whereas this section considers some of the legal 
technologies that a developer might deploy to aid that performance. In particular, I investigate 
the way that a developer might present the beginnings of a property-led development project 
as a gathering together of potential energy that can be released to move a process forward. I 
am keen to explore the rules that govern those actions and investigate the blending of 
statutory obligations, the ‘template’ that emerges out of standard property-led development 
practice and the script written down and carried around in a network of contractual 
arrangements.  
Among the observations I made in the previous section, I pointed out that property-led 
development often begins with a pitch from a developer to a local authority officer or 
councillor. I also mentioned that some local authority councillors perceive a need to project an 
entrepreneurial outlook towards property-led development opportunities proposed for their 
areas. This outlook is a recurring point of analysis in this thesis and can also be observed in the 
Winchester Development in the way that WCC’s officers grasped a development opportunity 
that arose in relation to land in central Winchester on which the bus company, Stagecoach 
(South) Limited,30 operated a bus station.31 Table 4.1 contains a timeline showing some of the 
key events in the beginnings of the Winchester Development.32  
                                                          
29 Callon, 'Some elements of a sociology of translation - domestication of the scallops and the fishermen 
of St-Brieuc Bay', 211. 
30 Throughout this thesis I will abbreviate Stagecoach (South) Limited to ‘Stagecoach’. 
31 Appendix C contains a plan illustrating the location of the Stagecoach bus station and various other 
land interests referred to in this chapter. Stagecoach’s land is numbered SSL on that plan.  
32 As I noted in the introduction to this chapter, there is no single starting point for a process of this 
type. Choosing to analyse the role of Stagecoach means privileging one set of interactions over other 
interactions. I hope, however, to address some of the other connections out of which the Winchester 
Development process took shape in the remainder of this chapter. 
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Table 4.1 Timeline showing the actions through which Winchester City Council and 
Thornfield Properties plc identified a development site and initiated the land assembly 
process 
Key dates Actions related to the Winchester Development  
November 1997 
WCC’s consultants publish an Urban Design Report considering property-
led development proposals for the area around the Bus Station 
c. February 1998 
Thornfield Properties plc formed and enters into Thornfield Stagecoach 
Agreement with Stagecoach (South) Limited for redevelopment of 
Winchester Bus Station. Thornfield Properties’ representatives approach 
WCC’s officers with a pitch regarding development of the Bus Station 
May 1998 
Thornfield Properties’ directors carry out negotiations with John De 
Stefano regarding acquisition of land interests adjacent to the Bus Station 
15 September 1998 
Further presentation from Thornfield Properties’ representatives to WCC’s 
officers regarding development of the Bus Station site 
2 December 1998 
Thornfield Properties’ directors propose terms to purchase De Stefano’s 
land 
26 February 1999 
Thornfield Properties’ directors propose revised terms to De Stefano for 
an Option Agreement for the purchase of De Stefano’s land 
15 June 1999 Internal WCC discussion regarding Thornfield Properties’ proposals 
15 March 2000 Thornfield Properties’ directors propose revised terms to De Stefano  
21 March 2000 Internal WCC discussion regarding Thornfield Properties’ proposals 
22 August 2000 
Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited incorporated to acquire land 
on the development site and carry out the Winchester Development 
September 2000 
WCC’s officers commission legal advice on working with Thornfield 
without first carrying out a tender process to select a development partner 
20 July 2001 Thornfield’s directors propose revised terms to De Stefano  
December 2001 
WCC strategic review concludes that WCC can work with Thornfield 
without carrying out a tender process. WCC’s Cabinet approves this course 
of action 
2002 
Thornfield enter into an Option Agreement for the purchase of Coitbury 
House, adjacent to the Bus Station 
28 May 2002 
Thornfield’s directors propose revised terms to De Stefano and write to 
WCC’s Director of Development Services encouraging him to recommend 
that WCC enters into an Exclusivity Agreement and a Development 
Agreement with Thornfield and makes a Compulsory Purchase Order 
6 June 2002 
De Stefano abandons negotiations with Thornfield, citing concerns about 
Thornfield’s ability to pay the negotiated purchase price 
24 July 2002 WCC ‘agreement in principle to work with’ Thornfield by making CPO 
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At some point before the publication of an Urban Design Report in November 1997, 
‘Stagecoach’s property advisers’ approached WCC’s officers regarding the redevelopment of 
the bus station.33 In response, WCC’s officers indicated their preference for a more extensive 
redevelopment of a wider area including but not limited to the bus station site.34 D2 was not 
involved in the Winchester Development but he explained that a company like Stagecoach, 
which does not specialise in property-led development, would engage expert developers to 
carry out redevelopment of an extensive landholding like the Winchester bus station. At the 
time that Stagecoach entered into discussions with WCC’s officers regarding the 
redevelopment of the bus station, Tony Marcus had formed Thornfield Properties plc35 and 
Stagecoach and Thornfield Properties entered into what I call the Thornfield Stagecoach 
Agreement.36 I cannot confirm the date of the TSA but this was a common development model 
for these two companies in the late-1990s.37 WCC’s Corporate Director, one of the Council’s 
most senior officers,38 described the TSA in a report to a Cabinet meeting as a ‘binding 
commercial agreement to achieve the redevelopment’ of the bus station site,39 presumably 
through which Stagecoach would provide its land and Thornfield Properties would develop the 
site, with both sharing in the monetary proceeds of development.40 The timeline in table 4.1 
includes an approximation of the date on which Stagecoach and Thornfield Properties signed 
the TSA, based on the date that Marcus incorporated Thornfield Properties plc.  
Regardless of the date on which Thornfield Properties and Stagecoach signed the TSA, 
and regardless of the terms contained in it, it was a form of legal technology that performed 
                                                          
33 Llewelyn-Davies, Central Winchester Study. Final Report. November 1997 (Appendix B, Document 
2.01), paragraph 2.9.1. The report does not state who Stagecoach’s property advisers were. I assume 
that they were either individuals connected to Thornfield Properties or individuals working for a 
property development consultancy. 
34 ibid, paragraph 10.1.5. 
35 I discussed the formation of Thornfield Properties plc in chapter one. 
36 I will abbreviate this term to ‘TSA’ in this chapter. When Thornfield began negotiating a DA with WCC, 
Thornfield and Stagecoach entered in a subsequent agreement that set out the specifications for the 
construction of a new bus station on the development site. I explain aspects of this subsequent 
agreement in chapter eight. It seems likely that Thornfield Properties entered into the TSA soon after 
incorporation of the company in February 1998. 
37 They had entered into similar agreements in other places. See, for example, Exeter City Council, 
'Executive Committee. 19 March 2002. Item 10. Economic Development Plan 2002/2003' 
<http://committees.exeter.gov.uk/CeListDocuments.aspx?CommitteeId=112&MeetingId=391&DF=19%
2f03%2f2002&Ver=2> accessed 25 March 2017, paragraph 3.3. 
38 I referred to the management structure of WCC in chapter one. 
39 Steve Tilbury, The Winchester City Council (Silver Hill) Compulsory Purchase Order 2011. Proof of 
Evidence of Steve Tilbury, Corporate Director, Winchester City Council. 30 May 2012 (Appendix B, 
Document 3.05), paragraph 3.1.4. 
40 This thus sounds like a type of joint venture agreement. I explained the use of joint venture 
arrangements in this type of development in chapter one. For an insight into their proliferation, consider 





an important role in the unfolding Winchester Development. Butler has pointed out that ‘signs 
and other discursive means’41 sustain many types of performance and the emphasis that 
WCC’s Corporate Director put on the ‘binding’ nature of the TSA is an important performance 
of legality because this suggests that Council officers felt that the agreement made some form 
of development on Stagecoach’s land inevitable. But the TSA also had a ‘blurry legal 
definition.’42 It is not clear what WCC’s Corporate Director meant when he described the TSA 
as ‘binding’ and nor is it clear what Thornfield Properties and Stagecoach were ‘legally’ obliged 
to do as a result of having entered into the agreement. It is important, though, that WCC’s 
Corporate Director viewed it as ‘binding’ and presented it to the Council in this way because 
officers and councillors could then point to it as a source of authority demonstrating that some 
form of property development action would take place on Stagecoach’s land.  
The TSA also functioned as a source of legitimacy for Thornfield Properties when, on 
15 September 1998, representatives working for the company pitched proposals to the 
Council’s officers for redevelopment of the bus station site and the land surrounding it.43 The 
legitimising function of the TSA flowed from the fact that Thornfield Properties did not, at this 
time, own any landholdings itself in Winchester.44 In addition, the TSA enabled Stagecoach and 
Thornfield Properties to give a credible warning to the Council’s officers that they would 
redevelop the bus station ‘independently’ of any development on neighbouring land if the 
Council did not support its proposals by agreeing to assist with the assembly of other land 
interests on the site.45  
But despite this warning, Thornfield Properties sought first to draw other organisations 
and land interests into the emerging development network. During its presentation to WCC in 
September 1998, Thornfield Properties’ representatives ‘expressed a desire to enter into a DA 
with the Council’46 and the Council’s officers confirmed that they were willing to work with 
                                                          
41 Butler, Gender trouble: feminism and the subversion of identity, 185. 
42 Cloatre, 'Fluid Legal Labels and the Circulation of Socio-technical Objects: the Multiple Lives of 'Fake' 
Medicines', 98. 
43 As recorded in a letter from Karen Hawes, one of Thornfield’s development directors, to John De 
Stefano, one of the landowners who held interests on the land adjacent to the bus station. See, 
Matthew Bodley, Proof of Evidence of Matthew Bodley. Appendix 10. Extracts of correspondence relating 
to London and Henley group of companies. Letter from Karen Hawes to John De Stefano (26 August 
1998) (Appendix B, Document 3.10.02). I refer to De Stefano’s land interests throughout this chapter. 
44 Thornfield Properties is not listed as one of the landowners consulted during the preparation of an 
Urban Design Report that WCC commissioned to assess the Council’s options for development around 
the Stagecoach bus station. See, for example, Llewelyn-Davies, Central Winchester Study. Final Report. 
November 1997 (Appendix B, Document 2.01), paragraphs 2.2—2.8. 
45 ibid, paragraph 2.9.1. 
46 Winchester City Council, CAB938. Broadway Friarsgate Development. Report of the Chief Estates 




Thornfield Properties if the company’s directors first initiated negotiations with other 
landowners.47 In doing so, the Council’s officers were showing that they shared with Thornfield 
Properties’ directors, even at this early stage and before their organisations had entered into 
any ‘formal’ legal agreements, a ‘coordinated perspective’48 on the merits of the potential 
development and the belief that ‘clever management’49 of land interests would enable the 
parties to achieve their common objective. These observations suggest that the parties 
conceived of a development project that needed to be carried out in many of the ways that 
Law has suggested are typical.50  
Similarly, in his work on the law-making practices of the Conseil d’Etat, Latour 
describes ‘episodes’ in which ‘a whole series of tensions, vectors, currents, pressures is slightly 
rearranged’51 and the period between 1998 and 2002 consisted of concerted episodes of letter 
writing, meetings and negotiations, during which Thornfield’s directors and WCC’s officers 
sought to rearrange landownership rights in this area of Winchester and identify a mutually 
acceptable trajectory for development. But pauses in correspondence separated these 
episodes and it is important to note that these episodes did not perceptibly move the 
development process forward. Instead, they involved repeated jostling for position as the 
parties considered how they might ‘slightly rearrange’ the various interests. On that basis, and 
as CON2 explained to me when describing the typical movement from initial negotiations to 
formal agreements, these episodes combined fast-paced action and a great deal of work 
separated by periods of waiting.  
In retrospect, WCC’s Corporate Director suggested that it had been directors working 
for Thornfield Properties who had been active at this stage while the Council’s initial 
involvement in the Winchester Development had been, as he put it, ‘passive.’52 The rationale 
for this approach was, the Corporate Director explained, that the Council hoped that 
organisations with land interests in the area would agree to joint proposals for property-led 
development.53 A chronology of events in the Independent Review into WCC’s decision-making 
through the Winchester Development refers, however, to internal Council discussions in 1999 
                                                          
47 Lloyd-Jones, A Perfect Storm - Report on Silver Hill (Appendix B, Document 2.08), 43. 
48 Law and Singleton, 'Performing technology's stories - On social constructivism, performance, and 
performativity', 768. 
49 Henriette Langstrup, 'Interpellating Patients as Users: Patient Associations and the Project-Ness of 
Stem Cell Research' (2011) 36 Science Technology & Human Values 573, 577. 
50 Law, Aircraft stories: decentering the object in technoscience. 
51 Latour, The making of law: an ethnography of the Conseil d'Etat, 141. 
52 Tilbury, The Winchester City Council (Silver Hill) Compulsory Purchase Order 2011. Proof of Evidence of 
Steve Tilbury, Corporate Director, Winchester City Council. 30 May 2012 (Appendix B, Document 3.05), 
paragraph 3.1.6. 




and 2000 regarding Thornfield Properties’ proposals.54 These included a meeting to consider a 
report from WCC’s legal advisors55 that Council officers commissioned in September 2000, 
immediately after Thornfield Properties had incorporated Thornfield Properties (Winchester) 
Limited as a special purpose company established to carry out the Winchester Development.56 
The advisor’s report noted that EU procurement law meant that WCC could work with 
Thornfield without first carrying out a formal tendering process inviting proposals from other 
potential developers.57 This report formed the basis for a further ‘strategic review’ completed 
in December 2001 that ‘concluded that the semi reactive position where the Council 
negotiated with a single developer was a legally acceptable route to follow.’58  
WCC’s Cabinet approved this development trajectory at a further Cabinet meeting on 
19 December 2001, after which the Council issued a press release stating that it had ‘chosen’ 
Thornfield as its preferred development partner,59 although it made clear that it would wait for 
Thornfield to assemble a development site before committing more closely to Thornfield’s 
programme for action.60 CON2 explained that one of the reasons why a local authority might 
                                                          
54 Lloyd-Jones, A Perfect Storm - Report on Silver Hill (Appendix B, Document 2.08), 44. 
55 The Independent Review states that the Council’s solicitors ‘were appointed on the basis that their 
bills were paid by Thornfields [sic]’ (ibid, 19), although the author of the Independent Review does not 
provide any supporting evidence for that statement or explain the terms of any arrangement between 
WCC, Thornfield and WCC’s solicitors at this stage in the development process. Each of D2, D3 and D4 
explained that a developer would very often agree to pay a local authority’s legal and other professional 
fees but would do so on the understanding that these fees would be subtracted from any profit payable 
to the local authority from a completed development. It seems unlikely that Thornfield had agreed, 
however, to pay WCC’s consultants fees at this stage of the development process. Indeed, it seems 
more likely that Thornfield only became obliged to pay WCC’s costs in respect of external legal and 
professional advice after Thornfield and WCC entered into an Exclusivity Agreement in 2003 (see, for 
example, Winchester City Council, Appendix to CAB1030. Broadway Friarsgate - Development 
Agreement. Report of Chief Estates Officer. 8 February 2005 (Appendix B, Document 1.12), paragraph 
11), which I discuss in detail in chapter five. The use of legal advice as a strategy of property-led 
development is an important theme of this thesis that I explore more fully in chapter 10. 
56 For the sake of brevity, I refer from here on to ‘Thornfield’ when discussing the actions of 
representatives working for both Thornfield Properties plc and Thornfield Properties (Winchester) 
Limited. To this point, I have differentiated between Thornfield Properties plc and Thornfield Properties 
(Winchester) Limited to demonstrate when the former created the latter as the vehicle that would lead 
the development process. 
57 Winchester City Council, CAB938. Broadway Friarsgate Development. Report of the Chief Estates 
Officer. 6 October 2004 (Appendix B, Document 1.08), paragraph 1.4. 
58 Winchester City Council, Appendix to CAB1030. Broadway Friarsgate - Development Agreement. 
Report of Chief Estates Officer. 8 February 2005 (Appendix B, Document 1.12), paragraph 9. I will explain 
the procurement law background to these deliberations briefly in chapter five when I discuss the DA 
that WCC and Thornfield entered into. I then conduct a much more detailed analysis of the legal advice 
that WCC received throughout the development process in chapter 10. 
59 Hampshire Chronicle, 'City picks Friarsgate developer (20 December 2001)' 
<http://www.hampshirechronicle.co.uk/news/5612114.City_picks_Friarsgate_developer/> accessed 20 
April 2017. 
60 Winchester City Council, Appendix to CAB1030. Broadway Friarsgate - Development Agreement. 




expect a developer to make independent progress on land acquisitions before entering into a 
DA is because a DA usually commits a local authority to make a CPO to complete the assembly 
of a development site. A developer and a local authority would always be aware, CON2 
explained, of the need to acquire some of those land interests before the local authority made 
the CPO to ‘reduce the risk’ that the CPO would be overturned at a public inquiry. The key 
point here, however, is that WCC’s officers wanted Thornfield’s directors to make efforts to 
acquire some of those land interests before the officers recommended that the Council’s 
Cabinet approved either a DA between the Council and Thornfield or the making of a CPO. 
Legal and ‘nearly legal’ agreements 
The issue of landownership was a significant obstacle for Thornfield that its directors 
attempted to avoid through a complex network of ‘legally binding’ and ‘nearly legal’ 
agreements. I have already suggested that the TSA, which afforded Thornfield’s directors an 
opportunity to pitch a development proposal to WCC, had an indistinct legal meaning despite 
WCC’s officers presenting it as a ‘binding commercial agreement.’ This agreement nonetheless 
provided some justification for WCC’s decision to work with Thornfield, 61 although the 
Council’s officers viewed this as an insufficient basis on which to formalise the closeness of its 
ties to Thornfield. This was because those officers wanted Thornfield’s directors first to make 
further efforts to consolidate land interests on the site. With that in mind, I now want to 
consider the ways in which Thornfield’s directors mobilised agreements that they presented as 
‘nearly legal’ in order to generate actions from WCC and other organisations connected to the 
Winchester Development.  
Another way of thinking about this way of using ‘binding’ and ‘nearly legal’ 
agreements is by understanding this use as ‘vehicular.’ Cowan and Wincott explain that a 
‘vehicular idea … moves things on.’62 In a slightly different vein, Mol has suggested that 
‘distribution’ is an ordering device that ‘does not expunge messiness but shifts it. Pushes it 
along.’63 Both concepts, though, aid an understanding of the way that reliance upon ‘binding’ 
and ‘nearly legal’ agreements means that their existence can move property-led development 
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forward. On that basis, it is important to ask what developers do to ensure that these 
documents circulate in ways that direct the processes running through a property-led 
development scheme. 
While WCC’s officers had been carrying out internal discussions and considering 
external advice regarding the merits of working with Thornfield, Thornfield’s directors had 
negotiated the terms for the purchase of a property on the development site called Coitbury 
House, referred to in the plan set out in Appendix C as plot 6.64 The terms for that proposed 
acquisition envisaged that Thornfield would initially acquire the freehold title before 
transferring the title to the Council ‘at cost’65 on the assumption that the Council would 
incorporate this title into the freehold title it would hold to the entire development site and 
out of which it would grant Thornfield a long leasehold interest.66 The report of Tony 
Langridge, WCC’s Chief Estates Officer, which relayed the details of this proposed acquisition 
to the Council’s Cabinet, implies that Thornfield did not complete the acquisition of Coitbury 
House immediately after it ‘concluded terms,’ however, although this is not surprising.67 
Rather, as CON2 explained, this type of acquisition, made in advance of a DA, is usually 
conditional on the developer and the local authority entering into that DA or on a successful 
defence of the making of a CPO at a public inquiry. This form of land acquisition agreement is 
thus a type of option agreement68 and the deployment of an OA for the purchase of Coitbury 
House is an example of a ‘routinized reliance’69 on this type of agreement. An OA is a helpful 
tool for a developer like Thornfield engaged in the process of assembling a development site 
because it affords the developer the flexibility to choose whether or not to exercise the option. 
A contrast can be drawn, therefore, between the sense of movement and transition running 
through the property development process and the way that an OA stores up the potential for 
further change while maintaining the stability of existing landownership. 
The information pertaining to the freehold title to Coitbury House available from the 
Land Registry70 shows that the acquisition of the title eventually took place because WCC is the 
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Report of Chief Estates Officer. 8 February 2005 (Appendix B, Document 1.12), paragraph 11. The plan in 
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current registered proprietor. There is also an extant notice on the registered title in respect of 
an interest in favour of Thornfield. This interest refers to a right over the property granted in 
the DA that Thornfield and WCC eventually entered into. Although I cannot definitively 
establish the date that Thornfield exercised its option to purchase Coitbury House, I surmise 
that Thornfield ‘concluded terms’ for the acquisition of the title to Coitbury House around the 
same time that it was carrying out other negotiations with landowners with interests in the 
Winchester Development site. Thornfield then completed the purchase and transferred the 
title to WCC shortly before Thornfield and WCC entered into their DA. In the DA, WCC then 
agreed to include the land on which Coitbury House was situated in the long leasehold it would 
grant to Thornfield. This was, therefore, a way for Thornfield to ‘expunge the messiness’71 of 
the multitude of other ongoing interactions from this negotiation while enabling it to show its 
commitment to the overall project. Moreover, the OA enabled Thornfield’s directors to 
progress with other transactions with confidence that they had settled the terms for their 
company’s acquisition of Coitbury House while retaining the assurance that the company did 
not have to complete the acquisition if assembly of the remainder of the site proved 
problematic.  
Correspondence between Thornfield’s directors and individuals with other 
landholdings adjacent to the bus station site suggests that Thornfield’s directors attempted to 
secure their position in the Winchester Development by linking a series of transactions in an 
ordered sequence of events.72 This publicly available correspondence illuminates some of 
these ‘backroom deals’73 and shows Thornfield developing its position in letters74 exchanged 
between Karen Hawes and Andrew Sanderson, who were two of Thornfield’s development 
directors, Michael Capocci, Thornfield’s managing director, an individual called John De 
Stefano and representatives acting on behalf of De Stefano. De Stefano owned a group of 
companies that held the freehold titles to various parcels of land adjacent to Stagecoach’s bus 
station.75 De Stefano also owned a long leasehold title, which WCC had granted to one of his 
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companies, of a covered market called Kings Walk, which Thornfield and WCC hoped to 
incorporate into the development site.76 Various retailers leased premises on the plots that De 
Stefano’s companies owned and correspondence throughout this period between Thornfield’s 
directors and De Stefano concerned interim lettings of those premises while Thornfield and De 
Stefano negotiated the sale of both the freeholds and the head leases.77  
Prior to the presentation that Thornfield’s directors gave to WCC’s officers in 
September 1998, Karen Hawes had met with De Stefano to discuss the purchase of De 
Stefano’s land interests in Winchester.78 In response, De Stefano had instructed Hawes as to 
the terms on which he would sell his land interests to Thornfield. Equipped with this 
information, Hawes then informed De Stefano that Thornfield would revisit the discussions 
after its representatives presented proposals for redevelopment of the bus station site and De 
Stefano’s land to WCC.79  
In their negotiations with De Stefano, which took place in written correspondence and 
in various face-to-face meetings, Hawes and Thornfield’s other directors came close on three 
occasions to finalising a conditional OA for the purchase of De Stefano’s land. Hawes proposed 
terms on behalf of Thornfield in December 199880 before abandoning the conditional 
agreement and then revisiting negotiations on amended terms in February 1999.81 The 
proposed condition in the OA was, however, an extremely vaguely worded proviso to the 
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effect that the option would only be exercisable in the event of ‘Thornfield being committed to 
carry out a development on the Bus Station site.’82 Moreover, the period for which the option 
would subsist was time-limited, with an end-date of 31 December 2001. This meant that the 
agreement, had it been finalised, would have demarcated a phase in the development process 
during which neither Thornfield’s directors nor De Stefano would have needed to take any 
further action in relation to this land, other than through Thornfield’s intermittent payment of 
the option fee. This option fee was, therefore, a way for Thornfield to acquire an ‘interval’ or 
‘pause’ in its pursuit of De Stefano’s land during which its directors could pursue a DA with 
WCC. This is what Strathern has referred to as an important ‘ordering function.’83 Applying that 
idea in this context helps to illuminate the way in which Thornfield’s directors formulated this 
phase in the land acquisition process to reproduce and sustain an overarching development 
trajectory. This performs a property development trajectory as a series of processes in the 
making84 in which progress along the overall trajectory occurs as some processes change while 
others are suspended in a complex blending of flux and stasis. The concept of ‘segments, 
intervals, and moments’ that are ‘produced’ and that provide an exemplification of and 
sustenance of an overarching process is one to which I will return throughout this thesis.85  
Although De Stefano indicated that the terms proposed in February 1999 were terms 
to which he approved,86 and solicitors acting on behalf of the two parties exchanged draft 
versions of the OA,87 Thornfield’s directors and De Stefano did not reach the point that they 
were ready to finalise the agreement. These negotiations were important for Thornfield’s 
directors, however, because achieving an OA that both parties were ready to sign had the 
potential to draw WCC into a formal DA in which it confirmed its intention to support 
Thornfield’s proposals. As these episodic negotiations unfolded, Thornfield’s directors sought 
to move towards a position from which they could present this type of ‘nearly legal’ 
agreement to WCC’s officers in order to satisfy the officers that Thornfield had made sufficient 
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efforts to acquire some of the land interests in the site. As demonstrated, however, an OA 
would have tied Thornfield into nothing more than payment of an option fee and the purchase 
of the land at a pre-agreed price so an option on these terms was a low-risk bargaining device 
to draw WCC into closer ties. I have already alluded to the sense of a property-led 
development process that moves forward through incremental steps and the finality of 
landownership that only changes at landmark moments. It is important to note, however, that 
an OA functions as a means to demonstrate a developer’s commitment to a vaguely defined 
general trajectory whereas a binding obligation either to purchase or fund the purchase of 
land would commit a developer to a much more tangible and specific commitment at a 
defined moment, carrying with it a more significant financial outlay. An OA is, therefore, a type 
of gesture pointing towards a willingness to engage in these future commitments without tying 
a developer into binding obligations until they are assured of further, council-supported, land 
acquisitions. 
In the next episode… 
The correspondence between Thornfield’s directors and De Stefano shows that the 
negotiating process was episodic. Periods of concerted correspondence, meetings and 
negotiations gave way to pauses or intervals before the correspondence, meetings and 
negotiations reopened in another episode of concentrated interactions. But treating property-
led development as episodic or staged creates the possibility for third-party interests to 
disrupt a neat linear trajectory. In particular, De Stefano was under no incentive to assist 
Thornfield’s directors with their efforts to line up the various interests on the development site 
and, while these negotiations were taking place, WCC’s officers were waiting.  
De Stefano and Thornfield’s directors abandoned their first negotiations and later 
correspondence indicates that De Stefano had significant doubts about Thornfield’s ability to 
fund the purchase of his land.88 At the same time, Thornfield’s directors seem to have been 
unable to obtain assurance from the company’s bank that the bank would approve 
Thornfield’s purchase of the De Stefano land unless Thornfield obtained formal confirmation 
that WCC would support the land acquisition process by making a CPO.89 As I have already 
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mentioned, however, WCC’s officers were reluctant to seek Cabinet approval for the making of 
a CPO until Thornfield had made progress on land acquisitions, demonstrating that, while 
Thornfield’s directors attempted to craft a sense of irreversible progression along a neat 
development trajectory, there remained an ongoing circularity to these episodic negotiations.  
Thornfield’s directors and De Stefano discussed various mechanisms through which 
Thornfield could take control of the De Stefano land, including a joint venture arrangement 
between the companies90 and a loan of £10m from Thornfield to De Stefano secured against 
the De Stefano land with an option to purchase at a price of £4.25m.91 After they abandoned 
those negotiations, they revived their discussion in May 2002 when the parties’ solicitors 
discussed new terms for an option agreement based on the payment of an advanced sum of 
£10m and a subsequent sum of £13m or £14.25m, depending on the extent of the land to be 
purchased. This draft option thus proposed an upfront payment and a purchase price far 
higher than the terms that had been agreed in 1999 and envisaged that it would be WCC that 
would purchase the De Stefano land, using Thornfield’s money, before transferring a long 
leasehold title to Thornfield later in the development process.92 In negotiating these terms, De 
Stefano imposed a deadline of 7 June 2002 for Thornfield to be in position to exchange 
contracts.93  
While these terms might have enabled Thornfield’s directors to move the 
development process forward, the correspondence indicates that Thornfield’s directors were 
simultaneously attempting to align the Council with this trajectory. In chapter one, I noted that 
a local authority is not a ‘single, undifferentiated actor’94 and can be more appropriately 
understood as an assemblage95 of overlapping parts, each possessing various capacities. WCC’s 
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Director of Development Services, Steven Bee, and the Council’s Chief Estates Officer, Tony 
Langridge, had, between 1998 and 2002, exercised their capacity to consider the proposals, on 
behalf of the Council, put forward by Thornfield.  
It is notable that Thornfield’s directors appear initially to have discussed their 
development proposals with Bee, who was the WCC officer responsible for WCC’s planning, 
design and project management teams. After Thornfield’s directors moved the Council closer 
to land acquisitions and the making of contractual arrangements designed to facilitate the 
exercise of the Council’s compulsory purchase powers, however, it was Langridge, the officer 
responsible for ‘maximising the return of the [Council’s] estate and seeking out regeneration 
opportunities,’96 who appears to have become the lead officer. But neither of these officers 
could enter into ‘binding’ land acquisition agreements with Thornfield on behalf of the Council 
without Cabinet approval. Nor could these officers activate the Council’s capacity to make a 
CPO without Cabinet approval. Thornfield’s directors thus sought to use their negotiations 
with De Stefano to prompt those officers to seek Cabinet affirmation for a commitment to the 
use of compulsory purchase powers. 
In July 2001, Thornfield and De Stefano had not been sufficiently close to agreement to 
enable Thornfield’s directors to align WCC to their preferred development trajectory. In a 
letter dated 20 July 2001, sent while Thornfield’s directors had been discussing an iteration of 
the option agreement with De Stefano, Andrew Sanderson, one of Thornfield’s development 
directors, had encouraged De Stefano to send a letter to Thornfield by return confirming De 
Stefano’s approval of the terms of the draft option. Sanderson explained that he would use 
that letter ‘to put a bomb under the Local Authority to ensure they meet our timescale.’ 97 No 
such letter from De Stefano had been forthcoming, however, and Sanderson had been 
consequently unable to convince WCC’s officers to advise the Cabinet to deploy the Council’s 
compulsory purchase powers to complete the land acquisition process.  
Michael Capocci, Thornfield’s managing director, was, by contrast, able to use the 
episode of negotiations and correspondence that occurred between May 2002 and July 2002 
to produce a tentative alignment between Thornfield and the Council, side-line De Stefano and 
move the land acquisition process forward. In a letter dated 28 May 2002, when he was 
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apparently hopeful of concluding the OA on the terms that I described above, Capocci wrote to 
Steven Bee, WCC’s Director of Development Services, stating that:  
My company are in the course of acquiring the De Stefano block which will put 
them in the position where having negotiated a development agreement with the 
Council, we could implement the scheme straight away.98  
In this letter, Capocci also informed Bee of the latest proposed terms for the purchase of De 
Stefano’s land.99 He also sent Bee drawings of the planned development, an appraisal 
demonstrating the ‘viability’ of Thornfield’s proposals for the development site and a request 
to enter into an Exclusivity Agreement100 ‘with a view to entering into a development 
agreement.’101 The letter is a key document that demonstrates that the proposed acquisition 
represented, for Capocci, a position from which he felt able to request a DA that committed 
WCC to make a CPO.  
D1 informed me that a developer will often, however, try to use some form of EA to 
set the stage for a nascent land acquisition process to become more carefully scripted in a DA. 
An EA would, D1 explained, benefit a developer by generating a series of actions from a 
Council, local landowners, potential tenants and potential funders. LA4 similarly told me that a 
DA would be the device that would enable the local authority and the developer to complete 
the land acquisition stage of development but that an EA would be an essential precursor to a 
DA. These comments suggest that an EA comes ‘loaded with assumptions’102 so I now look into 
the ways that these pre-conceived ideas about the ‘proper’ way to transit from initial 
negotiations between a local authority and a developer materialised in Winchester. 
The complex circular links between an undrafted EA, a similarly undrafted DA and 
various binding and nearly legal agreements emerge in the correspondence between 
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Thornfield’s directors and WCC’s officers. The TSA between Thornfield and Stagecoach103 gave 
Thornfield an opportunity to acquire the site of the Winchester Bus Station while the 
‘concluded terms’ for the purchase of Coitbury House104 and the ‘nearly legal’ OA for the De 
Stefano land were conditional on a DA that did not exist but that would, Capocci suggested, 
follow automatically from an EA between Thornfield and WCC. WCC’s officers may have 
wanted to achieve the ‘comprehensive redevelopment’105 of the Bus Station site and 
surrounding land but this would only be possible, Capocci was suggesting, if there was a DA in 
place and that DA had become unconditional. At the same time, however, Capocci emphasised 
his company’s willingness to carry out some form of ‘fallback scheme’ if WCC did not agree to 
sign an EA.106  
The letter from Capocci to Bee on 28 May 2002 implied, therefore, that Thornfield had 
various programmes of action available to it. In order to direct WCC towards closer contractual 
ties, in the form of an EA, Capocci mobilised the ‘nearly legal’ status of Thornfield’s OA with De 
Stefano and pointed out that the OA would ‘[r]ationalise the complex web of interests in the 
site, in particular the De Stefano “hostage creating” long leasehold interest.’107 The emotive 
language in this statement is striking. Capocci pointed towards his company’s ability to acquire 
De Stefano’s land and thus eliminate an obstacle to the comprehensive development of the 
site. The quotation marks around the phrase, ‘hostage creating,’ in Capocci’s letter gives the 
impression that he was quoting someone else, as if he was a messenger informing the Council 
that it was a hostage to De Stefano and that Thornfield was the solution.  
In this letter, Capocci explained that ‘I am now in solicitors [sic] hands with De Stefano 
in respect of the purchase of his interest’ and reiterated this point when he stated that his 
company was ‘in the course of acquiring’ De Stefano’s land.108 This is an illustration of what I 
mean by an agreement that is being presented as ‘nearly legal.’ The letter implied that 
Thornfield would be ready to complete the transaction as soon as the solicitors had completed 
the legal ‘technicalities’109 necessary to convert a ‘nearly legal’ agreement to a ‘legally binding’ 
agreement. And the implication that this OA was ‘nearly legal’ legitimised the instruction 
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Capocci gave to Bee that the latter should use his position to commit the Council to sign an EA 
with a view to reaching a DA. The ‘nearly legal’ nature of the OA, coupled to the already 
‘binding’ TSA and the ‘concluded terms’ for the purchase of Coitbury House bolstered 
Capocci’s position by showcasing an apparently compelling programme for action that 
Thornfield would follow, if necessary, without WCC’s support but that would be enhanced with 
WCC’s support. The ‘nearly legal’ OA was, therefore, an important device in guiding the 
Council towards an EA and then a DA. This interplay reveals some of the looped negotiations 
that took place at this stage of the Winchester Development, as well as the roles that various 
legal and nearly legal agreements performed in those negotiations.  
A tipping point 
In the previous section of this chapter, I pointed out that John De Stefano had set a 
deadline of 7 June 2002 for Thornfield’s directors to exchange contracts on the latest iteration 
of the proposed OA for the purchase of De Stefano’s land. I also noted that Michael Capocci, 
Thornfield’s managing director, had informed WCC’s Director of Development Services, Steven 
Bee, that he was ‘in the course of acquiring’ De Stefano’s land.110 However, De Stefano’s 
imposition of a deadline for the exchange of contracts imported to the negotiations some of 
‘the qualities’ of time, as Hull puts it,111 in that the negotiations thus became temporally 
bounded and marked by the ‘ticking of the clock.’112 
One of the consequences of this was that Bee wrote to Capocci on 6 June 2002. In that 
letter, Bee stated his approval for Thornfield’s development proposals but indicated that the 
price that Thornfield would pay in the ‘nearly legal’ OA was unnecessarily high. Moreover, Bee 
informed Capocci that he now accepted that Thornfield had made sufficient efforts to acquire 
the De Stefano land. He also told Capocci that, regardless of Thornfield’s failure to actually 
acquire that land, he would recommend that the Council’s Cabinet should authorise officers to 
enter into an EA, discuss a DA and, after signing the DA, make a CPO.113 In doing so, Bee 
categorised Thornfield’s episodic negotiations with De Stefano as a type of ‘passing phase’114 in 
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the progression of the development. Those negotiations had, notwithstanding the outcome, 
made possible movement to the next phase of the process and had enabled Thornfield’s 
directors to enrol Bee as an ally who promised to recommend closer ties between WCC and 
Thornfield at a forthcoming meeting of the Council’s Cabinet.115 At that meeting, which took 
place on 24 July 2002, the Cabinet approved ‘an agreement in principle’ between the Council 
and Thornfield that would form the basis for the parties to collaborate further on land 
assembly.116  
Capocci had told Bee that he was ‘in the course of acquiring’ De Stefano’s land117 but 
Bee’s decision to seek approval for an ‘agreement in principle’ with Thornfield pulled 
Thornfield’s directors off that course. In the previous paragraph, I suggested that Bee did this 
to ensure that Thornfield did not convert its apparently ‘nearly legal’ OA with De Stefano into a 
‘binding’ OA. Doing so might, Bee indicated, have led Thornfield to acquire De Stefano’s land at 
a price that Bee felt might have diverted money away from other development costs.118 But 
Bee does not appear to have been aware that the negotiations between Capocci and De 
Stefano had almost run their course anyway. 
Bee had written to Capocci on 6 June 2002 informing him of his support for 
Thornfield’s plans. But De Stefano’s 7 June deadline for the exchange of contracts with 
Thornfield had prompted other actions on 6 June. During that day, Capocci telephoned De 
Stefano seeking extra time to secure approval from Thornfield’s bank for the terms of the 
‘nearly legal’ option.119 Capocci’s note of that telephone call indicates that he spoke to Felicity 
Devonshire, De Stefano’s wife, who discussed Capocci’s request with De Stefano’s solicitor. 
Devonshire then informed Capocci that they would not extend the deadline and intended to 
terminate the negotiations. A letter from De Stefano’s solicitor, sent to Capocci the following 
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day, indicates that De Stefano was unwilling to extend his deadline for exchange of contracts 
because he had lost rental proceeds from properties left unlet while negotiations with 
Thornfield had been ongoing. In turning away from the negotiations with Thornfield, De 
Stefano’s solicitor also pointed to his client’s long-standing concerns about Thornfield’s ability 
to fund the purchase if the option became exercisable, to which I referred earlier in this 
chapter.120 On that basis, Thornfield had lost the opportunity to purchase De Stefano’s land at 
almost precisely the same moment that Bee, the Council’s Director of Development of 
Services, told Capocci that he would seek Cabinet approval for the proposed ‘agreement in 
principle.’  
There is nothing in Bee’s letter to indicate that he had been aware, at the time he 
signed the letter, of the content of the telephone call between Capocci and Felicity 
Devonshire. Instead, Bee focused on the concerns that he held regarding the price that 
Thornfield’s directors had negotiated for the purchase of the De Stefano land.121 Given that 
Capocci had indicated that Thornfield was about to conclude terms on that basis,122 Bee felt 
compelled to inform Capocci not to exchange contracts.123 In effect, Thornfield’s failure to 
acquire De Stefano’s land at anything other than an above market price thus legitimised the 
Council’s eventual decision to support Thornfield and to agree to assemble the land interests 
required for a comprehensive development, even though Thornfield was unable to pay the 
purchase price that had been negotiated. 
Despite Capocci’s failure to purchase the De Stefano land, he had been able to fall back 
on the closeness of his company’s ties to Stagecoach, the other principal landowner on the 
site. This had given Thornfield’s directors a basis from which they could encourage the 
Council’s officers to exercise their compulsory purchase powers to assemble a development 
site. WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors had attempted to follow well-established rules 
for property-led development that assume landownership as a founding principle and 
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overriding objective.124 Even after Thornfield’s directors and De Stefano had discontinued 
negotiations regarding their OA, WCC’s Director of Development Services met with De Stefano 
to encourage the latter to enter into some form of ‘agreement’ with Thornfield about his land 
interests,125 although this attempt to draw De Stefano back into negotiations was unsuccessful. 
It is possible that Thornfield’s directors knew that De Stefano had over-valued his land 
and Capocci may have decided to present a ‘nearly legal’ OA carrying around an inflated price 
to demonstrate to Bee the lack of any realistic prospect of purchasing De Stefano’s land at or 
close to market value without a CPO. But these points are speculative and I have no evidence 
to corroborate them. Nevertheless, it is clear that Thornfield’s directors and WCC’s officers 
agreed to explore a development trajectory on which they expected the future acquisition of 
De Stefano’s land to occur, even if they had to take De Stefano’s land from him.  
Thornfield’s directors and WCC’s officers had followed a programme for action that 
resembled the practices some of my interviewees described. For example, D1, CON2 and CON3 
each discussed the manner in which a developer makes preliminary efforts to consolidate land 
interests on a proposed development site before a local authority agrees to support further 
acquisitions by making a CPO. But successfully following a trajectory linking the stages of a 
property-led development process is not ‘given in the order of things’126 and any sense of a line 
linking these stages requires, as Greenhouse puts it, ‘constant maintenance.’127 Without WCC’s 
willing use of its compulsory purchase powers, it would have been impossible for Thornfield to 
acquire all the land interests on the development site128 and securing confirmation from WCC’s 
Cabinet that the Council would exercise its powers in this way had the potential to initiate a 
form of collaboration that would become, as a result, more ‘carefully scripted.’129 
Choosing to take De Stefano’s land without his consent, however, locked-in stresses 
that reappeared as determined challenges to the making of a CPO and, more circuitously, to a 
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concerted challenge to the Cabinet’s decision to reaffirm a course of action that would enable 
officers to work with Thornfield’s directors without carrying out a competitive tender open to 
other developers. These stresses came, eventually, to undermine the smooth progress of the 
Winchester Development and are issues that I will revisit in chapters five to 10. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have considered the ways in which Thornfield’s directors enrolled 
WCC’s officers, the Council’s Cabinet and parts of the Council assemblage as participants in the 
Winchester Development and how this led WCC’s officers to recommend that the Council’s 
Cabinet approved closer ties between the Council and Thornfield. The existence of a ‘binding’ 
joint venture agreement between Thornfield and Stagecoach demonstrated how a developer 
might use ‘legally binding’ and ‘nearly legal’ resources to present a programme of action with 
parts for local authority officers and councillors to play, parts for the developer to play and 
parts for the contractual arrangements to play. At this stage of the Winchester Development, 
WCC’s officers seem to have hoped to be led through the development process by Thornfield’s 
directors. 
It is helpful here to reflect on this stage of the Winchester Development with 
reference to Cowan’s idea of ‘processes’ and ‘networks in the making.’130 Thornfield’s directors 
had been lining up various things before they approached the Council. They had identified the 
opportunity to acquire an interest in the development site and had ascertained the potential 
for development on neighbouring land, albeit that the land required belonged to other 
landowners. Before pursing negotiations for the acquisition of the neighbouring land, 
Thornfield’s directors sought and obtained confirmation that the Council would support its 
plans.  
These descriptions of a developer’s acquisition of a stake in the land on which 
development is planned suggests events might occur rapidly after the initial ‘pitch’ from a 
developer to a local authority. This might be one way of thinking about the way that a 
development process begins. But to return to Cowan’s idea of processes in the making, I want 
to emphasise that there were various processes beginning together in the Winchester 
Development. Thornfield’s negotiations regarding a joint venture partnership with Stagecoach 
informed and preceded negotiations regarding the Council’s willingness to support a 
development proposition encompassing neighbouring land. These processes fed each other in 
a progressive loop sustained by the Council’s confirmation that it was receptive to the 
developer’s proposals.  
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This chapter has shown, therefore, why the acquisition of a land interest on a 
development site can be so significant for a developer seeking to enrol a local authority 
partner. The process of enrolment for the Winchester Development involved a multitude of 
negotiations and a slow gathering of potential energy that the developer’s acquisition of a land 
interest on the development site unleashed. There is, however, no clearly identifiable 
beginning to the Winchester Development other than a series of negotiations and transactions 
involving local landowners, a property development company and the Council. This, 
nonetheless, is an example of a property-led development network in the making. 
The findings I have set out in this chapter demonstrate that some local authority 
officers and private sector developers understand the early stages of property-led 
development as a movement from somewhat open-ended initial negotiations to negotiations 
‘with a view to entering into a development agreement.’ I have shown how a developer can 
deploy a variety of resources to direct that movement, including EAs, joint venture agreements 
with landowners and optional land acquisition agreements designed to demonstrate their 
commitment to a particular development proposition. The Winchester Development involved 
a series of processes that fed each other in a progressive loop as Thornfield’s directors moved 
backwards and forwards from negotiations with one landowner to negotiations with other 
landowners and to negotiations with WCC’s officers. The ‘nearly legal’ agreements that 
Thornfield’s directors produced to perpetuate this motion had the benefit, from the point-of-
view of a developer, of demonstrating a commitment to the emerging development trajectory 
without tying the developer too closely to a particular development script.  
Interpreting property-led development as a scripted process invites an analysis of the 
way that it is performed. I have evaluated some of these performances by considering, for 
example, the ways in which developers ‘pitch’ their credentials as a potential development 
partner by exhibiting various apparently ‘binding’ and ‘nearly legal’ agreements to local 
authorities. But I have also considered property-led development as a staged performance 
consisting of periods or steps connected in a sequence of linked movements. As I have 
indicated through my reference to Greenhouse’s work on cultural understandings of time, this 
may be a product of Western notions of time, which reveal a prevailing tendency to arrange 
time into neat stages, with progress marked by steps in a process.131 Underlying this 
assumption is a belief that this attempt to arrange makes further ordering possible. In 
property-led development, the initial negotiations are presented as a step in the process 
pointed towards the assembly of land interests and the DA relied upon for the culmination of 
the development. In Winchester, WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors deployed an EA to 
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mark the time during which they would work together to take that step. This EA forms part of 
the subject matter to be discussed in chapter five, where I ask if using contractual 
arrangements to divide time into somewhat meaningful phases132 provides a different type of 
stage on and during which a developer and a local authority can negotiate with other 
landowners and with each other to define and redefine their development approach.  
By analysing the Winchester Development, I have suggested that, if there is a line 
linking the initial negotiations between the Council’s officers and Thornfield’s directors, its EA 
and its DA, it is one that the developer plotted and the Council followed. I have shown that a 
sense of progression is made perceptible by the parties entering into agreement with each 
other, reaching agreement for the acquisition of land from others, establishing close ties with 
various allies and distancing potential opponents. Chapter five will consider how this process 
continues while a developer and a local authority negotiate a DA.  
  
                                                          









The journey from Exclusivity Agreement to Development Agreement 
In this thesis, I am analysing property-led development as a performance of a series of 
actions mapped out in accordance with temporal coordinates and pre-conceived ideas about 
an ideal development trajectory. This chapter focuses on part of that development trajectory 
and examines the extent to which interviews I conducted with local authority officers, 
developers and consultants1 reveal the means to achieve movement along that trajectory. 
Alongside this, my ongoing examination of a property-led development project planned for 
Winchester city centre2 offers a case study of the actions that a local authority and a developer 
might take to progress from an initial developer pitch to land acquisitions, as well as their 
expectation of further progression onwards towards construction. I refer in this chapter to 
documents WCC’s officers produced for consideration at Council committee meetings, the 
minutes of proceedings at those meetings, and documents submitted to the 2012 inquiry into 
WCC’s making of a Compulsory Purchase Order3 for the purposes of the Winchester 
Development. In addition, I use the Independent Review that WCC commissioned in 2016 into 
its decision-making throughout the development process to fill in important gaps in the 
information available in Council documents.4 
In chapter four, I discussed the gradual tightening of relations between Winchester 
City Council5 and Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited6 based on Thornfield’s work to 
assemble land interests on the Winchester Development site and the eventual ‘agreement in 
principle’ with Thornfield that WCC’s Cabinet7 approved as the basis from which officers would 
                                                          
1 I discuss material I gathered in interviews with LA2, LA4, D1, D2, D4, CON2, CON3 and CON4. Appendix 
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numbered list of documents in Appendix B. 
5 Throughout this thesis I will abbreviate Winchester City Council to ‘WCC.’ 
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company that Thornfield Properties plc set up on 22 August 2000 for the purpose of carrying out the 
Winchester development. Where it is necessary to refer to Thornfield Properties plc, I use the full name 
of that company. Where I discuss ‘the developer’ for the purposes of analysing the Winchester 
development, I am referring to Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited, which I shorten to 
‘Thornfield.’ 
7 In chapter one, I explained the relationship between councillors and local authority officers and, in 
WCC, the relationship between the Council’s Cabinet, the Full Council and committees such as the 




assist Thornfield’s directors with that part of the process.8 In this chapter, I expand on this 
analysis by showing how WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors continued their efforts to 
reorder landownership. I explain that their shared perception of the preferred path to be 
followed to achieve this reordering led WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors to move from 
initial negotiations to an Exclusivity Agreement.9 I analyse what an EA is and examine reasons 
why this type of agreement is routinely deployed in these circumstances, scrutinising the way 
it gathers together a series of previous actions and stimulates a wider sequence of subsequent 
actions. 
This chapter starts with further exploration of the idea that I introduced in the 
previous chapter regarding the use of ‘nearly legal’ agreements as an instrument for ‘lining up’ 
those subsequent actions. I have already shown how developers and local authorities inculcate 
a sense of movement along a development trajectory by pointing to both ‘legally binding’ and 
‘nearly legal’ agreements as markers of progress. To develop these insights further, I now 
explore how WCC’s officers used a nearly legal version of the EA as a device to encourage 
councillors to approve a ‘Planning Brief,’ which became a component of WCC’s development 
plan documents.10 The Planning Brief set out the Council’s overall development objectives for 
the development site,11 as well as some more detailed specifications related to the height and 
density of buildings,12 phasing of the construction process13 and the use of particular building 
materials,14 among other things.15 I ask how that Planning Brief interacted with contractual 
                                                          
8 Winchester City Council, WDLP15. Broadway Friarsgate Planning Brief. Report of Director of 
Development Services. 15 January 2003 (Appendix B, Document 1.01), paragraph 1.3. 
9 Throughout this thesis I have been abbreviating the term exclusivity agreement to ‘EA.’ I continue to 
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2.03)). In chapter two I referred to other academic work that has noted the use of this type of Planning 
Brief to construct a particular ‘representation’ of a place as ripe for development and to ‘enrol’ 
developers and other human actors in a property development project (see, for example, Malcolm Tait 
and Ole B. Jensen, 'Travelling Ideas, Power and Place: The Cases of Urban Villages and Business 
Improvement Districts' (2007) 12 International Planning Studies 107, 119). 
12 Winchester City Council, Adopted Broadway Friarsgate Planning Brief. Part 3 - Design Framework 
(Appendix B, Document 2.06), paragraph 3.5. 
13 ibid, paragraph 3.8. 
14 ibid, paragraph 3.11. 
15 This approach seems to have been common. For example, Erwin Heurkens, David Adams and Fred 
Hobma, 'Planners as market actors: the role of local planning authorities in the UK's urban regeneration 




arrangements deployed at this stage, and how WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors 
situated it within the overarching development trajectory. 
Once I have considered both the ‘nearly legal’ EA as a type of triggering device and the 
interplay between the ‘nearly legal’ EA, the Planning Brief, and the ‘legally binding’ EA, I move 
on to discuss that binding EA as a starting point for negotiations around a ‘Developer Brief’ 
that WCC’s officers commissioned from consultants. Those officers provided the Developer 
Brief to Thornfield on the basis that the Brief ‘set out the terms on which [the Council] would 
be prepared to promote a scheme16 and use Compulsory Purchase powers.’17 I show how this 
Developer Brief formed part of the overarching development trajectory by providing the 
outline for the ‘Heads of Terms’18 that would then provide the basis for the Development 
Agreement19 that WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors both anticipated would follow the 
EA. I note that the Council’s officers issued this Developer Brief only to Thornfield and chose 
neither to notify other developers of the existence of this Brief nor to publish the Brief more 
widely.20 
I discuss the negotiations that WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors carried out 
between publication of the Developer Brief and before they signed their DA. I show that the 
DA, in common with other DAs, was designed to provide the basis for the making of a CPO. I 
probe the extent to which an EA produces a form of temporally-bounded shelter for those 
negotiations to take place and examine the issues that a local authority and a developer 
debate between entering into an EA and a DA. Taking the terms of the Winchester EA as a 
basis for my analysis, I question whether pre-defined time limits in the EA, which purported to 
set a date by which the parties needed to have concluded the negotiations for their DA, 
created a fixed target or reflected a more general objective that could shift with the needs of 
WCC or the developer. In doing so, I also reveal how choices WCC’s officers made in entering 
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the development. 
16 D1 used the term ‘scheme’ to refer to the plans that would form the basis for a built development. 
This seems to be the way WCC used the term here. 
17 Steve Tilbury, The Winchester City Council (Silver Hill) Compulsory Purchase Order 2011. Proof of 
Evidence of Steve Tilbury, Corporate Director, Winchester City Council. 30 May 2012 (Appendix B, 
Document 3.05), paragraph 3.2.4. 
18 PS1 explained that ‘Heads of Terms’ are ‘four or five pages of plain English before you instruct a 
lawyer.’ In essence, Heads of Terms are a way to set out the main points on which two parties have 
found common ground and that they intend to use to reach a more formal and ‘binding’ agreement 
(see, for example, PLC, 'Practice note - Transfer of shares, (Resource ID: 0-107-6683)' 
<www.practicallaw.com> accessed 20 July 2017). 
19 Throughout this thesis I have been abbreviating the term development agreement to ‘DA’. I continue 
to do so in this chapter. 





into a DA with Thornfield locked-in stresses to the development process that exacerbated and 
added to those I identified in chapter four. Finally, I ask how a DA might function as a 
coordinating mechanism, a means of channelling actions towards more clearly defined goals, 
and an embarkation point for the next stage of the development process. 
Planning, compulsory purchase powers and creating irreversible situations 
As I mentioned in chapter four, Thornfield’s directors had been engaged in a process of 
‘lining up’ land acquisitions before they asked WCC’s officers to enter into an EA.21 In my 
earlier discussion, I focussed on the interplay between Thornfield’s ‘binding’ agreement with 
Stagecoach (South) Limited22 regarding Winchester bus station,23 Thornfield’s purportedly 
‘nearly legal’ option agreements with local landowners,24 and Thornfield’s ‘viability’ appraisals 
assessing the profitability of its proposals for the Winchester development site.25 When 
Michael Capocci, Thornfield’s managing director, asked Steven Bee, WCC’s Director of 
Development Services and one of the Council’s most senior officers, to enter into an EA ‘with a 
view to entering into a DA,’26 he situated these agreements within a forward-facing 
development trajectory linking Thornfield’s negotiations with local landowners to a DA and 
onwards to culmination of the land acquisition process. Underpinning this proposed 
contractual framework was, as Capocci put it to Bee, the presumption that these agreements 
would provide the basis for the making of a CPO that would ‘assist’ Thornfield’s efforts at land 
                                                          
21 The first record of a request for a lock-out agreement or EA is in Matthew Bodley, Proof of Evidence of 
Matthew Bodley. Appendix 10. Extracts of correspondence relating to London and Henley group of 
companies. Letter from Michael Capocci to Steven Bee (28 May 2002) (Appendix B, Document 3.10.10). 
22 Hereafter shortened to ‘Stagecoach.’ 
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discussed in Matthew Bodley, Proof of Evidence of Matthew Bodley. Appendix 10. Extracts of 
correspondence relating to London and Henley group of companies. Letter from John Summers, John 
Summers & Co Solicitors (on behalf of John De Stefano) to Peter Dempster, Dempster Binning LLP (on 
behalf of Thornfield Properties plc) (6 June 2002) (Appendix B, Document 3.10.11) . Both Coitbury House 
and John De Stefano’s land are highlighted on the plan in Appendix C to this thesis.  
25 Bodley, Proof of Evidence of Matthew Bodley. Appendix 10. Extracts of correspondence relating to 
London and Henley group of companies. Letter from Michael Capocci to Steven Bee (28 May 2002) 





acquisition.27 Making a CPO is, as I demonstrated in chapter one, a complex process and, in the 
event that officers sought the Cabinet’s approval for the making of a CPO, those officers would 
have needed to address the requirements set out in Circular 06/2004.28 This meant that WCC’s 
officers would have needed to be able to demonstrate that the making of a CPO was a ‘last 
resort’ when efforts to acquire that land by negotiation had failed.29 In addition, to secure 
confirmation of the making of the CPO, those officers would have needed to be able to show 
that there existed no ‘planning impediments’ to the development of the land30 and that 
‘adequate funding would be available’31 to compensate the landowners to be dispossessed by 
the Council’s exercise of its compulsory purchase powers.  
The DA was the document designed to facilitate the making, confirmation and exercise 
of a CPO in Winchester. But the EA was the document that WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s 
directors hoped would help them sign a DA, so it was essential that the EA enabled them to 
address the points set out in Circular 06/2004. A legal network founded on future land 
acquisitions is inherently forward-looking and anticipates the moment of those land 
acquisitions but depends upon the making of a CPO. In the following sections of this chapter, I 
investigate the ways in which WCC’s officers prepared for the making of a CPO by publishing a 
Planning Brief for public consultation and issuing a Developer Brief to Thornfield containing 
‘the terms’ on which WCC would make a CPO. I explore the formulation of a planning 
framework first before then analysing the operation of the Developer Brief. 
The formulation of a planning framework 
Table 5.1 contains a timeline showing progress on the Winchester Development 
between July 2002 and December 2004. 
  
                                                          
27 ibid. In chapter one, I explained the basis on which a local authority can ‘make’ and then ‘exercise’ a 
CPO and discussed the wider policy context for the use of compulsory purchase powers at the time that 
WCC and Thornfield were considering how to approach the Winchester Development. 
28 As I explain later in this chapter, WCC and Thornfield entered into a DA on 22 December 2004 so, to 
the extent that that DA would facilitate the making, confirmation and exercise of a CPO, Circular 
06/2004 was the relevant guidance. In chapter one, I pointed out that the current government guidance 
on the making, confirmation and exercise of a CPO is Department for Communities and Local 
Government, Guidance on Compulsory purchase process and The Crichel Down Rules for the disposal of 
surplus land by, or under threat of, compulsion (2015). 
29 The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, ODPM Circular 06/2004. Compulsory Purchase and The 
Crichel Down Rules (2004), paragraph 24. 
30 ibid, paragraphs 22-23. 
31 ibid, paragraph 21. 
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The actions that WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors took to establish a planning 
framework for the Winchester Development provide a further insight into the deployment of 
Table 5.1 Timeline showing key actions between WCC and Thornfield’s ‘agreement in 
principle’ up to the date of their Development Agreement 
Key dates 
Actions related to the 
Planning Brief 
Actions related to the 
EA 
Actions related to the 
Developer Brief 
24 July 2002 WCC ‘agreement in principle to work’ with Thornfield  
15 January 2003 
WCC officers present 
draft Planning Brief to 
Cabinet 
WCC officers present 
‘nearly legal’ EA to 
Cabinet 
 
Early March 2003 
Draft Planning Brief 
published for public 
consultation 








concludes and Planning 
Brief published 
 
WCC issues Developer 
Brief to Thornfield, 
inviting response by 1 
August 2003. No other 
developers receive the 
Developer Brief 
25 June 2003 
Planning Brief adopted 
as a background 
document to the 
Winchester Local Plan 
  
1 October 2003  
WCC and Thornfield 
agree to extend EA to 
29 February 2004 
WCC Cabinet meets to 
consider Thornfield 
response to Developer 
Brief, rejects proposals 
but invites revisions 
11 February 2004   
WCC Cabinet approves 
Thornfield revisions as 
basis for Heads of 
Terms of DA 
25 May 2004   
WCC Cabinet meets to 
consider ‘detailed set’ 
of Heads of Terms 
6 October 2004   
WCC Cabinet approves 
draft DA 
15 October 2004  
WCC and Thornfield 
extend EA to cover 
period until DA signed 
 
22 December 2004 WCC and Thornfield enter into Development Agreement 
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‘nearly legal’ agreements in this type of development process. On 15 January 2003, WCC’s 
Director of Development Services presented a report to a meeting of the Council’s Cabinet, in 
which he noted that, on 24 July 2002, Cabinet had approved ‘an agreement in principle to 
work with Thornfield’ and that a more formal agreement had subsequently ‘been prepared in 
draft’32 with completion of that agreement pending the publication of a Planning Brief also 
being discussed at that meeting.33 The report from WCC’s Director of Development Services 
did not make explicit the link between the draft agreement and the draft Planning Brief and 
there is no reason that I can identify as to why the documents had to be linked in this way. 
However, a significant competitive advantage did accrue to Thornfield from the way that 
WCC’s officers linked the draft Planning Brief and the nearly legal EA. The nearly legal EA 
formed the basis of the EA that WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors eventually signed. 
That EA would prohibit WCC’s officers from conducting landownership negotiations with any 
developer other than Thornfield. The draft Planning Brief was different, and was designed to 
provide guidance to any developer considering whether or not to submit an application to 
WCC for planning permission for the development of the earmarked site. WCC’s planning 
officers would have been compelled to consider all planning applications submitted to them 
but the link that WCC’s Director of Development Services made between the EA and the 
Planning Brief meant that Thornfield had a considerable advantage over other developers in 
relation to the other aspects of land assembly. Those other developers might have secured 
planning permission for the development of the site but it was Thornfield, as a function of the 
EA its directors proposed to sign with WCC, that would secure an exclusive opportunity to 
participate in the land acquisition process. This is an example of WCC’s officers favouring 
Thornfield’s proposals. On the recommendation of WCC’s Director of Development Services, 
councillors duly approved the draft Planning Brief and the Council published it for consultation 
in early March 2003,34 at the same time that the Council entered into the EA with Thornfield.35  
                                                          
32 Between the Cabinet meeting on 15 January 2003 at which WCC’s Director presented this report and 
the date on which Thornfield and WCC entered into their agreement, the label given to the agreement 
shifted from a lock-out agreement to an EA. This is not an issue I consider in detail because the content, 
purpose and effect of the agreement seem to have remained constant. 
33 Winchester City Council, WDLP15. Broadway Friarsgate Planning Brief. Report of Director of 
Development Services. 15 January 2003 (Appendix B, Document 1.01), paragraph 1.3. The version of the 
Planning Brief published for consultation is Winchester City Council, Draft Broadway Friarsgate Planning 
Brief. 2003 (Appendix B, Document 2.02). 
34 Winchester City Council, WDLP21. Broadway Friarsgate Planning Brief. Report of Director of 
Development Services. 29 May 2003 (Appendix B, Document 1.02), paragraph 1.2; Winchester City 
Council, CAB938. Broadway Friarsgate Development. Report of the Chief Estates Officer. 6 October 2004 
(Appendix B, Document 1.08), paragraph 1.2. 
35 WCC informed the Inspector appointed to carry out the 2012 public inquiry into WCC’s exercise of its 




In March 2003, when WCC’s Director of Development Services confirmed that officers 
had published the draft Planning Brief for consultation, he pointed towards a succession of 
other documents that would come to constitute the planning basis for the Winchester 
Development. Following publication of the draft Planning Brief, WCC carried out a six-week 
consultation to inform the final version,36 which would, WCC’s director explained: 
Inform and guide the drafting of a master plan for the site, which will be prepared 
by the architects acting for the developer, Thornfield plc. A planning application is 
anticipated in 2004 and if permitted, development will start on site as soon as 
landownership issues have been resolved.37 
While this statement lined up the planning documents that would follow the Planning Brief, it 
also reflected the Council director’s preoccupation with addressing third-party landholdings 
that he felt might inhibit the reordering of landownership in favour of the Thornfield-led 
development proposition. While WCC’s director presented concrete and quantifiable 
outcomes from the Planning Brief that would be carried out in accordance with specific target 
dates, these things would only enable construction to start if, he explained, the 
‘landownership issues have been resolved.’  
In chapter one, I noted that ‘landownership issues’ are a recurrent preoccupation for 
local authorities and property development companies engaged in property-led development 
projects. But, in this instance, the Council director’s statement that there were ‘landownership 
issues’ was extremely vague. Stating early in a development process that there were 
landownership issues to be resolved implied the need for a CPO, although Council officers did 
not, at this stage, publicly state that they would seek Cabinet approval for making a CPO. The 
director’s statement, therefore, gave expression to an idea and was a way to ‘bind action to 
[an] abstract and invariant principle.’38 Without a detailed investigation of the ownership 
background to the development site, neither WCC’s officers nor Thornfield’s directors could 
have established the extent of the freehold, leasehold and minor interests that they would 
need to consolidate in order to assemble a development site. Moreover, as D1 pointed out, it 
is often impossible for a developer and a local authority to identify all the extant interests on a 
development site if some interests are unregistered,39 meaning that neither WCC’s officers nor 
                                                          
Thorby, CPO Report to the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government; SUO Report to the 
Secretary of State for Transport. 17 December 2012 (Appendix B, Document 3.03), 45. 
36 Winchester City Council, WDLP21. Broadway Friarsgate Planning Brief. Report of Director of 
Development Services. 29 May 2003 (Appendix B, Document 1.02), paragraph 1.2. 
37 ibid, paragraph 1.3. 
38 David Scott, Omens of adversity: tragedy, time, memory, justice (Duke University Press 2014), 64. 
39 Sections 1(1) and 99(1) of the Land Registration Act 2002 (hereafter referred to as ‘the LRA 2002’) 
require the Chief Land Registrar to keep a ‘register of title’ to land in England and Wales. The registrar 




Thornfield’s directors could have been sure precisely what interests they needed to acquire to 
‘resolve the landownership issues.’ 
D1 explained that a CPO is a way to assuage this uncertainty and to guarantee that a 
developer eventually gets a ‘clean’ title to land, purged of any potentially adverse interests. 
But a simple statement that a local authority and a developer are working towards the 
resolution of landownership issues leaves a lot unsaid. LA4 and PS1 informed me that, prior to 
making a CPO, a local authority and a developer will carry out a great deal of work to agree the 
value of the land to be acquired, the likely amount of compensation to be paid to all the 
existing landowners, the basis on which the developer would fund payment of that 
compensation, the mechanism for the transfer of the newly acquired land from the local 
authority to the developer, and the circumstances in which the developer would start building 
on that land.  
Steven Bee, WCC’s Director of Development Services, acknowledged these 
uncertainties in a letter he wrote to Michael Capocci, Thornfield’s managing director, in 
response to the latter’s request both for an EA with the Council and for confirmation that the 
Council would exercise its compulsory purchase powers.40 In that letter, Bee made clear that 
numerous variables stood between ‘an agreement in principle’ to make a CPO and the actual 
making of a CPO: 
The Council has previously agreed that it would, in principle, be prepared to 
exercise its CPO powers to secure the appropriate development of the site. A 
commitment to exercise these powers will require a further resolution by 
Cabinet,41 and will have to be based on an analysis of the likely costs to which the 
Council could be exposed, and how these could be met. Your assertion that 
                                                          
the identity of the proprietor of the freehold or leasehold estate in question. The register also records 
most third-party interests such as easements, charges and covenants that benefit or burden the title in 
question. The presence of these matters on a centralised register should, in theory, make identification 
of the extant interests on a development site straightforward. However, not all third-party interests 
need to be registered (as discussed in sections 11(4)(b) and 12(4)(b) and section 29(2)(ii) and (iii) of the 
LRA 2002) and it is quite possible that some freehold and leasehold estates on a development site may 
be ‘unregistered’ if, for example, an estate has been in the ownership of the same individual or 
corporation for a long period of time. In those circumstances, establishing the identity of the proprietor 
or identifying the existence of third-party rights, such as easements, might be more challenging. 
40 Matthew Bodley, Proof of Evidence of Matthew Bodley. Appendix 10. Extracts of correspondence 
relating to London and Henley group of companies. Letter from Steven Bee to Michael Capocci (6 June 
2002) (Appendix B, Document 3.10.12). 
41 Section 101(1) of the Local Government Act 1972 allows a council to delegate performance of some of 
its functions to a committee or an officer. As I pointed out in chapter one, WCC has a published 
constitution stating the function of and range of actions delegated to the Cabinet (see Winchester City 
Council, Constitution of the City Council - Part 3A - Responsibility for Functions (Appendix B, Document 
2.11), section 2) and the range of functions delegated to officers (see Winchester City Council, 





Thornfield would agree to a back to back arrangement,42 and underwrite all the 
Council’s costs, is helpful, and we look forward to exploring this further.43  
The phrase, ‘back to back arrangement,’ that Bee used here typically describes the situation in 
which a local authority acquires land following the exercise of a CPO and, soon after, transfers 
that land to a developer. This mechanism was common in the early 1990s44 and remains 
common now.45  
In addition to referring to a ‘back to back arrangement’ for land assembly, this letter 
from WCC’s Director of Development Services is interesting because it demonstrates that, 
privately, Bee acknowledged the complexity of the negotiations to be carried out prior to the 
making of a CPO. But the same director’s public statement to the Council’s Cabinet had 
presented the formulation of a planning framework for development as something that would 
enable construction to commence ‘as soon as landownership issues have been resolved.’46 By 
using the phrase ‘as soon as’ in this context, the director identified ‘landownership issues’ as 
an obstacle but implied confidence that resolution would be achieved swiftly.47 His private 
letter to Michael Capocci,48 by contrast, came closer to acknowledging that the task of 
resolving landownership issues would necessitate convoluted negotiations.  
The preoccupation with landownership issues, the earlier efforts that Thornfield had 
made to make land acquisitions on the earmarked development site and the perception that 
                                                          
42 Thornfield’s directors suggested that WCC might acquire the land interests on the development site, 
consolidate the various interests into a single freehold title and act as owner of that freehold title. They 
then suggested that WCC might then lease the whole site to Thornfield on the basis of a 125-year lease 
(see Bodley, Proof of Evidence of Matthew Bodley. Appendix 10. Extracts of correspondence relating to 
London and Henley group of companies. Letter from Michael Capocci to Steven Bee (28 May 2002) 
(Appendix B, Document 3.10.10)). In chapter six, I point out that WCC and Thornfield eventually agreed 
that WCC would lease the assembled development site to Thornfield on the basis of a 200-year lease 
(Winchester City Council, Appendix to CAB1030. Broadway Friarsgate - Development Agreement. Report 
of Chief Estates Officer. 8 February 2005 (Appendix B, Document 1.12), paragraph 15). 
43 Bodley, Proof of Evidence of Matthew Bodley. Appendix 10. Extracts of correspondence relating to 
London and Henley group of companies. Letter from Steven Bee to Michael Capocci (6 June 2002) 
(Appendix B, Document 3.10.12). 
44 Ann Harding, 'The rise of urban-growth coalitions, UK- style' (1991) 9 Environment and Planning C - 
Government and Policy 295, 309. 
45 Antonia Layard, 'Shopping in the Public Realm: A Law of Place' (2010) 37 Journal of Law and Society 
412, 418. See also R (Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd) v Wolverhampton City Council [2010] UKSC 20, 
[2011] 1 AC 437. 
46 Winchester City Council, WDLP21. Broadway Friarsgate Planning Brief. Report of Director of 
Development Services. 29 May 2003 (Appendix B, Document 1.02), paragraph 1.3. 
47 In chapter one I noted that some of the academic literature analysing the use of compulsory purchase 
powers in property-led development projects has identified the use of compulsory purchase powers as a 
tool of land assembly used to ‘get the job done quickly’ (see Rob Imrie and Huw Thomas, 'Law, legal 
struggles and urban regeneration: Rethinking the relationships' (1997) 34 Urban Studies 1401, 1408).  
48 Bodley, Proof of Evidence of Matthew Bodley. Appendix 10. Extracts of correspondence relating to 
London and Henley group of companies. Letter from Steven Bee to Michael Capocci (6 June 2002) 




that progress would be lost without some form of ‘binding’ legal agreement to underpin the 
land assembly process tied WCC closely to Thornfield. And this is an important point because 
the draft version of the Planning Brief put before WCC’s Cabinet on 15 January 2003 was a 
document written on the basis that it would ‘give general guidance for developers and their 
design team.’49 The Planning Brief expressly sought proposals from any ‘developers’ interested 
in pitching ideas to the Council.50 By contrast, WCC’s Director of Development Services 
referred to Thornfield as ‘the developer’ in the report that accompanied the final published 
version of the Brief at the end of May 2003.51 Before the consultation on the draft Planning 
Brief had concluded, WCC had moved from an ‘agreement in principle’ with Thornfield to an 
EA with Thornfield because WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors wanted to work towards 
resolving landownership issues.  
There were a number of different devices at play here that were attempts to produce 
what Latour might call ‘irreversible situations.’52 No landownership rights had yet changed 
hands, WCC’s Cabinet had not yet approved the making of a CPO, and Thornfield was not yet 
obliged to build anything on the development site. These were all matters to be ‘resolved’ at 
some point in the future. But, as CON2 informed me and Circular 06/2004 demonstrated, 
WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors would have known that they would need to point to 
the legitimising value of a granted planning permission at any future public inquiry into the 
making of a CPO.53 Publication of the Planning Brief, even though the Brief was ostensibly 
directed towards any developer interested in carrying out the development of the site, 
functioned as one of a sequence of cumulative acts of ratcheting54 or tightening55 that can 
embed a developer’s position in an emerging property-led development project. It did so 
because publication of the Planning Brief initiated the construction of a planning framework 
that would not only provide the basis for the grant of planning permission to Thornfield but 
that would also enable WCC’s officers to deploy a granted planning permission as justification 
for the making of a CPO. Taking these points into account demonstrates why WCC’s Director of 
                                                          
49 Winchester City Council, WDLP15. Broadway Friarsgate Planning Brief. Report of Director of 
Development Services. 15 January 2003 (Appendix B, Document 1.01), paragraph 2.5. Emphasis added. 
50 ibid, paragraph 1.0.5. The adopted version of the Planning Brief replicated this language (see 
Winchester City Council, Adopted Broadway Friarsgate Planning Brief. Part 1. Development Objectives 
(Appendix B, Document 2.03), paragraph 1.0.4). 
51 Winchester City Council, WDLP21. Broadway Friarsgate Planning Brief. Report of Director of 
Development Services. 29 May 2003 (Appendix B, Document 1.02), paragraph 1.3. Emphasis added. 
52 Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France (Harvard University Press 1988), 50. 
53 The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, ODPM Circular 06/2004. Compulsory Purchase and The 
Crichel Down Rules, paragraph 23. 
54 Bruno Latour, We have never been modern (Harvard University Press 1993), 72. 
55 Richard Harper, Inside the IMF: an ethnography of documents, technology, and organisational action 
(Routledge 1998), 258-9. 
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Development Services informed the Council’s Cabinet that publication of a Planning Brief 
would do more than simply enable the formulation of a planning framework for the proposed 
development. 
But, while a master plan, a planning application and a planning permission were 
presented as inevitable consequences of a Planning Brief, resolving land assembly issues 
through the exercise of the Council’s compulsory purchase powers still required other inputs. 
To mitigate the consequent uncertainty, and to ensure that land assembly became a more 
predictable process, WCC and Thornfield entered into their EA so that both parties benefited 
from Thornfield’s early efforts at land acquisitions and its agreement with Stagecoach. In 
discussing the modern conception of progress, Latour identifies the assumption that, ‘as we 
advance in time, each stage outstrips the preceding one,’56 and the approach to property-led 
development that I am describing fits neatly within this classification. The advances were 
incremental and the stages were only subtly separated but the move from a ‘nearly legal’ EA to 
a signed and ‘legally binding’ EA confirmed that Thornfield was WCC’s chosen development 
partner even while the Planning Brief invited proposals from other developers. This allowed 
WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors to focus more closely on joint efforts at land 
acquisition rather than the predominantly Thornfield-led initiative that had been followed to 
that point and that I described in chapter four. In addition, however, there is the hint here of a 
difference between private and public development trajectories. In private, WCC and 
Thornfield had established a similar ‘temporal orientation’57 in which Thornfield was the 
chosen developer and both parties directed their actions towards the grant of planning 
permission to Thornfield, the making of a CPO and the transfer of the land to Thornfield. On 
the other hand, WCC’s officers were presenting a different chronology for public consumption, 
in which the Council not only carried out a consultation period seeking public input into the 
built form that the development would take but also suggested that participation in the 
process was open to any developer.  
A credible basis for a CPO? Moving from an EA to a DA 
In this section, I analyse how the parties used the EA to give the subsequent 
negotiations some of ‘the qualities’ of time58 both as a legal necessity and to frame those 
negotiations. I also address the Developer Brief that WCC’s officers issued to Thornfield setting 
                                                          
56 Michel Serres and Bruno Latour, Conversations on science, culture, and time (University of Michigan 
Press 1995), 49. 
57 Sarah Keenan, 'Smoke, Curtains and Mirrors: The Production of Race Through Time and Title 
Registration' (2017) 28 Law & Critique 87, 100. 
58 Matthew S. Hull, Government of paper: the materiality of bureaucracy in urban Pakistan (University of 
California Press 2012), 258. 
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out the basis on which WCC would exercise its compulsory purchase powers and ask how this 
further tightened the ties connecting WCC and Thornfield. 
One of the points that I have emphasised so far in this thesis is that property-led 
development involves a complex set of processes initiated, gathered together, held apart, 
moved on, or concluded by the deployment of various types of ‘nearly legal’ or ‘legally binding’ 
agreements. In the previous section, I considered how the ‘nearly legal’ EA deployed in 
Winchester performed a role in advancing the planning part of the Winchester Development 
by acting as a catalyst for the production, circulation and approval of a Planning Brief designed 
to inform Thornfield’s master planning for the site and its eventual planning application. But, 
when the Council’s Director of Development Services observed that the Planning Brief would 
allow work to start on site only when ‘landownership issues have been resolved,’59 he 
emphasised that the early stages of property-led development also take shape in response to 
progress on land acquisitions as a component of land assembly. Consequently, noting the links 
between the ‘nearly legal’ EA and publication of the Planning Brief does not adequately explain 
why the EA was an important document.  
I have already mentioned that Thornfield’s directors sought an EA with WCC ‘with a 
view to entering into a development agreement’60 but this is another somewhat abstract 
statement so it is important to ask what WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors did with the 
EA to make entering into a DA possible. There are, however, very few WCC documents that 
were made publicly available that stated the Council’s reasons for deploying an EA. The author 
of the Independent Review into the Winchester Development had ‘privileged access’61 to 
otherwise confidential WCC Cabinet meeting minutes and reports, however, and she notes 
that the Council entered into the EA on a similar basis as Thornfield, ‘in anticipation’ of 
reaching a position in which they could sign a DA.62 Although the Independent Review provides 
some insight into WCC’s decision-making, it is imprecise as to the terms of the EA other than to 
suggest that it granted Thornfield an initial six month period to submit proposals to WCC 
regarding the exercise of the Council’s compulsory purchase powers and presenting 
                                                          
59 Winchester City Council, WDLP21. Broadway Friarsgate Planning Brief. Report of Director of 
Development Services. 29 May 2003 (Appendix B, Document 1.02), paragraph 1.3. 
60 Bodley, Proof of Evidence of Matthew Bodley. Appendix 10. Extracts of correspondence relating to 
London and Henley group of companies. Letter from Michael Capocci to Steven Bee (28 May 2002) 
(Appendix B, Document 3.10.10). 
61 Mariana Valverde, Everyday law on the street: city governance in an age of diversity (University of 
Chicago Press 2012), 14. In chapter three, I explained the circumstances in which WCC’s officers 
instructed the author of the Independent Review to carry out her review and the ‘access’ to WCC’s 
officers, councillors, consultants and documents that she received. 




Thornfield’s view of the form that the built components of the development should take.63 The 
EA facilitated the preparation of Thornfield’s proposals and the subsequent negotiation 
envisaged in the Developer Brief.  
WCC’s officers issued the Developer Brief in April 2003,64 less than a month after the 
date on which WCC and Thornfield signed their EA and WCC published its Planning Brief for 
consultation. The two Briefs served different purposes but while the consultation period for 
the Planning Brief began in March 2003 and publication of the Planning Brief was a matter of 
public record, WCC did not publicise that it had sent the Developer Brief to Thornfield until 
much later in the development process.65 Without reviewing the content of the Developer 
Brief, it is only possible to speculate why WCC’s officers treated it as confidential66 but, as I 
noted in the previous section by reference to correspondence between WCC’s Director of 
Development Services and Thornfield’s directors, the making of a CPO involves negotiations 
between a local authority and a developer regarding their valuation of the land to be acquired 
and it seems likely that WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors would have viewed these 
valuations as commercially sensitive. Moreover, the development proposal WCC and 
Thornfield were pursuing involved the lease of the assembled development site from the 
Council to the developer. The Developer Brief may have included some financial details 
pertaining to those land valuations, the ground rent that Thornfield would have paid to WCC 
for the lease of the entire site and any profit-sharing mechanism for the completed 
development, perhaps necessitating confidentiality.67  
                                                          
63 ibid, 44. 
64 I have not seen a copy of the Developer Brief but the Council stated at the 2012 Compulsory Purchase 
Order inquiry that it had issued the Brief in April 2003 (see Thorby, CPO Report to the Secretary of State 
for Communities and Local Government; SUO Report to the Secretary of State for Transport. 17 
December 2012 (Appendix B, Document 3.03)) and the Independent Review (see, Lloyd-Jones, A Perfect 
Storm - Report on Silver Hill (Appendix B, Document 2.08), 15). 
65 The first reference that I can find to a Developer Brief is in Winchester City Council, CAB938. 
Broadway Friarsgate Development. Report of the Chief Estates Officer. 6 October 2004 (Appendix B, 
Document 1.08), paragraph 1.5, which states that the Brief ‘set out the Council’s requirements and 
aspirations for the site in its capacity of landowner.’ 
66 WCC discussed the Brief and Thornfield’s response to it in Cabinet meetings, but did so in closed 
sessions from which the public were excluded. The minutes of these meetings state simply that ‘Cabinet 
considered the […] report which set out the Developer’s response to the Brief’ (see, for example, 
Winchester City Council, Minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 1 October 2003 (Appendix B, 
Document 1.03), item 472). 
67 Section 100A(4) of the Local Government Act 1972 allows a council to exclude the public from a 
meeting if it feels that their participation would enable them to obtain information that the local 
authority deems to be ‘exempt’ from disclosure. Section 100I and Schedule 12A of the 1972 Act list the 
circumstances in which a local authority might justifiably deem information ‘exempt.’ Schedule 12A of 
the 1972 Act, as amended by the Local Government (Access to Information) (Variation) Order 2006 SI 
2006/88, contains broadly defined categories of information that a local authority might deem to be 
exempt from public discussion, including ‘information relating to the financial or business affairs of any 




I base these assumptions on the content of the Developer Brief on my reading of 
contemporaneous Developer Briefs. For example, in chapter three, I referred to a property-led 
development in Farnham that began at a similar time to the Winchester Development. For the 
purposes of the former, Waverley Borough Council published a ‘Development Brief’ designed 
to generate property development proposals from developers.68 The Farnham Brief included a 
section outlining the Heads of Terms that the council envisaged would form the basis for a 
DA.69 However, when Waverley Borough Council’s Executive approved a draft of the Farnham 
Brief in an ostensibly public meeting, they discussed ‘general, non-exempt, sections of the 
Brief’ in the open part of the meeting and financial details deemed exempt from the need for 
public discussion in private.70  
The Winchester Developer Brief called for a set of proposals from Thornfield’s 
directors by August 2003.71 The six-month exclusivity period, beginning on the date of the EA 
in March 2003, would run in parallel until September 2003. During that time, the EA obliged 
both parties to conduct negotiations ‘in good faith’ and required Thornfield to cover all the 
costs WCC incurred in instructing consultants to engage in negotiations on its behalf.72 In 
return, WCC promised not to negotiate with any other developers in relation to the 
development opportunity and to maintain commercial confidentiality throughout.73 As a 
means to direct the parties towards signing a DA, the EA was important, therefore, because it 
                                                          
of Schedule 12A of the 1972 Act in force at the time that WCC issued its Developer Brief allowed a local 
authority to treat as exempt from public discussion ‘[a]ny terms proposed or to be proposed by or to the 
authority in the course of negotiations for a contract for the acquisition or disposal of property.’ 
68 Hereafter referred to as ‘the Farnham Brief.’ 
69 Cluttons, 'East Street Area of Opportunity, Farnham. Development Brief. Waverley Borough Council. 
Undated' <http://www.waverley.gov.uk/downloads/file/3323/brightwells_development_plan_2002> 
accessed 12 November 2017, 44-50. The clickable link refers, apparently erroneously, to a document 
entitled ‘Brightwells Development Plan 2002.’ 
70 Waverley Borough Council, 'Minutes of the meeting of the Executive held on 24 July 2002' 
<http://waverweb.waverley.gov.uk/live/wbc/newcomdb.nsf/f0688ddc4711c8578025761c004fe22b/888
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inquiry in June 2012 (see Thorby, CPO Report to the Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
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was a means to compel the parties to maintain a ‘shared temporal coordination’74 throughout 
those negotiations. This type of EA gave the development trajectory some of ‘the qualities’ of 
time75 by setting out a framework to measure progress against fixed temporal markers.  
Imposing a temporal framework on action can, as Grabham has shown, create 
‘momentum and force’ because ‘prescribed periods of time are conceptually linked with high 
pressure.’76 A temporal framework has the potential, therefore, to function as a form of 
‘disciplinary’ technique.77 It is easy to assume that the EA defined a prescribed timeframe for 
‘the exclusivity period’ to compel the parties to reach agreement on the terms of a DA before 
the time expired and this is an assumption that I consider later in this chapter. But a prescribed 
time limit was also a necessity if the parties wanted to create a ‘legally binding’ agreement. 
The House of Lords judgment in the case of Walford v Miles78 confirmed that an EA will be 
enforceable in the event of a breach of any of its terms, first, if the ‘buyer’ provides some sort 
of consideration to the ‘seller’79 and, second, if the agreement imposes a sufficiently certain 
obligation upon a ‘seller’ not to negotiate with other parties for a fixed period. While the 
temporal framework in the EA created, as I will show, no more than a hypothetical schema for 
the movement along the pre-defined development trajectory, part of the purpose for the 
imposition of a time limit was the way that it endowed the EA with ‘legal’ force. By creating a 
‘legal’ agreement, WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors presumably sought to put in place 
redress mechanisms that could be deployed if either party did not negotiate the terms of a DA 
in good faith or if, for example, Thornfield refused to pay costs that WCC incurred or if WCC’s 
                                                          
74 Keenan, 'Smoke, Curtains and Mirrors: The Production of Race Through Time and Title Registration', 
100. 
75 Hull, Government of paper: the materiality of bureaucracy in urban Pakistan, 258. 
76 Emily Grabham, 'Governing Permanence: Trans Subjects, Time, and the Gender Recognition Act' 
(2010) 19 Social & Legal Studies 107, 118. 
77 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Penguin 1991), 215. 
78 [1992] 2 WLR 174 (HL). This thesis does not analyse the Walford v Miles judgement or its detailed 
application to the Winchester EA but, for further reading, consider Leon E. Trakman and Kunal Sharma, 
'The binding force of agreements to negotiate in good faith' (2014) 73 Cambridge Law Journal 598 and 
Henry Hoskins, 'Contractual obligations to negotiate in good faith: faithfulness to the agreed common 
purpose' (2014) 130 (Jan) Law Quarterly Review 131. 
79 There is limited detail available to indicate the consideration Thornfield offered to WCC although I 
have noted that Thornfield agreed to pay WCC’s professional costs throughout the duration of the 
exclusivity period. In other places, the consideration the developer provided to the local authority is 
more clearly defined. For example, in Leicester, Hammerson plc and Leicester City Council entered into 
an EA to facilitate negotiations on a DA and to allow Hammerson to test the feasibility of proposals for 
the Highcross development in Leicester. The EA required an initial payment of £25,000 from 
Hammerson to the council with a subsequent payment of £25,000 on the anniversary of the date of the 
agreement, followed by biannual payments of the same amount during the lifetime of the agreement. 
See, Leicester City Council, 'Shires West Update - Report of the Corporate Director of Resources, Access 
and Diversity - Supporting Information - 4 August 2003' <directory.leicester.gov.uk/media/2538/foia-




officers started to negotiate a DA with an alternative developer. An EA is, therefore, a type of 
navigational device holding the parties to their pre-plotted heading for a set period of time by, 
on the one hand, tying the developer and the local authority together and, on the other hand, 
setting both parties’ expectations for progress towards a DA.  
In addition, there are other reasons for the use of this type of agreement. One of the 
ways of thinking through the significance of an EA might be by understanding it as a ‘summing 
up of interactions’80 into an overarching development trajectory. In Winchester, the EA was 
also a way of linking the present to the future through that summing up. It did so by projecting 
forward WCC’s agreement, as of March 2003, not to negotiate with other potential developers 
in the event that other developers responded to the Council’s Planning Brief with development 
proposals to rival Thornfield’s.81 But in addition to acting as a summing up and a device to hold 
the parties to an agreed development trajectory, an EA provides a developer with a sense of 
comfort. For example, D1 told me that ‘before you get into the details of the DA, you’ll have 
spent a lot of time and money on your concept’ and will want to ‘know that you’ve got a 
credible scheme.’ An EA appears to be important to a developer, in those circumstances, if he 
or she can use an exclusivity period to carry out extensive tests to assess the profit-generating 
capacity of the proposals. What these points also demonstrate is that a developer and a local 
authority will often begin an exclusivity period with little certainty that doing so will lead to a 
completed development or that they have a ‘credible’ basis for making a CPO.  
An EA nonetheless provides comfort to a developer who is about to incur substantial 
‘costs’ drawing up and testing the profitability of plans or negotiating with landowners, 
prospective tenants or local authorities. Without an EA, that developer would have no ‘legally 
binding’ assurance that the local authority shared his commitment to the development. The 
underlying concern here appears to be with future costs recovery and a fear that a developer 
would be unable to recover costs expended if the local authority retained and utilised the 
flexibility to discuss development proposals with other potential development partners. In 
Winchester, the EA meant that this expenditure of time and money on drawing up plans, 
embarking on detailed negotiations as to the terms of a DA, valuing land and testing 
profitability took place sheltered by a neatly demarcated exclusivity period. But as well as 
enhancing the prospect of recovery of costs already expended, D1 indicated that obtaining the 
                                                          
80 Bruno Latour, 'On recalling ANT' in John Law and John Hassard (eds), Actor network theory and after 
(Blackwell 1999), 17. 
81 The only record of alternative development proposals that I have found were proposals John De 
Stefano put forward for development on his land interests adjacent to the bus station. I will discuss De 
Stefano’s proposals in more detail in chapter six. 
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opportunity to assess costs to be expended in acquiring land, paying inducements to key retail 
tenants and constructing the end development is an important function of an EA.  
My interviewees gathered these considerations together under the label, ‘feasibility.’ 
D2 offered an insight into the interplay of costs and profit when he explained that a developer 
would have spent some time before entering into an EA assessing the value of land interests in 
the vicinity of a development site. LA4 made a similar point and explained that a developer will 
carry out a lot of ‘costing up’ before negotiations on a DA begin so that the developer and the 
local authority know where they ‘are starting from’ in those negotiations. From LA4’s 
perspective, these feasibility exercises involve spreadsheets with ‘huge, big matrices that work 
all this out, that are mind-numbing, that are the size of a snooker table.’ And he explained that 
a local authority should participate in a developer’s feasibility testing to some extent in order 
to assess the credibility of the developer’s assumptions regarding land valuations, construction 
costs and likely profit so that it could form a clear bargaining position on the contents of a DA. 
But both D2 and LA4 explained that, while a developer would have conducted 
feasibility testing before the exclusivity period, the developer would then, after entering into 
the EA, carry out further assessments to enable a more detailed estimate of the likely cost of 
land acquisitions and other development costs that would arise if the local authority made a 
CPO. Those estimates would inform the developer’s decision whether or not to pursue a DA 
because, if the land acquisition costs were too high, D1 and D2 explained, the developer would 
not expect to make a suitable profit and would not want to continue with the project. Existing 
research into the financial planning underpinning these legal arrangements has demonstrated 
that developers come to treat a pre-determined rate of return as an ‘entitlement.’82 D1 told 
me that he would simply allow any ‘binding’ EAs to expire by effluxion of time if he did not 
expect to manufacture a development proposition that produced estimated profits in line with 
his expectations.  
But beyond a general expression of a belief that an exclusivity period allowed 
thorough costs assessments and presaged a more detailed DA, D1 suggested that there was 
little else to this type of agreement. In chapter four, I argued that developers seek to line up 
option agreements with existing landowners to enable them to purchase land interests once 
they have secured a DA with a local authority and there is something similarly ‘routinized’ or 
procedural83 about the use of EAs. The Winchester EA was time-limited and purported to 
define a coordinated period of negotiations, but CON2 told me that an EA is simply ‘an interim 
                                                          
82 Fleur Johns, 'Financing as Governance' (2011) 31 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 391, 405. 
83 Emilie Cloatre, 'Fluid Legal Labels and the Circulation of Socio-technical Objects: the Multiple Lives of 
'Fake' Medicines' in David Cowan and Daniel Wincott (eds), Exploring the 'Legal' in Socio-Legal Studies 
(Palgrave 2016), 97. 
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measure while you’re waiting for your DA’ and thus little more than a way of filling time. This is 
shown most clearly in D1’s struggle to articulate what an EA is for: 
It’s an agreement to keep you tied, without being formally tied. And it gives 
everyone an easy out as well. There’s no formal process. And it’s not even 
something that you would say is something. It doesn’t contain something that you 
would say, “You need to do [PAUSE].” It’s just something that [PAUSE]. If it’s felt 
that the parties need to have a bit of certainty, they do it. 
LA4 similarly argued that there is usually ‘nothing [in an EA] to bind anyone’ other than a 
promise from the local authority not to negotiate with rival developers. My understanding of 
the Winchester EA is that Thornfield’s duty to pay WCC’s costs and the imposition of a time 
limit might have ensured that the agreement contained ‘binding’ obligations.84 But the legal 
definition of these agreements is, at best, ‘blurry.’85 For developers, consultants and local 
authority officers, it appears that the only two things that matter are that the parties enter 
into it with a view to agreeing a DA and its output is, therefore, an agreed DA deployed to 
facilitate a CPO. Attempting to enforce the obligations in an EA is only something that would 
occur in the event of a refusal by the developer to pay the local authority, a failure by either 
party to negotiate in good faith, or if the local authority sought to enter into a DA with another 
developer. PS1 explained that this is the type of thing that a developer and a local authority 
would simply ‘get the lawyers’ in to resolve.  
Thought of in this way, an EA might be just another type of rather abstract ‘vehicular 
idea’ in that its role, like the nearly legal agreements I discussed in chapter four, is ‘to move 
things on’86 and direct actions towards a future goal. LA4 explained that this is ‘how you get to 
the development agreements’ and CON2 noted that it is part of ‘the route along the way to 
getting your DA.’ Latour points us towards the way that a series of ‘hesitations’ often facilitate 
decision-making processes87 and there is something similar at work here in the early stages of 
property-led development. The way that D1, D4, CON2 and LA4 described the operation of an 
EA reveals a perception that an EA helps make possible onward movement through the 
development process by marking out a scheduled interval during which a developer can 
expend costs with a growing confidence in its ability to recover those costs or, alternatively, 
establish the possibility that it might not attain a desirable level of profitability.  
  
                                                          
84 As defined in Walford v Miles (n78). 
85 Emilie Cloatre, Pills for the poorest: an exploration of TRIPS and access to medication in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Palgrave 2013), 99. 
86 David Cowan and Daniel Wincott, 'Exploring the 'Legal'' in David Cowan and Daniel Wincott (eds), 
Exploring the 'Legal' in Socio-Legal Studies (Palgrave 2016), 26. 
87 Bruno Latour, The making of law: an ethnography of the Conseil d'Etat (Polity 2010), 91. 
142 
 
Heads of Terms, time limits and extensions 
In this section, I reflect on the requirement that a legally enforceable EA must have a 
time limit but demonstrate that this principle rests upon an inherent vagueness that allows 
substantial flexibility to the manner of its application. So far in this thesis, I have argued that a 
developer and a local authority set out a linear trajectory connecting initial negotiations to an 
EA and an EA to a DA but that they also seek out periods of hesitation during which land 
acquisitions, feasibility tests and other discussions take place. The deployment of various 
‘legally binding’ and ‘nearly legal’ technologies marks progress and facilitates further 
movement along that line by ‘summing up’ prior interactions88 and establishing a closed 
project world89 in which a subsequent period of negotiation can play out on the stage set to be 
filled by a DA. Underlying this linear trajectory is an assumption that a developer and a local 
authority will ‘get to’ a DA to enable the local authority to legitimately make a CPO. In the next 
chapter, I will explain why a DA ‘stands behind a CPO,’ as LA2 put it, but my focus here is on 
the ways that WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors manipulated the purported time limits 
set out in the Winchester EA to ensure that they reached a point from which they were 
prepared to enter into a DA.  
The time limits set out in the EA were affected by, and had an effect on, the time limits 
in the Developer Brief to which I referred in the previous section of this chapter. There were 
two apparent deadlines operative here. Thornfield’s directors needed to respond to the 
Developer Brief with development proposals by 1 August 2003 and the exclusivity period that 
the EA purported to create was scheduled to run until September 2003. I have already 
suggested that the temporal framework that the EA imposed created a sense of momentum 
and force.90 This is helpful for my analysis of the operation of the Winchester EA because there 
is a perception that temporal targeting produces an organisational culture in which 
collaborative and productive processes channel resources towards the satisfaction of 
predefined goals in a timely manner. 
Entering into a DA was the predefined goal set out in advance as the intended target 
of the negotiations during the Winchester exclusivity period. But the negotiations between 
WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors demonstrate what happens when the intended target 
                                                          
88 Latour, 'On recalling ANT', 17. 
89 John Law and Valerie Singleton, 'Performing technology's stories - On social constructivism, 
performance, and performativity' (2000) 41 Technology and Culture 765; Henriette Langstrup, 
'Interpellating Patients as Users: Patient Associations and the Project-Ness of Stem Cell Research' (2011) 
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90 Grabham, 'Governing Permanence: Trans Subjects, Time, and the Gender Recognition Act'. 
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is not achieved within the prescribed time limit because, during the Winchester Development, 
it was the desire for a DA that was fixed, not the time limit.  
Thornfield’s directors submitted a response to the Developer Brief that WCC’s officers 
presented to the Council’s Cabinet at a closed meeting on 1 October 2003. The publicly 
available minutes recording the discussion are short and simply state: 
Cabinet considered the above report which set out the developer’s response to 
the Brief regarding redevelopment of the Broadway/Friarsgate area, and 
proposed the next steps to be taken (detail in exempt minutes).91 
There is no further public record of the discussion or the proposed steps, which was 
problematic for landowners likely to be affected by the Winchester Development because 
these discussions and the ‘steps to be taken’ were preliminary steps to the making of a CPO. 
The Independent Review provides more, albeit limited, insight and points out that WCC 
rejected Thornfield’s proposals in October 2003 but invited revisions to be submitted during 
the exclusivity period, which was extended to 29 February 2004 by an alteration to the EA.92 
An exclusivity period originally scheduled to run for six months had, therefore, been 
extended to run for 12 months. This demonstrates that there was a ‘plasticity’93 or ‘fluidity’94 
to the temporal framework deployed in the EA because time itself could not be mastered and 
ran on regardless of progress against pre-defined targets. The adaptability of time limits will be 
a theme of the remainder of this thesis as I analyse the various ways in which local authorities 
and developers attempt to measure the amount of time actions take to perform while also 
attempting to accommodate the exigencies, unpredictabilities and overflows95 of property-led 
development. Hull notes that ‘[w]riting things down is usually seen to nail things down, but it 
can also set them in motion’96 and writing down a time limit for the end of the Winchester 
exclusivity period simply led to repeated variation of that time limit. This suggests that setting 
the time limit for the exclusivity period at six months was either an estimate for the amount of 
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time that WCC and Thornfield would need to reach a DA or an arbitrary figure simply based on 
standard property-led development practice.97 
My supposition that 6 months may have been a somewhat arbitrary figure is 
supported by the way that WCC considered Thornfield’s second response to the Developer 
Brief and moved towards a DA. WCC’s Cabinet met on 11 February 2004 and, at that meeting, 
agreed that Thornfield’s ‘revised response’ offered ‘a way forward’98 that could form the basis 
for the ‘Heads of Terms’ for a DA.99 But, even so, the parties had a long way to go before they 
entered into a DA. PS1 suggested that ‘getting to’ Heads of Terms can be difficult when ‘you’re 
trying to identify 14 or so main points’ as the basis for further negotiations. But, nonetheless, 
LA2 explained that some sort of Heads of Terms or memoranda of understanding is essential 
to give ‘each party the comfort to keep going.’ This played out in Winchester in the form of a 
‘detailed set’ of Heads of Terms that WCC’s officers put before WCC’s Cabinet on 25 May 
2004.100 
Heads of Terms, LA4 explained, help a local authority and a developer identify where 
they are ‘starting from’ in this type of negotiation. PS1 evoked the purity of ‘pre-legal’ Heads of 
Terms when he told me: 
When I do a legal agreement, I start with what I call guiding principles. That’s 
usually four or five pages of plain English before you instructed a lawyer. And all 
the parties agree those. But even if that’s compressed to two pages of heads of 
terms, your lawyers will convert it to 70 pages of what ifs. And the what ifs 
contain all of the circumstances in which you will consider variation, or 
termination, or whatever. It’s those that [PAUSE]. Often you’ve just lost the plot 
of what was in those. And whether someone knocked one of those out late at 
night because they thought that it was something to give in relation to another 
point. 
                                                          
97 The Farnham development that I referred to in chapter three and briefly earlier in this chapter 
involved an exclusivity period allowing the council’s preferred developer a 6 month period to carry out a 
public consultation on their development proposals and prepare an application for planning permission 
(see Waverley Borough Council, 'East Street, Farnham Regeneration - Appendix O - Report to the 
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His comment on the relationship between Heads of Terms and ‘a legal agreement’ reveals a 
sense of a loss of control once ‘lawyers’ convert ‘plain English’ into ’70 pages of “what ifs.”’ But 
his focus on ‘guiding principles’ indicates that varying or terminating a DA is something that 
some developers and local authorities do not consider at the outset of negotiations, preferring 
to leave this to the ‘lawyers.’ In chapters six to 10, however, I will demonstrate why a 
variations clause can become an extremely important component of a DA. 
Instead of discussing future variation to or termination of a DA, PS1, LA4, D1 and D4 
referred to an ‘invariant’ focus on the costs of land acquisition and construction, and the way 
that those costs will be recovered. D1 pointed out that, even after agreeing Heads of Terms, 
‘you get more understanding about costs, you do more survey work, and things come out of 
the woodwork that get bolted on.’ I will consider the use of bolt-ons, or what Latour might call 
‘plug-ins,’101 throughout the remainder of this thesis but my point here is that a local authority 
and a developer try to ‘start’ from simple Heads of Terms but find the actual negotiations on 
the terms of a DA to be frustratingly complex. For example, LA4 commented that ‘so much 
work is done before you get to a DA’ and that negotiations following the approval of Heads of 
Terms would not just concern land acquisition costs and construction costs but also 
encompass matters pertaining to the potential return on costs, the height and density of 
buildings, the combination of retail, leisure, office and residential units in the development, 
and the type of retail tenants that the developer would pursue.  
For the purposes of the Winchester Development, WCC’s Overview and Scrutiny 
Committee met on 27 September 2004 to consider a report from the Council’s Chief Estates 
Officer, deemed exempt from publication, on a Thornfield-produced financial appraisal and a 
further clarification of the Heads of Terms.102 Following that meeting, WCC’s Cabinet met, on 6 
October 2004, with Thornfield’s managing director, architects, retail consultants and building 
consultants in attendance, to listen to WCC’s officers pitch the terms of the negotiated DA to 
them and to approve that DA.103 Cabinet duly confirmed its approval104 but WCC and 
Thornfield did not enter into their DA until 22 December 2004, necessitating a further 
extension of the exclusivity period until the DA had been signed.105 These extensions were 
                                                          
101 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the social: an introduction to actor-network-theory (Oxford University 
Press 2005), 207. 
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necessary because, while WCC and Thornfield could identify that the desired output of the 
exclusivity period was a DA, negotiating a DA can be difficult. CON2 told me that local 
authorities and developers generally prefer to be able to enter into a DA as soon as possible in 
a development process so that they can ‘get on’ with securing third-party land by making a 
CPO. But it is also clear that there are circumstances when waiting or drawing out a ‘legally’ 
defined exclusivity period might be desirable. WCC’s Chief Estates Officer pointed to the need 
to extend the exclusivity period simply because the Council had incurred substantial costs in 
negotiating and drawing up the DA and the EA contained a mechanism for recovery of those 
costs from Thornfield on the signing of a DA.106 LA2 talked about the period between a local 
authority and a developer entering into an EA and then agreeing a DA and commented that 
sometimes ‘these things take a heck of a long time’ but that such things as provision for future 
cost recovery and past progress on land acquisitions would give a local authority ‘comfort to 
keep going.’ 
These points show that cost recovery is an important interest of both a local authority 
and a developer at this stage of property-led development. From D1’s point-of-view, however, 
a drawing out of the pause between an EA and a DA can provide an opportunity for a 
developer. Referring to a project he was then involved in, he had been ‘constantly 
reappraising, looking at value engineering, costs savings, everything else’ while negotiating a 
DA but could not manufacture his desired rate of return from the mix of buildings and uses 
that the Council wanted the end development to include. As a result, he had refused to sign a 
DA that the Council believed had been settled. He acknowledged that the ‘local authority may 
see this as a gun to the head’ but he argued that ‘we’re saying, “we will sign but on those 
ground rules,”’ which obliged the local authority to change its requirements. D1 noted that, if 
he had signed the DA on the existing terms, he would have had to have had ‘the same 
discussion about costs and revenues three or four months down the line.’ Nonetheless, he 
understandably preferred to keep what he perceived to be unaffordable requirements out of 
the DA. But all of this suggests that while a property-led development project might initially 
gain shape, purpose and structure from a time limit, more pressing concerns with cost 
recovery, profit-generating capacity, and land acquisition, among other things, very often take 
precedence. This is an underlying thread that I will explore throughout the remainder of this 
thesis. 
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‘A cautious approach?’ 
In the final part of this chapter I analyse another component of the exclusivity period 
in Winchester involving legal advice that WCC’s officers received regarding the lawfulness of 
entering into a DA with Thornfield without having first publicly advertised the development 
opportunity or carried out a competitive tender. My analysis in this section will initially focus 
on the decision that WCC’s officers made not to circulate the Developer Brief to any developer 
other than Thornfield or to discuss it in public meetings with councillors. 
Some local authorities involved in the ‘promotion’ of development projects taking 
place in the early to mid-2000s seem to have taken a different approach to the use of this type 
of Developer Brief, with some using a Developer Brief as a component of a competitive 
tendering process and only agreeing to enter into an EA with a developer after the conclusion 
of that competition.107 Incorporating a Developer Brief into a tender competition is consistent 
with what CBRE, a well-known property development consultancy, described as a ‘cautious’ 
interpretation108 of the then extant EC Directive on the procedural requirements for the award 
of public works contracts.109 
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issued a Planning Brief in February 2000 identifying a development site in its area (Waverley Borough 
Council, 'Planning Brief for the East Street Area of Opportunity Farnham. February 2000' 
<http://www.waverley.gov.uk/download/downloads/id/3308/planning_brief_february_2000.pdf> 
accessed 28 March 2017). After receiving 25 expressions of interest from property development 
companies in response to the Planning Brief, the council then issued a ‘detailed development brief’ in 
April 2002 to eight of those developers, from which it selected its preferred development partner 
(Waverley Borough Council, 'East Street Farnham. Compulsory Purchase Order Statement of Case. 
September 2012', paragraph 3.8). Waverley then only entered into an EA with its chosen development 
partner after the tender process had concluded (Waverley Borough Council, 'East Street, Farnham 
Regeneration - Appendix O - Report to the meeting of the Executive held on 14/01/2003', paragraphs 1-
2). 
108 CBRE, 'EU Procurement Regulations. The Impact on Joint Venture Proposals. January 2008' 
<http://www.cbre.co.uk/portal/page/portal/emea_en/services/public_sector/public_sector_content/p
ublic_sector_leftcol/eu_public_procurement_regulations_impact_on_jv%20Proposals.pdf> accessed 7 
July 2017, paragraph 1.2. The cautious approach was, according to CBRE’s report on the state of 
development practice in the early to mid-2000s, to carry out a competitive tender for all major property 
development projects. 
109 Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of procedures for the 
award of public works contracts OJ [1993] L199/54 (hereafter referred to as ‘the 1993 Directive’). The 
1993 Directive has since been superseded by Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works 
contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts OJ [2004] L134/114 (‘the 2004 Directive’). 
The Public Contracts Regulations 2006, SI 2006/5 (hereafter ‘the PCR 2006’) transposed the 2004 
Directive into domestic law. The 2004 Directive has since been superseded by Directive 2014/24/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing 
Directive [2014] OJ L94/65 and Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts OJ [2014] L94/1, respectively transposed into UK 
law by the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 SI 2015/102 and the Concession Contracts Regulations 




WCC’s officers chose, however, not to take a cautious approach, although the author 
of the Independent Review revealed that this may have gone against the expectations of both 
the organisation that drafted the Developer Brief110 and Thornfield’s directors: 
[The Developer Brief] was sent only to Thornfields [sic] asking for a response by 1st 
August 2003. The brief itself assumes that it will be sent to more than one 
developer. There is some evidence that Thornfields [sic] itself thought that the 
brief may also have gone to other developers.111 
This suggests that the consultants who prepared the Developer Brief assumed that WCC’s 
officers would use it as the basis for some form of competitive tendering process in which 
various developers submitted proposals to the Council to enable it to select its preferred 
developer. Doing so would have meant that WCC used the Brief in a similar way to that which 
CON3 described when he recalled how his consultancy had ‘led’ competitions for local 
authority clients and produced a Brief, evaluated proposals according to pre-defined metrics 
and recommended a developer to the local authority.  
The approach that WCC’s consultants anticipated was also consistent with the 
‘cautious view’ that CBRE advocated. It should be noted, however, that some of my other 
interviewees expressed strong reservations about the suitability of a ‘cautious’ approach. 
CON2 told me that he would always encourage developers and local authorities to avoid 
having to carry out a competitive tender where possible because doing so would entail costs 
for a local authority from running the competition. In addition, CON2 pointed to the possibility 
of litigation if losing bidders felt that the local authority had followed an inappropriate 
procedure or the consultants had carried out the evaluation of proposals in a way that left the 
local authority’s eventual decision open to challenge.  
D4 similarly told me that the costs, complexity and risk of losing in a competitive 
tender meant that he would always seek to arrange a partnership with a local authority in such 
a way that a competitive tender was not necessary by, for example, negotiating a DA that did 
not impose an enforceable obligation on a developer to acquire land or commence 
construction.112 LA2 similarly talked about the frustration of having ‘to guard against challenge’ 
                                                          
110 I assume that WCC instructed consultants to draft the Developer Brief. CON3 told me that his firm 
would often prepare tender documents for local authorities. The Independent Review states that WCC 
appointed a consultancy practice on 22 September 2000 (Lloyd-Jones, A Perfect Storm - Report on Silver 
Hill (Appendix B, Document 2.08), 44) and it is likely that this firm prepared the Developer Brief. The 
Farnham Development Brief that I referred to earlier in this chapter (see n69) was produced on behalf of 
Waverley Borough Council by Cluttons, the council’s consultant. 
111 ibid, 15. 
112 Recent case law in R (Midlands Co-operative Society Ltd) v Birmingham City Council [2012] BLGR 393, 
[2012] EU LR 640 and in R (Faraday Development Ltd) v West Berkshire Council [2016] EWHC 2166 
(Admin), 168 Con LR 131 discusses this type of arrangement and confirmed that a DA in these terms will 




and the perception that ‘you just end up lining procurement lawyers’ pockets quite 
significantly’ because any advice produces ‘a list as long as your arm of what the risks are.’ He 
acknowledged that his attitude was more bullish than other local authority officers but 
suggested that some local authorities could be more tolerant of ‘procurement risks’ on the 
basis that few are ‘successfully prosecuted.’ Even CON3, whose firm exploited the fee-
generating potential of the competitive tender process, expressed his frustration with what he 
perceived as a risk-averse outlook on the part of procurement lawyers who, he felt, always 
instructed him that any action he intended to take carried the inherent potential for a 
procurement challenge.  
My research has indicated that, by contrast, WCC’s officers had received more bullish 
legal advice from Dechert LLP, a firm of external solicitors, to the effect that the Council could 
lawfully work exclusively with Thornfield without carrying out any form of competitive 
tender.113 Although WCC’s officers repeatedly turned to this legal advice throughout the 
Winchester Development as a source of legitimacy, it proved highly contentious as the 
development process unfolded, as I will demonstrate in chapter 10.  
Dechert’s solicitors may have recommended this approach because of uncertainty 
regarding the implications of EU procurement law. One of the solicitors who participated in the 
Winchester Development has since noted that ‘compliance with EU procurement rules among 
local authorities was patchy’114 until two landmark European Court of Justice decisions in 2007 
and 2010115 clarified the law. These decisions confirmed that DAs imposing an obligation on a 
developer to carry out construction ‘works’ constituted a ‘public works contract’116 and so fell 
                                                          
113 Winchester City Council, Appendix to CAB1030. Broadway Friarsgate - Development Agreement. 
Report of Chief Estates Officer. 8 February 2005 (Appendix B, Document 1.12), paragraphs 8-9. Although 
WCC’s officers appear not to have made any public reference to this legal advice until 2005, they had 
consulted Dechert in 2003 and 2004, prior to signing the DA. In that advice, Dechert advised that the DA 
would simply entail the transfer of land from WCC to Thornfield and so would fall outside of the scope 
of EU procurement rules (see Winchester City Council, CAB2665. Silver Hill - Judicial Review Decision. 
Report of Chief Operating Officer - As Monitoring Officer. 3 March 2015 (Appendix B, Document 1.46), 
paragraph 2.1).  
114 Mark Bassett, 'Timely delivery for regeneration projects' (Solicitors Journal, 
<https://www.solicitorsjournal.com/comment/timely-delivery-regeneration-projects> accessed 7 July 
2017. Bassett did not work for Dechert but for another law firm that became involved in challenges to 
the Thornfield-led development trajectory. I discuss the role of legal advisers in more detail in chapter 
10 of this thesis. 
115 Case C-220/05 Auroux v Commune de Roanne [2007] ECR I-385; Case C-451/08 Helmut Müller GmbH 
v Bundensanstalt für Immobilienaufgaben [2010] ECR I-2707. 
116 As defined in Article 1(a) of the 1993 Directive and regulation 2(1) of the Public Works Contracts 




within the scope of EU procurement rules.117 Moreover, these cases confirmed that contracts 
in which the developer stood to retain the majority of both the profits generated from the 
completed development and/or the rental proceeds generated from tenants occupying units in 
the completed development would also constitute a ‘public works concession contract’118 
similarly subject to the requirement for a competitive tendering process prior to award of the 
contract.  
In light of the existence of these unresolved controversies at the time that WCC was 
negotiating its DA with Thornfield, WCC’s officers were aware of the risk that they might face a 
challenge under EU procurement law to their decision to negotiate with Thornfield without 
carrying out an open market tendering process.119 But by pushing forward the Thornfield-led 
development trajectory without first carrying out an open market tendering process, WCC’s 
officers avoided having to go back in time to re-open negotiations with Stagecoach, John De 
Stefano and others regarding acquisition or use of their landholdings for the purposes of the 
Winchester Development.  
The Council’s uncertainty about the legitimacy of its ties to Thornfield was clear in the 
way that, when the Council entered into its DA with Thornfield, its Chief Estates Officer 
produced a retrospective account explaining how officers had approached the negotiations 
with Thornfield.120 He described three choices that officers had faced when they began 
negotiating with Thornfield. The first option he identified was a ‘pro-active’ approach in which 
officers invited proposals from interested developers, carried out a competitive tendering 
process and selected the best developer from those submitting proposals. By comparison, he 
suggested that officers could have taken an ‘entirely reactive’ approach, which would simply 
have involved waiting for planning applications from developers, with no promise of Council 
support for the land acquisition process and the risk that either no developer submitted a 
planning application, no planning applications met the Council’s requirements for 
comprehensive redevelopment of the entire site, or no developer was able to consolidate the 
landholdings on the site.121 Neither of these approaches would, he explained, have afforded 
the Council the certainty that Thornfield would be the developer carrying out the project.  
                                                          
117 For a practitioner perspective on the implications of this, consider David Elvin and Charles Banner, 
'The application of the Public Contracts Directive to development agreements and planning agreements 
following Auroux v Roanne' (2008) 8 Journal of Planning and Environmental Law 1072. 
118 As defined in Article 1(d) of the 1993 Directive and regulation 2(1) of the PWCR 1991. 
119 As noted in Winchester City Council, Appendix to CAB1030. Broadway Friarsgate - Development 
Agreement. Report of Chief Estates Officer. 8 February 2005 (Appendix B, Document 1.12), paragraph 8. 
120 ibid, paragraph 9. 




Between the ‘pro-active’ and the ‘entirely reactive’ approaches that WCC’s Chief 
Estates Officer presented was a ‘semi reactive position’ that had, he argued, enabled officers 
and councillors122 to retain a measure of ‘control’ over the content and delivery of the final 
development proposals and to avoid the costs of commissioning a tender competition.123 But 
this account was founded on the strained notion of a ‘semi-reactive position’ and appears to 
have been an attempt to explain away the lack of a tendering procedure prior to the signing of 
the DA. It was an account that appears to have been an attempt to legitimise past decision-
making and to ensure that the Council was not required to unravel its already close ties to 
Thornfield. 
As I will show in the remainder of this thesis, WCC’s officers tried to move on from 
their decision to enter into an EA and then a DA with Thornfield without carrying out a 
tendering exercise. The manner in which officers had used the Developer Brief and the 
circumstances in which they obtained Cabinet approval for an EA with Thornfield enabled 
them to commit the Council to a relatively low-cost development trajectory that simply 
required the Council to continue its negotiations with an established partner rather than to 
start again with alternative developers. But WCC’s officers and councillors locked stresses into 
the DA by entering into the EA before it issued the Developer Brief, issuing the Brief to only 
one developer and entering into the DA with Thornfield without first carrying out a tendering 
competition. These stresses materialised later in the development process and conditioned the 
manner in which the DA worked. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have tracked the ways that local authorities and their private sector 
development partners progress along a pre-defined development trajectory from a ‘nearly 
legal’ EA to a DA. This chapter has explained that, for some local authorities and developers, an 
EA is a means to record that the parties intend to pursue the making of a CPO and collaborate 
in the land acquisition component of property-led development. I have illustrated that an EA is 
a device designed to enable the movement from initial negotiations to a DA by giving the 
negotiating parties the confidence that they can expect to recover past and current costs 
incurred in negotiating the DA, as well as the future costs to be incurred in funding land 
acquisitions, negotiating with third parties and constructing the built development. 
                                                          
122 Councillors retained a small element of control over the process through their ability to vote against 
approval for the terms of any officer-negotiated DA. Any such vote would have made it unlawful for the 
Council’s officers to sign the DA. 
123 Winchester City Council, Appendix to CAB1030. Broadway Friarsgate - Development Agreement. 




The Winchester Development has provided an illuminating insight into the use of time 
as a resource in this type of development process. While the EA defined a time-limited 
exclusivity period that afforded WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors a scheduled pause in 
the ‘supposedly all-encompassing flow’124 of the overarching process, I have shown that the 
scheduling was open to change. Thus, while a time limit was a legal necessity if the parties 
intended to create a ‘binding’ agreement, the significance of the time limit is called into 
question by the parties’ shared willingness to change the date on which the period was due to 
expire. Time continued to flow during the Winchester Development, but the temporal 
framework that the EA produced was malleable enough to allow the development to continue 
despite the passing of pre-defined time limits. Underlying this willingness to adapt and 
remould the agreed temporal framework was a desire to achieve a DA, with the expectation 
that doing so would facilitate both the making, confirmation and exercise of a CPO and further 
progress along the development trajectory. But this preoccupation with forward movement 
meant that WCC’s officers made choices regarding the Council’s partnership with Thornfield 
and the scope of EU procurement law that locked-in stresses that the DA carried forward as 
WCC and Thornfield followed their preferred development trajectory. I will explore the ways in 
which these stresses undermined the Winchester Development throughout the remainder of 
this thesis, including in the next chapter, where I consider the content of the Winchester DA 
and the manner in which a DA enacts unresolved issues as a set of conditions.  
  
                                                          
124 Michelle Bastian, 'Political Apologies and the Question of a "Shared Time' in the Australian Context' 




A ‘conditional phase’ 
In this thesis, I have introduced the idea of property-led development as a carefully 
planned process involving a succession of written agreements that purport to separate that 
process into distinct phases. In this chapter, I continue that theme and analyse the content of 
the Winchester Development Agreement.1 In doing so, I analyse the text of the Winchester 
DA2 and utilise various documents produced for WCC’s committee meetings.3 I also use the 
input of my interviewees4 to show how local authority officers, councillors, developers and 
property development consultants involved in property-led development understand the 
function and purpose of DAs. I note that these individuals described how a DA marks the 
commencement of a ‘conditional phase’ in a development process, beginning on the date of a 
DA, and I explain how these individuals envisage the ending of this conditional phase. This 
enables me to connect my findings regarding the Winchester Development to an analysis of 
wider property-led development practice. 
I include in this chapter a brief chronology of the events that occurred in relation to 
the Winchester Development between 22 December 2004, when Winchester City Council5 and 
Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited6 signed the Winchester DA, and 14 April 2011. This 
latter date marked the conclusion of an unscripted ‘standstill period’ that had begun when 
Halifax Bank of Scotland put Thornfield’s parent company into administration.  Table 6.1 
summarises these key events.  
  
                                                          
1 Throughout this thesis I have been abbreviating this term to ‘DA.’ I continue to do so in this chapter. I 
introduced the ‘Winchester Development’ in chapters one and three. 
2 Appendix A to this thesis explains how I obtained a copy of the Winchester DA, various deeds of 
variation and supplementary deeds. 
3 Appendix B to this thesis is a list of the primary source documents produced during the Winchester 
Development that I use in this thesis. 
4 I discuss interviews with D1, D2, D3, D4, CON2, CON3, CON4, LA2, LA3, LA4 and PS1. Appendix D 
contains some limited biographical details explaining who these interviewees are and when I met them. 
5 Throughout this thesis I have been referring to Winchester City Council as ‘WCC.’ I continue to do so in 
this chapter. 
6 Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited was a special purpose company set up by Thornfield 
Properties plc to enter into a DA with WCC and carry out the Winchester development. Thornfield 
Properties (Winchester) Limited was, therefore, ‘the developer’ for the purposes of the Winchester DA. I 
have referred to Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited throughout this thesis as ‘Thornfield’ and 
continue to do so here. 
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Table 6.1 Timeline illustrating some of the key events following the signing of the 
Winchester DA and the administration of Thornfield Properties plc 
Date Event 
22 December 2004 
WCC (Local Authority), Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited 
(Developer) and Thornfield Properties plc (Guarantor) enter into 
Development Agreement with Long Stop Date set at 22 December 2009 
27 March 2007 
WCC’s Planning Development Control Committee approves application for 
planning permission pending section 106 agreement between WCC and 
Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited 
9 February 2009 
WCC’s Planning Development Control Committee grants Thornfield 
Properties (Winchester) Limited planning permission  
October 2009 
WCC agrees revisions to the Winchester DA proposed by Thornfield 
Properties (Winchester) Limited and both parties exchange letters changing 
the Long Stop Date in the Winchester DA to 31 December 2012 
January 2010 
Thornfield Properties plc placed into administration by Halifax Bank of 
Scotland 
24 November 2010 
WCC’s Cabinet approves Henderson UK Property Fund’s purchase of 
Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited and replacement of Thornfield 
Properties plc as Guarantor. New Long Stop Date set at 31 August 2014 
10 December 2010 
Henderson completes purchase of Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited 
and becomes ‘the Developer’ in the Winchester DA. Henderson’s parent 
company replaces Thornfield Properties plc as Guarantor. ‘Standstill period’ 
of six months and 10 days commences 
14 April 2011 
Change of name of ‘the Developer’ in the Winchester DA from Thornfield 
Properties (Winchester) Limited to Silverhill Winchester No 1 Limited 
Setting out these events assists in establishing the decision-making processes playing 
out during the Winchester Development. One of the themes underlying my analysis to this 
point has been that property-led development involves a complex set of processes initiated, 
gathered together, held apart, moved on, or concluded by the deployment of various types of 
‘nearly legal’ and ‘legally binding’ agreements. In this chapter, I evaluate some of the attributes 
of the conditional phase initiated by the Winchester DA. I ask if it simply functions as another 
in a series of ‘segments, intervals, and moments’7 that are necessary to make possible the 
linear progression that I described in chapters four and five from original pitch through an 
‘exclusivity period’ to a DA and onwards to a completed development. In doing so, I reflect on 
                                                          
7 Marilyn Strathern, 'On Space and Depth' in John Law and Annemarie Mol (eds), Complexities: social 
studies of knowledge practices (Duke University Press 2002), 91; See also David Scott, Omens of 




the relentlessly forward-facing orientation8 of the Winchester Development trajectory and the 
network of contractual arrangements that ‘scripted,’9 re-inscribed and then sought to facilitate 
seamless movement along that trajectory. I ask what it is about the conditional phase that 
made possible this sense of ‘a chain of progressive succession’10 and lay the groundwork for 
subsequent chapters to explore what happened in Winchester when that movement turned 
out to be neither seamless nor irreversible. 
In the first part of this chapter, I explain how the Winchester DA initiated the 
conditional phase of the Winchester Development. I scrutinise the conditional phase as a 
scripted pause and as a device to provide a temporal framework for a series of ‘rule-governed 
transformations’11 and ‘for transporting messages back and forth’12 in a way intended to move 
the Winchester Development forward. An elaboration of some of the key moments in this 
phase helps me to investigate this. I analyse the ways that WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s 
directors structured their attempt at lining things up based on a planned movement from 
‘conditionality’ to ‘unconditionality.’ I explain what it means to call a date ‘unconditional’ and, 
borrowing D1’s phrase, I ask how it benefits a developer or a local authority to treat that date 
as ‘a line in the sand’ that marks the passage from a conditional phase into unconditionality. I 
then question if local authority officers and their private sector development partners deploy a 
conditional DA with the expectation that ‘the Unconditional Date’ will inevitably occur. To 
complement these points, I examine the operation of a series of ‘Long Stop Dates’ written into 
the Winchester DA to ask if the DA limited the possible duration of the conditional phase. 
Thereafter, this chapter considers the contents of the Winchester DA. While preparing 
the DA, Thornfield had used the exclusivity period to take the time to consider the feasibility of 
its proposals for the development of the earmarked site. When discussing the exclusivity 
period in chapters four and five, I pointed to the way that the actors involved in this type of 
process recognise the need to accommodate emergent and pre-existing uncertainties and 
                                                          
8 Emily Grabham, Brewing Legal Times: Things, Form, and the Enactment of Law (University of Toronto 
Press 2016), 168; See also Mariana Valverde, 'Studying the governance of crime and security: Space, 
time and jurisdiction' (2014) 14 Criminology & Criminal Justice 379, 386 on the forward-looking 
orientation of crime prevention work. 
9 Madeleine Akrich, 'The De-Scription of Technical Objects' in Wiebe E. Bijker and John Law (eds), 
Shaping technology/building society: studies in sociotechnical change (MIT Press 1992), 208; Michel 
Callon, 'Writing and (Re)writing Devices as Tools for Managing Complexity' in John Law and Annemarie 
Mol (eds), Complexities: social studies of knowledge practices (Duke University Press 2002), 192. 
10 Scott, Omens of adversity: tragedy, time, memory, justice, 108. 
11 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting (University of Chicago Press 2004), 243. 
12 Michel Serres in Michel Serres and Bruno Latour, Conversations on science, culture, and time 




examined their use of a ‘succession of deals’13 to produce a gradual fixing of meaning.14 The 
exclusivity period to which I referred gave WCC's officers and Thornfield’s directors an 
opportunity to arrange their initial proposals. Having done so, and as I mentioned in chapter 
five, they then incorporated the outcome of their negotiations into a DA. Here, I outline the 
‘required elements’ written into the DA that stated the built features that both parties 
expected to form the basis of the constructed development.15 I will explain the purpose of 
these ‘required elements’ and the implications of writing them down in a DA in the second 
part of this chapter and in more detail in chapters seven to 10. 
In addressing these required elements in this chapter, I also begin to investigate the 
attempts at ‘lining things up’ that took place during the conditional phase, and note that the 
exclusivity period did not resolve all the uncertainties that emerged both before and during 
that phase. I question if there is a ‘lop-sidedness’ to the actions lined up in a DA and I ask if the 
conditional phase afforded the parties both a further transitional phase of ‘adjustments’16 and 
the opportunity to adapt proposals that were left initially and intentionally ‘partially 
undetermined’17 to allow the exigencies of property-led development to play out. I concluded 
chapter five by discussing how a developer and a local authority ‘bolt things on’ to a ‘nearly 
legal’ DA during the negotiation process, and I revisit that concept here. In particular, I note 
the circumstances that led to Thornfield Properties plc, the parent company of Thornfield 
Properties (Winchester) Limited, being placed into administration by its bank. I explain that 
this did not lead to the termination of the DA but initiated a change of ownership of Thornfield 
and the renaming of ‘the developer’ carrying out the Winchester Development. I analyse the 
adjustments, bolt-ons, and changes to the DA that this provoked. 
A Conditional Phase 
Each of the developers, local authority officers and property development consultants 
who I spoke to explained that it is common practice for a developer and a local authority to 
use a conditional DA to facilitate property-led development. This type of DA would contain an 
obligation imposed on a developer to commence construction of a development. But that 
                                                          
13 Fleur Johns, 'Financing as Governance' (2011) 31 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 391, 398. 
14 Richard Harper, Inside the IMF: an ethnography of documents, technology, and organisational action 
(Routledge 1998), 45. 
15 The DA referred to these both as ‘required elements’ and the ‘minimum requirements.’ Clause 5.3 of 
the DA set these out in detail and these basic requirements were 90,000 square feet of retail floor-
space, 364 residential units of which 35% were to be affordable homes, 279 public car parking spaces, a 
new civic square, a new bus station, premises for WCC’s CCTV equipment, a new shop mobility and dial 
a ride service, a new market space and a financial contribution to public art provision. 
16 Callon, 'Writing and (Re)writing Devices as Tools for Managing Complexity', 192. 




obligation would only become enforceable if the local authority and the developer first 
discharged a series of conditions. Prior to ‘unconditionality’, a developer will have no more 
than a vague future commitment to commence construction of a development, the 
components of which would be based loosely on proposals agreed during the exclusivity 
period. Valverde has described how ‘[v]agueness … is often a desideratum in legal discourse’18 
and this is a notable feature of the Winchester DA and the DAs that my interviewees 
described. CON2, CON3 and D1 explained that the indeterminacy of the commitments in a 
conditional DA enables the contracting parties to work together before they are certain that 
the components necessary for a ‘viable’19 project will connect. If those components do connect 
sufficiently, CON2, CON3 and D1 explained, the contracting parties would transition from the 
conditional phase to the unconditional phase and the developer would be expected to start 
building. If uncertainties remained around the ability of the contracting parties to join up site 
assembly, viability and planning issues, among other things, CON2, CON3 and D1 told me, they 
could use the conditionality of a DA to avoid onerous and expensive additional commitments 
but would remain in the conditional phase for as long as they needed to resolve these issues. If 
they could still not resolve those issues, they would terminate the process. 
PS1 argued that feasibility testing before the conditional phase should enable a 
developer ‘to say, “I know what my costs are, I know what my [land] values are. Therefore, I 
will build this building in three years’ time.”’ But, as I demonstrated in chapter five, 
Thornfield’s directors ran those feasibility assessments during the exclusivity period of the 
Winchester Development without being certain that they would complete the land acquisition 
process. For those reasons, D2 explained that he would always expect a developer to ensure 
that it did not commit to constructing a development unless it was certain that it had all the 
land it required. Moreover, as D3 pointed out, a developer will also ensure that it is not 
committed to construct a development unless it is certain that it has adequate funding in place 
to finance land acquisition and construction,20 agreements for lease with a sufficient quantum 
of prospective tenants to guarantee profitability, and long-term confidence that they would 
secure their desired financial return from the completed development. 
With the exception of COU2 and COU3, my interviewees told me that it is also 
commonplace for a local authority to agree to provide land for a developer by making a 
                                                          
18 Mariana Valverde, 'The Crown in a Multicultural Age: The Changing Epistemology of (Post)colonial 
Sovereignty' (2012) 21 Social & Legal Studies 3, 8. 
19 The notion of a ‘viable’ project is one to which I will return in chapters seven to 10. 
20 D3 also pointed out that a developer would also seek to finance land acquisition costs and the costs of 





Compulsory Purchase Order.21 I am keen to explore how a DA commits a local authority to 
make a CPO because there is some indication that a local authority will often need reassurance 
before doing so. For example, property-led development, land assembly initiatives and the 
exercise of compulsory purchase powers carry significant political uncertainties22 and financial 
implications. Among the numerous financial implications, WCC’s Head of Estates described the 
need to instruct consultants to assess existing landownership interests on a site and prepare 
lists explaining those interests.23 In addition, a local authority might make, obtain confirmation 
for and exercise a CPO but the developer might refuse to accept the transfer of an assembled 
site if it felt that the development proposal was no longer viable, if it could not secure funding, 
or if it had gone into administration.24 
This means that a local authority is often unwilling to expose itself to those perceived 
risks without a commitment from a developer to provide an end product in the form of a 
constructed development. But a local authority’s reluctance to make a CPO without a 
developer’s commitment to commence construction, combined with a developer’s 
unwillingness to commit to constructing a development without first securing all the land, 
creates a mismatch. Nevertheless, my research shows that the parties typically choose not to 
delay entering into their DAs because they use their DAs to manage those uncertainties. They 
do so by making their DA conditional on the satisfaction of various matters, including the 
making of a CPO. CON3 told me that DAs are, therefore, ‘largely, hugely, conditional.’ He went 
on to explain that the conditions ‘usually concern site assembly, planning permission, anchor 
store, pre-letting, and then may go on to concern funding or viability.’  
I will analyse the conditions in the Winchester DA later in this chapter. The implication 
of the conditionality inherent to most DAs means that, once the local authority has obtained 
confirmation for the making of a CPO, and once the developer has secured planning 
                                                          
21 Throughout this thesis I have been abbreviating this term to ‘CPO.’ I continue to do so in this chapter. 
As I mentioned in chapter one, a local authority cannot ‘exercise’ its compulsory purchase powers until 
it has, first, drafted the necessary order, second, its Cabinet had approved the ‘making’ of it, and, third, 
the CPO that it is has ‘made’ has been ‘confirmed’ at a public inquiry. 
22 Raco et al observe that ‘the ordering of times and spaces in urban regeneration policy is an inherently 
political process which requires decisions to be taken not only over what types of development should 
take place but also when they should be phased, and when different interests should expect to see their 
needs and priorities addressed (Mike Raco, Steven Henderson and Sophie Bowby, 'Changing times, 
changing places: urban development and the politics of space - time' (2008) 40 Environment and 
Planning A 2652, 2657). Specific political ‘risks’ that might arise include the reputational effects of 
promoting a CPO that is overturned on inquiry, or ‘blighting’ land to be acquired by announcing the 
intention to compulsorily purchase land before abandoning the process. 
23 Winchester City Council, CAB1739. Silver Hill Winchester - Compulsory Purchase Order. Report of Head 
of Estates. 18 November 2008 (Appendix B, Document 1.20), paragraph 2.1. 
24 This is an eventuality that WCC’s officers had to consider in relation to the Winchester Development, 




permission, satisfied itself that the development is viable, obtained funding, and so on, the 
parties will have satisfied the conditions and the DA will become unconditional. That moment, 
described by CON3 and in various DAs as ‘the Unconditional Date,’ triggers the obligation to 
commence construction of the development. There is a lop-sidedness to this arrangement 
given that a local authority must be willing to make a CPO before the developer commits to 
construction. This lop-sidedness is a focus for much of the analysis in this chapter. 
The contents of the Winchester DA 
In the report that WCC’s Director of Development Services presented to the Council’s 
Cabinet25 confirming that a DA had been signed with Thornfield, the Council’s director noted 
that the DA was ‘on standard institutional terms’26 that an ‘institutional’ investor, such as a 
bank, pension fund or insurance company, would find acceptable. An institutional investor 
matters here because, D4 told me, very few developers can fund a development project 
entirely out of their own cash reserves and local authorities similarly lack the financial 
resources to fund a development, necessitating some form of financing arrangement with a 
funder. CON4 told me that there is a tendency to write DAs based on ‘the tried and trusted’ 
because funders will rarely invest in projects that try to ‘start breaking new ground.’ A funder 
would expect an income from its initial investment, as well as either a stake in the completed 
development or repayment of its original financial provision, so PS1 pointed out that he would 
base his assessment of the suitability of a proposed DA on the parts of an agreement that he 
thought would matter to a funder. He explained that a funder would primarily look at the 
‘minimum value’ set out in the DA as a price to be paid by the developer for the grant of a long 
leasehold of the site, the ground rent payable and the length of term of the lease, which would 
all be included in a DA.27 In addition, PS1 told me, a funder will consider that the developer has 
an ‘investable’ proposition if the DA and accompanying viability statements suggest a suitable 
rate of return. 
It is notable that WCC’s Director of Development Services sought to sell the 
Winchester DA to the Council’s Cabinet on the basis that it was ‘institutionally acceptable’ 
rather than by making reference to the ‘required elements’ in this particular DA, which 
                                                          
25 In chapter one, I explained the relationship between councillors and local authority officers and, in 
WCC, the relationship between the Council’s Cabinet, the Full Council and committees such as the 
Overview and Scrutiny Committee. 
26 Winchester City Council, Appendix to CAB1030. Broadway Friarsgate - Development Agreement. 
Report of Chief Estates Officer. 8 February 2005 (Appendix B, Document 1.12), paragraph 14. 
27 See ibid, paragraph 15, which states that the length of the term to be granted to Thornfield would be 
200 years. The Independent Review into WCC’s decision-making during this development process states 
that the agreed minimum for the annual ground rent was £250,000 (see, Claer Lloyd-Jones, A Perfect 




included items such as affordable housing,28 a new bus station, a new ‘civic square’ and ‘dial a 
ride’ premises ‘to meet the needs of people with disabilities or other mobility impairment.’29 
WCC’s website identifies the pressing need for affordable housing in Winchester and notes 
that ‘over 2,300 households’ are on the council’s housing waiting list.30 Each of these required 
elements might be deemed a form of public service and thus a component of the DA worth 
selling to the Cabinet. Instead, the contents of the DA that WCC’s Director of Development 
Services emphasised to the Cabinet indicate a perceived need to showcase the Council to 
‘institutional investors.’ This is, of course, a type of ‘performance’31 and suggests that a 
demonstration of the project’s appeal to private finance was a marker of legitimacy.  
The report that WCC’s Director of Development Services gave to the Cabinet is also 
notable for the way that it brushed over the complexity of moving from a conditional DA that 
required the making of a CPO to an unconditional DA that would impose a binding 
commitment on Thornfield to build the development. The report set out some of the 
conditions contained in the DA32 but simply stated that, if the site had been assembled and 
planning permission had been obtained, Thornfield could commence building.33 As I will show, 
however, this comment assumed that Thornfield would want to commence building and was 
thus a significant simplification of the nature of the move from conditionality to 
unconditionality. I consider the implications of this assumption in the remainder of this thesis.  
When is a date ‘unconditional’ and when is a date a ‘long stop’? 
So far in this chapter I have shown that the Winchester DA contained a conditional 
obligation that had the potential to compel Thornfield to construct a development 
incorporating a set of ‘required elements.’ In this section of the chapter, I will explain that the 
                                                          
28 The term ‘affordable housing’ is, of course, extremely broad-ranging, as demonstrated in Brett 
Christophers, 'Wild Dragons in the City: Urban Political Economy, Affordable Housing Development and 
the Performative World-making of Economic Models' (2014) 38 International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 79, 83-85. Out of the 364 residential units required in the Winchester DA, 35% of 
those units were to be ‘affordable,’ with 80% of those affordable units to be ‘shared ownership,’ 16% 
‘social rented’ and 4% ‘key worker’. See, for example, Winchester City Council, Appendix to CAB1030. 
Broadway Friarsgate - Development Agreement. Report of Chief Estates Officer. 8 February 2005 
(Appendix B, Document 1.12), paragraphs 16 and 21. 
29 Winchester City Council, Adopted Broadway Friarsgate Planning Brief. Part 2B - Background and 
Analysis Cont'd (Appendix B, Document 2.05), paragraph 2.7.7. 
30 Winchester City Council, 'The Need for Affordable Housing' 
<http://www.winchester.gov.uk/housing/new-affordable-housing/need-affordable-housing/> accessed 
14 July 2017. 
31 Judith Butler, Gender trouble: feminism and the subversion of identity (Routledge 1990). 
32 Winchester City Council, Appendix to CAB1030. Broadway Friarsgate - Development Agreement. 
Report of Chief Estates Officer. 8 February 2005 (Appendix B, Document 1.12), paragraph 15.  




function of two Long Stop Dates in the DA was to show the point in time by which 
unconditionality should have occurred.  
To make the Winchester DA unconditional, various conditions needed to be 
discharged. These conditions stated that the developer needed to have secured planning 
permission (‘the planning condition’), obtained a road closure order (‘the road closure 
condition’) and produced a survey of the site confirming that no geotechnical, environmental, 
flooding or archaeological matters would diminish the assumed financial viability of the 
development (‘the site survey condition’). 34 Thornfield needed also to have exchanged 
agreements for lease with tenants for an agreed proportion of the proposed retail area of the 
development (‘the pre-letting condition), and to have entered into a ‘legally binding’ funding 
agreement with a ‘fund’ to finance the costs of development (‘the funding condition.’). It 
should also have drawn up another ‘legally binding’ agreement stating that the developer 
would sell the affordable housing element of the proposed development to a registered social 
housing provider (‘the affordable housing condition’). The DA does not explain what the term 
‘legally binding’ meant in either the context of the affordable housing agreement or the 
funding agreement, however.35 Finally, the DA was also conditional on the developer 
producing a financial appraisal showing that the proposed development was financially viable 
in terms that the developer deemed acceptable (‘the viability condition’).  
The Winchester DA also contained clauses stating that the obligation to commence 
construction of the development was conditional on ‘the land appropriation’ and ‘the site 
assembly’ conditions, which would be satisfied either when the local authority entered into 
agreements for sale with third party owners to acquire the interests in the development site or 
when the Secretary of State confirmed the making of a CPO following a public inquiry. These 
conditions required, therefore, the making of a CPO and the successful defence of its validity at 
the public inquiry that, CON2 and CON3 pointed out, is inevitable when a local authority seeks 
to compel private landowners to part with their land.36 ‘The title condition’ required WCC to 
confirm it could provide a ‘good and marketable title to the development site when it granted 
a lease of the site to the developer. While the scope of these conditions was, therefore, far-
reaching and required WCC to assemble the development site, it did not require WCC to 
                                                          
34 As set out in schedule 2, paragraph 2 of the DA.  
35 This became a significant issue in 2016 when Thornfield’s successor company attempted to 
demonstrate that it was ready to make the DA unconditional. It had negotiated heads of terms with a 
registered social housing provider and had a ‘nearly legal’ agreement in place to satisfy the ‘affordable 
housing condition’ but it could not agree terms for a funding package with a financial institution so was 
unable to present a ‘nearly legal’ funding agreement as a precursor to the ‘legally binding’ funding 
agreement needed to satisfy the ‘funding condition.’ I discuss this in more detail in chapter 10. 
36 Acquisition of Land Act 1981, s12(2) and s13A(3)(a). I explain the making of the Winchester CPO in 
more detail in chapter seven, where I also analyse the objections to the making of the CPO that 
necessitated a public inquiry.  
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transfer the land to the developer at this stage.37 I have set out the conditions and the Long 
Stop Dates in the Winchester DA at table 6.2.  
Despite the inherent flexibility of drafting a DA as a ‘hugely conditional’ document, the 
Winchester DA set out the steps that the parties should have taken to discharge those 
conditions. It also specified two ‘Long Stop Dates’ by which discharge should have occurred, 
and the circumstances in which the parties could terminate the DA if discharge did not occur 
                                                          
37 The grant of a long lease to the developer would only occur, as I pointed out above, on completion of 
construction. Once the site had been assembled and the DA had become unconditional, a licence from 
WCC to Thornfield automatically took effect allowing Thornfield to enter WCC’s newly-acquired land to 
commence construction. 
 
Table 6.2. Sequence of conditions, Long Stop Dates and 
termination events set out in the DA dated 22 December 
2004 made between Winchester City Council and Thornfield 
Properties (Winchester) Limited 
The Planning Long Stop Date  
Triggers mutual right of termination if the 
Developer had not discharged the planning 
condition 
To discharge the planning condition, the 
Developer needed to have obtained a planning 
permission authorising a development 
containing all the ‘required elements’ stipulated 
in the DA 
Date of the DA 22 December 2004 
22 December 2006 
The Final Long Stop Date 
Triggers mutual right of termination if the DA 
had not become unconditional 
To make the DA unconditional: 
 The Developer should have discharged 
the road closure, site survey, pre-
letting, funding, affordable housing and 
viability conditions; and 
 Winchester City Council should have 
discharged the site assembly, title and 
land appropriation conditions 
22 August 2010 Anticipated Works Commencement Date 
22 December 2009 
163 
 
prior to the Long Stop Dates.38 The DA initially stipulated that Thornfield needed to have 
secured planning permission for the development by the Planning Long Stop Date, on 22 
December 2006.39 Thereafter, WCC and Thornfield needed to have collaborated to discharge 
the remaining conditions by the Final Long Stop Date, on 22 December 2009.40 I will focus on 
the concept of a Final Long Stop Date in this chapter before revisiting, in chapter seven, the 
practicalities WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors faced in discharging the planning 
condition in time for the Planning Long Stop Date.  
The Winchester DA, in common with others my interviewees described, therefore 
contained an apparently carefully delineated temporal framework, imposing obligations on the 
contracting parties that would have taken effect if a series of time-limited conditions were 
satisfied. One of the complexities of this type of DA, however, is the interplay between ‘the 
Unconditional Date’ and this sequence of Long Stop Dates. The Final Long Stop Date is the 
date, scheduled in advance, by which unconditionality must happen. The Unconditional Date, 
which is not scheduled in advance, is the date on which unconditionality occurs,41 although the 
parties to a DA begin the conditional phase with the expectation that the Unconditional Date 
will occur on or before the Final Long Stop Date, given that a right to terminate the agreement 
arises on the Final Long Stop Date. These are, therefore, ‘dates’ that serve different purposes. 
The Final Long Stop Date is the pre-defined cut-off point after which the conditional phase 
would end if the DA had not already become unconditional and if the parties then exercised 
their termination rights.42 On the other hand, the Unconditional Date is an anticipated event 
and a moment for the parties to aspire towards. The Winchester DA looked forward to the 
Unconditional Date, then onwards to the moment by which construction should have 
commenced,43 then onwards again to the moment that WCC would grant a lease of the 
development site to Thornfield, then onwards into the open-ended operational phase of the 
development during which Thornfield expected to generate profits and WCC would share in 
                                                          
38 As set out in clause 24.1.1 and schedule 2, paragraphs 15.1 and 15.2 of the DA. 
39 Referred to as ‘the date which is two years after the date of this Agreement.’ As set out in clause 
1.1.10 of the DA. 
40 Referred to as the date ‘5 years from and including the date of this Agreement.’ As set out in clause 
1.1.50 of the DA. 
41 The specific clause dealing with this in the Winchester DA stated that the Unconditional Date would 
be ‘[t]he date when the last outstanding Conditions is [sic] waived’ (see clause 1.1.73). The DA then 
stated that the developer would have to ensure that construction commenced within nine months of 
the Unconditional Date. 
42 As I will demonstrate in chapter 10, the Long Stop Date occurred in Winchester before the discharge 
of the conditions but WCC allowed the developer to attempt to demonstrate satisfaction of the 
conditions before serving notice of termination. 




those profits.44 Although my focus is on the conditional phase of the Winchester DA, the sense 
of stages that would follow each other sequentially in a ‘progressive succession’45 is clearly laid 
out in a way that ‘implies a line’46 between the date of the DA and the Unconditional Date, 
albeit one that is of an undefined length and that can only be measured after the 
Unconditional Date has occurred.  
From uncertainty to cohesion: The time before the Unconditional Date and the time after 
the Unconditional Date 
In this section I explore the concept of an Unconditional Date in more detail. Analysing 
a DA based on the concept of the Unconditional Date means looking at the purpose of the 
conditions in this type of agreement. CON3 described a DA as a means to plot the coordinates 
of the journey from conditionality to unconditionality because it is a way, he explained, for a 
local authority and a developer to state what they intend to do to enable the developer to 
start building. From CON3’s point-of-view, a DA enables two contracting parties to ‘transit’ 
from an indeterminate development proposition, contingent on site assembly, funding, 
planning and viability, to a position from which the developer is prepared to commence 
construction. The suggestion that a DA is a device that enables ‘transit’ recalls the point I made 
in chapters four and five that an EA is a ‘vehicular’ device that allows a local authority and a 
developer to move forward in the development process.47  
Similarities are also apparent between the Winchester exclusivity period and the 
conditional phase. In the same way that the exclusivity period began on the date of the EA, the 
conditional phase began on the date of the DA. Each phase was also forecast to end with a 
specific event, respectively the date of the DA and the date that the DA became unconditional. 
But the Winchester DA, which laid out the conditions to be discharged before unconditionality 
could occur, was a more obvious attempt to ‘plot’ subsequent actions than the Winchester EA. 
In his work on narrative techniques and historical writing, Ricoeur talks about plotting as a 
means to draw ‘causes, intentions, and also accidents into a single meaningful unity’ and to 
                                                          
44 WCC would receive its profit share by way of an ‘overage’ payment. The officers report produced in 
February 2005 explained simply that the council would ‘receive a share of the developer’s profits ‘by 
way of a capital payment’ (see Winchester City Council, Appendix to CAB1030. Broadway Friarsgate - 
Development Agreement. Report of Chief Estates Officer. 8 February 2005 (Appendix B, Document 1.12), 
paragraph 20). I will investigate this profit-sharing mechanism in more detail in chapter nine, where I 
point out that, in July 2014, WCC chose to provide more details of the basis for the overage calculation 
(see Winchester City Council, CAB2603. Silver Hill Regeneration. Report of the Silver Hill Officers Project 
Team. 7 July 2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.37), paragraph 10.2). 
45 Scott, Omens of adversity: tragedy, time, memory, justice, 108. 
46 Carol J. Greenhouse, A moment's notice: time politics across cultures (Cornell University Press 1996), 
35. 
47 David Cowan and Daniel Wincott, 'Exploring the 'Legal'' in David Cowan and Daniel Wincott (eds), 




guide ‘complex action from an initial situation to a terminal one by means of rule-governed 
transformations.’48 The Winchester DA functioned in this way to force the contracting parties 
to make decisions, carry out actions, interpret events and respond to accidents through the 
prism of the planned movement from conditionality to unconditionality.  
But Ricoeur also points out that a plot is also a way to make a reader believe in the 
narrative coherence of the story being told.49 This is a helpful way to think about the temporal 
schema deployed in a DA. There is an alluring internal cohesiveness to the presentation of a 
movement from an uncertain ‘initial situation’ at the start of the conditional phase to the 
settled state of the Unconditional Date. And there are many ways in which WCC’s officers and 
Thornfield’s directors treated the date of the DA as an initial situation. For example, WCC’s 
Chief Estates Officer used his reports to Cabinet to present the date that the parties signed the 
DA as an originating moment50 after which a ‘period of activity’ began that focused on the 
submission of a planning application and extensive ‘pre-application discussions’ between 
Thornfield’s directors and Council planning officers.51 The DA was also, WCC’s Chief Estates 
Officer pointed out, the stimulus for Thornfield to enter into a conditional contract for the 
purchase of the site of the bus station on the development site.52  
Similarly, there are also many ways in which a local authority and a developer treat the 
Unconditional Date as a destination, with repeated invocations of journey metaphors. D3 
invoked the image of a developer ‘racing’ to bring together the components of a viable 
development, while D4 presented a developer involved in this sort of process as the ‘driver’ 
and the local authority as a passenger who sits back and awaits arrival at the Unconditional 
Date. Slightly more flamboyantly, LA2 described the moment of unconditionality as 
confirmation that a developer had ‘purified’ uncertainties as to site assembly, planning, 
viability and funding that had been present at the date of the DA but that had been eradicated 
with the passing of the Unconditional Date. These insights hint that something magical 
happens on the Unconditional Date and presents a ‘moment of accession’53 that occurs with 
                                                          
48 Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting, 243. 
49 ibid, 243. 
50 Greenhouse, A moment's notice: time politics across cultures, 86. 
51 Winchester City Council, PS202. Silver Hill Development Update Report. Report of Chief Estates Officer. 
17 October 2005 (Appendix B, Document 1.13), paragraph 1.1. 
52 This contract seems to have superseded the agreement between Thornfield and Stagecoach (South) 
Limited that I discussed in chapters four and five. It was conditional on Thornfield securing planning 
permission for the development and construction of a new bus station on the development site (see 
Winchester City Council, Appendix to CAB1030. Broadway Friarsgate - Development Agreement. Report 
of Chief Estates Officer. 8 February 2005 (Appendix B, Document 1.12), paragraph 4). Thornfield’s 
agreement with Stagecoach had, as I mentioned in chapters four and five, itself acted as a stimulus for 
the entire development process. 
53 Emily Grabham, 'Governing Permanence: Trans Subjects, Time, and the Gender Recognition Act' 




the passage from the conditional phase into unconditionality. CON3 used similar language to 
that deployed in the Winchester DA54 and told me that, once the Unconditional Date has 
occurred, from a developer’s point-of-view, ‘the agreement comes in with the full force of a 
contract.’ This comment suggests that there is something transformational about a DA that has 
become a ‘legally binding’ agreement and the emphasis on the ‘fullness’ of the 
unconditionality that occurs on the Unconditional Date depicts both the ripening55 of the DA 
and the perceived significance of this as an event. 
But my research also demonstrates how a developer might carefully control the 
passage from conditionality to unconditionality in a similar way to the type of ‘highly 
moderated change’ that Johns identifies as an attribute of the contractual underpinnings of 
many urban infrastructure projects.56 Referring to his experience of working with a developer 
on a property-led development project, LA2 told me that he presumed that he had a ‘deal’ 
with a developer as soon as his local authority entered into a DA with that developer. When I 
put that idea to CON3, however, he refuted it and stated that ‘a DA, until it becomes 
unconditional, is about as meaningful as a menu.’ He expanded on this point by describing a 
DA as a ‘governor on change’ and a ‘partnership regulator’ and I understand these images to 
be expressions of a desire for the mechanical57 given that a governor or a regulator is a type of 
device used to control the flow of fuel to an engine to ensure steady motion. On that basis, 
CON3 appears to be suggesting that ‘the driver’ of a development process should be able to 
use a DA to regulate the rate of change from a conditional state to an unconditional state. D3 
expressed this in terms of the implications for a local authority when he explained that he had 
encountered some ‘naïve’ local authority officers and councillors who believed that a 
development would get constructed in close accordance with the terms of a conditional DA 
whereas, in his experience, the conditionality of a DA afforded a developer an ongoing 
opportunity to pick and choose the type of development that they wanted to carry out.  
Others amongst my interviewees also used mechanical imagery to describe the 
movement from conditionality to unconditionality. For example, D1 talked about assembling 
the conditional components of a DA and knowing ‘which buttons to push.’ CON4 offered the 
image of lining ‘your ducks up in a row’ before the Unconditional Date but acknowledged that 
getting planning, compulsory purchase, funding and lettings to ‘coincide’ in time for the 
                                                          
54 Other DAs I studied expressed this in the same way. A DA that Waverley Borough Council entered into 
for a development in Farnham in Surrey stated that the ‘provisions of this agreement will come into full 
force and effect.’ 
55 Bruno Latour, The making of law: an ethnography of the Conseil d'Etat (Polity 2010), 82. 
56 Johns, 'Financing as Governance', 401. 




Unconditional Date ‘requires an element of luck as well as skill.’ By contrast to the sense of 
magic underlying a ‘moment of accession,’ these points are important because they suggest 
that property-led development actually involves methodically lining things up for the 
Unconditional Date and that there is no magic in the movement from conditionality to 
unconditionality.  
The difference in perception here between local authority officers and developers is 
striking. On the one hand, there are developers who appear to treat the journey to 
unconditionality as something involving luck but which can be controlled. These developers 
presented the journey from conditionality to unconditionality as involving a series of 
somewhat quotidian actions, with generally predictable effects. On the other hand, there are 
local authority officers who had to wait for unconditionality with a growing ‘sense of the 
forthcoming.’58 There is a lop-sidedness apparent in these experiences of the passage of time 
in property-led development. 
Regardless of the combination of luck and skill required to make an Unconditional 
Date happen, the prospect of unconditionality does give a ‘glimpse of the future’59 and enables 
a developer to assess the desirability of that future. CON3 explained that he would 
communicate this to his developer clients by telling them that after the Unconditional Date:  
[You’re] pretty much bound to complete. It’s very difficult to walk away because 
you leave all of your money in the ground. I mean, it’s an absolute disaster 
scenario for companies, and it has happened. But it’s pretty much [PAUSE], they 
lose everything. The council keeps the site, keeps the works [PAUSE], you know. 
So it rarely happens, and that’s why [developers] are very concerned to regulate 
the timing of the Unconditional Date. Because after that, they’re committed. 
This is another illustration of the perceived transformational effect of a ‘legally binding 
agreement.’ By contrast, CON3 explained, if a developer chose to abandon a development 
before the Unconditional Date, the developer involved would lose only the costs it had 
invested in preparing planning applications and negotiating with prospective tenants and 
funders. Even if the developer had acquired some of the land interests required to assemble 
the development site before the Unconditional Date, CON2 told me, it would have obtained a 
saleable asset that it would use to recover some of its costs in the event of termination.  
But, CON2 explained, the costs a developer accrued before the Unconditional Date 
were a small proportion of the development costs that would begin to accrue after the 
Unconditional Date. He told me that he would advise a developer to prolong the conditional 
phase of a development process if there was any reason to doubt the profitability of the 
proposition because unconditionality would mean that the developer had ‘to start spending 
                                                          
58 Grabham, 'Governing Permanence: Trans Subjects, Time, and the Gender Recognition Act', 113. 
59 Harper, Inside the IMF: an ethnography of documents, technology, and organisational action, 134. 
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two or three hundred million pounds’ on land acquisitions and building work. If land 
acquisition took place and construction started in those circumstances, a developer might, 
using CON3’s description, ‘leave all of [the] money in the ground’ if they withdrew from the 
agreement having started construction or if they started construction but failed to make 
enough money to recover their costs. 
Termination of a DA thus signifies a type of ending. An Unconditional Date is also, in 
the sense that Ricoeur describes, ‘a terminal’ situation because developers and local 
authorities treat it as an unrepeatable event that changes the relationship between a 
developer and a local authority. But, using Johns’ phrase, this is ‘highly moderated change.’60 
After the Unconditional Date, the developer is no longer subject to a vague commitment to 
construct a development but a binding commitment to pursue that development to the 
completion of construction or ‘leave its money in the ground.’ After the Unconditional Date, a 
local authority would exercise its CPO,61 start compensating landowners for the acquisition of 
their land, and expect the developer to fund those acquisitions. It is at this point, as CON2 put 
it, that the financial outlay shifts from ‘tens of millions of pounds’ to ‘hundreds of millions of 
pounds.’  
Drawing a line: the Long Stop Date and the discharge of conditions 
Based on the previous discussion, the prospect of movement from conditionality to 
unconditionality would seem to be a matter at the discretion of the developer, who seeks to 
exploit the flexibility inherent to the conditionality of a DA to manage the conditional phase in 
its favour. In this section of this chapter, I ask if mechanisms in a DA exist to address this 
apparent lop-sidedness.  
Most DAs do contain mechanisms that purport to ‘generate actions’62 from a 
developer, and the Winchester DA, for example, imposed an obligation on Thornfield to use its 
‘reasonable endeavours at its own cost to procure the satisfaction of [the conditions] as soon 
as reasonably practicable but in any event prior to the Long Stop Date.’63 This clause is notable 
                                                          
60 Johns, 'Financing as Governance', 401. 
61 In the Winchester DA, clause 10.2 stated that Thornfield could serve an ‘Acquisition Notice’ on WCC 
requiring it to proceed with the exercise of its compulsory purchase powers to acquire all outstanding 
land interests on the site. 
62 Emilie Cloatre, Pills for the poorest: an exploration of TRIPS and access to medication in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Palgrave 2013), 45. 
63 Schedule 2, paragraph 3.3. The DA referred specifically here to the planning condition, the road 
closure condition, the survey report condition, the pre-letting condition, the funding condition, the 
affordable housing condition and the viability condition. It did not refer to the site assembly condition, 
although the DA separately required Thornfield to use its ‘reasonable endeavours’ to negotiate with 
existing landowners regarding the sale and purchase of their interest (see Schedule 2, paragraph 1.2). It 
should be noted that the DA also imposed a similarly worded ‘reasonable endeavours’ obligation on 
WCC, as stated in schedule 2, paragraph 3.4 of the DA. 
169 
 
because it makes clear that discharge or satisfaction of the conditions must occur before the 
Final Long Stop Date, although this expectation is caveated by the inclusion of a ‘reasonable 
endeavours’ clause. D1 attempted to describe the flexibility inherent to a reasonable 
endeavours clause when he told me that: 
The flexibility aspects are really by virtue of the fact that you can’t really impose 
on a developer, and vice versa a council, conditions in a DA that have to be 
addressed. What you can say is that you’ll use reasonable endeavours. 
Reasonable endeavours is probably a simple way of saying that we’ll show 
[PAUSE], sort of [PAUSE], sort of [PAUSE], show keenness, and a want to do 
something. But, obviously, that has to be done in a way that is best for the project 
rather than just [PAUSE], sort of [PAUSE], ploughing ahead. 
This description of the purpose of a reasonable endeavours clause neatly captures the 
vagueness of this type of provision. CON3 also discussed the use of reasonable endeavours 
clauses and told me that a DA ‘doesn’t really lock a developer’ into specific actions because the 
developer is ‘merely there to use reasonable endeavours’ in seeking to discharge the 
conditions. Similarly, CON2 commented that, while a developer will ‘enter into a reasonable 
endeavours clause to fulfil’ the conditions, the flexibility of this concept means that ‘you’ve got 
enough get-outs there’ to avoid any undesirable commitments.  
Of more significance is the reference in the DA to the Long Stop Dates, which I referred 
to in Table 6.2. As I have already stated, the Winchester DA contained a Planning Long Stop 
Date that was set to occur exactly two years after the date of the DA, and a Final Long Stop 
Date that was scheduled to fall exactly five years after the date of the DA. WCC and Thornfield 
entered into the DA on 22 December 2004 so those Long Stop Dates fell on 22 December 2006 
and 22 December 2009, respectively.64 My analysis of the temporal framework that a 
conditional DA provides for the conditional phase of a property-led development project has 
so far considered the connections between the date of the Winchester DA and the 
Unconditional Date anticipated in that DA. By contrast, these Long Stop Dates marked the 
moment upon which the DA would become terminable if the Unconditional Date had not 
occurred. I have argued that the apparent link between the date of the DA and the 
Unconditional Date ‘implies a line’65 extending from the initial pitch from Thornfield to WCC 
and seamlessly onward to an operational development. Alongside this line linking the date of 
                                                          
64 WCC documents also refer to the second Long Stop Date as scheduled to occur on 31 December 2009 
(see, for example, Winchester City Council, CAB2085. Silver Hill Regeneration Project - Latest 
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falling on 31 December 2009 so have not investigated that point. 




the DA and the Unconditional Date, the link between Long Stop Dates, termination rights and 
the Unconditional Date also purported to draw a line that carries an important justificatory 
logic that I now consider. 
In chapters four and five, I described some of the ways in which WCC and Thornfield 
gave various different ‘nearly legal’ and ‘legally binding’ agreements some of ‘the qualities’ of 
time66 by embedding a sequence of dates in those documents. In a similar way, local 
authorities and their developer partners make a conditional DA ‘timely’ through the use of 
Long Stop Dates. Earlier in this chapter, I demonstrated that the line linking the date of a DA 
and the Unconditional Date is initially of an undefined length and can only be measured after 
the Unconditional Date has occurred. In one sense, therefore, legitimacy flows through a DA 
from the way that the Unconditional Date is presented as a forthcoming event that will 
provide a record of the movement from conditionality to unconditionality. By pointing to an 
Unconditional Date as a temporal reference point and a marker of progress, a local authority 
and a developer can thus show how they will demonstrate that they are effectively working 
towards the destination laid out in an overarching development trajectory.  
Using a specific date as a Long Stop Date in a conditional DA has, on the other hand, 
the potential to perform a different type of legitimising role. This is because Long Stop Dates in 
a DA are a means to construct the conditional phase of the development process as a ‘finite 
segment’67 between the date of a DA and the moment that the DA becomes unconditional. In 
discussing property development projects generally, D1 used the image of a ‘line in the sand’ 
that separates parts of a development process in the sense of ‘a line’ that marks a limit or a 
boundary. The Final Long Stop Date in a DA ostensibly marks the last possible moment on 
which the Unconditional Date can occur and so sets the pre-agreed extent of the conditional 
phase. A temporal reference point embedded within a DA might thus afford the process a form 
of legitimacy on the basis that a Final Long Stop Date has the potential to end the process if 
insufficient progress has been made by that date. The underlying assumption is, therefore, 
that this Long Stop Date will ‘generate actions’ from both the contracting parties on the basis 
that the developer will otherwise risk losing the development opportunity that comes from the 
making of a CPO and that the local authority will lose the developer’s capacity to generate 
funding.  
There are numerous examples of this from my research. For example, PS1 argued that 
a series of Long Stop Dates in a DA should act as ‘a sequence of triggers that you have put in 
place to ensure that the developer does one thing, and then something else, and then 
                                                          
66 Matthew S. Hull, Government of paper: the materiality of bureaucracy in urban Pakistan (University of 
California Press 2012), 258. 
67 Greenhouse, A moment's notice: time politics across cultures, 20. 
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something else.’ D1 offered a further acknowledgement of the potential of a Long Stop Date as 
a type of monitoring and accountability device by suggesting that ‘a date’ provides something 
for a local authority ‘to fall back on’ in the event of a lack of overall progress on a development 
proposal because it gives ‘the comfort of knowing that [a developer is] not spinning things 
out.’ Similarly, he observed that a Final Long Stop Date is a necessity ‘because, obviously, if it 
didn’t have a date, one could hide behind the agreement and it might be years before the 
development gets on site.’68 This use of Long Stop Dates to give the development process 
some of the qualities of time resembles other mechanisms for, as Rakoff describes it, placing 
‘people and events in temporal relation with each other’ that, he suggests, are ‘a hallmark of 
production in modern societies.’69 The reassurance that a developer is not ‘spinning things out’ 
could only come, D1 suggested, from forming some form of linkage between progress on the 
discharge of conditions and calendar time. 
The assumption that a Final Long Stop Date would prevent a developer ‘spinning 
things out’ also underpinned the Winchester DA. The Council’s Chief Executive presented a 
report to the Council’s Cabinet that explained that, while the ‘Long Stop Date in the 
Development Agreement (31 December 2009) does not bring the agreement to an end on that 
date,’ the inclusion of a Long Stop Date, he said, ‘was obviously intended to provide an 
incentive on both parties to proceed diligently.’70 The reference to ‘an incentive’ demonstrates 
a belief that the imposition of temporal markers would motivate Thornfield’s directors to 
behave in a particular way, thus addressing some of the inherent lop-sidedness of this type of 
agreement. That the purpose of the Long Stop Date was, according to both WCC’s Chief 
Executive and D1, also apparently ‘obvious’ suggests that this type of arrangement is founded 
upon a self-evident logic. In the remainder of this chapter, however, I question this logic. 
D1 and PS1 both told me that the ‘disciplining’71 effect of a Long Stop Date is crucial to 
the legitimacy of a DA as a tool that facilitates a property-led development proposal. But PS1 
also emphasised that a Long Stop Date is a crucial tool for a local authority’s officers and 
cabinet members, who might need to justify their decision to enter into a DA with a developer 
                                                          
68 In terms of asking whether or not a time limit is a legal necessity for a binding DA, the case law on 
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real property (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012), paragraph 15-009. 
69 Todd D. Rakoff, A time for every purpose: law and the balance of life (Harvard University Press 2002), 
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70 Winchester City Council, CAB2085. Silver Hill Regeneration Project - Latest Developments. Report of 
Chief Executive. 24 November 2010 (Appendix B, Document 1.23), paragraph 3.4. In doing so, the 
Council’s Chief Executive seems to have interpreted the Final Long Stop Date as falling on 31 December 
2009 rather than 22 December 2009. I cannot explain why. 




to councillors, local residents and voters. By putting in place a mechanism intended to ensure 
that the move from conditionality to unconditionality occurred on or before a fixed date, the 
local authority he argued, is equipped to measure progress towards the discharge of 
conditions against a precise temporal scale. Both D1 and PS1 made these points in light of the 
generally held suspicion, that D1 acknowledged, that most developers will seek to exploit the 
desperation of a local authority to manipulate property-led development processes in their 
own favour.72  
LA3 and LA4 both countered this and insisted that a Long Stop Date can provide a 
sufficiently robust mechanism to ensure that a developer takes a DA to unconditionality and 
then carries out construction. For example, LA4 told me that ‘a Development Agreement sets a 
framework. What it says and what happens might not tally exactly but it is close enough.’ In 
addition, he argued that a developer’s willingness to agree to a Long Stop Date might not 
produce an absolute guarantee that unconditionality will occur within a given period but does 
provide sufficient assurance about the ongoing reliability of a developer and the suitability of a 
DA as a means to ensure that construction takes place. Despite these comments, however, 
there is more evidence of a lop-sidedness here, this time in the way that developers and local 
authority officers interpret Long Stop Dates. 
Something ‘scientific’ or something ‘arbitrary’ – setting the Long Stop Dates in a DA  
One of the questions that my research sought to answer is how local authorities and 
their development partners set the Long Stop Dates in a DA and how they use those dates 
after they have been agreed. I investigate this further in this section of this chapter. 
During my fieldwork, CON2 told me that he had negotiated numerous Long Stop Dates 
in DAs on behalf of different property development companies. He explained that he would 
first have a meeting with his client from the development company to ‘estimate how long it’ll 
take us to actually just discharge the conditions, and then we add a bit on.’ His experience of 
the planning application process, leasing arrangements and the compulsory purchase process 
would inform that general sense of what he deemed suitable. He would then enter into 
negotiations with a local authority with a general sense as to a suitable calendar date for the 
Long Stop Date. The extent of any negotiations with the local authority as to the actual Long 
Stop Date would depend, thereafter, on the parties’ respective views on the reasonableness of 
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the ‘bit’ added on. If the local authority felt that the developer was trying to add too much on, 
CON2 told me, they might seek to negotiate a Long Stop Date slightly closer to the anticipated 
date of the DA, whereas a developer would seek to ensure that the temporal framework 
contained enough flexibility to allow them to maximise the amount of time available before 
the DA imposed a binding commitment to construct. 
Nevertheless, CON2 argued that there ‘is a bit of science’ to the setting of a Long Stop 
Date. This assertion rested upon an assumption that a developer would calculate a Long Stop 
Date in a logical manner based on experience, expertise and past experimentation. By 
contrast, CON2 suggested that a local authority would be more unpredictable and might 
introduce concerns that were irrelevant or unrelated to the actual task of working through the 
conditions in a DA: 
There’s a bit of negotiation to it, and [PAUSE], so [PAUSE]. There’s a bit of science 
to it from the developer’s side and there is sometimes from the local authority’s 
side. [But t]here’s something like, “We need this before our council changes,” or 
“We’ve made promises to our electorate that we’re going to do this.” So some of 
it is purely arbitrary. 
From his point-of-view, setting a Long Stop Date might involve some thoughtful analysis and 
the application of expertise from a developer and his or her consultants, although his emphasis 
on the need to ‘add a bit on’ and the inherent inexactness of this approach suggests that the 
choice is shaped more by whim and spur of the moment decision-making than he admitted. 
His description of the basis for the selection of the Long Stop Date hints that it is a provisional 
judgement based on personal choice rather than a careful sequencing of actions. He 
highlighted the purportedly ’scientific’ approach of a developer and bemoaned the ‘arbitrary’ 
approach of a local authority but it seems reasonably pragmatic and entirely unsurprising that 
a local authority might focus on electoral cycles and commitments to constituents. 
Presumably, however, he characterised this as an arbitrary choice because it might introduce 
to a conditional phase of a development process factors other than the commercial priorities 
of a developer and its consultants. 
In Winchester, public documents that WCC produced at the time that it entered into 
the DA with Thornfield do not explain the basis for the choice of Long Stop Dates.73 However, 
the lack of progress on satisfaction of the conditions in line with these Long Stop Dates by the 
end of 2008 led WCC’s Head of Estates to seek approval from the Council’s Cabinet for an 
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extension of the Long Stop Date to 31 December 2012.74 The rationale for this extension was 
that WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors had negotiated a ‘Compulsory Purchase Order 
Indemnity Agreement’75 that was still in draft form but that would supplement the DA and 
require Thornfield to reimburse the costs that WCC incurred in preparing, making, defending 
and implementing a CPO for the development.76  
CON2 explained that a CPOIA is a standard component of the network of contractual 
arrangements that a local authority and a developer would enter into to facilitate this type of 
development. But it is interesting here because it is another example of a local authority 
officer using a ‘nearly legal’ agreement to generate actions from councillors. In his report to 
the Council’s Cabinet, WCC’s Head of Estates emphasised that the agreement ‘is now at final 
draft stage’77 and explained that WCC and Thornfield would proceed with the making of the 
CPO after the CPOIA was ‘in place.’78 Putting the CPOIA ‘in place’ was impossible, he indicated, 
while the Long Stop Date was still set to fall in December 2009 because it was unlikely that 
WCC would be able to satisfy the site assembly condition by that date given the typical length 
of time between making a CPO and its confirmation at a public inquiry.79 WCC’s officers, 
presumably with Cabinet approval, and Thornfield’s directors subsequently exchanged letters 
in which they agreed not to exercise the termination rights that would arise on the Long Stop 
Date until 31 December 2012.80  
This decision to extend the Long Stop Date in the Winchester DA requires more 
analysis. Earlier in this chapter, I mentioned the way that developers and local authority 
officers present the incorporation of a Long Stop Date into a DA as a marker of the legitimacy 
of a DA and as a means of holding a developer to account for any lack of progress on the 
satisfaction of DA conditions. But it is important to ask how willing a developer and a local 
authority are to vary those dates and extend a conditional phase. In chapter five, I analysed 
the temporal parameters laid out for the duration of an exclusivity period and noted a 
pervasive assumption that temporal limitations produce a target-driven organisational 
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of Estates. 18 November 2008 (Appendix B, Document 1.20), paragraph 9.2. I will discuss the making of 
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culture.81 But I also noted that the pre-agreed termination date of the exclusivity period that 
WCC and Thornfield agreed in the Winchester EA was malleable enough to adapt to the fixed 
need to enter into a DA. WCC’s willingness to change the Long Stop Date in the Winchester DA 
suggests a similar plasticity.82 LA4 compared the materiality of a DA as a paper artefact83 with 
the adaptability of its contents: 
Development Agreements make people happy in the sense that they’ve got a bit 
of paper there [pointing to a bundle of papers on the desk] but the reality is that 
you’re driven by the market. 
While he also extolled the disciplining effects of a series of Long Stop Dates, LA4 commented 
that a DA will ‘theoretically, have dates. But we all know that we vary them.’ Varying the Long 
Stop Dates was a technical84 task requiring expertise to ensure that the DA retained its internal 
cohesiveness, LA4 explained, so you just ‘bring your lawyers in to adjust them.’ 
I have already discussed D1’s description of matters that get ‘bolted-on’ to a draft DA 
when two contracting parties move from Heads of Terms to a position at which they are ready 
to enter into that DA. Varying the Long Stop Date through an exchange of letters is an example 
of bolting things on or plugging things in85 to an agreed DA. The bolt-ons added to the DA that I 
described in chapter five were items that changed the DA while it was still at its draft stage 
and, in the example I gave, D1 used the ‘nearly legal’ status of the DA to extract concessions 
from a local authority that benefitted his company. WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors, 
by contrast, bolted on the letters exchanged between them to the DA during the conditional 
phase, after the DA had become a ‘legal’ agreement. This demonstrates both that the process 
of changing, enhancing and layering continues after a DA has been agreed and that a 




                                                          
81 As also discussed, for example, in John Law, Aircraft stories: decentering the object in technoscience 
(Duke University Press 2002). 
82 Javier Lezaun, 'The Pragmatic Sanction of Materials: Notes for an Ethnography of Legal Substances' 
(2012) 39 Journal of Law and Society 20; Susan Leigh Star and James R. Griesemer, 'Institutional Ecology, 
Translations and Boundary Objects - Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley's Museum of Vertebrate 
Zoology, 1907-39' (1989) 19 Social Studies of Science 387. 
83 Hull, Government of paper: the materiality of bureaucracy in urban Pakistan. 
84 Annelise Riles, 'A new agenda for the cultural study of law: Taking on the technicalities' (2005) 53 
Buffalo Law Review 973. 
85 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the social: an introduction to actor-network-theory (Oxford University 
Press 2005), 207. 
86 ibid, 204; Nicholas Blomley, 'Disentangling Law: The Practice of Bracketing' (2014) 10 Annual Review 




Maintaining the internal cohesiveness: Bolt-ons, standstills and changes 
As I pointed out earlier in this chapter, WCC agreed to change the original Long Stop 
Date in the DA it had with Thornfield, from 31 December 2009 to 31 December 2012. 87 It did 
so because the Council’s Head of Estates indicated that a change to the Long Stop Date would 
enable the two parties to proceed with the compulsory purchase of the land required for the 
development site.88 The final observation that I want to make in this chapter, however, relates 
to a further change to the DA and a related change to the Long Stop Date that provoked 
concern amongst WCC’s officers on the basis that these subsequent changes might have led to 
a challenge under EU procurement law. The context in which WCC considered the justification 
for these further changes is worth briefly setting out.  
There were three parties to the Winchester DA. WCC was the local authority obliged to 
make, secure confirmation for and, following the Unconditional Date, exercise a CPO. 
Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited, the entity that I have been referring to as 
Thornfield, was the developer that would, on the Unconditional Date, be obliged to commence 
construction and reimburse WCC for the costs it expended in making, seeking the confirmation 
of and exercising its CPO. The third entity was Thornfield Properties plc, the parent company of 
Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited. Thornfield Properties plc was ‘the guarantor’ of 
Thornfield’s obligations in the DA. This meant that Thornfield Properties plc would be obliged 
to reimburse WCC’s costs expended in relation to the CPO if Thornfield Properties 
(Winchester) Limited did not do so.89 
Thornfield Properties plc was ‘jointly owned in 50:50 equal shares’ by a group of 
private individuals and Halifax Bank of Scotland plc (HBOS).90 I have not explored this 
ownership structure in detail but press reports state that, in January 2010, Thornfield 
Properties plc had accrued debts to HBOS of around £120million, with the result that HBOS 
placed it into administration in order to recover those debts.91 The administrators appointed to 
manage Thornfield Properties plc’s assets sought to extract any value available from the 
company’s various interests by attempting to sell its subsidiaries, and bundling into that 
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transaction any DAs into which those subsidiaries had entered.92 This included the DA that 
Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited had entered into with WCC.93 The Council treated 
the purchase by a third party of Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited as a matter that 
did not amount to a significant variation to the DA because the same company would remain 
the developer, albeit that a new parent company owned its shares.94  
However, given that Thornfield Properties plc, the developer’s original parent 
company, was also a guarantor of its subsidiary’s obligations in the DA, WCC sought external 
legal advice in March 2010 before the administrators had disclosed any bidders for Thornfield 
Properties (Winchester) Limited. It sought this advice on the basis that a change in the 
developer’s guarantor might trigger the requirement for an open market tendering process 
during which other potential developers would be able to bid for the award of the contract.95 
At the same time, the Henderson UK Property Fund, a property investment vehicle managed 
by Henderson Global Investors, bid to acquire Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited and 
to act as guarantor of its obligations under the Winchester DA.96 After a period of discussion 
between WCC officers and Henderson, WCC’s Chief Executive informed the Council’s Cabinet 
that ‘Mr Giffin [the QC appointed to advise WCC] has advised that it would be lawful’ for a 
company to purchase Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited and to supersede Thornfield 
Properties plc as guarantor.97 This published account of the QC’s advice was, however, 
somewhat abbreviated and the Chief Executive’s report noted that more detail on the advice 
was available in an exempt appendix to the report.98 The author of the Independent Review 
provides some insight into that advice by pointing out that Mr Giffin also informed the Council 
that the DA ‘should have been openly procured’ when it originally awarded the DA to 
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Thornfield in 2004.99 In addition, Mr Giffin informed the Council’s officers that he believed that 
the DA was ‘a public works contract and that a change of developer is a variation.’100  
As I have stated, however, the Council’s officers appear to have taken the view that 
the identity of ‘the developer’ had not changed. Their rationale, as noted above, was that 
Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited simply converted from a special purpose 
development company wholly owned by Thornfield Properties plc to a special purpose 
development company wholly owned by Henderson. In addition, there were continuities 
between Thornfield and Henderson that were not noted in the report referred to above. For 
example, Michael Capocci, an individual I referred to in chapters four and five, was Thornfield’s 
managing director and led negotiations on behalf of his company for the acquisition of John De 
Stefano’s land on the Winchester Development site.101 Mr Capocci was also the Thornfield 
director who had led his company’s efforts to convince WCC’s officers to seek Cabinet 
approval for the DA that Thornfield sought.102 What is interesting about this is that Mr Capocci 
became, after Henderson replaced Thornfield, a director working on behalf of Henderson.103 
This point demonstrates how Henderson ‘stepped into the shoes’ of Thornfield. The 
company registered at Companies House with company number 04057646, at one time called 
Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited, was, at all times during the life of the DA, ‘the 
developer.’ Henderson did, however, change the name of the company to Silverhill Winchester 
No1 Limited.104 There is a distinction, however, between the developer and the parent 
company that was the guarantor of the developer’s obligations in the DA. I do not want to 
dwell on this distinction, however, so call the developer after Thornfield’s administration, 
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‘Henderson,’ to reflect the change of overall ownership of the special purpose company 
fulfilling the role of ‘the developer.’ 
Regardless of the change of ownership of the developer and the new guarantor, WCC's 
officers chose not to treat this variation as a ‘material’ change to the DA that might have 
necessitated a tendering competition.105 Given that the Council chose to proceed with 
Henderson as the new parent company of the developer and as the new guarantor,106 
however, Mr Giffin advised that he could not ‘be confident that no-one would challenge’ the 
Council’s Cabinet decision to approve the substitution of Thornfield Properties plc with a new 
guarantor.107 He thus recommended a ‘standstill period’ of six months from the date on which 
Henderson’s parent company superseded Thornfield Properties plc as the new owner of 
Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited and the new guarantor.108 There is no published 
WCC report at the time noting this standstill period. Instead, the evidence that Martin Perry, 
Henderson’s Director of Retail Development, submitted to the inquiry held, in 2012, to confirm 
the Winchester CPO, referred to ‘a collateral agreement’ between WCC and Henderson 
entered into on 10 December 2010, on the same day that Henderson acquired Thornfield 
Properties (Winchester) Limited and became the guarantor of the company’s obligations.109 
This evidence also stated that the precise duration of the standstill period was ‘6 months and 
10 days to allow for any potential challenge.’110 WCC and Henderson agreed that neither 
organisation would incur any costs related to the Winchester Development during the 
standstill period.  
The standstill period thus acted as a further ‘bolt-on’ to the Winchester DA, and a 
means to afford the parties a pause within the conditional phase during which they allowed 
time to pass to enable them to obtain the confidence that they could proceed without fear of 
challenge. The circumstances of the deployment of this bolt-on to the DA are very unusual and 
I found no similar circumstances during my research. This is, therefore, a novel use of time as a 
resource and, if the conditional phase is presented as a necessary pause in the otherwise 
                                                          
105 I consider the importance of distinguishing between ‘material’ and immaterial changes to a DA in 
chapters seven to 10 when I consider subsequent variations to the Winchester DA. 
106 Winchester City Council, Minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 24 November 2010 (Appendix 
B, Document 1.22), item 3. 
107 Lloyd-Jones, A Perfect Storm - Report on Silver Hill (Appendix B, Document 2.08), Appendix 4, 3. 
108 ibid, Appendix 4, 3. 
109 Perry, Proof of Evidence. Silverhill, Winchester. 6 June 2012 (Appendix B, Document 3.06), paragraph 
6.1. 
110 ibid, paragraph 6.1. A claimant seeking to pursue court proceedings against a public body for breach 
of procurement law requirements must do so within three months from the date on which they knew or 
ought to have known of the breach (see, for example, Case C-406/08 Uniplex (UK) Ltd v NHS Business 
Services Authority [2010] PTSR 1377). Allowing a period of ‘six months and 10 days’ seems to have been 




seamless progression from initial pitch to EA to conditional DA to unconditionality, perhaps 
this standstill period can be described as a pause within a pause.  
At the same time as agreeing to the standstill period, Henderson’s directors also 
requested, and WCC’s Cabinet approved, a further bolt-on to the DA in the form of another 
change to the Long Stop Date, this time from 31 December 2012 to 31 August 2014.111 
Although he did not refer specifically to the proposed standstill period, WCC’s Chief Executive 
justified this change on the basis that Thornfield Properties plc’s administration had delayed 
progress on discharge of conditions and would prevent Henderson discharging the conditions 
in the DA before 31 December 2012.112 Moreover, the Chief Executive explained, the Council 
needed to agree to a change to the DA because Henderson’s directors had informed him that a 
funding institution would not invest in a development project if a local authority had an 
imminent right to terminate the DA. For that reason, the Chief Executive explained, a further 
drawing out of the conditional phase was necessary to ensure that ‘the project did not become 
unfundable.’113 This willingness to change the Long Stop Dates may not, in general terms, be 
surprising given that D4 told me that ‘you have a Long Stop Date but it’s capable of being 
moved out in the event that things don’t happen. And, actually, that’s the practice.’ 
No challenge to WCC’s decision to accommodate Henderson as the new developer and 
guarantor did emerge, and in chapter seven I consider how Henderson’s directors took 
forward the work that Thornfield’s directors had invested in discharging the conditions in the 
DA. This standstill period and the variation to the Long Stop Date were part of a sequence of 
bolt-ons added to the DA that WCC and Thornfield originally agreed. LA3 explained that 
adaptations to a DA are necessary so that the text of a DA ‘doesn’t get left behind’ by events. 
The bolt-ons that I have discussed in this chapter were a means to adapt an already flexible 
temporal schema to, paraphrasing Scott, absorb contingencies, incidents and accidents as 
‘mere moments’ in the conditional phase.114 But what is revealing here is the way that WCC’s 
officers, Thornfield’s directors and then Henderson’s directors each found ways to bolt ‘time’ 
on to the DA when unexpected things happened. The use of Long Stop Dates in a DA has the 
potential to produce a ‘finite segment’115 with an agreed start point and a settled end point, 
but the practices of the contracting parties can mean that this end point is likely to 
continuously move, as this chapter has shown. 
                                                          
111 Winchester City Council, Minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 24 November 2010 (Appendix 
B, Document 1.22), item 3. 
112 Winchester City Council, CAB2085. Silver Hill Regeneration Project - Latest Developments. Report of 
Chief Executive. 24 November 2010 (Appendix B, Document 1.23), paragraph 3.4. 
113 ibid, paragraph 3.4. 
114 Scott, Omens of adversity: tragedy, time, memory, justice, 87. 




The conditional phase in a property-led development DA is, as I have shown, a scripted 
pause in the progression along a development trajectory that follows an exclusivity period and 
should lead, according to developers, local authority officers, councillors and consultants, into 
the unconditional, construction phase of a development. I have explained here that the period 
between the date of the Winchester DA and a sequence of Long Stop Dates written into that 
DA marked out the temporal parameters of this conditional phase. By referring to material I 
gathered in interviews, I have also demonstrated that, at the outset of this phase, a developer 
will usually have no more than a vague future commitment to commence construction based 
loosely on proposals agreed during an exclusivity period. But, I have argued, there is an alluring 
internal cohesiveness to the presentation of the movement from this ‘largely undetermined’116 
and ‘initial situation’117 through to the settled state that comes with the Unconditional Date, 
which presents the promise of closure and onward movement through the development 
process. This movement, however, has been shown to be the product of ‘highly moderated 
change’118 and I revealed some of the ways in which a developer seeks to exert control over 
the date on which unconditionality occurs. 
In this chapter, therefore, I explored the suggestion that many of my interviewees 
made that a DA is a device that enables regulated ‘transit’ and linked this to my analysis of EAs 
in chapters four and five. This has revealed that a DA, like an EA, created a temporal schema 
into which other events could be absorbed. I pointed out, however, that one of the 
complexities of this type of DA is the interplay between an Unconditional Date and the 
sequence of Long Stop Dates that I referred to above. The prospect of an Unconditional Date 
provides a local authority and a developer with a ‘glimpse of the future’119 and enables a 
developer, in particular, to decide whether or not to embrace that future.  
A sequence of Long Stop Dates, on the other hand, gives the conditional phase of a DA 
some of ‘the qualities’ of time120 and has the potential to construct the conditional phase of a 
development process as a ‘finite segment.’121 The potential inherent to the Long Stop Dates 
flowed from the way the Winchester DA enabled either the developer or the local authority to 
terminate the DA if the last Long Stop Date in the DA occurred before the Unconditional Date. 
But I have shown the inherent inexactness of the practice of setting Long Stop Dates and the 
way that a lack of progress on the satisfaction of conditions very often leads to changes to 
                                                          
116 Callon, 'Writing and (Re)writing Devices as Tools for Managing Complexity', 192. 
117 Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting, 243. 
118 Johns, 'Financing as Governance', 401. 
119 Harper, Inside the IMF: an ethnography of documents, technology, and organisational action, 134. 
120 Hull, Government of paper: the materiality of bureaucracy in urban Pakistan, 258. 
121 Greenhouse, A moment's notice: time politics across cultures, 20. 
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Long Stop Dates rather than the implementation of termination rights. By studying the 
Winchester DA, I have revealed the way in which these changes, performed through bolting on 
various extensions to the DA, created an assemblage composed of many moving parts 
designed and repeatedly redesigned to accommodate unexpected changes. This analysis has 
also enabled me to investigate the novel use of time as a resource in the Winchester DA to 
create a ‘standstill period’ during which time passed while the development process remained 
static. This passage of time carried with it the receding threat of a challenge to the lawfulness 
of changes to the DA. 
In the next chapter, I continue my analysis of the conditional phase of the Winchester 
Development and look more specifically at the actions that WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s 
directors took to discharge the planning and site assembly conditions prior to Thornfield’s 
administration. I then consider the ways in which Henderson’s directors continued the process 






A ‘passing phase’ 
In this chapter, I address some of the issues that arise when a developer and a local 
authority begin the process of discharging the conditions laid out in a Development 
Agreement.1 In chapter six, I showed that discharge of the conditions is viewed as a 
preparatory step to the moment at which a conditional DA converts from a vague expression 
of intended future action into a collection of ‘legally binding,’ unconditional commitments that 
impose immediate expectations, including an enforceable obligation on a developer to 
commence construction. Taking my lead from the text of the Winchester DA and the 
comments that my interviewees made regarding the actions required to discharge those 
conditions,2 I ask what a local authority and a developer do to move through the ‘conditional 
phase of a development process.’ This conditional phase formed the subject matter of much of 
my analysis in chapter six where I demonstrated that developers, local authority officers and 
property development consultants treat ‘conditionality’ as the latest in a sequence of ‘passing 
phases.’3 Treating conditionality as a passing phase has the effect of presenting a DA as a thing 
that needs time to mature or ‘ripen’4 while the developer and the local authority work on it 
and with it. I investigate, therefore, what happens during the conditional phase and how the 
DA directs the work that developers and local authorities carry out. In particular, I examine the 
discharge of the planning condition in the Winchester DA and the move towards the grant of a 
planning permission for the Winchester Development. I then consider the discharge of the site 
assembly condition and the role that a Compulsory Purchase Order5 played in this. 
Taking my lead from Ricoeur’s discussion of ‘rule-governed transformations,’6 I analyse 
parts of the Winchester DA and scrutinise documents presented as evidence to the CPO 
inquiry and documents produced for consideration in WCC’s Council and Cabinet meetings.7 In 
chapter six, I analysed the DA by reference to Table 6.2, which included the conditions to be 
discharged before the DA became unconditional. In this chapter, I include Tables 7.1 and 7.2, 
which both illustrate that, in practice, the discharge of conditions is far messier than the neat 
                                                          
1 Throughout this thesis I have been abbreviating this term to ‘DA.’ I continue to do so in this chapter. 
2 I refer to material obtained in interviews with D1, D3, CON2, CON3 and CON4. 
3 Nick Lee and Steven D Brown, 'The Disposal of Fear: Childhood, Trauma and Complexity' in John Law 
and Annemarie Mol (eds), Complexities: social studies of knowledge practices (Duke University Press 
2002), 263. 
4 Bruno Latour, The making of law: an ethnography of the Conseil d'Etat (Polity 2010), 82. 
5 Throughout this thesis I have been abbreviating this term to ‘CPO.’ I continue to do so in this chapter. 
6 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting (University of Chicago Press 2004), 243. 
7 Appendix B to this thesis is a list of the primary source documents produced during the Winchester 




sequence that the contents of a DA might present. I examine the conditional phase of the 
Winchester Development, during which Winchester City Council’s officers8 and first Thornfield 
Properties (Winchester) Limited’s9 directors and then Henderson UK Property Fund’s10 
directors went about discharging the conditions in the DA.  
I have already shown that discharging conditions in a DA necessitates engagement 
with various temporalities,11 some of which I addressed in chapter six and remain relevant 
here, and some of which I newly introduce. For example, the conditional phase was a period in 
the Winchester Development during which WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors sought to 
address the different temporalities of Thornfield’s expectation of a long-term rate of return on 
its investment, the short-term need for affordable housing in Winchester, the statutory 
temporalities of conducting a compulsory purchase process,12 and contingencies put in place 
to manage unforeseen events such as the administration of Thornfield’s parent company and 
the acquisition by Henderson of Thornfield and the renaming of Thornfield to Silverhill 
Winchester No 1 Limited.13 
I begin this chapter by examining the extent to which the Winchester DA imposed an 
order for the discharge of conditions. Chapter six revealed that the Winchester DA originally 
stipulated that a Planning Long Stop Date would occur on 22 December 2006 and that a Final 
Long Stop Date would occur on 22 December 2009. This meant that WCC and Thornfield 
anticipated that discharge of the planning condition would happen ‘first’ but in this chapter, by 
scrutinising the DA and discussing material gathered in my interviews, I ask why, what 
                                                          
8 Throughout this thesis I have been referring to Winchester City Council as ‘WCC.’ I continue to do so in 
this chapter. 
9 Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited was a special purpose company set up by Thornfield 
Properties plc to enter into a DA with WCC and carry out the Winchester development. Thornfield 
Properties (Winchester) Limited was, initially, ‘the developer’ for the purposes of the Winchester DA. I 
have referred to Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited throughout this thesis as ‘Thornfield’ and 
continue to do so here. 
10 Throughout this thesis I have been referring to Henderson UK Property Fund as ‘Henderson.’ I 
continue to do so in this chapter. As I explained in chapter six, Henderson UK Property Fund replaced 
Thornfield Properties plc as guarantor of the developer’s obligations in the DA after Halifax Bank of 
Scotland placed Thornfield Properties plc. Henderson also acquired the Thornfield entity that was the 
developer. For the sake of brevity, I refer to ‘the developer’ after Thornfield Properties plc’s 
administration as ‘Henderson.’ 
11 Davina Cooper, 'Time against time: Normative temporalities and the failure of community labour in 
Local Exchange Trading Schemes' (2013) 22 Time & Society 31. 
12 In the sense that WCC had to allow a period of 21 days for objectors to challenge the compulsory 
purchase order (see Acquisition of Land Act 1981, s12(1)(c)), then prepare evidence for a public inquiry, 
attend that inquiry, await confirmation of the inquiry’s decision, and then pause until the limitation 
period for challenge to the confirmation of the order to expire. I revisit statutory temporalities in 
chapter 10. 
13 As I noted earlier in this chapter, although the same corporate entity acted as the developer for the 
purposes of the Winchester DA, I refer to the developer as ‘Henderson’ following the administration of 




Thornfield’s directors did to achieve satisfaction of the planning condition and how they went 
about incorporating the ‘required elements’14 into their application for planning permission.  
I then explain that Thornfield discharged the planning condition just before Halifax 
Bank of Scotland, Thornfield’s principal creditor, placed Thornfield’s parent company into 
administration. After the standstill period that I discussed in chapter six, Henderson took on 
the DA and the planning permission granted to Thornfield, so I ask what Henderson did with 
the DA and what it did to continue work already done to discharge the planning and site 
assembly conditions. I explore the ways that a DA encourages, facilitates and supports the 
making and confirmation of a CPO by asking if the discharge of the planning condition helps 
with this and if the non-discharge of other conditions inhibits this. Similarly, I ask if a DA assists 
the making and confirmation of a CPO by presenting a route to completion of development 
even though movement along that route is conditional on other factors. In that respect, I 
consider if a DA is a way to make a Planning Inspector adjudicating at a CPO inquiry ‘believe’15 
that development will happen. I examine how some local authorities and developers achieve 
this by encouraging Inspectors to overlook the messiness16 of conditionality and to act ‘as if’17 
the other conditions were mere formalities that would smoothly follow discharge of the 
planning and site assembly conditions in a seamless progression towards unconditionality. 
A sequential process or an irregular gathering together? Discharging the conditions in a DA 
In chapter six, I showed that a DA will often contain a temporal framework produced 
to construct a phase during which the contracting parties can test their initial proposals before 
committing to the costs of land acquisition and construction or attempting to finalise 
agreements with funders or prospective tenants. The conditional phase in the Winchester 
Development began on 22 December 2004, which was the date of the DA. The DA then laid 
out a sequence of dates, purporting to mark smaller phases through which the overarching 
process needed to move to reach unconditionality. By the ‘Planning Long Stop Date,’ 
scheduled to fall on 22 December 2006,18 Thornfield needed to have discharged the planning 
                                                          
14 I explained what these required elements were in chapter six. In summary, the DA stated that the 
completed development should incorporate 90,000 sq ft of retail floor-space, 364 residential units (of 
which 35% were to be affordable homes), a new public square, a new bus station and other public 
services. The DA termed these the ‘required elements.’ 
15 Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting, 243. 
16 Annemarie Mol, The body multiple: ontology in medical practice (Duke University Press 2002). 
17 Annelise Riles, Collateral knowledge: legal reasoning in the global financial markets (University of 
Chicago Press 2011), 173; Fleur Johns, 'Financing as Governance' (2011) 31 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 391, 399. 
18 Table 6.2 in chapter six set out the dates by which discharge of conditions in the Winchester DA 




condition by obtaining a planning permission that authorised the construction of a 
development that incorporated certain ‘required elements.’19  
If Thornfield failed to discharge the planning condition by the Planning Long Stop Date, 
either party could terminate the DA.20 But if Thornfield had discharged the planning condition, 
the DA envisaged a shift towards satisfaction of the next set of conditions by a Final Long Stop 
Date, originally scheduled to occur on 22 December 2009.21 The DA gathered together these 
conditions but set no particular sequence for their discharge, other than to state that the 
viability condition would only be discharged by the receipt of a positive viability appraisal 
produced after satisfaction of the other conditions.22 Any such appraisal would only be 
satisfactory for the purposes of the viability condition if it demonstrated that the proposals 
were likely to achieve a stipulated level of profitability.23 While the DA did not specify any 
sequence for the discharge of the conditions, it was clear that the planning condition was the 
‘first’ that needed to be discharged and that the viability condition, for reasons to be discussed 
in chapter nine, was the condition that would be discharged ‘last’ to determine whether or not 
the development would go ahead. 
Despite the ostensible gathering together of the conditions to be discharged between 
the planning condition and the viability condition, one of my interviewees pointed out that 
most developers approach these conditions in sequence even if the order of discharge is not 
written into a DA. For D1, ‘first is planning,’ suggesting that the Winchester DA contained a 
standard temporal structure.24 Then he explained that ‘next’ is the site assembly condition and 
then the other conditions would follow, with the viability condition, which he called ‘the 
overriding one,’ to be discharged ‘last.’ Coupled to the express provision in the Winchester DA 
that satisfaction of the viability condition could only be assessed after the prior satisfaction of 
                                                          
19 As stated in clauses 1.1.65 and 5.3 of the DA. I noted in the introduction to this chapter that those 
required elements were written into the DA and stipulated that the completed development should 
incorporate 90,000 sq ft of retail floor-space, 364 residential units (of which 35% were to be affordable 
homes), a new public square, a new bus station and other public services. 
20 As stated in schedule 2, paragraph 15.1 of the DA. 
21 As stated in clause 1.1.50 of the DA. 
22 As stated in schedule 2, paragraph 2.9 of the DA. Most DAs make this clear. The DA for a similar 
development in Farnham in Surrey stated that the viability condition in the relevant DA would only be 
satisfied after all other conditions in the DA had been satisfied and, even then, only if the developer 
obtained an appraisal demonstrating ‘in its reasonable opinion’ that its expected profitability targets 
would be achieved (as stated in clause 3.6.7 of the DA).  
23 The requisite level of profitability has been redacted in the published DA, although evidence 
submitted to the compulsory purchase order public inquiry revealed that the ‘viability measure’ was 
10% profit on cost (Martin Robert Perry, Proof of Evidence. Silverhill, Winchester. 6 June 2012 (Appendix 
B, Document 3.06), paragraph 14.8). 
24 One of the other DAs I obtained while carrying out my research did not state this explicitly but did 
stipulate that the developer could only ask the Council to exercise its compulsory purchase powers in 
pursuit of satisfaction of the site assembly condition after the grant of planning permission and, thus, 
after discharge of the planning condition. 
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all other conditions, this demonstrates that there is a sequence that some developers adopt to 
move through the conditional phase. At various points in this chapter, and in more detail in 
chapter nine, I ask what it means to say that questions surrounding viability have the scope to 
override progress on other conditions. My primary focus here, however, is on the planning and 
site assembly conditions. 
Balancing specificity and fluidity: planning for variations or variations for planning? 
The phase of the Winchester Development that I consider first is the ‘time-in-between’ 
the date of the DA and the Planning Long Stop Date. To discharge the planning condition in the 
Winchester DA, the developer needed to have secured planning permission for a development 
incorporating all the required elements set out in clause 5.3 of the DA, which contained the 
minimum specifications for such matters as the amount of retail floor-space, the number of 
residential units and affordable homes, and the range of public services to be incorporated 
into the built development. The DA allowed, however, some flexibility in the provision of these 
required elements by including a ‘variations clause’ that enabled Thornfield to seek WCC’s 
approval for changes to these required elements.25  
One way of thinking about this variations clause is by considering the way that Callon 
describes ‘writing practices’ that, through a ‘method of successive adjustment,’ enable various 
different types of organisation to ‘progressively become aware of what they want to express’ 
in their documents.26 Similarly, Hull has observed that ‘writing’ can sometimes ‘nail things 
down’ but that it can also ‘set things in motion.’27 Applying these ideas to the required 
elements in the Winchester DA is helpful because setting out these minimum requirements 
purported to stipulate certain buildings that had to be included in the constructed 
development. But the list of required elements set out in the DA only went some way towards 
confirming the parties’ expectations. The variations clause in the DA, by contrast, sought to 
balance the ‘directive quality’ of the list of required elements with the ‘productive flexibility’ 
that comes from acknowledging that the expectations written into the DA at the date of the 
DA might need to be re-written in response to circumstance.28 In the same way that an 
historical archive is, Mawani argues, ‘in an ongoing state of creation and production through 
                                                          
25 As stated in clause 5.1.3 of the DA. 
26 Michel Callon, 'Writing and (Re)writing Devices as Tools for Managing Complexity' in John Law and 
Annemarie Mol (eds), Complexities: social studies of knowledge practices (Duke University Press 2002), 
192-3. Emphasis in original. 
27 Matthew S. Hull, Government of paper: the materiality of bureaucracy in urban Pakistan (University of 
California Press 2012), 248. 
28 Alex Faulkner, 'Law's performativities: Shaping the emergence of regenerative medicine through 




translation, interpretation, elaboration, dismissal, and disavowal,’29 the meaning and effect of 
a written DA is subjected to change as it is read, implemented, adjusted and moved around. 
Incorporating a set of required elements alongside a variations clause is to attempt to embed 
within a DA the capacity to bend practices to it by requiring certain outcomes, while allowing 
the flexibility to bend the DA in response to external requirements if the originally desired 
outcomes became unworkable. Crafting a DA in this way would appear to require a careful 
balancing of specificity with fluidity.  
During my research, a particular view emerged of the way to balance specificity with 
fluidity. CON2 and CON3 argued, for example, that DAs successfully achieved an appropriate 
balance if they embraced change rather than imposed strict directives. CON2 explained that 
starting out with a list of ‘design parameters’ to be incorporated into a DA means that the 
writing and implementation of the DA tends to get a ‘bit lengthy.’ CON3 similarly argued that 
some indeterminacy is desirable in a DA because it enables a developer to adapt its original 
proposals. His assessment of the content of a DA was that it ‘needs to be framed with 
sufficient flexibility’ and that if ‘it assumes anything to do with fixed, blueprint design, as 
several do, you know that it’s a document fundamentally misconceived by the inexperienced.’ 
CON4 offered a similar observation when he explained that a DA that fails to accommodate 
change ‘isn’t worth the paper that it’s written on because [the original design] is simply not 
going to happen.’ These insights demonstrate that a mechanism to allow variation is an 
essential component of a DA. But it is important to ask how this type of mechanism performs 
in practice. This was one of my principal research questions and to answer this question, I 
examine Thornfield’s efforts to discharge the planning condition in the DA and investigate the 
ways that WCC and Thornfield made changes to the DA.  
Table 7.1 illustrates the changes to the required elements that WCC and Thornfield 
made to enable Thornfield to discharge the planning condition.  
  
                                                          
29 Renisa Mawani, 'Law's Archive' (2012) 8 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 337, 354. 
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Table 7.1 Timeline illustrating some of the key events between Thornfield’s application 
for planning permission and the grant of planning permission 
Date Event 
12.12.2005 
Thornfield submits draft application for planning permission to WCC for approval in 
the Council’s ‘capacity as landowner’ and Cabinet approves variation to DA reducing 
number of residential units in ‘required elements’ from 364 to 285 
13.04.2006 
Cabinet approves variation to DA reducing number of residential units in required 
elements from 285 to 277 
23.05.2006 
Thornfield submits application for planning permission to WCC in the Council’s 
‘capacity as’ local planning authority 
27.03.2007 
Planning Development Control Committee approves Thornfield’s application for 
planning permission pending section 106 agreement between WCC and Thornfield 
17.10.2007 
Cabinet recommends that officers make CPO when Compulsory Purchase Order 
Indemnity Agreement agreed with Thornfield 
March 2008 
Officers receive legal advice on risks of procurement challenge to proposed 
variations to the ‘required elements’ in the DA 
21.10.2008 
Planning Development Control Committee approves amendments to application for 
planning permission that increases the amount of retail floor-space, increases the 
number of residential units and reduces the amount of affordable housing 
18.11.2008 
Cabinet agrees to vary DA to allow Thornfield to make a financial contribution to the 
provision of off-site affordable housing and to change the Final Long Stop Date 
09.02.2009 
WCC and Thornfield sign section 106 agreement and planning permission granted 
Planning condition discharged 
Against the background of points that I have already made in this chapter regarding 
the level of fluidity or specificity written into a DA, WCC’s officers did ‘know,’ at the time that 
the Council entered into the DA, some of the components that they wanted the DA to include. 
For example, the Planning Brief that WCC’s Cabinet approved in April 2003, setting the 
Council’s design parameters for the development, stated that ‘[t]he Council expects a 
significant residential component’ through the provision of ‘housing above shops.’30 The 
Planning Brief also envisaged that ‘35% of these dwellings [would] be affordable’31 but did not 
stipulate a specific number of residential units that the development would have to include. 
The DA, by contrast, stated that the ‘minimum requirement’ was the provision of 364 
residential units. I can find no account from the time that the parties entered into the DA that 
                                                          
30 Winchester City Council, Adopted Broadway Friarsgate Planning Brief. Part 2A - Background and 
Analysis (Appendix B, Document 2.04), paragraph 2.5.1. 
31 ibid, paragraph 2.5.4. The 65% of the residential units not required to be affordable would have been 
units either available for sale or rental on the open market, with the prospect of a significantly higher 
rate of return for Thornfield than the affordable housing would generate. 
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explains why WCC and Thornfield incorporated this precise number of residential units into the 
DA as a required element. As I will show, it is likely that this is the number of residential units 
that Thornfield deemed necessary to enable them to achieve their desired level of profitability 
so it was written into the DA in an attempt to hold the Council to this figure. 
Soon after WCC and Thornfield entered into the DA, however, it became clear that this 
number of residential units could not form the basis for ‘a workable proposition.’32 After 
entering into the DA, Thornfield’s directors began negotiations with WCC’s planning officers to 
inform the preparation of a draft application for planning permission.33 Alongside those 
negotiations, WCC and Thornfield carried out a ‘wide scale consultation with the public’ 
regarding Thornfield’s proposals for the development.34 This public consultation revealed 
opposition to the design based on the proposed height and density of the buildings.35 Similarly, 
WCC’s Chief Estates Officer informed the Council’s Cabinet that the proposed ‘scale and 
massing of the buildings is […] a potentially major planning issue’ in light of the Council’s 
planning policies related to preservation of ‘the area’s character.’36 What is interesting about 
the Chief Estates Officer’s comments is that he was reporting to the Council’s Cabinet in his 
capacity as a senior officer in the landholding function of the Council. As I noted in chapter 
one, his primary role was to maximise the value of the Council’s estate, not to implement 
planning policy.37 
The proposed height and density of the buildings appears to have been necessitated, 
however, by the desire to incorporate 364 residential units. Thornfield’s directors had sought a 
turning away from the Planning Brief, which had suggested that the development site could 
support 100 residential units,38 to enable the construction of higher buildings to incorporate 
‘additional residential units [to] help the scheme viability.’39 I discuss these ‘viability’ concerns 
in chapter nine but my point here is that Thornfield’s initial application for planning permission 
                                                          
32 Winchester City Council, PS202. Silver Hill Development Update Report. Report of Chief Estates Officer. 
17 October 2005 (Appendix B, Document 1.13), paragraph 1.1. 
33 ibid, paragraph 2.1. 
34 ibid, paragraph 1.1. 
35 Winchester City Council, CAB1179. Silver Hill Development Landowner's Approval. Report of Chief 
Estates Officer. 12 December 2005 (Appendix B, Document 1.15), paragraph 5.2.  
36 ibid, paragraph 3.5.9. 
37 The Council’s constitution states that this individual’s current job title is ‘Assistant Director (Estates 
and Regeneration).’ See Winchester City Council, Constitution of the City Council - Part 7 - Management 
Structure (Appendix B, Document 2.14), 4. 
38 Winchester City Council, Adopted Broadway Friarsgate Planning Brief. Part 2A - Background and 
Analysis (Appendix B, Document 2.04), paragraph 2.5.1. 
39 Winchester City Council, CAB938. Broadway Friarsgate Development. Report of the Chief Estates 




was for a lower density development incorporating 285 residential units, not the 364 units 
required in the DA.40 WCC’s Chief Estates Officer noted that: 
It is possible, however, that meeting the requirements of the local planning 
authority could have an impact on financial viability. Were this to be the case both 
Thornfield and the Council, as landowner, have to reconsider their respective 
positions and this is a risk which Members should be aware of.41 
The way that WCC, ‘as landowner,’ and Thornfield, as developer, responded to this ‘risk’ forms 
the focus of my analysis here. 
This process of change exemplifies the way in which WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s 
directors went about ‘gradually producing’ a set of proposals that were both ‘desired and 
tested.’42 It also demonstrates how changes to a DA might be necessitated not just by what a 
developer wants but sometimes by what a local authority wants. But this is a complex picture 
because it also illustrates that changes to a DA might also be necessary because of what one 
part of a local authority wants while another part of the local authority desires something 
different. WCC, in common with other local authorities, was a complex assemblage that 
functioned as a local planning authority obliged to consider applications for planning 
permission and a landholding body with an interest in pursuing the development of its own 
land.43 As Adams et al have pointed out, a local authority is not a ‘single, undifferentiated 
actor.’44 Clause 33 of the DA stated that WCC entered into the agreement solely ‘in its capacity 
as landowner’ and clause 36.3 similarly stated that no provisions in the DA should be 
construed in a way that would ‘fetter the discretion of the Council in its capacity as planning 
authority or in the exercise of any other statutory function.’ On the other hand, Thornfield’s 
‘pre-planning discussions’ had ‘taken place with the Council as local planning authority’ rather 
than as a landowner.45 
                                                          
40 Winchester City Council, CAB1179. Silver Hill Development Landowner's Approval. Report of Chief 
Estates Officer. 12 December 2005 (Appendix B, Document 1.15), paragraph 5.2. 
41 ibid, paragraph 3.6. 
42 Michel Callon, Pierre Lascoumes and Yannick Barthe, Acting in an uncertain world : an essay on 
technical democracy (Inside technology, MIT 2009), 205. See also Michel Callon, 'Writing and (Re)writing 
Devices as Tools for Managing Complexity' in John Law and Annemarie Mol (eds), Complexities: social 
studies of knowledge practices (Duke University Press 2002). 
43 To maintain the separation between these two functions, councillors who sat on both the Cabinet and 
the Planning Committee left meetings of those two committees while discussions regarding the 
Thornfield’s application took place. See, for example, Winchester City Council, Minutes of the meeting of 
the Cabinet held on 13 April 2006 (Appendix B, Document 1.16), item 21. 
44 David Adams, Robert Croudace and Steve Tiesdell, 'Exploring the 'Notional Property Developer' as a 
Policy Construct' (2012) 49 Urban Studies 2577, 2587. See also Ann Harding, 'The rise of urban-growth 
coalitions, UK- style' (1991) 9 Environment and Planning C - Government and Policy 295, 296. 
45 Winchester City Council, PS202. Silver Hill Development Update Report. Report of Chief Estates Officer. 




In its ‘capacity as landowner,’ WCC’s estates team had agreed to the incorporation of 
364 residential units as a minimum requirement in the DA. But, ‘as local planning authority,’ 
WCC’s planning officers had advised Thornfield’s directors that 364 residential units did not 
form the basis of a ‘workable proposition.’ Because the construction of 364 residential units 
was a required element in the DA, WCC’s Chief Estates Officer recommended that the Cabinet 
should approve a variation to the DA to accommodate this change.46 If WCC and Thornfield 
had retained the original figure as a required element in the DA but Thornfield had obtained 
planning permission for the lower figure, Thornfield would have failed to discharge the 
planning condition and an actionable termination right would have been available to WCC. This 
might have been important only as a ‘technicality’47 because WCC, in its capacity as landowner, 
might not have chosen to utilise that termination right to bring the DA to an end. But the 
problem would, I presume, have lain in the uncertainty that this technicality might have 
created. 
In chapter six, I noted that Henderson’s directors had informed WCC’s officers and 
councillors that no funding body would agree to invest in a development proposition if a local 
authority had a ‘live’ right to commence an action for termination against a developer. The 
Winchester DA stated that the planning condition would only be discharged by the grant of a 
planning permission that incorporated all the required elements. A change to the required 
elements, itself a ‘technicality,’ was necessary to avoid creating this impediment to 
investment. WCC’s Cabinet duly approved this variation48 and a subsequent variation49 and 
Thornfield then submitted its application for planning permission on 23 May 2006 proposing 
264 residential units, alongside the other items specified in the required elements of the DA.50 
WCC’s planning committee stated its general approval for the proposals but refused to grant 
planning permission until Thornfield also entered into a ‘section 106 agreement.’51  
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Although Thornfield had applied for planning permission on 23 May 2006, WCC’s 
planning committee did not grant planning permission until 9 February 2009.52 As I stated 
previously, the planning condition in the DA would be discharged by the grant of planning 
permission, and discharge had to occur prior to the Planning Long Stop Date, scheduled to 
occur on 22 December 2006. The DA accommodated the possibility that the grant of planning 
permission might actually occur after the Planning Long Stop Date, without triggering 
termination rights, by postponing the Planning Long Stop Date if Thornfield had submitted an 
application for planning permission but ‘a s106 agreement is being negotiated but is not yet 
completed.’53 The WCC planning committee that recommended the grant of planning 
permission pending the finalisation of a section 106 agreement noted that this agreement was 
‘still the subject of negotiation with the applicant.’54 This meant that an agreement whose 
terms had not been settled was still sufficient to stop time running for the purposes of the DA.  
The text of the DA did not state a date beyond which this pause would have been 
unacceptable, although presumably the termination rights arising on the passing of the 
Planning Long Stop Date would have been activated if negotiations on the terms of the section 
106 agreement had failed. And the postponement of the Planning Long Stop Date did not 
effect a similar postponement of the Final Long Stop Date, which was unaffected by the 
application for planning permission.55 This is, though, another example of a scripted pause in 
the Winchester Development trajectory. This pause differs from the standstill period that I 
analysed in chapter six, however, which was scripted by an external legal advisor in response 
to unexpected events. The pause following the application for planning permission, by 
contrast, followed a script that the DA ‘carried around.’56 
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Thornfield’s directors had submitted an application for planning permission in May 
2006 because the DA required the company to obtain planning permission to discharge the 
planning condition prior to the Planning Long Stop Date. But, they had left the terms of a 
section 106 agreement unresolved because doing so ‘postponed’ the Planning Long Stop Date 
and allowed them to explore further adjustments to the required elements while sheltered 
from the possibility of termination rights arising. In particular, Thornfield’s directors sought to 
amend the application for planning permission to allow an increase in retail floor-space.57 But 
the proposals for amendments to the planning permission also sought an increase to the 
number of residential units permitted back up from 264 to 287, with the number of private 
units scheduled to increase from 158 to 187 and the number of affordable housing units 
scheduled to fall from 106 to 100.58 The rationale for these proposed changes was that 
Thornfield’s directors believed that the proposals previously agreed no longer formed the basis 
for a ‘viable’ development.59  
Amending the planning application to accommodate these changes also necessitated, 
for the reasons I outlined above, corresponding variations to the DA. But Thornfield’s viability 
concerns had implications for the provision of affordable housing. A further proposed change 
to the DA would enable Thornfield’s directors to choose either to build the agreed quantum of 
affordable housing or to remove affordable housing entirely as a component of the built 
development.60 This amendment to the DA envisaged that, if Thornfield chose not to construct 
on-site affordable housing, it would make a financial contribution to the Council in lieu. At the 
same time as seeking WCC’s approval for these changes to the required elements, Thornfield’s 
directors also sought a variation to the mechanism envisaged in the DA for the grant by WCC 
to Thornfield of long leasehold interests in the development site after the Unconditional Date. 
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WCC has published a redacted version of the deed of variation that affected these changes, 
although the extent of the redaction makes it impossible to analyse these changes. However, 
the report that WCC’s Chief Estates Officer presented to the Council’s Cabinet on these 
variations stated that the proposed variation would mean that WCC granted a lease of the 
development site to Thornfield before the commencement of construction rather than after 
the commencement of construction, as had originally been agreed.61 The purpose for this 
change was to reduce the Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT) that Thornfield would be required to 
pay on the basis of the value of the site on the grant of the lease, which, if assessed against the 
value of the development site, might have made the scheme ‘unviable.’62 WCC’s Chief Estates 
Officer noted that this meant that if the Council granted a lease to Thornfield but Thornfield 
did not commence construction, WCC would have to seek possession of the site through 
commencing forfeiture proceedings63 but he deemed this ‘risk’ to be less significant than the 
risk that the scheme would not go ahead ‘unless SDLT liability is minimised.’64 
Taken together, therefore, these changes to the required elements and the alteration 
to the mechanism for the grant of a lease made changes that would increase the profitability 
of the development proposition. WCC’s Cabinet approved the proposed variations to the DA,65 
and WCC’s planning officers approved the amendments proposed to the application for 
planning permission, observing that Thornfield’s directors had provided evidence ‘to suggest 
that the amount of affordable housing required may threaten the viability of the 
development.’66 While the officers acknowledged that the ‘provision of affordable housing is 
one of the Council’s key priorities and should not normally be compromised,’67 the Planning 
Committee concluded that the importance of the short-term need to preserve Winchester’s 
place ‘in the retail hierarchy’ trumped the long-term need for affordable housing.68  
The variations that WCC and Thornfield made to the required elements had, therefore, 
allowed WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors to attend to the technical problems that 
would arise on grant of a planning permission that did not incorporate the previously agreed 
required elements. The variations also enabled WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors to 
                                                          
61 Winchester City Council, CAB1739. Silver Hill Winchester - Compulsory Purchase Order. Report of Head 
of Estates. 18 November 2008 (Appendix B, Document 1.20), paragraph 8.1. 
62 ibid, paragraph 8.1. 
63 ibid, paragraph 8.2. 
64 ibid, paragraph 8.3. 
65 Winchester City Council, Minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 18 November 2008 (Appendix 
B, Document 1.19), item 17. 
66 Winchester City Council, PDC768. Report of Head of Planning Control. 21 October 2008 (Appendix B, 
Document 1.18), paragraph 3.9. 
67 ibid, paragraph 3.9. 




postpone the scheduled Planning Long Stop Date to enable further changes to the required 
elements while sheltered from the possibility of termination. But, in common with other 
decisions I have discussed in this thesis, these amendments exacerbated stresses already 
locked-in to the DA. Thornfield’s directors had, as I have indicated, sought the inclusion of 364 
residential units in the DA to enable the company to achieve its profitability target. The 
‘disavowal’69 of this required element did not come from a belief that a lower target would 
enable the same level of profitability, but out of necessity based on planning policy. WCC’s 
Head of Estates’70 report to Cabinet on 18 November 2008 suggests that this reduction in the 
number of residential units, alongside an overall decline in property values, undermined the 
overall profitability of the proposals, presumably on the basis of the reduced return that 
Thornfield would receive from the sale of those residential units.71 The ramifying effect of this 
change to the required elements was that Thornfield later sought other changes to the 
required elements to remove the entire affordable housing component of the proposed 
development to enable it to construct a sufficient quantum of units to be sold at ‘market’ 
value.  
My analysis of the changes to the required elements in the DA in this section has 
demonstrated that a document that purports to possess a ‘directive quality’ has, in practice, a 
significant capacity to change. This capacity to change exists even where the impetus for 
change comes from the tension between what a developer perceives to be a ‘workable’ 
development proposition and what the planning branch of a local authority deems to be 
acceptable.  
Moving through the conditional phase: site assembly and the making of a compulsory 
purchase order  
In this section, I consider how the grant of planning permission in February 2009 did 
not facilitate the start of construction in accordance with the proposals agreed between WCC’s 
planning officers and Thornfield’s directors but did function as an important symbol of 
progress at the CPO inquiry that followed. Earlier in this chapter, I referred to comments that 
D1 made to indicate that he would usually approach the discharge of conditions in a DA in 
sequence by first addressing the planning condition before then supporting a local authority in 
its making of a CPO to enable the discharge of a site assembly condition. This suggests that a 
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conditional phase might, for a developer, involve what Grabham has called ‘a sequential 
structuring of knowledge’72 as the developer gains understanding of its ability to put in place 
the conditions for the movement to unconditionality. But D1’s comments, coupled to the way 
that the Winchester DA positioned discharge of the planning condition first and the viability 
condition last but grouped the other conditions together in between, suggests that there is 
also a looping back and forth. This looping combines a step-by-step approach to discharge of 
the conditions with repeated movements from the present to the future, and vice versa, as 
actions in pursuit of discharge of one condition intersect with actions required to discharge 
other conditions, and both feed into and are fed by concerns about future viability.73 
I explored some of this movement back and forth in the previous section of this 
chapter when I discussed the planning permission granted to Thornfield in February 2009. The 
focus of my discussion shifts here to consider how discharge of the planning condition enabled 
movement towards discharge of the site assembly condition. The distinction between making 
a CPO, receiving confirmation of its validity, and the exercise of a confirmed order is worth 
reiterating here so that I can analyse the site assembly condition. It is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to explore the ‘technicalities’74 in detail, although some explanation of these rules and 
principles is essential to understand the way that a DA provides a form of contractual 
underpinning for the making, confirmation and exercise of a CPO.  
As I mentioned in chapter one, a local authority has the power to make a CPO to 
acquire land in its area if it can demonstrate both that doing so would ‘facilitate’ the 
‘development, redevelopment or improvement’ of that land75 and also that any such 
development, redevelopment or improvement ‘is likely’ to contribute social, economic or 
environmental benefits for the wider area.76 To exercise those powers, a local authority must 
make a CPO authorising the compulsory purchase of identified land interests and must submit 
that CPO to the Secretary of State appointed to confirm the justification for and validity of it.77 
If any of the individuals or organisations whose land is to be acquired make objections to the 
CPO, the Secretary of State will ‘cause a public inquiry to be held’ to enable the local authority 
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to justify the CPO, the objectors to challenge it and, following consideration of the evidence, to 
enable the Secretary of State to confirm it.78 
 Table 7.2 sets out some of the key events between the grant of planning permission 
and the conclusion of the Winchester CPO inquiry. 
Table 7.2 Timeline illustrating some of the key events between the grant of planning 
permission and the confirmation of the CPO 
Date Event 
09.02.2009 
WCC and Thornfield enter into section 106 agreement and planning permission 
granted 
Planning condition discharged 
October 2009 
WCC and Thornfield exchange letters changing Final Long Stop Date to 31 
December 2012 
09.12.2009 
Deed of variation enacting variations to DA approved by Cabinet on 18 
November 2008 
24.11.2010 Cabinet approves change to Final Long Stop Date to 31 August 2014 
10.12.2010 
Henderson becomes ‘the Developer’ in the DA, replaces Thornfield Properties 
plc as Guarantor and ‘standstill period’ of six months and 10 days commences 
18.11.2011 
WCC and Henderson enter into Compulsory Purchase Order Indemnity 
Agreement and WCC makes CPO (on 21.11.11) 
June – July 2012 
Public inquiry leads to confirmation of the CPO 
Site assembly condition discharged on conclusion of challenge period 
Discharge of the site assembly condition in the Winchester DA depended upon the 
confirmation of a CPO and, to that end, Thornfield could serve written notice on WCC 
requesting that WCC make a CPO.79 Following receipt of a request from Thornfield, WCC’s 
Cabinet approved the making of a CPO on 17 October 2007 subject to WCC and Thornfield first 
entering into a Compulsory Purchase Order Indemnity Agreement.80 The DA states that the 
purpose of the CPOIA was to set out the terms on which the developer would reimburse WCC 
for costs that the latter incurred in making, seeking confirmation of and exercising a CPO.81 
CON2 told me that a CPOIA is commonly utilised in a property-led development like that 
planned in Winchester to provide the local authority with the assurance that it would not incur 
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irrecoverable costs during the CPO process. A CPOIA was, therefore, a type of ‘plug-in’82 or 
enhancement to the DA that WCC and Thornfield anticipated at the time that they signed their 
DA.  
I have already made the point that not all the bolt-ons and plug-ins to the DA were a 
response to contingencies, accidents and unexpected events, and that WCC and Thornfield 
scripted a contractual relationship that was ‘continuously being made and remade.’83 But while 
WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors tried to deploy a CPOIA as a device designed to 
generate movement along the pre-agreed development trajectory, contingencies, accidents 
and unexpected events did disrupt that movement. For example, WCC’s Head of Estates had 
presented a ‘nearly legal’ form of the CPOIA to the Council’s Cabinet in November 2008, as 
justification for the extension of the Final Long Stop Date from December 2009 to December 
2012, which I discussed in chapter six.84 Thornfield then secured planning permission for the 
development on 9 February 200985 but did not enter into a ‘binding’ CPOIA with WCC, and 
WCC did not make a CPO, before Thornfield’s bank placed Thornfield’s parent company into 
administration in January 2010. A ‘legally binding’ version of the CPOIA did, eventually, play an 
important role in the making of the Winchester CPO because WCC and Henderson entered into 
a CPOIA on 18 November 201186 and WCC then made a CPO on 21 November 2011.87 In 
practice, therefore, Henderson’s directors simply adopted the scripted expectation that was 
written into the DA. Given that Henderson had entered into a ‘binding’ CPOIA, the DA obliged 
WCC to make a CPO,88 which the Council duly did.89  
Following the making of the Winchester CPO, WCC received 23 objections from 
owners, lessees and occupiers of land to be acquired.90 The Secretary of State for Communities 
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and Local Government appointed a Planning Inspector to adjudicate at a public inquiry 
scheduled to commence on 25 June 2012 and that sat for eight days.91 At the time that the 
inquiry commenced, there were seven remaining objectors and three remaining non-qualifying 
objectors.92 The Inspector’s report produced after the inquiry summarises the evidence that 
WCC provided to justify the making of the CPO, as well as the various grounds raised in 
objection to the making of the order.  
I do not consider either all evidence for justification of the CPO or all the grounds for 
objection in this thesis. However, one of the grounds presented for objection was that the 
Winchester DA was not a legitimate basis for the making of the CPO because the original 
contract award had not been made following an open market tendering process. I discussed 
many of the issues that arose in relation to the making of the DA in chapter six and revisit 
these legal points in chapter 10. At the conclusion of the inquiry, the Inspector appointed to 
adjudicate stated her opinion that the DA was ‘a lawful and valid document’ because WCC’s 
Cabinet decision to enter into the DA had neither been challenged nor overturned in legal 
proceedings at the time that the DA had been agreed or following any of the variations that 
had been made.93 The Secretary of State, in confirming the CPO, agreed that, while no 
competitive tender had taken place, the lack of any legal challenge to the original grant of the 
DA meant that none of the objectors had ‘established that it is not a legitimate document.’94  
Moving through the conditional phase: the confirmation of a compulsory purchase order 
The ‘Statement of Case’ that WCC submitted to the CPO inquiry setting out its 
justification for the making of the CPO included a redacted copy of the DA as one of a bundle 
of accompanying documents.95 The Statement pointed simply to the existence of the DA as an 
artefact96 and did not elaborate on the DA’s contents other than to state that the agreement 
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had ‘been put in place to enable the Development to proceed.’97 Steve Tilbury, the Council’s 
Corporate Director, elaborated slightly in evidence submitted to the inquiry in which he 
informed the Inspector that the existence of the DA demonstrated the closeness of the ties 
between WCC and Henderson, which was exemplified, he indicated, by the fact that ‘[t]o date, 
Henderson has fulfilled its obligations under the Development Agreement.’98 In practice, 
however, the extent of the obligations that the DA imposed on Henderson was limited. As I 
have already pointed out, until the Unconditional Date, the DA contained only a conditional 
obligation on the developer to commence construction of the development. Having replaced 
Thornfield as the developer, Henderson was therefore obliged to use its reasonable 
endeavours ‘to procure satisfaction’ of the conditions in the DA,99 to meet on a monthly basis 
with WCC’s officers to discuss progress on the discharge of conditions100 and to reimburse 
costs WCC incurred in instructing solicitors and consultants in connection with the 
development.101 Although these obligations were limited, WCC’s Corporate Director seems to 
have made this point to indicate the seamlessness of the transition from Thornfield to 
Henderson. 
WCC and Henderson also sought to emphasise the continuity between Thornfield and 
Henderson by pointing to the efforts that Henderson had been making to acquire land 
interests on the development site. Matthew Bodley, the chartered surveyor Henderson 
appointed to negotiate with affected landowners, informed the Inspector that these efforts 
had begun in 2011 following Henderson’s acquisition of Thornfield102 and had continued up to 
the commencement of the inquiry.103 It was important that Thornfield and Henderson had 
both tried, and failed, to acquire other landowners’ interests, including those of John De 
Stefano,104 because the Circular providing guidance on the making of a CPO that was applicable 
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at the time of the Winchester inquiry105 stated that making a CPO should be ‘a last resort in the 
event that attempts to acquire by agreement fail.’106 To support these land acquisition efforts, 
and to ensure that this aspect of the CPO guidance had been met, the Winchester DA 
contained a clause stating that ‘the developer shall use reasonable endeavours to negotiate’ 
with existing landowners throughout the conditional phase of the development process.107 
In practice, therefore, WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors, and then WCC’s 
officers and Henderson’s directors, had been pursuing the discharge of the site assembly 
condition from the date of the DA and throughout the conditional phase. As well as the 
episodes of correspondence between 1998 and 2002 that I discussed in chapter four, Michael 
Capocci, Thornfield’s managing director, and Nigel Wright, property director of De Stefano’s 
companies, exchanged correspondence between December 2005 and April 2006.108 Similar 
correspondence circulated between September 2007 and July 2008 between Jason Marcus, 
Thornfield’s Chairman, Riccardo Mai, Thornfield’s Project Director for Winchester, Karen 
Hawes, who had previously worked for Thornfield but was now a director working on behalf of 
one of De Stefano’s companies, and Rob Hobson, who had replaced Nigel Wright as property 
director of De Stefano’s companies.109 This correspondence is notable for the apparent 
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difference in intention between Capocci, Mai and Marcus and Wright, Hawes and Hobson. 
Throughout both episodes of correspondence, De Stefano’s directors sought to encourage 
Thornfield’s directors to allow De Stefano to develop his land as part of the overall 
development proposed for the site. On the other hand, Thornfield’s directors used the 
correspondence to invite De Stefano’s directors to re-open negotiations for the sale and 
purchase of De Stefano’s land. Similarly, Martin Perry, Henderson’s Director of Retail 
Development, took up these negotiations after Henderson succeeded Thornfield as developer, 
as evidenced in meetings and correspondence between Perry and John Strachan, a property 
development consultant acting on behalf of De Stefano, which began in June 2011 on the 
conclusion of the standstill period mentioned in chapter six.110 This correspondence continued 
until May 2012 in the form of telephone conversations between Matthew Bodley, Henderson’s 
consultant surveyor, and Karen Hawes.111 There is no record of any further correspondence 
after the commencement of the CPO inquiry.  
Throughout these episodes of correspondence, each side remained resolutely 
unwilling to countenance the other’s propositions but the correspondence presented an 
important paper record112 or material artefact,113 which could be placed before the Inspector 
at the inquiry, of attempts made to acquire various landholdings by agreement, including 
those held by De Stefano. WCC’s officers could thus argue that Henderson had been working 
towards the discharge of the site assembly condition and fulfilling their obligation to use 
reasonable endeavours to acquire land by agreement. 
But Steve Tilbury, WCC’s Corporate Director, did not just present the DA, and 
Henderson’s commitment to its obligations contained in the DA, as evidence of the closeness 
of the ties between WCC and Henderson. He also sought to present the DA both as a script for 
the movement from conditionality to unconditionality and as a guarantee that that movement 
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would take place. His evidence to the inquiry explained that the DA contained conditions that 
needed to be discharged before the commitment to commence construction took binding 
effect.114 He also informed the Inspector that the DA contained a planning condition that 
required the developer to obtain planning permission for the development. He noted, 
however, that WCC had already granted planning permission and that this meant that ‘[a]t the 
time of writing this evidence the Planning Condition has been satisfied,’115 demonstrating why 
developers and local authority officers might favour a sequential approach to the discharge of 
conditions. Similarly, Martin Perry, Henderson’s Director of Retail Development, giving 
evidence at the inquiry in support of the making of the CPO, informed the Inspector that the 
developer had carried out feasibility assessments indicating that the planning permission 
provided a sound basis for the development.116  
The Inspector therefore noted that, ‘with planning permission already in place, there 
are no [planning] impediments to the Scheme.’117 However, WCC also had to demonstrate that 
the development, redevelopment or improvement of the land would take place ‘within a 
reasonable time-scale.’118 This was, of course, the reason that the Winchester DA existed but 
that DA contained only a conditional obligation imposed on the developer to commence 
construction on the development site. WCC’s officers and Henderson’s directors needed, 
therefore, to demonstrate to the Inspector that, notwithstanding this conditionality, 
development would soon take place. This provides an illuminating insight into one of the ways 
that the DA ‘travelled’119 to some of the times and places at which progress on the 
development was discussed. The idea that a legal text can be a ‘materialized object’ that 
moves across various bureaucratic and technical networks120 is important for considering this. 
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Similarly important here are the ideas that an artefact can be used to enrol allies121 and that 
setting out the development trajectory in something that appears to be a ‘coherent, unified 
and persuasive legal text’122 enables that trajectory, by extension, to appear coherent, unified, 
persuasive and legally binding. 
WCC’s officers and Henderson’s directors and representatives all sought to 
demonstrate at the inquiry that the DA, notwithstanding its conditionality, plotted a trajectory 
to the development, redevelopment or improvement of the land. They also sought to 
demonstrate that the DA, notwithstanding its conditionality, made it likely that that 
development, redevelopment or improvement would actually happen because WCC and 
Henderson were following that trajectory. For that reason, Steve Tilbury, WCC’s Corporate 
Director, presented evidence to the inquiry stating not only that the planning permission 
provided a sound basis for the proposed development but that the planning condition, as a 
first step towards reaching unconditionality, had been discharged. He explained that, following 
discharge of that planning condition, the ‘Council has no reason to believe that any of the 
remaining conditions cannot be satisfied.’123 He did not, however, mention that Thornfield had 
obtained that planning permission over two years after the Planning Long Stop Date in the DA 
had passed. Instead, he presented the planning permission as evidence of progress in the 
discharge of conditions in the DA. 
This way of enacting the DA is akin to the concept of modularity that Star discusses.124 
But this is a selective performance of breaking down the DA into some of its constituent parts, 
demonstrating how those parts have worked and then reconstituting the DA as a single 
working ‘unit’125 or ‘something that closely resembles an organised whole.’126 The statement 
that Tilbury, WCC’s Corporate Director, made regarding discharge of the planning condition, 
coupled to similar statements that Martin Perry, Henderson’s Director of Retail Development, 
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made to the inquiry, presented a justification for WCC’s contention that the other conditions 
were ‘nearly discharged,’ that the DA was ‘nearly unconditional’ and that development, 
redevelopment and improvement would soon follow the confirmation of the CPO. These 
actions bring to mind Johns’ discussion of the manner in which the parties to a public-private 
infrastructure project present their project as founded on a type of ‘autonomous logic.’127 
Tilbury and Perry achieved this performance by reducing the complexity and 
indeterminacy of a conditional DA ‘to a few well-defined parameters.’128 For example, and as I 
have already stated, the DA contained an ‘overriding’ viability condition but Tilbury explained 
that, at the time that he submitted his evidence, ‘the scheme is viable […] and can meet the 
requirements set out in the Development Agreement.’129 Similarly, Perry informed the inquiry 
that: 
Henderson has demonstrated to WCC that the scheme as consented would 
currently be capable of satisfying the viability measure stipulated within the 
development agreement of 10% profit on cost.130 
These statements presented the discharge of the viability condition as something run-of-the-
mill and as a mere matter of routine following site assembly. But despite these ostensibly 
optimistic statements, it is notable that Perry, Henderson’s Director of Retail Development, 
caveated his statement by pointing out that this positive assessment only applied ‘currently.’ 
This left open the possibility that Henderson might later produce a further assessment that 
might not contain a similarly positive outlook. In fact, Henderson’s directors exploited this 
possibility to seek further changes to the required elements in the DA after the CPO inquiry 
had concluded, although these changes form part of the subject matter to be analysed in 
chapters eight and nine. 
Crafting a DA as a conditional agreement can, therefore, be seen to have advantages 
to a developer and a local authority alongside holding back a commitment to construct a 
particular type of development. By producing a DA that required a sequential approach to the 
discharge of conditions, WCC’s officers could present satisfaction of the planning condition as 
evidence that WCC and Henderson were on course to discharge the other conditions. This 
means that the DA contained within it a mechanism for perpetuating its own usefulness 
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because discharge of the planning condition functioned to demonstrate the coherence of the 
DA as a whole. According to the arguments that WCC’s officers and Henderson’s directors 
presented at the inquiry, given that the planning condition had been discharged, discharge of 
the other conditions would inevitably follow, as long as landownership issues could be 
resolved. They needed to be able to demonstrate that no planning impediments existed to the 
proposals131 but, by incorporating this pre-requisite into the DA as a planning condition, they 
reframed that pre-requisite as a basis from which to generate a symbolic gesture pointing 
towards the imminent commencement of construction. 
Lining things up or making things up: site assembly and discharging conditions 
In this final section, I consider other ways in which WCC’s officers and Henderson’s 
directors presented the discharge of conditions in the DA as run-of-the-mill, and challenge 
aspects of this performance. In the previous section of this chapter, I explained how these 
people connected to the DA presented discharge of the planning condition as a precursor that 
would lead to discharge of the other conditions as soon as the CPO had been confirmed. 
Alongside professing confidence in the viability of the development proposals, Martin Perry, 
Henderson’s Director of Retail Development, indicated that the Unconditional Date would 
occur in the month following confirmation of the CPO.132 He also informed the inquiry that one 
of the conditions requiring discharge was ‘the pre-letting condition’ and presented discharge 
of that condition as a matter of routine. The pre-letting condition stated that the DA would 
remain conditional until the developer had granted a sufficient quantity of agreements for 
lease with prospective tenants133 to provide what D1 called ‘a platform for a viable scheme.’ 
The metaphor that D1 invoked shows that this is another example of staging. I have already 
noted the double meaning of the term, ‘stage,’ and D1’s comment suggests that some 
developers think of a pre-letting condition as a stage on which they can perform the other 
actions required to bring a property-led development to completion.  
The DA that WCC presented to the Winchester CPO inquiry did not reveal the quantity 
of ‘pre-lettings’ needed to discharge the pre-letting condition because the figure had been 
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redacted. During my fieldwork, I asked D1 and CON5 why this information would have been 
redacted from a published DA. They explained that a developer might insist that a local 
authority concealed this information in a published DA to avoid revealing the minimum level of 
pre-lettings that the developer had requested because doing so might enable rival developers 
to undercut them and other local authorities with whom they might undertake developments 
to hold the developer to a bargain that they had struck elsewhere. 
If this guarded approach mattered to Henderson in advance of the inquiry, it appears 
not to have mattered during the inquiry, however. Perry, Henderson’s Director of Retail 
Development, informed the inquiry that discharge of the condition would be achieved through 
pre-lets amounting to ‘not less than 70% of total agreed yearly rents of ground and first floor 
retail units.’134 This means that Henderson’s directors, or retail consultants that the directors 
appointed,135 would have carried out a valuation to assess the income that they would receive 
if that retail space was let to tenants. By calculating 70% of that anticipated income, they 
would have reached the figure that would be the threshold beyond which the condition had 
been discharged. But while Perry informed the inquiry that this 70% figure represented the 
pre-lettings threshold for unconditionality, he also pointed out that he would require only 
‘35% of retail space (by value) to be pre-let’ before commencing with construction and that he 
was ‘confident that [this figure] could be achieved’ to enable construction to start ‘once land 
interests are assembled.’136 This statement suggests that Henderson’s directors were prepared 
to make a significant concession on the amount of pre-lets required before the DA became 
unconditional.  
This statement is, however, a device that ‘stands in’ for the messiness137 of the range 
of interactions needed to secure this number of pre-lettings. For example, D4 pointed out that 
most retailers reach their own conclusion about the commercial prospects of an area, with 
consequence that achieving a pre-letting target is not entirely within the developer’s control. 
This means that the extent of the concession that Perry purported to be offering by accepting 
a lower pre-lettings threshold was limited. Moreover, some of my interviewees also indicated 
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that the presentation of a pre-letting condition as ‘nearly discharged’ should provide an 
Inspector and a local authority with limited confidence that unconditionality was imminent. 
CON3 expressed this most clearly when he told me: 
[M]ost of the conditions are actually matters that the developer raises to hold 
back their commitment until they’re ready. […] So, the 40 per cent, which is quite 
common, pre-leasing rule [PAUSE]. At any point, the developer can say, “Well, I 
know I’ve only got 32 per cent but let’s start.” Or, he wants to hold that because 
he knows he could achieve 40 per cent on Thursday but he holds at 38 per cent 
and says, “Well, there’s no point concluding that last one because if I do that, my 
condition will be satisfied.” So, it is entirely a way for development companies to 
control and regulate the timetable. Because they are like a juggler. They have to 
get all these things up in the air and really come down precisely at the right time. 
This emphasis on ‘control’138 has been an underlying theme of this thesis. CON3’s statement 
suggests that, rather than lining up the discharge of conditions, a developer can line up 
conditions in a DA as a means to hold back unconditionality until the moment that the 
developer deems to be ‘precisely […] the right time.’ In doing so, CON3’s portrayal of a 
developer as a ‘juggler’ indicates a belief that a developer must be a skilled performer who is 
unusually adept at coordinating the movement of different entities. CON4 made a similar point 
when he told me that, in a development in which he was acting as the developer’s agent, 
‘actually, the analogy is that we are the conductors of an orchestra and we have to make sure 
that each part of the orchestra comes in at the right time.’ As he observed, ‘if the conductor 
said, “No, I’m having a breather,” it would be a bit disastrous.’  
The images deployed here are intriguing. Most jugglers and conductors perform in 
public but practise in private. There is a juxtaposition in the work of a developer, though, 
between public displays of juggling or conducting, as seen in Martin Perry’s evidence to the 
CPO inquiry, and the ‘backroom,’139 private meetings and email exchanges where the 
negotiations between a developer and individual retailers take place. The comments that 
CON3 and CON4 made also, indirectly, invoke the ‘image of projectness’ that Law has 
discussed.140 This is the idea that technological development projects work best if they are 
performed as a sequence of linked actions that are closely controlled and carefully managed 
from behind-the-scenes. According to CON3, the way that a pre-letting condition affords a 
developer ‘control’ and the ability to ‘regulate the timetable’ is desirable because it is the 
developer that is best placed to assess ‘the right time’ for development to begin.  
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D1 also argued that a ‘pre-lettings threshold’ can be a ‘platform for a viable scheme’ 
but that the way a developer puts that platform in place depends on that developer’s 
priorities: 
If you’re keen to get on site, you might waive some of the key conditions. You 
might think that you can’t get to the leasing threshold, the leasing percentage 
that you want. And invariably, the council will have a leasing percentage at our 
behest because we don’t want to be forced into a situation where we’re starting 
at a level below our target. But equally, if you waive it and get to a point where 
you think the market is just not working for us at the moment, we’ll crack on and 
try to let it later, then that’s fine. […] But, if we’re not comfortable, it’s a pre-
condition, which means we might never get on site. So it’s a fundamental 
condition, but it’s one in our control. 
As well as discussing ‘control,’ D1 focuses here on the ‘comfort’ that a pre-lettings condition 
grants a developer. This suggests that he is perhaps more concerned about convincing himself 
of his capacity to control events. His focus is on the extent to which he can choose whether or 
not the pre-lettings condition is something to be disavowed or treated as fundamental.  
These observations point to vulnerability but also reveal the lop-sidedness inherent to 
many DAs. At the inquiry into the making of the Winchester CPO, Martin Perry, Henderson’s 
Director of Retail Development, informed the Inspector that he would waive the 70% pre-
lettings threshold in the DA and commence construction if 35% of the retail space had been 
pre-let.141 But, objectors to the making of the CPO pointed out the extent of the ‘control’ that 
this type of condition grants to a developer. The Inspector’s report summarises part of the 
evidence of Bruce Hartley-Raven, who was a planning consultant John De Stefano had used in 
relation to his Winchester landholdings since 2003.142 Hartley-Raven submitted evidence on 
behalf of De Stefano in opposition to the making of the order in which he stated: 
Pre-letting conditions are also required to be met in the DA which put the start of 
the development entirely within the control of the developer. The consequence of 
all these conditions is that the DA is really no more than an option agreement. 
There can be no certainty that [Henderson] will proceed.143 
What is remarkable about this statement is that it uses language reminiscent of that 
CON2 and D1 deployed to set out the virtues of a pre-letting condition. CON2 summed 
this up most succinctly when he told me that a pre-letting condition is:  
A protection. It’s one of those things that makes a development agreement a bit 
of an option, really. It’s just an additional form of protection to hide behind if 
things go badly wrong.  
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From his point-of-view, it was important that developers who ‘have been frightened by 
what happened in the recession’ have that ‘protection’ so that they can avoid getting 
dragged into binding commitments before they are certain that they will achieve their 
profitability targets. 
CON2’s comments highlighted a need for ‘protection’ that mirrored D1’s desire for 
‘comfort,’ which I mentioned earlier in this section. In chapter eight, I note that a developer 
can use a local authority’s fear of losing a development opportunity as a technology of 
power144 deployed to extract concessions from local authority officers. Here, D1 and CON2 
were talking about a different type of fear but were, nonetheless, also deploying fear as a 
means to obtain control over property-led development processes. My research shows that 
developers and consultants both make the same observations about the purpose of a pre-
letting condition. This type of condition appears to be acknowledged as a way for a developer 
to gain control ‘of the timetable.’  
One way of balancing this apparent lop-sidedness might be to require a developer to 
have in place a certain quantum of pre-lets before the local authority is required to make a 
CPO. But even then, CON2 pointed out, a pre-lettings condition would provide an ‘illusory’ 
guarantee because ‘most retailers won’t sign up to something four years in advance.’ CON4 
made the same point when he told me that ‘[y]ou may get some [retailers] to commit but even 
these have walk away options if the thing isn’t delivered on time.’ Moreover, he pointed out 
that, even if a local authority has obtained confirmation for its CPO at an inquiry, ‘you can get 
everything in a row’ but ‘if you lose all your pre-lets, you’re back to square one.’  
The evidence submitted by WCC’s officers and Henderson’s directors and 
representatives to the CPO inquiry did not take account of these issues but was founded on 
two assumptions. They invited the Inspector to conclude, first, that discharge of the remaining 
conditions in the DA was a matter of routine and, second, that, with the appropriate inputs at 
the appropriate times, the DA would generate a successful development. This assumption was 
used to legitimise the making of the CPO because WCC and Henderson could assert that, once 
unconditionality had occurred, construction of the development would take place. And WCC 
and Henderson supported that assertion by suggesting that achieving unconditionality was a 
matter of routine that would follow closely after the confirmation of the CPO. 
At the conclusion of the CPO proceedings, the Inspector recommended that the 
Secretary of State should confirm the CPO,145 observing that ‘[p]lanning permission has been 
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secured and the DA, together with the Section 106 Planning obligations accompanying the 
permission, will ensure the comprehensive development of the Order Land.’146 The Secretary 
of State then confirmed the CPO on 20 March 2013.147 The presentation of the Winchester DA 
as a nearly unconditional instrument for the development, redevelopment and improvement 
of the land to be acquired in the Winchester CPO had enabled WCC’s Corporate Director and 
Henderson’s Director of Retail Development to act ‘as if’ the DA guaranteed that development, 
redevelopment and improvement would take place.148 The content of the conditions in the DA 
that were discussed in the inquiry invited this impression by suggesting that, while the DA 
contained various parts, with the inputs that WCC and Henderson promised to make, these 
parts would fit neatly together into a coherent whole that would enable construction to 
commence. What was not acknowledged at the inquiry was that the DA remained what CON3 
called a ‘hugely conditional’ document that allowed the developer to control the movement to 
unconditionality. Similarly, there was no acknowledgement that resolving landownership 
issues does not lead automatically to the commencement of construction. Instead, what this 
case study demonstrates is that a local authority must make and seek confirmation of a CPO 
on the basis that doing so might incentivise a developer to commit to construction of a 
development. Chapter eight considers how useful this incentive was for WCC. 
Conclusion 
My analysis of the Winchester Development in this chapter has developed some of the 
themes that have underpinned my analysis throughout this thesis by asking what happens 
during the conditional phase of a property-led development process. I examined the planning 
permission and the CPO made for the purpose of this development, explored how the 
Winchester DA plotted the movement from conditionality to unconditionality and investigated 
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the extent to which components of the DA imposed rules that governed that movement. My 
analysis here has enabled me to scrutinise the ‘required elements’ written into that DA that 
purported to stipulate the minimum specifications for the Winchester Development. I revealed 
how these became the site of contestations between Thornfield’s directors and different 
branches of WCC. Moreover, these changes to the DA provide an important insight into the 
way that two contracting parties might attempt to preserve the internal cohesiveness of a DA. 
WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors did this by agreeing changes that enabled the grant 
of a planning permission that in turn made possible the discharge of the planning condition. 
However, they did this while attempting to accommodate planning policy requirements and 
Thornfield’s profitability expectations. The consequent changes to the DA did not entail a 
series of bolt-ons similar to those that I described in chapter six but necessitated the rewriting 
of parts of it. I demonstrated how WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors sought to preserve 
the continuity of aspects of their original agreement while severing those aspects that would 
prevent the grant of a planning permission suitable for discharge of the planning condition. 
These insights set the scene for chapter eight, in which I investigate if this rewriting resolved 
stresses locked-in to the DA or created new tensions that disrupted the discharge of other 
conditions. 
Having explored the rewriting of the DA, I then pointed out how WCC’s officers and 
Thornfield’s directors exploited the text of the DA to obtain shelter from the possibility of 
termination by postponing the Planning Long Stop Date. They did this after Thornfield’s 
application for planning permission by delaying their entry into the section 106 agreement that 
would trigger the grant of planning permission. Doing so meant that they gained extra time to 
make further adjustments to the DA and for amendments to Thornfield’s application for 
planning permission as they sought to balance the need to have a planning permission in place 
with the need for that planning permission to provide a basis for a profitable development. 
This is an important finding because it demonstrates how the text of the DA contained the 
potential for this scripted pause and that WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors took up that 
opportunity when it was advantageous to them to do so. Their actions to postpone the 
Planning Long Stop Date further undermines any sense of the effectiveness of a Long Stop 
Date to generate specific actions within a strict timeframe. Rather, the existence of a Planning 
Long Stop Date can be seen to have incentivised creative use of provisions in the DA to 
preserve a developer’s preferred development trajectory. 
The lop-sidedness that this discussion highlighted has been a significant theme of this 
chapter that also emerged in my discussion of the making and confirmation of the CPO that 
would discharge the site assembly condition. A consideration of the making and confirmation 
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of the CPO led me to analyse the way in which Henderson’s directors took forward the work 
that Thornfield’s directors had invested towards discharge of the planning condition, and I 
explored continuities between the time before the change of developer and the time after. I 
showed how WCC’s Corporate Director and Henderson’s Director of Retail Development 
presented the DA at the inquiry as a script for commencement of construction and as a 
guarantee that construction would soon commence notwithstanding the conditionality of the 
DA. Rather than providing any sort of guarantee of the inevitability of the commencement of 
construction, however, I revealed that the conditions in a DA shelter a developer from any sort 
of commitment to construct. While Henderson retained the benefit of the shelter that the 
Winchester DA afforded, I showed that WCC needed to make and confirm a CPO while hoping 
that discharge of the other conditions might follow. In chapter eight, I investigate the 





An instinct to extend and to amend: rewriting a Development Agreement 
In this chapter, I continue to analyse the discharge of conditions in the Winchester 
Development Agreement.1 By investigating the Winchester DA, I have explained how 
Winchester City Council,2 Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited3 and, following the 
administration of Thornfield’s parent company, Henderson UK Property Fund4 strove to make 
the DA unconditional. I draw again here on my interviews with developers, local authority 
officers, councillors and property development consultants5 and continue my analysis of the 
Winchester Development to consider how WCC and Henderson addressed the ongoing 
conditionality of the DA.6 I also analyse the extent to which they treated the DA as a script 
containing ‘invariant principles’7 that governed the movement towards the ‘Unconditional 
Date.’8 
In this chapter, I revisit the Compulsory Purchase Order9 that WCC made on 21 
November 201110 to enable discharge of the site assembly condition and consider the ongoing 
                                                          
1 Throughout this thesis I have been abbreviating this term to ‘DA.’ I continue to do so in this chapter. 
2 Throughout this thesis I have been referring to Winchester City Council as ‘WCC.’ I continue to do so in 
this chapter. 
3 Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited was a special purpose company set up by Thornfield 
Properties plc to enter into a DA with WCC and carry out the Winchester Development. Thornfield 
Properties (Winchester) Limited was, therefore, ‘the developer’ for the purposes of the Winchester DA. I 
have referred to Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited throughout this thesis as ‘Thornfield’ and 
continue to do so in this chapter. After Thornfield Properties plc was placed into receivership, 
Henderson UK Property Fund acquired Thornfield and changed the name of the company to Silverhill 
Winchester No 1 Limited.  
4 As I noted in chapter six, after Thornfield Properties plc was placed into administration Henderson UK 
Property Fund became the guarantor of ‘the developer’s’ obligations in the DA. The developer in the DA 
became a wholly owned subsidiary of Henderson UK Property Fund. For the sake of brevity, I refer to 
the developer after Thornfield Properties plc’s administration as ‘Henderson.’ Where it is necessary to 
distinguish between the Henderson entity acting as developer and the Henderson entity acting as 
guarantor, I make the distinction clear. 
5 I discuss interviews with D1, D4, COU1, CON2 and CON3. Appendix D contains some limited 
biographical details explaining who these interviewees are and when I met them. 
6 For a summary of the conditions in the Winchester DA, please see Table 6.2. Alongside the viability 
condition, the developer needed to discharge the planning, road closure, site survey, pre-letting, 
funding and affordable housing conditions. WCC needed to discharge the title, land appropriation and 
site assembly conditions. 
7 David Scott, Omens of adversity: tragedy, time, memory, justice (Duke University Press 2014), 64. 
8 In chapter six, I demonstrated that the DA anticipated an ‘Unconditional Date’ that would mark the 
moment at which the developer’s conditional obligation to commence construction converted into an 
unconditional duty. 
9 Throughout this thesis I have been abbreviating the term ‘Compulsory Purchase Order’ to ‘CPO.’ I 
continue to do so in this chapter. 
10 For confirmation that WCC made the CPO on 21 November 2011, please see Winchester City Council, 
The Winchester City Council (Silver Hill) Compulsory Purchase Order 2011. Statement of Case. 22 March 




negotiations between WCC’s officers, Henderson’s directors and John De Stefano11 to enable 
the acquisition of the latter’s land interests on the Winchester Development site. Having done 
so, I point out that, while WCC’s officers and Henderson’s directors were negotiating with De 
Stefano, Henderson’s directors were also seeking to reopen negotiations with the Council in 
order to rewrite the ‘required elements’12 set out in the DA. Analysing the rewriting of the 
required elements leads me to scrutinise the tension between continuity and change during 
the Winchester Development and in the Winchester DA.  
I will ask if Henderson’s directors, following confirmation of the CPO, approached the 
DA selectively, looking for elements of the DA to preserve and for parts of the DA to cast aside. 
Much of my analysis in this thesis has considered the way in which local authorities and 
developers present the discharge of conditions in a DA as a sequence of irreversible ratchets13 
or acts of cumulative tightening14 as the parties move through a conditional phase and settle 
on a development proposition that they deem to be workable. In thinking through the 
selectiveness Henderson’s directors exhibited, the basis for it and the implications of it, I 
reconsider the impression of property-led development as a linear process involving 
progression from the vagueness of conditionality through a series of events that solidify an 
overarching development trajectory. 
Conceptualising the discharge of conditions as a process that operates through 
ratcheting suggests a sequence of actions that cannot be undone. In chapter seven, I explained 
that WCC and Henderson told the Inspector appointed to adjudicate at the Winchester CPO 
inquiry that the planning permission granted on 9 February 200915 discharged the planning 
condition contained in the DA.16 I show that presenting the planning condition as discharged 
                                                          
11 John De Stefano owned a group of companies that held interests on the earmarked Winchester 
Development site. In chapters four and five, I discussed negotiations between Thornfield and De Stefano 
in which Thornfield sought to acquire De Stefano’s land as a precursor to entering into a DA with WCC. 
In chapter seven, I explained that Henderson had carried these negotiations forward after it replaced 
Thornfield as developer, and that De Stefano’s land formed a significant component of the land to be 
acquired through the exercise of WCC’s CPO. 
12 The DA listed the required elements in clause 5.3. These constituted the baseline specifications, 
agreed between WCC and Thornfield when they entered into the DA, for such things as the retail floor-
space, the number of residential units, the number of parking spaces and the other built components of 
the development, including a new bus station. 
13 Bruno Latour, We have never been modern (Harvard University Press 1993), 72. 
14 Richard Harper, Inside the IMF: an ethnography of documents, technology, and organisational action 
(Routledge 1998), 258-9. 
15 Winchester City Council, Grant of Planning Permission. Case: 06/01901/FUL (Appendix B, Document 
2.07). 
16 Steve Tilbury, The Winchester City Council (Silver Hill) Compulsory Purchase Order 2011. Proof of 
Evidence of Steve Tilbury, Corporate Director, Winchester City Council. 30 May 2012 (Appendix B, 




did not, however, create an ‘irreversible situation’17 because Henderson sought changes to the 
required elements in the DA and a replacement for the planning permission granted in 
February 2009. I explain what those changes were and ask how WCC’s officers justified them. 
Doing so leads me to scrutinise the implications that those changes had for the provision of 
affordable housing and the construction of a bus station as part of the Winchester 
Development. 
Discharging the site assembly condition: circulating drafts and extending Long Stop Dates  
Table 8.1 sets out the key events between confirmation of the CPO and the approval of 
a new planning permission for the Winchester Development. The Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government confirmed the Winchester CPO on 20 March 2013,18 but 
WCC and Henderson did not complete the land assembly process immediately. Most notably, 
WCC’s officers and Henderson’s directors began a new stage of negotiations with John De 
Stefano, following confirmation of the CPO, for the transfer of the latter’s landholdings.19 The 
three parties agreed terms for the transfer in early November 2013, and WCC’s Cabinet and 
Council20 respectively approved those terms on 4 and 6 November 2013.21 No public record22 
of the negotiations between WCC, Henderson or De Stefano is available in Council documents. 
Subsequent records explain, however, that WCC’s officers, Henderson’s directors and De 
Stefano finalised the transfer on 30 January 201423 for a price of £5million.24 The acquisition of 
                                                          
17 Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France (Harvard University Press 1988), 50. 
18 Department of Communities and Local Government and Department for Transport, The Winchester 
City Council (Silver Hill) Compulsory Purchase Order 2011 - Confirmation Letter (20 March 2013) 
(Appendix B, Document 3.04). 
19 Appendix C to this thesis contains a plan illustrating the site of the Winchester Development and 
highlighting De Stefano’s land. (See Claer Lloyd-Jones, A Perfect Storm - Report on Silver Hill (Appendix B, 
Document 2.08), Appendix 4, 5). 
20 In chapter one, I explained the relationship between councillors and local authority officers and, in 
WCC, the relationship between the Council’s Cabinet, the Full Council and committees such as the 
Overview and Scrutiny Committee. 
21 London & Henley (Middle Brook Street) Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government [2013] EWHC 4207 (Admin) at [8].  
22 The minutes of the Cabinet or the Council meetings on 4 and 6 November 2013 stated that some 
discussions related to the sale and purchase agreement took place in private proceedings. As discussed 
in Winchester City Council, Minutes of the special meeting of the Cabinet held on 4 November 2013 
(Appendix B, Document 1.29); Winchester City Council, Minutes of the meeting of the Council held on 6 
November 2013 (Appendix B, Document 1.30). 
23 As stated in clause 1.1 of the Supplemental Deed to the DA between Winchester City Council, Silverhill 
Winchester No 1 Limited and Henderson UK Property Fund. 
24 Winchester City Council, CAB2695. Silver Hill Update - Submission by Developer. Report of Silver Hill 
Project Team. 21 May 2015 (Appendix B, Document 1.52), paragraph 6.3. This price differs markedly 
from that which Thornfield had agreed as the basis for an option agreement to buy De Stefano’s land in 
2002. Correspondence in 2002 suggests that the parties were discussing a purchase price of between 
£13m and £14.25m, depending on the extent of the land to be acquired (see Matthew Bodley, Proof of 
Evidence of Matthew Bodley. Appendix 10. Extracts of correspondence relating to London and Henley 




De Stefano’s land still meant that WCC and Henderson had not completed assembly of the 
development site because there were other land interests identified in the CPO that remained 
to be acquired.25 Nonetheless, and as I will show, the parties to the Winchester Development 
presented the acquisition of De Stefano’s land as a ‘monumental one-off event’26 in the 
overarching development trajectory. 
Table 8.1 Timeline illustrating some of the key events following confirmation of the CPO  
Date Event 
04.11.13 
Negotiations between WCC’s officers, Henderson’s directors and John De Stefano lead to 
acquisition of De Stefano’s land and decision to move the Final Long Stop Date to 1 June 
2015 
30.01.14 
Supplemental deed to the Winchester DA incorporating De Stefano’s land into the DA and 
amending provisions in the Compulsory Purchase Order Indemnity Agreement 
10.07.14 
Cabinet considers revisions to the DA to allow for an increase in retail floor-space, 
removal of a bus station from the ‘required elements’ and replacement with a new 
‘anchor’ store, substitution of financial payment for on-site affordable housing and a 
reduction in residential units 
16.07.14 
Full Council resolution on provision of affordable housing recommends Cabinet reconsider 
removal of affordable housing component 
06.08.14 Cabinet resolution to approve revisions to DA considered on 10.07.14 
11.12.14 
Planning Development Control Committee grant planning permission for increase in retail 
floor-space, removal of bus station, substitution of financial payment for on-site 
affordable housing and a reduction in residential units  
In chapters four to seven, I demonstrated that De Stefano’s opposition to the 
development process, and the way that the DA assumed the acquisition of De Stefano’s land, 
was a ‘locked-in stress.’ Following the acquisition of De Stefano’s land, the leader of WCC, 
Councillor Keith Wood, informed the local press that the transaction was ‘a very significant 
milestone’ that would enable construction to commence the following year.27 Martin Perry, 
Henderson’s Director of Retail Development, was similarly enthused and also told the local 
press that ‘the deal’ represented ‘a significant milestone […], opening the way for 
                                                          
Properties plc) to John Summers, John Summers & Co Solicitors (on behalf of John De Stefano) (28 May 
2002) (Appendix B, Document 3.10.09)). That agreed price had induced WCC to agree ‘in principle’ to 
make a CPO to acquire De Stefano’s land and other interests on the site. 
25 For a description of the land to be acquired, consider Winchester City Council, The Winchester City 
Council (Silver Hill) Compulsory Purchase Order 2011. Statement of Case. 22 March 2012 (Appendix B, 
Document 3.02), paragraph 4. 
26 Emily Grabham, 'Governing Permanence: Trans Subjects, Time, and the Gender Recognition Act' 
(2010) 19 Social & Legal Studies 107, 110. 





development to commence.’28 These statements reinforced the impression of a relentlessly 
forward-facing temporal orientation29 and suggested that the script for development that the 
DA purported to carry around30 remained the basis for a workable development proposition.  
The way WCC’s leader and Henderson’s director referred to the passing of milestones 
implied both that the acquisition process had been a merely transitory phase31 along the 
development trajectory and that purchase of De Stefano’s land marked how far WCC and 
Henderson had travelled along the development trajectory. WCC’s leader and Henderson’s 
director both thus expressed a belief that the De Stefano land acquisition was the latest in a 
series of actions that would preclude backward steps in the progression of the development 
process. The rhetoric deployed here is consistent with other comments made throughout the 
Winchester Development. I have already explained why the metaphor of a ratchet32 is a rich 
way of thinking through the ways that local authority officers, councillors and private sector 
development directors seek to instil a sense of irreversible progression.33 The comments that I 
have quoted convey the impression both that the development process had moved a stage 
further and, although that movement may have been slower than hoped, that the preceding 
stage of the development had been closed. 
It is important to note, however, that the statements that Wood and Perry made also 
emphasised that WCC and Henderson still needed to do more to enable construction to 
commence. Their point seems to have been that the acquisition was an endpoint, in that it 
marked the closure of the protracted negotiations that Thornfield had begun with De Stefano 
in 1998. The ‘temporal gridlock’34 caused by De Stefano’s refusal to part with his land interests 
had been eased by the confirmation that his land interests had been acquired. But while this 
meant that the negotiations with De Stefano could now be classed as a transitory, passing 
phase,35 both Wood and Perry had sought to emphasise that this was a milestone. This shows 
                                                          
28 ibid. 
29 Emily Grabham, Brewing Legal Times: Things, Form, and the Enactment of Law (University of Toronto 
Press 2016), 168; Mariana Valverde, 'Studying the governance of crime and security: Space, time and 
jurisdiction' (2014) 14 Criminology & Criminal Justice 379, 386. 
30 Emilie Cloatre, Pills for the poorest: an exploration of TRIPS and access to medication in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Palgrave 2013), 181. 
31 Nick Lee and Steven D Brown, 'The Disposal of Fear: Childhood, Trauma and Complexity' in John Law 
and Annemarie Mol (eds), Complexities: social studies of knowledge practices (Duke University Press 
2002), 263. 
32 Latour, We have never been modern, 71-2. 
33 Carol J. Greenhouse, A moment's notice: time politics across cultures (Cornell University Press 1996). 
34 Annelise Riles, '[Deadlines]: Removing the Brackets on Politics in Bureaucratic and Anthropological 
Analysis' in Annelise Riles (ed), Documents: artifacts of modern knowledge (University of Michigan Press 
2006), 82. 




that they recognised that the development process was not complete and is a metaphor that 
suggested there was a distance that remains to be travelled.36 Rather than suggesting a 
physical distance, however, these statements implied a temporal distance. There was no 
suggestion that construction would commence on a specific date in accordance with specific 
plans so this distancing was important because, while WCC’s officers and Henderson’s 
directors could show that they were en-route to creating a viable development proposition, 
they were careful to retain some room to manoeuvre even as they approached 
unconditionality and the commencement of construction.  
Maintaining the unity of the DA  
One of the actions to be addressed before the commencement of construction 
involved a ‘technicality.’37 As I have already indicated, the DA was a device that was carrying 
around a significant investment of time and money, as well as a mechanism for the exercise of 
the CPO and the transfer of the development site to Henderson. Following the negotiations 
between WCC’s officers, Henderson’s directors and De Stefano it was WCC, not Henderson, 
that had acquired De Stefano’s land.38 For that reason, having acquired De Stefano’s land, WCC 
and Henderson needed to incorporate De Stefano’s land into the DA. Incorporating De 
Stefano’s land into the DA did not effect the transfer of the land from WCC to Henderson but it 
was a way of enclosing that land into the neatly assembled package that would later be 
granted to Henderson in a long leasehold of the development site.39 In chapter six, I discussed 
the alluring internal cohesiveness of the way that the DA laid out a sequence of actions that 
would carry WCC and the developer to unconditionality. A similarly alluring internal 
cohesiveness also came from the way in which the DA packaged together the land interests 
that would form the development site. Combining De Stefano’s land with other interests that 
WCC already held on the development site was also another way of lining things up for the 
                                                          
36 As discussed by Bakhtin in his rendering of the ‘chronotope of the road’ (See Mikhail M. Bakhtin, The 
dialogic imagination: four essays (University of Texas Press, 1981), 243). 
37 Annelise Riles, 'A new agenda for the cultural study of law: Taking on the technicalities' (2005) 53 
Buffalo Law Review 973. 
38 See Winchester City Council, CAB2700. Silver Hill - Submissions by Silverhill Winchester No 1 Ltd and 
Council's Response. Report of Silver Hill Project Team. 13 July 2015 (Appendix B, Document 1.55), 
paragraph 16.1; Winchester City Council, CAB2603. Silver Hill Regeneration. Report of the Silver Hill 
Officers Project Team. 7 July 2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.37), paragraph 6.2. 
39 As I noted in chapter one, this a standard property-led development mechanism, as discussed, for 
example, by Layard (Antonia Layard, 'Shopping in the Public Realm: A Law of Place' (2010) 37 Journal of 




Unconditional Date and the commencement of construction. It was thus a ‘means to an end’40 
that produced no material change in ownership but that warrants further investigation.  
In chapter four, I described how, between entering into its Exclusivity Agreement with 
WCC and the date of the DA, Thornfield had ‘concluded terms’ for the purchase of a property 
on the development site called Coitbury House.41 The terms for this acquisition had envisaged 
that Thornfield would acquire the freehold title42 before transferring that title to the Council 
‘at cost’ on the assumption that WCC would create a development site by combining that title 
with the land it already owned and the land that it would acquire through exercising a CPO. 
Following the exercise of the CPO and the commencement of construction, WCC would grant 
Thornfield a long leasehold out of the assembled development site.43 Based on these 
assumptions, Thornfield had duly transferred the freehold title to Coitbury House to WCC 
before entering into the DA.44 WCC and Thornfield then included the freehold title to Coitbury 
House as part of ‘the Council’s land’ for the purposes of the DA.45 
By contrast, WCC and Henderson incorporated De Stefano’s land into the DA through 
bolting on a supplemental deed.46 I have already discussed the DA as a document that needed 
to be rewritten, adapted and reconstituted on the basis of relations that were ‘continuously 
being made and remade.’47 Prior to the acquisition of the De Stefano land and the 
incorporation of that land into the DA, WCC and Thornfield had bolted letters and collateral 
agreements on to the DA to extend the ‘Final Long Stop Date’ and prevent termination rights 
arising, and had rewritten the required elements to enable Thornfield to obtain a planning 
permission and move towards unconditionality. The supplemental deed that WCC and 
                                                          
40 Annelise Riles, Collateral knowledge: legal reasoning in the global financial markets (University of 
Chicago Press 2011), 68. 
41 Winchester City Council, Appendix to CAB1030. Broadway Friarsgate - Development Agreement. 
Report of Chief Estates Officer. 8 February 2005 (Appendix B, Document 1.12), paragraph 11. This 
property is marked on the plan in Appendix C. 
42 ibid, paragraph 11. 
43 ibid, paragraph 15. 
44 As recorded at the Land Registry under title number HP654264, a copy of which I purchased and 
downloaded on 25 March 2017 at 11:18.59. 
45 As stated in schedule 1 of the DA. 
46 Entered into on 30 January 2014, the same date that WCC and De Stefano entered into their sale and 
purchase agreement. 
47 Nicholas Blomley, 'Disentangling Law: The Practice of Bracketing' (2014) 10 Annual Review of Law and 
Social Science 133, 142 discusses contractual relations that are constantly in flux. In relation to rewriting 
the DA as the parties became more aware of what they were trying to express, I drew on ideas 
discussed in Michel Callon, 'Writing and (Re)writing Devices as Tools for Managing Complexity' in John 
Law and Annemarie Mol (eds), Complexities: social studies of knowledge practices (Duke University Press 
2002). Latour’s ideas of ‘plug-ins’ have helped my analysis of adjustments and adaptations to the DA (as 
discussed in Bruno Latour, Reassembling the social: an introduction to actor-network-theory (Oxford 




Henderson used to incorporate De Stefano’s land into the DA was another bolt-on intended to 
function as part of the ‘summing up’48 of the interactions required to produce a ‘coherent, 
unified and persuasive legal text’49 with clear instructions about what WCC and Henderson 
were going to do with the development site.  
The mechanism contained in the DA for the grant of a long leasehold interest in the 
development site thus necessitated the purchase of De Stefano’s land by WCC rather than 
Henderson. WCC has subsequently published a redacted copy of the supplemental deed that it 
bolted-on to the DA, which stated that Henderson would pay WCC an amount equivalent to 
the purchase price for De Stefano’s land on the Unconditional Date.50 To fund the acquisition 
of De Stefano’s land, WCC had borrowed the amount equivalent to the purchase price and had 
funded the costs of that borrowing from its ‘useable reserves.’51 When the Council later 
discussed termination of the DA, the consequent non-recovery of the amount paid to De 
Stefano, the ongoing costs of the borrowing and the additional estate management costs of 
the land that it had acquired were all factors that officers pointed out as weighing against any 
decision to terminate.52 
The ‘technicalities’53 for incorporating De Stefano’s land into the DA were a means of 
consolidating disparate land interests into a neat package to be transferred to the developer as 
the process moved forward. But, as I have just pointed out, this assumed that the process 
would move forward. Consequently, at the same time as solving one problem, this land 
transfer mechanism stored up problems and locked-in stresses that WCC would have to 
resolve when the development process unravelled. I analyse this unravelling in more detail in 
chapter 10.  
  
                                                          
48 Bruno Latour, 'On recalling ANT' in John Law and John Hassard (eds), Actor network theory and after 
(Blackwell 1999), 17. 
49 Jonathan Murdoch, Simone Abram and Terry Marsden, 'Modalities of Planning: A Reflection on the 
Persuasive Powers of the Development Plan' (1999) 70 The Town Planning Review 191, 195. 
50 As stated in clause 4.8 of the supplemental deed. Appendix A explains how I obtained a copy of this 
supplemental deed. 
51 Winchester City Council, CAB2695. Silver Hill Update - Submission by Developer. Report of Silver Hill 
Project Team. 21 May 2015 (Appendix B, Document 1.52), paragraph 6.3. 
52 Winchester City Council, CAB2700. Silver Hill - Submissions by Silverhill Winchester No 1 Ltd and 
Council's Response. Report of Silver Hill Project Team. 13 July 2015 (Appendix B, Document 1.55), 
Appendix 7 (Risk Management Table). I revisit these points in chapter 10. 
53 Annelise Riles, 'Introduction: in response' in Annelise Riles (ed), Documents: artifacts of modern 




An instinct to extend: Henderson and a new Long Stop Date 
Following confirmation of the CPO on 20 March 2013, WCC established a cross party 
group of councillors called the ‘Silver Hill Informal Policy Group.’54 The members of the Policy 
Group represented a small cross-section of the councillors elected to the Full Council. At the 
time of the first Policy Group meeting, WCC was a Conservative-controlled Council and three 
Conservative Cabinet members participated.55 Alongside these Cabinet members in the Policy 
Group were a Labour councillor56 and a Liberal Democrat councillor.57 The final councillor was 
Councillor Kim Gottlieb, a Conservative Councillor elected in May 2011.58 Councillor Gottlieb 
was a member of the Council’s Overview and Scrutiny Committee but not a member of the 
Cabinet.59 The Policy Group met on a monthly basis to ‘discuss key issues arising from the 
development’ and ‘to advise Cabinet and other Members on the progress of the Scheme,’ with 
the caveat that the group was ‘not a decision-making body.’60 Although these meetings took 
place in private, WCC has since published various ‘notes’ summarising proceedings.61  
WCC’s Corporate Director attended the first meeting of the Policy Group and informed 
the councillors present that: 
                                                          
54 Hereafter referred to as ‘the Policy Group.’ 
55 These councillors were Councillor Keith Wood (Leader of the Council), Councillor Robert Humby 
(Deputy Leader and Portfolio Holder for Strategic Planning & Economic Development) and Councillor 
Stephen Godfrey (Portfolio Holder for Finance & Administration). For a list of the Cabinet members 
portfolios as of April 2013, see Winchester City Council, Minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 
10 April 2013 (Appendix B, Document 1.25). 
56 Councillor Chris Pines, chairman of WCC’s Overview and Scrutiny Committee (see Winchester City 
Council, Minutes of the meeting of the Overview and Scrutiny Committee held on 18 March 2013 
(Appendix B, Document 1.24)). 
57 Councillor Kelsie Learney, also a member of the Overview and Scrutiny Committee (See, ibid). 
58 The Elections Centre, 'Winchester City Council. Election Results. 1973-2012' 
<http://www.electionscentre.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Winchester-1973-2012.pdf> 
accessed 31 July 2017, 17. Councillor Gottlieb will be an important figure in the remaining parts of this 
thesis. As well as serving as a councillor for the majority group in WCC, he was a ‘leading member of the 
Winchester Deserves Better campaign,’ a group set up to oppose the WCC-Henderson development 
trajectory (as discussed in as discussed in R (Gottlieb) v Winchester City Council [2015] EWHC 231 
(Admin), [2015] ACD 74 at [3]). In addition to serving as a WCC councillor, Councillor Gottlieb worked as 
a property developer (see Winchester City Council, OS104. Silver Hill Development Proposal. Report of 
Cllr Kim Gottlieb. 7 July 2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.36), 2). 
59 Winchester City Council, Minutes of the meeting of the Overview and Scrutiny Committee held on 18 
March 2013 (Appendix B, Document 1.24). 
60 Winchester City Council, Note of Silver Hill Members Informal Policy Group held on 12 April 2013 
(Appendix B, Document 1.26). Emphasis in original. This emphasis is important because WCC officers and 
Cabinet members sought to preserve the function of the Cabinet as the principal decision-making body 
in WCC. 
61 I have been unable to ascertain why WCC published these notes, and I have not found notes for all the 
meetings of the Policy Group. I located some of those notes by typing the name of the Policy Group and 




There will be some changes required to the approved scheme, some necessitated 
by change outside of Henderson’s control and others which Henderson feels will 
enhance the development.62 
At a subsequent meeting of the Policy Group, Henderson’s directors attended to pitch 
proposals addressing ‘issues’ related to the provision of affordable housing, the incorporation 
of a bus station into the development, and the amount and layout of the proposed retail 
space.63 None of the notes of these meetings explained the ‘issues’ or why ‘change outside 
Henderson’s control’ necessitated alterations, although I will analyse Henderson’s justifications 
for change later in this chapter. In doing so, I will also consider how WCC’s officers and senior 
councillors translated these justifications into a form that they deemed appropriate for 
presentation to the Council’s Cabinet. 
Henderson’s directors explained to the Policy Group that the alterations proposed to 
the required elements would also necessitate a new planning permission for the 
development.64 A new planning permission would mean an unravelling of the planning 
permission that had formed the basis for discharge of the planning condition in the DA. To 
provide the time for both negotiations with officers regarding the variations to the DA and the 
application for planning permission, Henderson’s directors asked WCC to agree to extend the 
Final Long Stop Date in the DA from 31 August 2014 to 1 June 2015.65 In this thesis, I have 
already analysed the function of Long Stop Dates in the Winchester DA and have shown that 
they offered a form of scheduling, setting out the dates on which termination rights might 
arise in the event of the failure to discharge conditions in the DA.66 WCC and Thornfield initially 
set the Final Long Stop Date to fall on 22 December 2009.67 To avoid the Final Long Stop Date 
triggering termination rights, first WCC and Thornfield and then WCC and Henderson bolted 
extensions onto the DA moving the Final Long Stop Date to 31 December 2012 and then to 31 
August 2014. I have already sought to challenge any presumption that Long Stop Dates form 
the basis for a strict programme of action and Henderson’s request for a further extension to 
the Final Long Stop Date further demonstrates this.  
                                                          
62 Winchester City Council, Note of Silver Hill Members Informal Policy Group held on 12 April 2013 
(Appendix B, Document 1.26). This legal advice forms part of the subject matter discussed in chapter 
nine. 
63 Winchester City Council, Note of Silver Hill Members Informal Policy Group held on 9 July 2013 
(Appendix B, Document 1.27). Henderson’s directors in attendance included Michael Capocci, who was 
formerly a director acting on behalf of Thornfield in relation to the Winchester Development. 
64 ibid. 
65 Winchester City Council, Note of Silver Hill Members Informal Policy Group held on 24 October 2013 
(Appendix B, Document 1.28). 
66 As stated in schedule 2, paragraph 15.2 of the DA. 
67 As stated in clause 1.1.50 of the DA. 
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This third proposed extension to the Final Long Stop Date also illustrates another 
important underlying theme to the Winchester Development. WCC’s officers presented 
Henderson’s request for a further extension to the development process as a desirable means 
through which Henderson’s directors could improve the development proposition. By contrast, 
WCC’s officers classed any ‘delay’ that might appear to be the fault of the Council as 
something that would inevitably undermine the development. This difference in attitude can 
be seen in relation to the extension to the Final Long Stop Date discussed here because the 
note of the Policy Group meeting on 24 October 2013 recorded that the councillors present 
‘felt that [extending the Final Long Stop Date] is necessary in order to […] show good faith to 
Hendersons [sic] as the Council’s development partners.’68 As a result, and at the same time as 
incorporating De Stefano’s land into the DA, WCC and Henderson bolted on this further 
extension.69 The new Final Long Stop Date came with the proviso that Henderson needed to 
submit formal proposals for variations to the required elements in the DA to the Council for 
‘landlord approval’ by 14 June 2014.70 This proviso may have functioned as a concession from 
Henderson’s directors to WCC to demonstrate willingness to proceed with finalising its 
intentions but it also imposed an obligation on WCC promptly to determine whether or not to 
approve the proposed variations. While WCC’s officers and councillors might have had to wait 
for Henderson’s new proposals, these officers and councillors were under time pressure to 
ensure that Henderson’s directors did not have to wait for ‘landlord approval.’ 
WCC’s instinct ‘to show good faith’ is one of the ‘repeated patterns of behaviour’71 
running through the Winchester Development that afforded both Thornfield and Henderson a 
significant degree of flexibility in the way that they implemented the proposals set out in the 
DA. COU1 expressed a similar instinct when he told me that he felt that, as a senior cabinet 
                                                          
68 Winchester City Council, Note of Silver Hill Members Informal Policy Group held on 24 October 2013 
(Appendix B, Document 1.28). 
69 I cannot find, however, a published record of this extension in any WCC documents prior to the 
minutes of a Cabinet meeting that took place on 18 March 2015 (see Winchester City Council, Minutes 
of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 18 March 2015 (Appendix B, Document 1.47), item 6). The earliest 
confirmation that I can find stating that WCC and Henderson changed the long stop date is in Lang J’s 
judgment in the judicial review that followed a subsequent variation to the DA later in 2014 (as 
discussed in R (Gottlieb) v Winchester City Council n58 at [109]). It is unusual that WCC did not announce 
this extension because officers had sought approval for the prior extensions in public Cabinet meetings. 
For approval of the extension of the long stop date from 22 December 2009 to 31 December 2012, see 
Winchester City Council, Minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 18 November 2008 (Appendix B, 
Document 1.19), item 17. For approval of the extension of the long stop date from 31 December 2012 to 
31 August 2014, see Winchester City Council, Minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 24 
November 2010 (Appendix B, Document 1.22), item 3. 
70 Winchester City Council, Note of Silver Hill Members Informal Policy Group held on 5 February 2014 
(Appendix B, Document 1.31), item 4. 




member, his role in discussions with a developer was to demonstrate that his council would 
support a developer’s needs. He recalled a development that his council had promoted but on 
which the council’s development partner had sought significant changes to the development 
proposal while the DA for that development remained conditional. Despite the extent of those 
changes, he explained that the developer had a ‘track record of delivering when they’ve 
moved forward on schemes so we, kind of, have felt it was worth exploring if we could make it 
work with them.’ These points suggest that some local authorities assume a developer will 
only ‘move forward’ if a local authority can be accommodating towards a developer’s 
demands.  
The actions that WCC’s officers took to accommodate Henderson’s demands, and the 
comments that COU1 made, are also indicative of the lop-sidedness of local authorities’ 
relations with the business world of developers. This lop-sidedness seems to be a product of 
some developers’ successful use of local authorities’ fear that a developer will go elsewhere. 
This is a use of fear as a technology of power72 and COU1 spoke to this fear when he 
emphasised that his role was to ensure his development partners that he and his colleagues 
were committed to accommodating variations to a DA that the developer requested. When 
discussing a recently completed property-led development project in his area, he recalled 
Cabinet meetings where he would be required to impress upon councillors the ‘direction of 
travel’ for alterations to the DA. In meetings with developers, by contrast, he would seek to 
assure the council’s development partner that it would not face ‘blockages’ in the journey 
from a conditional DA to a DA made unconditional on the developer’s terms: 
You know, businesses want certainty. So they don’t want to know that they’re 
going to do all these great things with officers or whatever and then come to a 
blockage politically. So it’s important that I’m there to say, “This is something that 
the city is backing.” You know, “We are absolutely determined that the scheme 
will happen,” you know. And this is our, kind of, attitude to business, to 
investment. 
These points suggest that COU1 was aware of both the way he performed73 and the way that 
he was expected to perform in discussions with officers and developers. He also suggested 
that he approached these meetings with a pre-prepared script to enable him to deliver a 
sufficiently compelling illustration of his council’s development credentials. The perception of 
a need to project a particular ‘attitude to business [and] to investment’ has been an underlying 
theme of this thesis and produces the type of deferential outlook in which WCC’s Cabinet 
members and officers appear not to have questioned Henderson’s proposed variations but 
willingly embraced them. 
                                                          
72 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Penguin 1991), 215. 
73 Judith Butler, Gender trouble: feminism and the subversion of identity (Routledge 1990). 
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D4 provided an interesting insight into his relationship with senior local authority 
officers when he told me: 
If there’s an issue with how [a development] is going, you need to be able to talk 
to a Chief Executive and say, “Look, you want this development agreement sorting 
out. We’ve got an issue with a third party,” [PAUSE] or something. It’s then all 
about the Chief Executive getting all the ducks in a row at the local authority end. 
His point, like COU1’s, was that senior officers or senior members of a council’s cabinet should 
be configuring processes within the local authority to ensure that the developer was able to 
use a DA in a way that satisfied its demands. D1 spoke to a similar expectation when he 
commented that: 
I’ve found that the most successful development partnerships have been where 
[the local authority] has got a strong Chief Executive who cuts through the morass 
of red tape and everything else. Someone who’s generally “can do.” 
My research has suggested that local authority cabinet members and officers are aware of this 
need to be seen to be ‘can do.’ For WCC, this manifested in a desire to accommodate 
Henderson’s requests and in a fear of being seen to be obstructive rather than ‘can do.’  
In discussing large-scale infrastructure projects involving public bodies and private 
companies, Johns has talked about the ‘deal-oriented configuration’ that generates ‘sources of 
momentum […], trajectories for change and paths for negotiation.’74 This configuration 
materialised in the Winchester Development in an assumption that momentum came from 
proposals that the developer made to change the nature of the ‘deal.’ Developer-led change 
was deemed desirable while Council-led change was undesirable. WCC’s officers and 
Henderson’s directors had begun negotiating changes to the required elements in the DA as 
soon as the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government confirmed the CPO.75 
Henderson had then started ‘pre-planning’ discussions with planning officers before the 
acquisition of De Stefano’s land.76 Extending the Final Long Stop Date in the DA gave 
Henderson extra time to seek approval from WCC’s Cabinet for the rewriting of parts of the DA 
and to prepare an application for the replacement of the existing planning permission for the 
development.77 Henderson’s new proposals envisaged, among other things, an increase in 
retail floor-space from 90,000 sq ft to 148,000 sq ft, the removal of the requirement for a new 
bus station and its replacement with a single retail unit with floor-space of 60,000 sq ft, a 
                                                          
74 Fleur Johns, 'Financing as Governance' (2011) 31 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 391, 398. 
75 Winchester City Council, Note of Silver Hill Members Informal Policy Group held on 12 April 2013 
(Appendix B, Document 1.26). 
76 Winchester City Council, Note of Silver Hill Members Informal Policy Group held on 24 October 2013 
(Appendix B, Document 1.28), item 5. 
77 As discussed in Winchester City Council, Note of Silver Hill Members Informal Policy Group held on 5 




reduction in the number of residential units from 287 to 184 and the removal of the 
requirement for either the on-site or off-site provision of affordable housing, or a financial 
contribution equivalent to the cost of that affordable housing.78  
After a brief public exhibition,79 Camerson Fraser, a Henderson director, submitted 
proposals to Howard Bone, WCC’s Head of Legal and Democratic Services, for approval.80 
WCC’s officers then arranged for a quick succession of meetings of the Overview and Scrutiny 
Committee, Cabinet and the Full Council to enable consideration of the variations by 
councillors. At a meeting of the Overview and Scrutiny Committee, on 7 July 2014, at which 
councillors discussed the proposals and considered a report that Councillor Gottlieb presented 
criticising the Council’s negotiating stance with Henderson,81 the committee members agreed 
eleven points regarding Henderson’s proposals that it suggested that the Cabinet should 
debate.82 When the Cabinet met three days later, its members nonetheless voted to approve 
Henderson’s proposals for the development, albeit that the members agreed that the officers 
should not finalise the necessary variations until the Full Council had expressed its support.83 
Although the Full Council, on 16 July, passed a motion asking the Cabinet to reconsider its 
decision to accept Henderson’s proposals with relation to affordable housing,84 on 6 August 
2014, Cabinet affirmed its earlier decision to approve Henderson’s proposed variations, on the 
basis that the changes were necessary if the DA was to become unconditional.85  
This decision involved a turning away from many of the components that had been 
assembled in the DA that WCC had originally agreed with Thornfield. I have already discussed 
                                                          
78 Winchester City Council, CAB2603. Silver Hill Regeneration. Report of the Silver Hill Officers Project 
Team. 7 July 2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.37), paragraph 2.4. 
79 ibid, paragraph 1.7. 
80 Winchester City Council, CAB2603. Appendix 1. Letter from Cameron Fraser to Howard Bone (12 June 
2014) (Appendix B, Document 1.34). 
81 Winchester City Council, OS104. Silver Hill Development Proposal. Report of Cllr Kim Gottlieb. 7 July 
2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.36). I will discuss Councillor Gottlieb’s criticisms in more detail in chapter 
nine. He also criticised the proposals for the Winchester Development based on what he deemed to be a 
lack of architectural merit (see Winchester City Council, Minutes of the special meeting of the Cabinet 
held on 6 August 2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.40), 7; Winchester City Council, Minutes of the meeting 
of the Planning Committee held on 11 December 2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.43A), 5.). 
82 Winchester City Council, Minutes of the meeting of the Overview and Scrutiny Committee held on 7 
July 2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.35), 13-4. These points ranged from concerns that the development 
should ‘integrate’ with the ‘existing town centre’ to concerns that WCC had not maximised its proposed 
share in any profits accruing from the development. 
83 Winchester City Council, Minutes of the special meeting of the Cabinet held on 10 July 2014 (Appendix 
B, Document 1.38), 15. 
84 Winchester City Council, Minutes of the meeting of the Council held on 16 July 2014 (Appendix B, 
Document 1.39), 8. 
85 Winchester City Council, Minutes of the special meeting of the Cabinet held on 6 August 2014 
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how Latour’s portrayal of the ‘modern’ sense of progress assumes that, ‘as we advance in 
time, each stage outstrips the preceding one.’86 To enable the confirmation of the CPO, 
Henderson’s directors had deployed the DA negotiated between WCC’s officers and 
Thornfield’s directors. The purchase of De Stefano’s land meant that this stage of the 
Winchester Development had then been closed, although this was merely another in a series 
of ‘means to an end.’87 After De Stefano’s land interests had been secured, Henderson’s 
directors presented the existing required elements as relics of a previous stage of the 
development and ‘enrolled’88 WCC’s officers and Cabinet members as advocates for change. 
An instinct to amend: affordable housing or an affordable development 
In this section, I analyse how Henderson’s directors convinced WCC’s officers and 
Cabinet members to treat changes to the ‘required elements’ in the DA as an example of 
advancement and a necessary stripping away of outdated ideas. Henderson’s directors did so 
by presenting the existing required elements as a potential obstacle to unconditionality. The 
linear structure of the DA and the way it scripted transition from conditionality to 
unconditionality made flattening this obstacle a compelling reason for rewriting the required 
elements. That script envisaged that the obligation to commence construction would become 
‘fully unconditional’ on the date that ‘the last’ condition in the DA had been satisfied or 
waived.89 The viability condition was scheduled to be the last condition to be discharged, and 
will be considered in more detail in chapter nine.90 The DA permitted Henderson to waive the 
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87 Riles, Collateral knowledge: legal reasoning in the global financial markets, 68. 
88 Michel Callon, 'Some elements of a sociology of translation - domestication of the scallops and the 
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89 As stated in Schedule 2, paragraph 3.2 of the DA. 




title,91 site survey,92 pre-letting93 and road closure94 conditions but did not permit waiver of the 
funding and affordable housing conditions, which are the focus of my analysis in this section.  
A brief recap on the relationship between the conditions in the DA and the ‘required 
elements’ in the DA is necessary here. The conditions in the DA were the matters that WCC’s 
officers and Thornfield’s directors had initially agreed needed to be in place before both 
unconditionality and the moment that the developer’s obligation to commence construction 
would take effect. The required elements in the DA had also been agreed by WCC’s officers 
and Thornfield’s directors when the parties had negotiated the DA. These required elements 
referred to the baseline specifications of the development that would be built if the DA 
became unconditional and were the matters on which Henderson’s directors had secured 
Cabinet approval.  
Discharge of the funding condition in the DA would occur on the entry by the 
developer into ‘a legally binding agreement’ with a financial institution in which that institution 
agreed to fund acquisition of the land interests and the costs of construction.95 To be ‘legally 
binding,’ the funding agreement required a commitment from the funder to the developer 
that would be enforceable if the funder failed to provide the agreed capital. At the CPO 
inquiry, Martin Perry, Henderson’s Director of Retail Development had informed the Inspector 
that, to discharge the funding condition, Henderson would ‘assemble a specific funding 
package’ from one of the ‘multiple alternative funding sources’ available to it.96 Based on this 
                                                          
91 Schedule 2, paragraph 2.4 of the DA is partially redacted but stated that unconditionality was subject 
to the Council ‘deducing good and marketable title’ to the land that it owned or had acquired on the 
development site and demonstrating that nothing in that title precluded the grant of a lease of the 
development site to the developer. 
92 Schedule 2, paragraph 2.5 of the DA stated that unconditionality would not occur until the developer 
had obtained ‘satisfactory’ geotechnical, environmental, flooding and archaeological surveys of the site 
(clause 1.1.22 of the DA set out the list of surveys relevant to the condition). The DA contained minimal 
guidance as to the meaning of the term, ‘satisfactory.’ However, I assume that, among other things, 
unsatisfactory geotechnical, environmental and flooding surveys would present findings that might 
prevent the developer obtaining insurance for the completed development or selling the completed 
development. An unsatisfactory archaeological survey might present findings indicating that the 
development potential of the site was reduced by the discovery of items of historic significance. 
93 I discussed the pre-letting condition in detail in chapter seven. In summary, schedule 2, paragraph 2.6 
of the DA stated that unconditionality was subject to the developer entering into agreements for lease 
with prospective retail tenants to cover 70% of the retail floor-space (the percentage figure was 
redacted in the published version of the DA but disclosed in Martin Robert Perry, Proof of Evidence. 
Appendices. Silverhill, Winchester. 6 June 2012 (Appendix B, Document 3.07), 24). 
94 Schedule 2, paragraph 2.2 of the DA set out the road closure condition, which required a ‘road closure 
order’ enabling any stopping up or temporary closure of highways on the development site required as 
part of the construction process. 
95 As stated in schedule 2, paragraph 2.7 of the DA. 
96 Martin Robert Perry, Proof of Evidence. Silverhill, Winchester. 6 June 2012 (Appendix B, Document 




evidence, the Inspector expressed her confidence that Henderson would be able to fund the 
full costs of development and recommended confirmation of the CPO.97  
While Henderson utilised the availability of funding as an instrument to move the 
Inspector towards confirmation of the CPO, Henderson’s directors later also deployed a lack of 
finance as a ‘generative mechanism.’98 Following confirmation of the CPO, WCC’s officers 
informed the Council’s Cabinet that Henderson had identified a prospective but unnamed 
‘project funder.’99 However, Henderson’s directors also informed officers that this funder felt 
that the existing required elements neither equated to a proposition that satisfied ‘the 
requirements of the market’100 nor would produce ‘an adequate return on capital 
employed.’101 Without changes to the required elements, WCC’s officers informed the Cabinet, 
the development would ‘not go ahead.’102  
Labelling the unnamed bank, pension fund or insurance company that was interested 
in financing the development as simply ‘the project funder’ effected a kind of distancing that 
suggested that the ‘funder’ was operating according to rules that councillors, officers and the 
people of Winchester could not understand. This played to a perception of private finance as 
ubiquitous but unanchored and able to make demands that had scant regard for pre-existing 
commitments between WCC and Henderson.103 For Henderson’s purposes, this was part of the 
pitch advocating a re-writing of the DA that would release it from an undesirable development 
proposition. The suggestion that changes to the required elements were necessary to satisfy 
this nameless, absent funder provided a screen onto which Henderson’s director could project 
their vision for the Winchester Development. For WCC’s officers, on the other hand, the 
demands of an unknown and unknowable funder offered a way to absolve themselves of 
responsibility for the changes. The officers thus advocated a turning away from the same 
proposals that Henderson, at the CPO inquiry, had professed to support. Underlying this was 
an entirely market-driven logic and an assumption that, if a set of proposals could be shown to 
produce a sub-optimal rate of return, those proposals were unacceptable and carried the 
potential only for delay and inaction. The presence of the funding condition compelled WCC’s 
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officers to advocate market-driven changes to the required elements because construction 
could not commence without a funding agreement in place.  
The affordable housing condition similarly meant that construction could not 
commence unless the developer had entered into a ‘legally binding agreement’ with a housing 
association for the sale and management of the affordable housing to be constructed on or 
off-site.104 Unlike the funding and other conditions in the DA, however, the affordable housing 
condition was linked directly to the affordable housing required element. WCC’s officers thus 
promoted changes to the required elements in the DA and sought to bypass the affordable 
housing condition entirely.  
I have already pointed out that Thornfield’s proposals for the development, as set out 
in the existing required elements, initially envisaged that 35% of the residential units to be 
constructed would be so-called affordable housing.105 In November 2008, WCC’s Head of 
Estates had reported to Cabinet that the originally proposed level of affordable housing 
rendered the whole scheme ‘unviable.’106 As a result, WCC’s Cabinet had approved successive 
variations to the DA, first allowing the developer to construct the same quantity of affordable 
housing off-site and then allowing the developer to make a financial contribution to off-site 
construction of affordable housing instead of itself constructing affordable housing.107 These 
Thornfield-led rewritings of the DA had gradually cut away the affordable housing required 
element but Henderson had carried forward the reduced requirement when it took on the DA.  
At the CPO inquiry, representatives of both WCC and Henderson had argued that the 
pre-existing required elements, including the requirement to construct on or off-site 
affordable housing or to finance off-site construction of affordable housing, formed the basis 
for a viable development.108 Using the acronym, ‘HPF,’ to refer to Henderson, Martin Perry, 
Henderson’s Director of Retail Development, had stated that the proposals incorporating the 
existing required elements were ‘viable to HPF at the current time and [have] been since it 
                                                          
104 As stated in schedule 2, paragraph 2.8 of the DA. The DA refers to the ‘Social Housing Condition.’ I 
refer to the ‘affordable housing condition’ to make it easier to follow the discussion in Council meetings 
and documents that referred to ‘affordable housing.’ 
105 See clause 5.3.1.2 of the DA. 
106 Winchester City Council, CAB1739. Silver Hill Winchester - Compulsory Purchase Order. Report of 
Head of Estates. 18 November 2008 (Appendix B, Document 1.20), paragraph 3.4. 
107 Winchester City Council, Minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 18 November 2008 (Appendix 
B, Document 1.19), item 17, resolution 5. 
108 Perry, Proof of Evidence. Silverhill, Winchester. 6 June 2012 (Appendix B, Document 3.06), paragraph 
14.1; Tilbury, The Winchester City Council (Silver Hill) Compulsory Purchase Order 2011. Proof of 
Evidence of Steve Tilbury, Corporate Director, Winchester City Council. 30 May 2012 (Appendix B, 




decided to take up the development opportunity.’109 During the inquiry, objectors to the CPO 
challenged these claims and argued that the existing required elements did not form the basis 
for a ‘viable’ scheme and would be changed immediately after confirmation.110 To rebut these 
assertions, Perry sought to legitimise his company’s viability assessments by placing its 
deliberations within the context of standard property-led development practice and by 
pointing out that ‘leading expert consultants’ had affirmed the accuracy of Henderson’s 
calculations.111 Invoking the input of a ‘leading expert’ suggested that Henderson and its 
advisers were dependable and consistent.112 As an extension of that logic, Perry sought also to 
assure the Inspector that Henderson’s positivity towards the existing required elements meant 
that it could be relied upon to commence construction in a timely and predictable manner.113 
The Inspector noted this evidence and recognised that, while there was ‘some 
uncertainty over the amount of affordable housing that will be delivered’ through on-site 
construction, Henderson was nonetheless committed to a financial contribution in lieu of 
construction.114 She concluded, moreover, that ‘there was no reason to doubt the developer’s 
ability […] to proceed with the Scheme for which the CPO is sought.’115 After confirmation of 
the CPO, however, and as I have stated above, Henderson sought not only to remove the 
requirement for on or off-site construction of affordable housing but also to remove the 
requirement to make a financial contribution to the construction of off-site affordable housing. 
This was the logical conclusion of the continual cutting away of the affordable housing 
component and reflected an ongoing trend in property-led development practice in which 
developers seek first to reduce and then to remove any obligation to construct or fund the 
construction of affordable housing.116 For Henderson, moreover, this constituted not only a 
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turning away from the Thornfield proposals for the Winchester Development but also a 
turning away from the evidence that its own Director of Retail Development gave at the CPO 
inquiry. My research has already suggested that commencement of construction on land to be 
acquired through a CPO is not inevitable so long as a DA remains conditional. The 
manoeuvrings around the provision of affordable housing as a required element of the 
Winchester Development also show that there can be good reason to doubt a developer’s self-
professed ability to construct a particular set of buildings.  
At the Cabinet and Full Council meetings on 10 July and 6 August 2014, WCC’s officers 
received criticism from members of the public for recommending removal of the affordable 
housing required element.117 The solution that Henderson’s directors and WCC’s officers 
proposed to address this public opposition was an attempt to ‘bracket’ that controversy.118 
They agreed that, instead of either constructing on or off-site affordable housing or 
contributing to the construction of off-site affordable housing, Henderson would make a one-
off payment to the Council of an unstated amount if the built development achieved certain 
unspecified profitability levels.119 This payment would not be a required element in the DA but 
a matter to be negotiated with WCC’s planning officers as a component of a new section 106 
agreement.120 A decision on the amount of the payment and the profitability level that would 
trigger it was, therefore, postponed until WCC’s planning officers and Henderson’s 
representatives began discussions for a new planning permission after the varied required 
elements had been approved.121 This meant moving the controversy to a different meeting on 
a different date, potentially giving the controversy time to cool.122 Meanwhile, Henderson’s 
directors could strip away any reference to affordable housing in the DA so that Henderson 
would no longer be tied either to the affordable housing required element or the affordable 
housing condition. The rationale behind this change was that the affordable housing required 
element rendered the Winchester Development unviable, with the effect that unconditionality 
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2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.40), 4-6. 
118 Riles, '[Deadlines]: Removing the Brackets on Politics in Bureaucratic and Anthropological Analysis'. 
119 Winchester City Council, Minutes of the special meeting of the Cabinet held on 6 August 2014 
(Appendix B, Document 1.40), item 6, resolution 1(ii). 
120 Winchester City Council, CAB2603. Silver Hill Regeneration. Report of the Silver Hill Officers Project 
Team. 7 July 2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.37), paragraph 5.6. 
121 As discussed in Winchester City Council, PDC1012 - Item 1 - Section 73 Application - 14/01912/FUL. 
11 December 2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.44), paragraphs 20.1-20.42. 
122 Kyle McGee, Bruno Latour: the normativity of networks (Routledge 2014), 180. See also Annemarie 
Mol, The body multiple: ontology in medical practice (Duke University Press 2002), 165, on the 




would not occur and construction would not go ahead if Henderson had remained tethered to 
that requirement.  
Bus stations or retail: finding strong anchors 
WCC’s officers agreed to remove the affordable housing component from the 
Winchester Development because of viability concerns. I examine viability modelling 
techniques in more detail in chapter nine but first consider other changes to the required 
elements in the DA that Henderson’s directors sought after WCC acquired John De Stefano’s 
land. Alongside removing the affordable housing as a required element in the DA, Henderson’s 
directors sought also to remove the requirement for a new bus station from the DA.123 In 
recommending that the Cabinet approved this proposal, WCC’s officers informed the Cabinet 
that Stagecoach (South) Limited,124 the bus operating company managing the existing bus 
station on the site, had indicated that it did ‘not want a direct replacement of its bus station 
facility.’125 When WCC’s officers presented Henderson’s proposals for discussion, one of the 
officers informed the councillors about a letter from Stagecoach to Henderson reputedly 
stating that on-street bus stops instead of an off-street bus station would enable Stagecoach 
to fulfil its timetabled services.126 In place of the bus station, a single large retail unit would 
enable the inclusion of a ‘department store type retailer’ as a ‘strong anchor which would 
attract other retailers, and generate footfall which would benefit the town centre overall.’127 
This change provided, according to WCC’s officers, ‘an improvement in the commercial 
prospects of the scheme’128 but was not part of the development proposals originally 
prescribed in the DA. The commercial prospects of the development were an important factor 
for WCC’s officers because, as I have stated, the viability condition in the DA was the last 
hurdle that would need to be crossed to enable the DA to become unconditional. 
A problem with achieving an improvement in the commercial prospects arose because, 
as I have also already explained, the DA incorporated the construction of a bus station as a 
required element. The longstanding relationship between Thornfield and Stagecoach had 
                                                          
123 Winchester City Council, CAB2603. Silver Hill Regeneration. Report of the Silver Hill Officers Project 
Team. 7 July 2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.37), paragraph 2.4. 
124 Hereafter referred to as ‘Stagecoach.’ 
125 Winchester City Council, CAB2603. Silver Hill Regeneration. Report of the Silver Hill Officers Project 
Team. 7 July 2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.37), paragraph 3.12. 
126 Winchester City Council, Minutes of the special meeting of the Cabinet held on 10 July 2014 (Appendix 
B, Document 1.38), 6. 
127 ibid, 10. 
128 Winchester City Council, CAB2603. Silver Hill Regeneration. Report of the Silver Hill Officers Project 




formed the basis for Thornfield’s original pitch to WCC129 and had been incorporated into the 
DA through a cross-reference to a document described as ‘the Stagecoach Agreement.’130 
Thornfield and Stagecoach had entered into the SA on 16 June 2003, while WCC and Thornfield 
had been negotiating their Heads of Terms for the DA.131 When WCC and Thornfield then 
entered into the DA on 22 December 2004, WCC and Thornfield agreed that the specifications 
for the bus station to be constructed on the development site would match those set out in 
the SA.132 The DA summarised the content of the SA and stated that the bus station to be built 
as a required element needed to include 12 bus bays, three ‘layover bays,’133 public toilets and 
unnamed ‘other facilities.’134 Incorporating the specifications in the SA into the DA anchored 
WCC and its development partner to a precise bus station design. 
I have already discussed the way that WCC, Thornfield and Henderson bolted collateral 
agreements and other documents onto the DA. This SA seems different, however. The first 
point to note is that WCC appears not to have been a party to the SA. Moreover, the DA was 
not designed to facilitate the acquisition of Stagecoach’s land because Thornfield and 
Stagecoach entered into a separate option agreement to that end after WCC and Thornfield 
signed the DA.135 The option agreement between Thornfield and Stagecoach stated that 
Stagecoach would only transfer title to the existing bus station when a new bus station had 
been built,136 which meant that Stagecoach would retain a land interest in the development 
site even if the CPO had been exercised. If either Thornfield or Henderson had then 
constructed the new bus station, the terms of the SA and the DA would then intervene and 
WCC would be obliged to grant a lease of the new bus station to Stagecoach for a term of 30 
                                                          
129 Winchester City Council, Appendix to CAB1030. Broadway Friarsgate - Development Agreement. 
Report of Chief Estates Officer. 8 February 2005 (Appendix B, Document 1.12). As discussed in chapter 
four. 
130 As described in clause 1.1.72 of the DA. This appears to be a different agreement to the Thornfield 
Stagecoach Agreement, which the parties Thornfield and Stagecoach had entered into before 
Thornfield’s initial pitch, in 1997, to WCC. I examined the TSA in chapter four. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I will refer to the Stagecoach Agreement as the ‘SA.’ 
131 Winchester City Council, Minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 25 May 2004 (Appendix B, 
Document 1.05). 
132 As stated in clause 5.3.1.5 of the DA. 
133 The terms and conditions for the use of Falkirk bus station indicate that a layover bay is a place 
where a driver can park a bus while the bus is not in use (see FirstGroup, 'Falkirk Bus Station Conditions 
of Use' <https://www.firstgroup.com/uploads/node_images/Falkirk_Bus_Station.pdf> accessed 3 
August 2017, paragraph 3). 
134 As stated in clause 5.3.1.5 of the DA. 
135 Winchester City Council, Appendix to CAB1030. Broadway Friarsgate - Development Agreement. 
Report of Chief Estates Officer. 8 February 2005 (Appendix B, Document 1.12), paragraph 4. 




years, although, because Stagecoach was not a party to the DA, there was no obligation in the 
DA on Stagecoach to accept the grant of that lease.137  
Stagecoach’s land constituted a significant component of the development site and its 
expectations for a bus station represented one of the required elements in the DA. But the DA 
was carrying around requirements for a bus station based on the relationship between 
Thornfield and Stagecoach as of June 2003. This arrangement produced a form of ‘temporal 
and analytical gridlock’138 that emerged when Stagecoach informed WCC and Henderson that 
it no longer required the bus station that Henderson was required to build. The way WCC and 
Thornfield had formulated the DA meant that WCC and whichever organisation took on the 
role of developer under the DA were hostages to Stagecoach’s operating preferences. This 
apparent absurdity is one of the reasons why CON3 told me that a DA without an effective 
mechanism for change to the basic specifications of a development proposition is a 
‘fundamentally misconceived’ document. 
The opportunity to replace the bus station was not, however, an entirely fortuitous or 
unexpected turn of events for WCC and Henderson.139 When WCC’s officers presented 
Henderson’s proposals for discussion at the Cabinet meeting on 10 July 2014, the Council’s 
Corporate Director presented the replacement of the bus station with another use as an 
opportunity that had not been appreciated at the time of the CPO inquiry in 2012 and that was 
the product of Stagecoach ‘firming up on’ the facilities that it required.140 Henderson and 
Stagecoach had, in fact, entered into a variation to the SA on 3 April 2014 in which they agreed 
that the development would incorporate ‘an updated linear bus station design and facilities as 
indicated on attached drawings.’141 This ‘linear bus station design’ would replace the 
requirement for a more traditional bus station described above.142 
                                                          
137 As stated in clause 11.3.3 of the DA. The SA is not a publicly available document so I have been 
unable to confirm whether or not the SA or any other agreement did compel Stagecoach to accept the 
grant of a lease of a new bus station. 
138 Riles, '[Deadlines]: Removing the Brackets on Politics in Bureaucratic and Anthropological Analysis',  
82. 
139 See Winchester City Council, CAB2603. Appendix 1. Letter from Cameron Fraser to Howard Bone (12 
June 2014) (Appendix B, Document 1.34), which set out Henderson’s formal request for changes to the 
required elements. The letter made reference to negotiations that had taken place between Henderson 
and Stagecoach following confirmation of the CPO. 
140 Winchester City Council, Minutes of the special meeting of the Cabinet held on 10 July 2014 (Appendix 
B, Document 1.38), 14. 
141 Winchester City Council, CAB2603. Appendix 1. Letter from Cameron Fraser to Howard Bone (12 June 
2014) (Appendix B, Document 1.34). 
142 Winchester City Council, Minutes of the meeting of the Overview and Scrutiny Committee held on 7 




This means that the then-unresolved negotiations for the acquisition of De Stefano’s 
land interests, which I have already mentioned, and the requirement for certainty of land 
acquisition had not stopped negotiations between Henderson’s directors and Stagecoach’s 
representatives regarding the bus station. In addition, neither the protracted land assembly 
process nor the fact that a new bus station was a required element in the DA prevented 
Henderson’s directors from lining up the site earmarked for the new bus station as the location 
for a department store. In some ways, this is not surprising. Over 25 years ago, Turok noted 
the allure of flagship department stores to property-led development.143 Similarly, Steven 
Henderson has explained that large property-led developments carry an ‘investment risk’ that 
can be mitigated by accommodating one of these flagships.144 Consequently, he points out, ‘a 
characteristic is the desire for department store anchors that will attract consumer footfall and 
entice other retailers to support the development.’145 
To accommodate a department store, however, Henderson’s directors had to secure 
variations to the DA. Following confirmation of the CPO, Henderson entered into an 
agreement with Stagecoach to provide bus stop facilities that were incompatible with the 
facilities required in the DA. This was an important device in aligning WCC’s officers with the 
need for variations to the required elements because Henderson’s directors needed the 
Council’s acquiescence to the variation to the DA that would rewrite the required elements. If 
Henderson’s directors presumed that WCC’s officers and, by extension, WCC’s Cabinet would 
approve the variations, this suggests both that the directors assumed an entitlement to change 
the terms of the DA in a way that suited them and that they expected to be able to rely upon 
officer-level and Cabinet-level approval.146 
If Henderson’s directors did assume that WCC’s officers would acquiesce to their 
requests and that WCC’s officers would enrol the support of the Cabinet, that assumption 
would have had strong grounding. The reports that WCC’s officers presented to the Overview 
and Scrutiny Committee and to Cabinet in July 2014, and the comments that officers made in 
those meetings, enacted Henderson’s proposals as a one-off opportunity and gave voice to the 
Council’s fears of losing that opportunity. For example, the Council’s Chief Executive informed 
the Overview and Scrutiny Committee on 7 July 2014 that rejecting or even seeking changes to 
                                                          
143 Ivan Turok, 'Property-led urban regeneration - panacea or placebo' (1992) 24 Environment and 
Planning A 361, 375. 
144 Steven R. Henderson, 'City centre retail development in England: Land assembly and business 
experiences of area change processes' (2011) 42 Geoforum 592, 593. 
145 ibid, 593. 





Henderson’s proposals ‘would raise concerns’ regarding the Council’s ability to have exercised 
the CPO by March 2016.147 He also expressed a fear of ‘reputational damage’ if the Council 
appeared to be holding out for variations that favoured it or if the Council appeared to be 
acting in an otherwise confrontational manner.148 In addition, he pointed to the fear that if the 
Council could not provide ‘proper reasons’ for rejecting Henderson’s proposals, it could be 
‘subject to litigation,’ presumably brought by Henderson on the basis of the Council’s failure to 
comply with its basic public law duty not to act irrationally.149 
With those points in mind, I looked for a record of a moment during the Winchester 
Development at which Council officers or councillors queried the substitution of a single large 
retail unit for the originally required bus station. As I have already observed, Henderson’s 
directors interpreted this change as an opportunity to incorporate a ‘department store type 
retailer’150 and WCC’s officers seem to have treated this as a change to be celebrated. The 
perception that a department store would ‘anchor’151 a successful development, suggests that 
it may have been straightforward for Henderson’s directors to pitch this to WCC’s officers on 
the basis that incorporating a department store aligned the Winchester Development more 
closely with standard property-led development practice and enhanced the prospect of the 
commencement of construction.  
CON2 explained some of the ways that a developer can harness this ‘sense of the 
forthcoming.’152 He pointed out that the prospect of a well-known department store as a 
component of a development provides a developer with significant leverage in negotiations 
with a local authority. According to CON2, this might enable the developer to pressure the 
local authority regarding the timing of an Unconditional Date and the price for which the 
developer would acquire the local authority’s land. A department store would have this effect, 
CON2 believed, because local authority officers would know that a department store draws 
other retailers to a development and can build confidence in the wider area as a dynamic 
commercial centre. Incorporating a department store was also important, CON3 explained, in 
                                                          
147 Winchester City Council, Minutes of the meeting of the Overview and Scrutiny Committee held on 7 
July 2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.35), 14. The Council’s Chief Executive did not corroborate this point 
and the only plausible basis for this contention is that Henderson would have wanted to enter into some 
form of funding agreement with a bank, pension fund or other institutional investor to finance the 
exercise of the CPO. It is possible, though perhaps unlikely, that Henderson would have required some 
time to negotiate this type of funding arrangement. 
148 ibid, 14. 
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convincing investors that the proposal was viable and would secure strong returns. Those 
investors would know that a ‘premier department store […] will add half a point on to your 
yield and 25 per cent to your value. So, absolutely essential.’ The uplift in projected yield and 
estimated land values would solidify the viability case and hasten unconditionality in a way, 
according to CON3, that meant, ‘no department store, no scheme.’ 
A preoccupation with improving the viability of a set of property-led development 
proposals and with making a development proposition attractive to institutional investors is an 
underlying theme of this thesis.153 CON3’s comments reflect that preoccupation and suggest 
that incorporating a department store into a development proposition might make that 
development more attractive to investors. What is important about the pursuit of an anchor 
tenant for the Winchester Development is that Henderson’s desire to incorporate a 
department store pulled the parties away from the required elements that WCC had sought 
and that had formed the basis for the original DA that WCC and Thornfield had agreed. From 
WCC’s point-of-view, however, developer-led change to the DA that might improve the 
potential profitability of the development proposition was desirable and to be embraced. 
WCC’s officers looked, therefore, for ways to present those changes as acceptable. 
Underlying the tension between continuity and discontinuity in the DA was a desire to 
hold onto the existing contractual arrangements while simultaneously improving upon them. 
This desire assumed that aspects of the Winchester DA related to the mechanism for the 
transfer of land remained an attractive basis on which to continue with the development 
process. Moreover, the DA was carrying around a series of bolt-ons, extensions and 
adjustments, as well as a confirmed CPO and a significant investment of time and money. 
Presented with a choice of accepting the changes proposed by an established partner who 
they believed would improve the viability of the development or starting again with a different 
partner, it is not surprising that WCC’s officers did what they thought they needed to do to 
enable unconditionality to happen. In chapter nine I examine the viability assumptions 
underpinning these variations and, in chapter 10, I explain why these proposed changes 
caused WCC and Henderson to fall foul of a judicial review brought to consider alleged 
breaches of EU procurement law. 
Conclusion 
By analysing the Winchester Development following confirmation of the CPO, I have 
scrutinised the actions that both parties took to move through the conditional phase to 
                                                          
153 For a discussion of property redevelopment projects as ‘investment assets,’ see Antoine Guironnet, 
Katia Attuyer and Ludovic Halbert, 'Building cities on financial assets: The financialisation of property 
markets and its implications for city governments in the Paris city-region' (2016) 53 Urban Studies 1442. 
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prepare for the commencement of construction. Doing so has enabled me to develop recurring 
themes and to introduce new areas of analysis. I have also revealed interesting continuities 
and discontinuities in the Winchester Development, which I scrutinised throughout this 
chapter. For example, when WCC and Henderson acquired De Stefano’s land, the contracting 
parties used a type of bolt-on to preserve the unity of the DA and to ensure that all the land to 
be acquired to create the development site was accounted for in the DA. This indicates that 
WCC and Henderson saw the land acquisition and transfer mechanism carried around in the 
DA as a desirable basis for progression along the pre-agreed development trajectory.  
But there was also a stark discontinuity in the form of the DA before and after the 
variations that Henderson proposed after confirmation of the CPO. WCC’s officers acted as 
advocates for these changes because doing so enabled them and WCC’s councillors to be seen 
to project a ‘can do’ attitude towards business and investment. A preoccupation with putting 
in place a framework that would enable unconditionality has thus been shown to be the 
overriding concern not only for developers but also for their local authority partners. This 
manifested in the Winchester Development in an assumption that any changes that 
Henderson’s directors proposed to make to the DA were positive and would improve the 
overall development proposition. Similarly, I have demonstrated that any delays that 
Henderson’s directors proposed to the progression along the pre-agreed development 
trajectory were seen as opportunities to address ‘issues’ that warranted extensions to the 
Final Long Stop Date. The instinct to extend the Final Long Stop Date in the Winchester DA and 
to accommodate viability concerns appears only to have applied, however, where Thornfield 
or Henderson sought more time to reconsider the course that the development was taking or 
to re-evaluate the components of the proposed development. I have shown how WCC’s 
officers classed changes or challenges that councillors suggested to Henderson’s proposals as 
unworthy of extended consideration, a potential source of reputational damage and 









Viability appraisals and property-led development 
In this chapter, I continue my analysis of a property-led development project proposed 
for a development site in Winchester1 and elaborate upon points that I have raised throughout 
this thesis in relation to ‘viability.’ Pinning down a precise definition of what it is that makes a 
property-led development project ‘viable’ is difficult but research in this field indicates that 
‘viability’ measures the financial prospects of a development proposition.2 I examine the data 
that I obtained in my interviews with local authority officers, property developers and 
consultants3 to expand my understanding of how viability works in property-led development.  
Those interviews proved helpful in clarifying what those local authority officers, 
property developers and consultants mean when they refer to viability. For example, CON2 
told me that property-led development projects will usually contain ‘a viability test’ and that 
that test: 
[W]ould often say [that a development proposition] has to show one, two, or 
three: An IRR4 of X, profit on cost of X, or return on cost of X, so a development 
yield.5 And sometimes you’d say that it needs to show all three. And then, that 
would be, theoretically, setting out what the developers’ hurdle rates are.  
This means that there are, typically, three measures that a developer might use to assess 
viability and, depending on the measure or combination of measures chosen, this is a ‘hurdle’ 
that the development proposition must cross before the conditional obligation to commence 
construction, imposed on a developer in a Development Agreement,6 can take effect. 
                                                          
1 I have been referring to this project as the ‘Winchester Development’ and continue to do so in this 
chapter. 
2 Alastair Adair, Jim Berry and Stanley McGreal, 'Financing property's contribution to regeneration' 
(2003) 40 Urban Studies 1065, 1075-6; Ingrid Nappi-Choulet, 'The role and behaviour of commercial 
property investors and developers in French urban regeneration: The experience of the Paris region' 
(2006) 43 Urban Studies 1511, 1513. 
3 I refer to material obtained in interviews with D1, D2, D4, CON2, CON3, CON4, CON5, LA2 and LA4. 
Appendix D contains some limited biographical details explaining who these interviewees are and when 
I met them. 
4 This is the acronym used to refer to an ‘internal rate of return.’ The notion of an ‘internal rate of 
return’ assesses the yield a developer receives from a development over a specific duration and 
compares that to the developer’s desired rate of return (See Nappi-Choulet, 'The role and behaviour of 
commercial property investors and developers in French urban regeneration: The experience of the 
Paris region', 1513. Also discussed in Simon Guy, John Henneberry and Steven Rowley, 'Development 
Cultures and Urban Regeneration' (2002) 39 Urban Studies 1181, 1186). If the prospective internal rate 
of return exceeds the desired rate, the development would be viable. 
5 A guidance note produced by the Royal Institute for Chartered Surveyors states that a ‘development 
yield,’ which CON2 also referred to as a return on cost, is calculated from the ‘[r]ental income divided by 
the actual cost incurred in realising the development’ (Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors, 'Financial 
viability in planning. RICS guidance note' 2012) <http://www.rics.org/uk/knowledge/professional-
guidance/guidance-notes/financial-viability-in-planning-1st-edition/> accessed 26 February 2018, 46).  




‘Profit on cost’ is the viability measure that was ‘carried around’7 in the Winchester DA 
in the viability condition that I discussed in chapters six, seven and eight. That condition stated 
that the Winchester Development would be deemed viable if the developer’s ‘anticipated 
profit’ could be shown to be equal to or more than ‘10% of anticipated Development Costs.’8 
By referring to documents presented as evidence to the Winchester Compulsory Purchase 
Order9 inquiry and produced for consideration in Winchester City Council’s10 committee 
meetings, I scrutinise how directors working on behalf of Henderson UK Property Fund11 and 
their consultants estimated these Development Costs and measured the likely profitability of 
the Winchester Development.12  
The valuation and future recovery of costs has been a theme of this thesis. I continue 
to examine those themes in this chapter and my analysis of viability modelling techniques also 
produces insights that contribute to other themes of this thesis. In particular, I examine the 
way that viability appraisals affect the emergence of a DA as a ‘legally binding’ agreement and 
consider why local authority officers, developers and their consultants invoke mechanical 
metaphors to explain how they assess viability. In doing so, I address the imbalances of 
expertise that condition the way that these individuals utilise the outputs from viability 
appraisals. I then consider the performance of viability modelling techniques over time, 
reflecting on the use of viability appraisals throughout a property-led development process 
and analysing the manner in which viability appraisals can be used to reinforce a sense of 
progression along a development trajectory. In addition, I show how viability can be deployed 
as a driver of change and, in doing so, expand upon points that I made in chapters four to 
eight. Finally, I examine the complex temporalities of viability assessment. 
Viability Appraisals: Exploring the ‘complex inner workings’ 
In this section, I review what my interviewees told me about the viability modelling 
techniques that they, or the consultants who they employed, used for the purposes of 
property-led development projects. I analyse these statements alongside the references to 
                                                          
7 Emilie Cloatre, Pills for the poorest: an exploration of TRIPS and access to medication in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Palgrave 2013), 181. 
8 As stated in schedule 2, paragraph 2.9 of the Winchester DA. 
9 I have been abbreviating the term Compulsory Purchase Order to ‘CPO’ throughout this thesis and 
continue to do so in this chapter. 
10 I have been abbreviating the name of the Council to ‘WCC’ throughout this thesis and so the same 
here. 
11 Throughout this thesis I have been referring to Henderson UK Property Fund, and its subsidiary acting 
as ‘the developer’ for the purposes of the Winchester DA, as ‘Henderson.’ I continue to do so in this 
chapter. 
12 Appendix B to this thesis is a list of the primary source documents produced during the Winchester 




viability modelling in the Winchester DA to better understand how viability appraisals were 
produced during the Winchester Development and to enable me to show how those appraisals 
performed a specific type of development into being. 
The relationship between a DA, a set of development proposals and viability modelling 
is complex. In chapters four and five, I provided an exposition of the way that directors 
working on behalf of Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited13 used ‘feasibility’ testing at 
an early stage in the Winchester Development to, among other things, establish the extent of 
the land interests they deemed necessary to make their development proposition profitable. 
But this testing also functioned as a device through which Thornfield’s directors could ‘enrol’14 
WCC in a property-led development project and, once that enrolment had taken place, extract 
concessions from WCC’s officers on the basis that the intentions that those officers had for the 
development were incompatible with a ‘feasible’ proposition.  
My observations in chapters four and five related specifically, however, to the ‘time-
before’ WCC and Thornfield entered into their DA. Financial modelling of the likely profitability 
of a project continues throughout a property-led development process, as D4 explained when 
he told me that he would expect to produce financial appraisals before starting on a project, 
during the development process and after construction had been completed.15 In chapters 
seven and eight, I explained that ‘viability concerns’ led to both Thornfield’s directors and 
Henderson’s directors seeking changes to the ‘required elements’ in the DA to enable 
unconditionality to occur. These viability concerns thus performed a particular property-led 
development dynamic into being, in which developers sought changes to the agreed terms of a 
development proposition, and local authority officers acquiesced to these demands. These 
changes occurred after the parties had entered into their DA, so happened in the ‘time-in-
between’ the date of the DA and the anticipated moment on which unconditionality would 
occur. 
                                                          
13 Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited was a special purpose company set up by Thornfield 
Properties plc to enter into a DA with WCC and carry out the Winchester development. Thornfield 
Properties (Winchester) Limited was, therefore, ‘the developer’ for the purposes of the Winchester DA 
and was the entity that Henderson UK Property Fund later acquired. I have referred to Thornfield 
Properties (Winchester) Limited throughout this thesis as ‘Thornfield’ and continue to do so here. 
14 Michel Callon, 'Some elements of a sociology of translation - domestication of the scallops and the 
fishermen of St-Brieuc Bay' in John Law (ed), Power, action, and belief: a new sociology of knowledge? 
Sociological Review Monograph (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1986), 211. 
15 An appraisal produced after construction had been completed, D4 explained, would be used to 
determine the precise amount of rent to be paid by a developer to a local authority for a lease of a 
development site and to assess the amount of any ‘profit’ that the developer would share with the local 
authority. The interplay between viability, rent for the lease of a development site and profit-sharing 




Although there appears to be a shift, after a local authority and a developer sign their 
DA, from a preoccupation with ‘feasibility’ to concerns with ‘viability,’ there is an overlap in the 
modelling techniques used. At the outset, the approach would be sequential. For example, LA4 
explained that he would negotiate with a developer as to the baseline components that would 
be incorporated into the development proposition before he sought councillor approval for a 
DA. These baseline specifications would have been things like the quantum of retail floorspace 
to be constructed, the number of residential units, the extent of any office floorspace, the 
amount of restaurant or leisure floorspace, and so on. These baseline specifications would, 
therefore, have been akin to the ‘required elements’ in the Winchester DA.16 But at the same 
time as negotiating these baseline specifications, LA4 would instruct consultants to work with 
the developer’s consultants to: 
Do a lot of open book assessments and valuations because that’s the steer in 
terms of the value of the land uses and in terms of the profit margin that goes in 
because, for your development agreement, you’ve got to agree costs, and sharing 
costs. 
Costs, for these purposes, are ‘agreed’ in so far as a developer and a local authority identify 
the expenses that the developer will pay and that will figure in their subsequent profitability 
calculations.17  
These costs assessments, land valuations and profit margins, using LA4’s phrase, ‘go 
into’ a DA, and the text of the Winchester DA demonstrates how these things materialise. For 
example, the costs payable by the developer were defined in the Winchester DA as 
‘Development Costs.’18 Typically, the major items of expenditure deemed relevant for an 
estimate of ‘Development Costs’ payable by a developer are land acquisition costs, together 
with ancillary expenses such as stamp duty land tax, and the costs of designing and 
                                                          
16 Clause 5.3 of the DA set these out in detail and the original required elements were 90,000 square 
feet of retail floor-space, 364 residential units of which 35% were to be affordable homes, 279 public car 
parking spaces, a new civic square, a new bus station, premises for WCC’s CCTV equipment, a new shop 
mobility and dial a ride service, a new market space and a financial contribution to public art provision. 
In chapters seven and eight, I explained how these changed during the conditional phase of the 
Winchester Development. 
17 An assessment of the amount of the costs payable by the developer would also be important in 
informing the content of the funding agreement required to discharge the funding condition. The 
purpose of this funding agreement was to secure a ‘legally binding’ commitment from a funder to 
provide some or all of capital required to meet land acquisition and construction costs. 
18 Schedule 3 to the DA defined the items to be considered as Development Costs. This schedule has 
been redacted, however, from the version of the DA published. Based on assumptions drawn from 
guidance outlining the suggested components of viability appraisals produced in conjunction with 
planning applications and viability appraisals published in relation to viability conditions in DAs 





constructing a development.19 There are, however, many items that make up the costs of 
designing and constructing a development, some of which are harder to capture in a neat 
definition. The Winchester DA classified ‘Development Costs’ by reference to a broad category 
of ‘proper costs that are properly incurred by the Developer,’20 which is a phrase that contains 
an interesting tautology. It is, of course, possible to imagine circumstances in which ‘proper 
costs,’ such as the costs incurred in preparing and submitting planning applications, are 
‘improperly’ incurred if, for example, a developer submitted a planning application without 
first obtaining approval required in a DA from a local authority’s estates team for the contents 
of the plans. The repetition of the word ‘proper’ in the Winchester DA seems unnecessary 
though and the consequence is that the clause reads as an excessive attempt to impress upon 
a reader that the developer can justifiably seek recovery of the costs to be claimed.  
Alongside costs to be expended on the preparation and submission of a planning 
application, ‘proper costs’ might have included fees payable to consultants instructed during 
the development process,21 financial contributions required pursuant to a section 106 
agreement, costs incurred as a result of any challenges to the grant of planning permission or 
the making of a CPO, and any inducements payable to prospective tenants of the constructed 
                                                          
19 The Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors guidance, to which I referred earlier in this chapter, on the 
operation of viability modelling in planning decision-making. That guidance includes an ‘indicative 
outline of what to include in a viability assessment’ (see Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors, 
'Financial viability in planning. RICS guidance note', 36). The RICS indicative outline lists the same 
components as those present in viability appraisals produced in conjunction with a DA for the ‘Silk 
Street’ development in Macclesfield (see Wilson Bowden Developments Ltd, 'Silk Street, Macclesfield 
viability appraisals: February 2014 - May 2014' <http://wakeupmacc.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/Silk-Street-viability-assessment-May-2014.pdf> accessed 30 August 2017). 
20 Schedule 3 to the Winchester DA contains the definition of ‘Development Costs’ but this has been 
redacted in the electronic copy that the council published. A report to Cabinet of the Council’s ‘Silver Hill 
Officers Project Team’ has reproduced parts of the definition, however (see Winchester City Council, 
CAB2603. Silver Hill Regeneration. Report of the Silver Hill Officers Project Team. 7 July 2014 (Appendix B, 
Document 1.37), paragraph 10.2). 
21 In addition to instructing solicitors, Henderson instructed architects, archaeologists, an engineering 
consultant to carry out site survey work, town planning consultants, a quantity surveyor, a chartered 
surveyor to advise on the marketing of the residential property and an ‘historic building adviser’ (as 
listed in Henderson, Winchester Silver Hill. A Vibrant City Centre. September 2014 (Appendix B, 
Document 2.15), 10). Henderson also instructed a retail consultant to advise on the letting and 
marketing of the retail units (Nicholas Symons, Proof of Evidence. Proposed Silver Hill Development, 
Winchester. June 2012 (Appendix B, Document 3.10B)), a transport consultant (see Stuart Jenkins, Proof 
of Evidence of Stuart Jenkins (Appendix B, Document 3.10A)), a chartered surveyor to negotiate land 
acquisitions, carry out land valuations and advise on the CPO process (see Matthew Bodley, Proof of 
Evidence of Matthew Bodley. On matters related to compulsory purchase. 25 May 2012 (Appendix B, 
Document 3.09), paragraph 1.8) and two other chartered surveyors to advise on viability modelling (as 
discussed in Christine Thorby, CPO Report to the Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government; SUO Report to the Secretary of State for Transport. 17 December 2012 (Appendix B, 
Document 3.03), paragraph 4.39). The costs figure based on consultant’s fees would also include, D4 




development.22 In addition, D4 indicated that some developers agree to pay the costs of any 
consultants that a local authority appoints during a property-led development process, 
although he remarked that while ‘a developer might pay, those costs would be put into the pot 
as Development Costs,’ thus creating an incentive for the local authority to minimise its use of 
any such consultancy services.  
Alongside agreeing the items of expenditure payable by the developer, PS1 and D4 
pointed out, a developer and a local authority will also agree the expenses that the local 
authority will pay. The local authority’s costs would not be collated under a general heading 
such as ‘Development Costs,’ so would not materialise in a DA in the same way and would, 
they told me, be disregarded from a profitability estimate. This provides an opportunity for 
cost engineering and PS1 further explained the relationship between a developer’s costs and a 
local authority’s costs when he observed that a local authority might help a developer improve 
the viability case for a development by moving items previously defined as a developer’s costs 
away from the DA and the corresponding viability appraisal and into unrelated categories of 
the local authority’s general expenditure.  
Moving costs from one party to another is not the only way to make a viability case, 
however, and D4 told me that he had been involved in property-led development projects in 
which, to engineer a profitable proposition, the local authority has ‘to find ways to help the 
developer cut costs.’ There might be various ways to do that but the most obvious would be by 
the local authority reducing either its demands for unprofitable community buildings or the 
ground rent payable on the grant of a long leasehold of a development site to a developer. 
To enable Henderson’s directors, WCC’s officers and their respective consultants to 
calculate the income required to generate sufficient profitability, Henderson’s consultants 
assembled estimates of the total Development Costs in viability appraisals produced 
episodically during the development process.23 This reliance on consultants is a manifestation 
of the ‘image of projectness’24 in which property-led development takes place. LA4 provided a 
summation of the role of consultants when he told me that: 
How you get to a DA is you both know roughly where you are going but you have 
two independent specialist consultants who value everything and bring that value 
together, which informs the appraisal.  
                                                          
22 These items featured in both the RICS indicative outline for viability appraisals and the Silk Street, 
Macclesfield appraisals to which I referred above (see Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors, 'Financial 
viability in planning. RICS guidance note'; Wilson Bowden Developments Ltd, 'Silk Street, Macclesfield 
viability appraisals: February 2014 - May 2014'). 
23 As discussed, for example, in Winchester City Council, OS104. Silver Hill Development Proposal. Report 
of Cllr Kim Gottlieb. 7 July 2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.36). 
24 John Law, Aircraft stories: decentering the object in technoscience (Duke University Press 2002), 8. 
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CON3 made similar observations regarding valuation when he explained the role two firms of 
property surveyors took in estimating land acquisition, construction and other costs that 
formed the basis for viability appraisals: 
Classically, on these scenarios, the council would use [Firm A] to do the valuations 
and the developer would use [Firm B] to do the valuations. If they know their job, 
which they truly do, they’re in the same place. So, then it tends to be an argument 
that, “That’s alright today, John, but what with John Lewis and a bigger 
catchment, rents will go up a bit.” And then, “Mmmm. No, I’m not sure they’ll go 
up that far.” That’s the debate. And there’s rarely disagreement on the key 
parameters. 
He went on to explain that his firm had also carried out viability exercises on behalf of 
developers to model the effect of changes in estimated costs and rental proceeds on overall 
profitability. He told me that: 
We run spreadsheets of ginormous size and debatable meaningfulness [PAUSE] 
but [PAUSE]. All to explore the impact on the rate of return. And if you get a large-
scale scheme, you just breathe on these numbers a bit here [pointing to a piece of 
paper] and it goes [mimicking a breeze]. You know [PAUSE]. The numbers start 
changing. And it’s more and more the financial modelling of viability that counts. 
And that’s getting to be an exotic art, to say the least. 
In a report that Councillor Kim Gottlieb presented to WCC’s Overview and Scrutiny Committee 
encouraging thorough examination of Henderson’s viability appraisals, he referred to his 
professional experience as a property developer25 and explained, for the benefit of the 
councillors present, his view of the malleability of the data that viability appraisals generate: 
[Viability appraisals] are time sensitive so that you can see the cost of interest and 
again, for example, if you extend the construction period or the time you 
anticipate it will take to let the shops, you can seen [sic] the effect on the bottom 
line.26  
Taken together, these observations point to both a consultant’s ability to manipulate 
conclusions, the perceived importance of ‘valuing’ everything and an assumption that these 
‘specialist consultants’ are the only people who ‘know’ how to do so. The consequent reliance 
on this knowledge means that, using Christophers’ phrase, viability testing and the way that 
these consultants manipulate lines in a viability appraisal comes to ‘format’ urban spaces in 
ways that are often unseen.27 
                                                          
25 Winchester City Council, OS104. Silver Hill Development Proposal. Report of Cllr Kim Gottlieb. 7 July 
2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.36), 2. I introduced Councillor Gottlieb in chapter eight. He is a 
Conservative Councillor who was elected to the council in May 2011. As well as serving as a member of 
the council’s Overview and Scrutiny Committee, he was a member of the council’s ‘Silver Hill Informal 
Policy Group,’ which I also introduced in chapter eight and mention again later in this chapter. 
26 ibid, 5. 
27 Brett Christophers, 'Wild Dragons in the City: Urban Political Economy, Affordable Housing 
Development and the Performative World-making of Economic Models' (2014) 38 International Journal 
of Urban and Regional Research 79, 95. 
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Viability modelling is, therefore, a way of documenting the anticipated financial costs 
of a property-led development project alongside expected profitability in a way that has 
concrete effects. These effects materialise in the way that viability outputs determine the 
buildings constructed during a development. These modelling techniques also have similarly 
important social and political effects by determining how people use and experience these 
places. But these effects appear after a property-led development project has been 
completed. It is also important, therefore, to examine how these appraisals determine the 
capacity for action of the legal technologies, like DAs, CPOs and planning permissions, 
generated during a development process. In addition, there is a question to be asked regarding 
the way that viability appraisals condition the relations between local authority officers and 
councillors and between local authority officers and developers. 
The primary means through which local authority officers and their private sector 
development partners seek to control the way that legal technologies work is through 
incorporating a ‘viability condition’ into the DAs that they negotiate. All my developer 
interviewees referred to DAs that contained viability conditions, and my five interviewees who 
were property development consultants each also discussed the importance of a viability 
condition. These conditions appear, therefore, to be ubiquitous. Incorporating some form of 
viability modelling techniques into a DA is thus another example of the ‘routinized’ 
behaviours28 that I have been discussing in this thesis. 
But while it is predictable that viability modelling will take place as a contractual 
requirement stipulating some form of comparison between anticipated costs and desired 
profitability, there can be small differences in the underlying methodologies, as Christophers 
demonstrates.29 These methodologies take the form of closely-guarded, ‘proprietary’ 
information that developers and their consultants endeavour to keep secret.30 Nevertheless, 
these techniques are both dynamic and mobile in that they can be transported to different 
settings and manipulated in accordance with the wants and needs of a particular developer or 
local authority officer.31 
                                                          
28 Annelise Riles, Collateral knowledge: legal reasoning in the global financial markets (University of 
Chicago Press 2011), 65; Cloatre, Pills for the poorest: an exploration of TRIPS and access to medication 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, 103; Emilie Cloatre and Martyn Pickersgill, 'International law, public health, and 
the meanings of pharmaceuticalization' (2014) 33 New Genetics and Society 434, 440. 
29 Christophers, 'Wild Dragons in the City: Urban Political Economy, Affordable Housing Development 
and the Performative World-making of Economic Models'. 
30 This is a point that Johns makes by reference to the suite of documents that underpin a public-private 
infrastructure project (see Fleur Johns, 'Financing as Governance' (2011) 31 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 391, 399). 
31 Christophers, 'Wild Dragons in the City: Urban Political Economy, Affordable Housing Development 




There are, as a result, many interesting tensions running through the use of these 
viability appraisals as a tool of property-led development. On the one hand, these techniques 
are treated as a run-of-the-mill, mundane component of property-led development to be 
completed out of necessity. Modelling techniques and valuation practices are thus a type of 
technology that is simultaneously taken for granted and afforded credibility simply because 
the same practices have been deployed in other places at other times.32 On the other hand, as 
I have shown, developers and local authority officers place significant weight on viability 
appraisals and treat these practices as ‘a sophisticated decision-making technique’ likely to 
produce objective and trustworthy outputs.33 Finally, however, Adams et al have noted that 
choosing a ‘fortuitous economic moment’34 is often the key indicator of success in a property-
led development, and this seems to be the case whether or not developers engage in the 
production of numerous viability appraisals.  
In chapter seven, I noted that CON4 had presented himself as a conductor leading an 
orchestra and tasked with ensuring ‘that each part of the orchestra comes in at the right time.’ 
I put it to him that the difference between a property development consultant and a 
conductor is that property-led development involves ‘an element luck.’ He agreed, and stated: 
Yes, that’s true. If you’ve been trying to conduct an orchestra for a number of 
years, timing would come into it for different reasons. But, yes, we’re subject to 
all sorts of extraneous influences. It’s financial markets, even government 
initiatives, be they central or local. 
He also used the image of lining up the elements of a development proposition when he 
explained that a viable development, in which a developer or a consultant needs to get ‘all 
your ducks in a row to coincide at the right time, requires an element of luck as well as skill.’ 
His point was that a developer or a consultant who has gained experience of how property-led 
development works has the expertise both to make the most of any good fortune that arises 
and to know ‘the right time’35 to produce a viability appraisal.  
ANT-inspired research provides ways to help think through the juxtaposition between 
something that is simultaneously run-of-the-mill, apparently highly sophisticated but also a 
                                                          
32 Yvonne Rydin, 'Using Actor-Network Theory to understand planning practice: Exploring relationships 
between actants in regulating low-carbon commercial development' (2013) 12 Planning Theory 23, 39. 
33 Guy et al question the ‘objectivity’ of these appraisals when they point out that decision-making 
based on viability modelling is more likely to be a product of preconceived prejudices than clear-headed 
analysis of the numbers on a spreadsheet (Guy, Henneberry and Rowley, 'Development Cultures and 
Urban Regeneration', 1186).  
34 David Adams, Alan Disberry and Norman Hutchison, 'Still vacant after all these years - Evaluating the 
efficiency of property-led urban regeneration' (2017) 32 Local Economy 505, 520. 
35 This is a phrase also used by Henderson (see Steven Henderson, 'Developer collaboration in urban 
land development: partnership working in Paddington, London' (2010) 28 Environment and Planning C - 
Government and Policy 165, 180) to explain that a developer usually achieves profitability on a 




product of luck. In particular, Latour’s ideas regarding ‘black boxes’ are instructive.36 Earlier in 
this section, I quoted comments that CON3 made during my interview with him in which he 
described two consultants in a meeting room debating the finer details of the land valuations 
and estimated rental proceeds that would go into a viability appraisal. His portrayal of the 
discussions between these two individuals envisaged two men, clearly familiar with each other 
and comfortable in each other’s company, having a conversation about the contents of a 
viability appraisal.  
This familiarity was also a feature of an anecdote that CON2 told me about his 
negotiations regarding the inducements to be paid to a specific anchor tenant. He explained 
that he had negotiated with representatives of that anchor tenant on many occasions, with the 
consequence that ‘there aren’t many people that have done deals with [that anchor tenant],’ 
meaning that ‘it tends to be me’ who leads the negotiations if a developer wanted to 
incorporate that anchor tenant into a development. CON2 went on to explain that he imagines 
that the individuals on the other side of the negotiations ‘groan inwardly, I think, you know, 
“Not him again,” because I’m the only person that has done the deals with them […] and 
therefore they know that I know what the deals are.’  
The idea that ‘they know that I know’ is an important one and suggests that there is 
limited room for manoeuvre for two consultants engaged in ‘backroom’37 negotiations. Both 
CON2 and CON3 depicted two individuals who are so familiar and comfortable in their roles 
that they are doing the same thing each time they meet. Nonetheless, and as I noted earlier, 
CON3 observed that ‘the financial modelling of viability’ has become ‘an exotic art’ and he 
highlighted the importance of ‘the spreadsheet’ that generates the figures on which the 
direction of property-led development depends. By contrast, LA4 lacked the insider knowledge 
that CON2 and CON3 possessed and he admitted that he relied upon his consultants to use 
their spreadsheets to value ‘everything.’ Neither LA4, CON2 nor CON3 talked in detail about 
the formulae or instructions embedded within the spreadsheet, although the two consultants 
both alluded to ‘the complex inner workings.’38 My point, though, is that the inner workings do 
not seem to matter to the developers and local authority officers whose organisations are the 
parties to a DA as long as they believe that the outputs are both credible and in alignment with 
their objectives. But this means that the workings of viability modelling are just as far from 
public scrutiny as the ‘backroom’ meetings at which consultants value the incentives payable 
                                                          
36 Bruno Latour, Science in action: how to follow scientists and engineers through society (Harvard 
University Press 1987), 3; Bruno Latour, The making of law: an ethnography of the Conseil d'Etat (Polity 
2010), 272. 
37 Mariana Valverde, Everyday law on the street: city governance in an age of diversity (University of 
Chicago Press 2012), 14. 
38 Latour, Science in action: how to follow scientists and engineers through society, 3. 
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to anchor tenants, the likely rental proceeds of a specific combination of buildings, and so on. 
Inputs generated in backroom discussions are processed according to a model that is drawn up 
in another place and at another time and that is firmly ‘black boxed.’ The hidden work that 
these models do, however, performs a significant role in the way that property-led 
development processes play out. 
Viability Appraisals: How a spreadsheet becomes the ‘primum movens’ 
In addition to the concept of a black box, there are other ideas that ANT researchers 
have developed that illuminate the workings of viability modelling techniques. The work that 
Callon has done on ‘enrolment’ and ‘translation’39 highlights network building processes and 
the ‘battles’40 that define and redefine identities, connections and relations within a 
networked situation. Of particular significance, he suggests, are the ‘multilateral negotiations, 
trials of strength and tricks’41 that enable one actor to become both an ‘obligatory passage 
point’42 and a spokesperson able to state what other actors ‘want and need.’43 
A straightforward application of these ideas to property-led development and viability 
modelling suggests that the negotiations between a developer and a local authority officer, or 
between their respective consultants, leads to a viability appraisal taking the form of an 
obligatory passage point that compels the parties to consider the viability consequences of 
every action carried out during a development process. This finding is valuable, particularly 
when placed alongside material from my interviews with D1 and D2. In those interviews, D1 
and D2 each explained that any viability appraisal that their companies carried out or that they 
commissioned from their consultants would be designed to assess likely profitability of a 
development proposition against a pre-determined benchmark that their respective company 
boards had set. D1 and D2 held different positions in their respective companies, so provided 
alternative but complementary insights into the interplay between a project-specific appraisal 
and a universal board benchmark. D1 was a development director in his firm but he explained 
that he needed to report to his firm’s board before the board would release funds for one of 
his projects and, if he could not convince the board that his project would attain the board 
benchmark for profitability, the board would not provide its support. By contrast, D2 had been 
a development director but had more recently been the managing director of his company, so 
was a board member who approved project proposals prepared by development directors. He 
                                                          
39 Callon, 'Some elements of a sociology of translation - domestication of the scallops and the fishermen 
of St-Brieuc Bay'. 
40 ibid, 212. 
41 ibid, 211. 
42 ibid, 205. 
43 ibid, 224. 
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confirmed that his board’s benchmark had been so firmly embedded as a pre-requisite to 
board approval that development directors knew not to approach the board unless they had 
viability figures that ‘worked.’ Local authority officers are compelled to share in a developer’s 
need to produce figures that ‘work’ when those figures are necessary to initiate the chain of 
interactions that lead to a developer’s board approving progress on a project.  
These points thus go some way to explaining why a viability appraisal is both central to 
property-led development decision-making and an obligatory passage point for the 
interactions taking place. This, however, is only a partial reading of the way that a viability 
appraisal performs a specific type of development process into being because a viability 
appraisal also creates various other interlocking connections. I have already explained that a 
viability appraisal enables a developer to tell a local authority officer what he or she should 
‘want or need’ if a development is to take place. A consultant that a local authority has 
engaged can, in theory, also tell that officer what he or she should want or need in a 
development. In addition, however, CON2 told me that his role in property-led development is 
often to produce and interpret viability outputs on behalf of developers who are inexperienced 
in the application of these techniques or the way that they are used in negotiations with a local 
authority. In that sense, a consultant becomes able to say what a developer wants or needs, 
possibly before a developer is aware of what he or she should want. The use of viability 
modelling techniques thus means that it is not necessarily the developer who is the ‘primum 
movens’44 in property-led development but the consultant, or the consultant’s computer, that 
is the obligatory passage point that all action must flow through and that conditions all the 
subsequent actions that take place during a development process. I did not put this 
observation directly to my developer interviewees, and D1, D2 and D4 each expressed 
familiarity with the viability modelling techniques deployed on their developments, albeit 
without going into the detail of these processes. Each would, I think, have nonetheless thought 
of themselves or their firm as the ‘primum movens’ in their project. But, even though D1, D2 
and D4 each spoke of their ability to interpret and manipulate ‘the figures,’ they still talked 
about using consultants during their projects.  
Although I cannot point to a comment from one of my interviews to this effect, it 
occurred to me in the final days of editing this chapter that some developers might use 
consultants when they are not actually seeking advice. Rather, it may be possible that 
developers might simply require the production of reports and appraisals that bolster their 
case on an issue. This appeared to occur in the Winchester Development when Martin Perry, 
                                                          




Henderson’s Director of Retail Development, informed the Winchester CPO inquiry that 
‘leading expert consultants’ had affirmed the accuracy of Henderson’s viability appraisals.45 
This type of practice might be particularly prevalent if a developer and a consultancy already 
have a close relationship, and if consultants have familiarised themselves with a developer’s 
decision-making processes and targets in a way that means that they are already aware of 
what the developer wants. In such circumstances, the objectivity or independence of any 
advice would become questionable. This, however, is an area for further research. 
Regardless, however, of whether the ‘primum movens’ in these situations is a 
developer, a consultant or a computer, and whether or not viability outputs are objective and 
impartial, viability appraisals do generate and sustain a ‘coordinated perspective’46 among 
developers, local authority officers and their respective consultants on what needs to be done 
to make a project viable. The goals of cost minimisation and recovery are, as Langstrup has put 
it, the type of ‘more or less unambiguous goals’47 that characterise project-oriented networks, 
even if the exact method of achieving those ends is the subject of ‘negotiations, trials of 
strength and tricks.’48 The reproduction of viability modelling techniques that appear to have 
worked in other places at other times is a way of creating the impression of a ‘succession of 
deals’49 that generates ‘momentum’ and ‘loyalty’50 towards these techniques. But these 
techniques are also a way to ‘inscribe’51 assumptions onto both a property-led development 
project and a DA about the conditions in which that project will play out and the ways that 
those technologies will work. These assumptions then ‘prescribe’52 the actions of a local 
authority officer or a developer who picks up and uses a DA or any of the web of interlinked 
documents connected to a DA. 
  
                                                          
45 Martin Robert Perry, Proof of Evidence Financial Viability Rebuttal. Silverhill, Winchester. 15 June 2012 
(Appendix B, Document 3.08), paragraph 1.5. 
46 John Law and Valerie Singleton, 'Performing technology's stories - On social constructivism, 
performance, and performativity' (2000) 41 Technology and Culture 765, 768. 
47 Henriette Langstrup, 'Interpellating Patients as Users: Patient Associations and the Project-Ness of 
Stem Cell Research' (2011) 36 Science Technology & Human Values 573, 577. 
48 Callon, 'Some elements of a sociology of translation - domestication of the scallops and the fishermen 
of St-Brieuc Bay', 211. 
49 Johns, 'Financing as Governance', 398. 
50 ibid, 398-9. 
51 Madeleine Akrich, 'The De-Scription of Technical Objects' in Wiebe E. Bijker and John Law (eds), 
Shaping technology/building society: studies in sociotechnical change (MIT Press 1992), 208. 
52 ibid, 208. 
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Viability appraisals: A ‘legally’ important document? 
One of the themes of this thesis has been an investigation into ‘the way that law and 
legality emerge’53 in property-led development. Current research into the provision of 
affordable housing as a component of large scale property-led development has shown 
viability appraisals to be manipulable instruments that developers use to limit or reduce their 
commitment to provide or contribute to projects potentially beneficial to the wider 
community.54 In particular, scholarship has analysed the deployment of viability modelling 
techniques to enable developers to avoid obligations ostensibly imposed upon them to 
incorporate affordable housing into their developments.55 In that respect, the Winchester 
Development is nothing new, as I showed in chapter eight. But these campaigners and 
academics have focused on the operation of viability testing in relation to the formation of 
district-wide planning policy and site-specific planning applications. My findings demonstrate, 
by contrast, that viability testing is not merely a matter of planning decision-making. By 
incorporating a viability test into the Winchester DA, WCC allowed the developer’s desired 
level of profitability and the consultants’ land valuations and costs estimates to underpin every 
aspect of the development process. LA4 expressed this pithily when he told me that the most 
important document in property-led development is a viability appraisal and a DA is simply 
‘the legal document attached to that.’ 
There are three observations that I want to make in relation to LA4’s comment. The 
first is that a viability appraisal needs a DA if it is to have effect as the basis of a development 
project because, without a DA, a developer will not be able to assemble the land interests 
required to construct a ‘viable’ development. The second point emerging from LA4’s comment 
is that a DA is a necessary document because its ‘legality’ adds credibility to the existence of a 
viability appraisal. Finally, LA4’s comment also suggests that a DA has some kind of pre-existing 
‘legal’ essence that marks it out as different from a document like a viability appraisal.  
Each of these points is important and I analyse the interplay between a DA and a 
viability appraisal throughout this section. My reading of the ‘legality’ of a DA is different to 
LA4’s, however. My research shows that a viability appraisal is one of the web of networked 
                                                          
53 David Cowan, 'Housing and Property' in Peter Cane and Herbert M. Kritzer (eds), The Oxford handbook 
of empirical legal research (Oxford University Press 2010), 332. 
54 See, for example, Neil Crosby, Patrick McAllister and Paul Wyatt, 'Fit for planning? An evaluation of 
the application of development viability appraisal models in the UK planning system' (2013) 40 
Environment and Planning B - Planning & Design 3; Patrick McAllister, Emma Street and Peter Wyatt, 
'Governing calculative practices: An investigation of development viability modelling in the English 
planning system' (2016) 53 Urban Studies 2363. 
55 See, for example, Christophers, 'Wild Dragons in the City: Urban Political Economy, Affordable 
Housing Development and the Performative World-making of Economic Models'; Jerry Flynn, 'Complete 
control: Developers, financial viability and regeneration at the Elephant and Castle' (2016) 20 City 278; 
Paul Watt and Anna Minton, 'London's housing crisis and its activisms: Introduction' (2016) 20 City 204. 
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and interlinked documents required to enable a DA to have ‘binding’ effect. This finding is one 
of the important contributions to knowledge that this thesis makes. In chapter seven, I 
focussed on the planning permission and the CPO that were also necessary to enable the 
obligation imposed in the Winchester DA on the developer to commence construction to take 
effect. The Winchester DA, like the DAs my developer and consultant interviewees discussed, 
depended for its effects on these documents. But the planning permission, CPO and other 
documents referred to in the DA also depended for their effects on the numbers that a 
consultant’s computer generates and the way that those outputs are captured in a viability 
appraisal. Similarly, the DA would not take effect as a ‘legally binding’ agreement without the 
numbers in a viability appraisal that would allow this to happen. This demonstrates how, 
paraphrasing Latour, the process of making an unconditional DA occurs over time and requires 
inputs from a variety of sources.56 It also shows how a binding DA is an instantiation of ‘law’ 
that depends on multiple connections for its effects and that is thus a fluid and precarious 
assemblage.57 
These findings emerge from the ways that developers and consultants attempt to 
foreground viability as a non-negotiable aspect of property-led development even while other 
aspects of a development proposition are negotiable. They place great emphasis on a viability 
appraisal and do so by ‘engineering its outputs into contracts.’58 These outputs become, as a 
result, part of the ‘socio-legal architecture’59 of property-led development. Consequently, the 
need to attain a prescribed level of profitability operates as an ‘unceasing’ disciplinary 
technique60 because local authority officers recognise that it is desirable that a conditional DA 
becomes an unconditional, fully-formed and ‘legally binding’ DA. The need to attain a 
prescribed level of profitability is, therefore, carried around and sustained in the text of a DA, 
in a way that conditions the actions of the parties to it.  
Treating a viability appraisal as a legally important document had implications for the 
Winchester Development that manifested in the changes to the required elements in the DA 
that Henderson’s directors demanded after the CPO Inquiry. I touched upon these changes in 
chapters seven and eight, where I pointed out that Henderson’s Director of Retail 
Development informed the Inspector chairing the Inquiry that the required elements agreed 
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58 Johns, 'Financing as Governance', 395. 
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between WCC and Thornfield formed the basis for a ‘viable’ development.61 WCC’s officers 
similarly informed the Inspector that their review of Henderson’s viability appraisals meant 
that ‘[t]he Council has satisfied itself that the Scheme is viable.’62 
The report that officers then presented to WCC’s Cabinet on 6 August 2014, 
recommending approval for Henderson’s proposed changes, described a reversal of opinion. It 
addressed the criticism that the Council received from local residents regarding the proposed 
removal of the affordable housing requirement63 and explained that the appraisals that had 
formed the basis for the evidence at the CPO inquiry were no longer appropriate because they 
had evaluated a scheme that could not be funded: 
Much comment has been made about how the latest proposals for treating 
affordable housing compare with earlier schemes. Thornfield did secure planning 
permission for a development of the site in 2009, but were unable to secure 
funding and eventually went into administration. While appraisals might have 
been produced in the past demonstrating that on site affordable [sic] provision 
was possible, in reality they were only illustrative and in the absence of funding 
came to nothing. In the absence of evidence that an alternative scheme can be 
funded, valid comparisons between a proposed scheme and an alternative 
(earlier) scheme are impossible.64 
There are significant gaps in this reasoning, however. Henderson’s Director of Retail 
Development had emphasised at the CPO inquiry that funding was available for the existing 
proposals and had provided evidence to that effect.65 Moreover, it is not clear what the 
officers meant by referring to the impossibility of ‘valid comparisons’ because the officers 
were themselves engaged in drawing a comparison between the existing required elements 
and the proposed required elements. Characterising past appraisals as ‘only illustrative’ was a 
way of describing Thornfield’s proposals for the development as no more than a ‘passing 
phase.’66 WCC’s officers were pointing to the momentary nature of viability modelling and 
                                                          
61 Martin Robert Perry, Proof of Evidence. Silverhill, Winchester. 6 June 2012 (Appendix B, Document 
3.06), paragraph 18.8. To avoid any doubt that this statement in his proof of evidence was a clear 
expression of his belief that the development proposition was ‘viable,’ Perry submitted a supplementary 
proof of evidence to the inquiry rebutting evidence from objectors that had suggested that the scheme 
was not viable (see Perry, Proof of Evidence Financial Viability Rebuttal. Silverhill, Winchester. 15 June 
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62 Winchester City Council, The Winchester City Council (Silver Hill) Compulsory Purchase Order 2011. 
Statement of Case. 22 March 2012 (Appendix B, Document 3.02), paragraph 12. 
63 In chapter eight, I referred to criticisms reported in Winchester City Council, Minutes of the special 
meeting of the Cabinet held on 10 July 2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.38), 2-3 and Winchester City 
Council, Minutes of the special meeting of the Cabinet held on 6 August 2014 (Appendix B, Document 
1.40), 4-6. 
64 Winchester City Council, CAB2607. Silver Hill Affordable Housing Review. Report of Head of Estates 
and Head of Legal & Democratic Services. 6 August 2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.41), paragraph 3.1. 
65 Perry, Proof of Evidence. Silverhill, Winchester. 6 June 2012 (Appendix B, Document 3.06), paragraph 
13.8. 
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used this as a basis on which to cast aside documents that had been inconveniently connected 
to the DA. If everything is a mere ‘snapshot,’ though, the problem is that this re-
characterisation of past appraisals would seem also to undermine the utility of current and 
future viability appraisals as comparative tools as well. 
One way of reading the officers’ statement is that WCC’s officers were simply saying 
that the most reliable benchmark of viability was the willingness of a funder to finance land 
acquisition and construction. On the other hand, though, the viability condition in the DA, to 
be discharged on the production of a positive viability appraisal, was the last condition to be 
discharged before unconditionality. This sequencing suggests that making comparisons is part 
of the purpose of viability modelling. The incoherence of the officers’ statement may have 
been a product of the situation in which WCC found itself, with a development proposition 
that it’s officers had previously defended now deemed indefensible. In trying to extricate 
themselves from this tangle, WCC’s officers sought to discredit past assumptions without 
inadvertently acknowledging that a developer and its consultants can make a viability appraisal 
‘illustrate’ whatever they want. 
A challenge to the ‘projectisation’ of property-led development? 
One of the reasons that developers and local authority officers can sustain these 
practices is, as I have pointed out, because viability modelling techniques are poorly 
understood. But another reason lies in the way that scrutiny of these practices tends to be part 
of the projectisation of property-led development. Johns has made similar observations in 
relation to public-private infrastructure projects in which, she explains: 
Regulatory oversight of such financial architecture tends to be administered 
through accounting standards and audit functions rather than through more 
explicitly deliberative and accessible governmental technologies.67 
Prior to the Winchester CPO Inquiry, there appear to have been few attempts by WCC Cabinet 
members or officers to use local government scrutiny, accountability or transparency 
mechanisms to examine the viability assumptions underpinning the Winchester Development. 
One way of interpreting this lack of scrutiny is by concluding that WCC’s councillors and 
officers failed to open the ‘black box’ that had been drawn around Henderson’s viability 
modelling techniques. This unwillingness to challenge viability modelling comes, as I have 
                                                          




shown, from a tendency to accept inputs as impartial and objective and outputs as facts,68 
even where some of inputs have long been recognised as a source of controversy.69 
The Winchester Development is notable, however, because a sustained challenge to 
Henderson’s viability assumptions did emerge. As I pointed out in chapter eight, Councillor Kim 
Gottlieb was a member of the ‘Silver Hill Informal Policy Group’70 that met on a monthly basis 
between 20 March 2013 and 9 April 2014 to ‘discuss key issues arising from the 
development.’71 In his capacity as a member of the Policy Group, Councillor Gottlieb was able 
to question senior officers and Henderson’s directors on the financial merits of the 
development proposals, and to scrutinise both Henderson’s viability appraisals and the advice 
that officers and Cabinet members received from a firm of property development consultants 
in relation to those appraisals.72 Councillor Gottlieb’s membership of the Policy Group meant 
that he was, initially, an insider with ‘privileged access’73 to documents usually presented to 
councillors in abridged form74 but he also presented himself as a type of opportunistic ‘local 
champion’75 able to trade on his experience as a property developer to challenge the Council’s 
decision-making processes.76 
                                                          
68 Rydin, 'Using Actor-Network Theory to understand planning practice: Exploring relationships between 
actants in regulating low-carbon commercial development'. 
69 As I noted earlier in this chapter, Adair et al point specifically to the lack of precision in the land 
valuations used in viability modelling (see Adair, Berry and McGreal, 'Financing property's contribution 
to regeneration').  
70 In chapter eight, I abbreviated the title of this group to ‘the Policy Group’ and continue to do so here. 
71 Winchester City Council, Note of Silver Hill Members Informal Policy Group held on 12 April 2013 
(Appendix B, Document 1.26). 
72 As recorded in Winchester City Council, Note of Silver Hill Members Informal Policy Group held on 24 
October 2013 (Appendix B, Document 1.28) and Winchester City Council, Note of Silver Hill Members 
Informal Policy Group held on 9 April 2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.32). 
73 Valverde, Everyday law on the street: city governance in an age of diversity, 14. 
74 In a later report that he submitted to the council’s Overview and Scrutiny Committee, Councillor 
Gottlieb described how he had looked at Henderson appraisals during the Policy Group meetings. By 
comparison, non-Cabinet councillors received only those details that officers deemed to be the ‘key 
output figures’ from Henderson appraisals (see, for example, Winchester City Council, CAB2603. Silver 
Hill Regeneration. Report of the Silver Hill Officers Project Team. 7 July 2014 (Appendix B, Document 
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75 Valverde, Everyday law on the street: city governance in an age of diversity, 88. See also Matthew S. 
Hull, Government of paper: the materiality of bureaucracy in urban Pakistan (University of California 
Press 2012), 128. 
76 There are many examples of this but perhaps the most striking is his leading role in the ‘Winchester 
Deserves Better Campaign,’ a grassroots campaign group established to challenge the development 
proposition put forward for the Winchester Development. His role in the campaign group is discussed in 
R (Gottlieb) v Winchester City Council [2015] EWHC 231 (Admin), [2015] ACD 74 at [3]. The group 
operates a website (http://winchesterdeservesbetter.com/) which, as of 27 February 2018, states that 
the group ‘was begun in June 2014 to stop the Henderson proposals for [the Winchester Development]. 
However, it also wanted to ensure that the eventual development of the site was of the kind that 




Councillor Gottlieb’s role in the Winchester Development was thus a performance. It 
was a type of performance made possible, as Valverde has noted, by the convergence of legal 
technologies and bureaucratic processes: 
The combination of opaque bureaucratic processes and a hopelessly byzantine 
legal structure thus creates opportunities for both self-appointed civic leaders and 
local politicians to seize the position of local champion.77 
Valverde’s point in identifying this type of figure is slightly different to mine because she shows 
how the emergence of a ‘local champion’ might lead a local government body to bring forward 
one-off, incremental development projects to placate the ‘local champion’ rather than ‘whole 
city’ solutions to urban problems.78 My point differs because Winchester is a small city and the 
Winchester Development was a large-scale project designed to have a ‘whole city’ effect. It 
was this ‘whole city’ effect that Councillor Gottlieb professed to be challenging though.79 
Regardless of this difference, the emergence of this type of figure is, as Valverde shows, not 
unusual. Councillor Gottlieb’s challenge was, however, unusually detailed, sustained and well-
funded, as I show in the remainder of this chapter and in chapter 10. 
Although Councillor Gottlieb had acquired insider status through his membership of 
the Policy Group, he lost his ‘privileged access’ to the documents that the Group considered 
when the leader of the Council disbanded the Policy Group following local elections in May 
2014.80 Councillor Gottlieb remained, however, a member of WCC’s Overview and Scrutiny 
Committee and, in July 2014 presented the committee members with a report cataloguing his 
criticisms of the Winchester Development. Calling on his experience as a property developer 
and evaluating the function of viability modelling, Councillor Gottlieb explained that: 
[An] appraisal is to a developer like a stethoscope is to a doctor or a spanner to a 
mechanic. It is the most basic tool of the trade, and without one no proper 
diagnosis of where we are or where we’ve been, or where we might be going to 
next can be undertaken.81 
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These comments are another expression of the engineering and travel metaphors that I have 
been highlighting throughout this thesis. They are also points that demonstrate that Councillor 
Gottlieb deemed a viability appraisal to be indispensable to property-led development.  
His criticisms of WCC’s officers addressed a perceived inability to hold Henderson’s 
directors to account for their viability assumptions. The consequence, as Councillor Gottlieb 
saw it, was technical, and linked viability modelling and the Council’s statutory duty to obtain 
‘best consideration.’82 A network of interlinked statutory provisions relate to this duty to 
obtain best consideration. Section 233(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 199083 refers 
to land that a local authority has acquired or appropriated for planning purposes. This includes 
land that a local authority has appropriated through the exercise of its compulsory purchase 
powers. If a local authority intends to dispose of such land, it has a wide discretion to dispose 
of that land in a way that it deems would ‘secure the best use of that or other land.’84 Section 
233(3) of the TCPA 1990 then states, however, that a local authority should not dispose of the 
land at anything other than the best consideration ‘that can be reasonably obtained.’85 
Part of the ‘consideration’ that WCC stood to receive came from the land interests it 
held or would acquire on the development site. When the Winchester DA had become 
unconditional, the grant of a licence from WCC to Henderson, allowing the latter access to the 
development site, would have taken effect.86 The DA stipulated an annual licence fee, payable 
by Henderson to the Council, of £240,000 when the licence became operative.87 As 
construction progressed, the DA envisaged that the Council would grant a lease to the 
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83 Hereafter referred to as ‘the TCPA 1990.’ 
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developer,88 in return for which it would receive an annual rent in the amount equivalent to 
7.56% of the rental proceeds that the developer received from the letting of individual units 
constructed on the site.89 The DA specified a minimum for this annual rent, set at £250,000.90 
The licence fee and the rent thus enabled the Council to look forward to a share in the 
developer’s income from the development.  
This was not the only consideration that the DA envisaged that the Council would 
receive from the development, however. The other part of the consideration payable to the 
Council came in the form of one-off ‘overage’ payments, entitling the Council to share in the 
developer’s profits from the completed development. WCC would receive 50% of the first £2m 
profit above 110% of Development Costs91 and 50% of any profits above 115% of Development 
Costs.92 The valuation of Development Costs was thus important both for an analysis of the 
affordable housing component of the development93 or the amount of rent that Henderson 
could afford and for the profit that WCC would make from the development. If Henderson’s 
directors could establish a high value for Development Costs, doing so might have meant that 
they could not only avoid expensive commitments to components such as affordable housing 
but that they could also minimise the need to share any profit with the Council. 
Councillor Gottlieb used his self-professed facility with the ‘tools of the trade’ to allege 
that WCC’s officers had been unable to secure ‘best consideration’ for the use of the Council’s 
land because they had failed to properly scrutinise Henderson’s viability appraisals: 
The fundamental point is that, in the absence of a comprehensive and transparent 
examination of all the possibilities presented by the prospect of the scheme being 
changed by the developer, the Council could not possibly know that Best 
Consideration was being received.94 
To explain why he felt that the Council’s examination of the financial basis for Henderson’s 
proposals was insufficient, Councillor Gottlieb outlined the scrutiny that had taken place. He 
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noted that the July 2013 meeting of the Policy Group had received a report from WCC’s 
consultants that compared a 2008 Thornfield appraisal with a 2011 Henderson appraisal.95 
WCC’s consultants produced the report in November 201196 meaning that the Policy Group 
was only able to examine it 18 months after the event. Councillor Gottlieb nonetheless noted 
that the report had identified the possibility of inflated assumptions regarding Henderson’s 
anticipated Development Costs97 and had recommended questions that officers should put to 
Henderson’s directors regarding these costs estimates.98 He alleged, however, that WCC’s 
officers had failed to interrogate Henderson’s directors or their consultants accordingly.99 
Councillor Gottlieb’s report to the Overview and Scrutiny Committee then also 
commented upon two subsequent Henderson viability appraisals. The first dated from August 
2013,100 while Henderson’s directors and WCC’s officers were negotiating with John De 
Stefano101 for the purchase of the latter’s land following the confirmation of the Winchester 
CPO. The second appraisal that Councillor Gottlieb considered was produced in May 2014, 
immediately before Henderson’s directors formally submitted their proposals for variations to 
the required elements.102 These variations included the removal of the affordable housing 
required element from the DA and the replacement of the bus station required element with a 
new retail unit.103 
Councillor Gottlieb’s principal concerns with Henderson’s 2011 viability appraisal were 
the amounts that the company proposed to spend on a ‘management fee’ and in interest on 
costs incurred, and the carrying forward of Thornfield’s expenditure on the Winchester 
Development prior to Thornfield’s parent company being placed into administration.104 He 
explained that the management fee and the interest on costs incurred were items that 
Henderson had included in their calculation of Development Costs and so, if they were over-
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Development site. In chapters four and five, I discussed negotiations between Thornfield and De Stefano 
in which Thornfield sought to acquire De Stefano’s land as a precursor to entering into a DA with WCC. 
In chapter seven, I explained that Henderson had carried these negotiations forward after it replaced 
Thornfield as developer, and that De Stefano’s land formed a significant component of the land to be 
acquired through the exercise of WCC’s CPO. 
102 Winchester City Council, OS104. Silver Hill Development Proposal. Report of Cllr Kim Gottlieb. 7 July 
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valued, would affect the amount and timing of the overage that the Council would receive, as 
well as the potential satisfaction of the viability condition in the DA. Similarly, Councillor 
Gottlieb argued that, if the costs that Thornfield had incurred prior to the administration of 
Thornfield Properties plc were afforded a line in a viability appraisal and treated as the part of 
the ‘Development Costs’ defined in the DA, Henderson’s directors could use those costs to 
present an artificially diminished viability case. His contention, on this latter point, was that it 
was improper for Henderson’s directors and their consultants to incorporate into their viability 
appraisal costs incurred by Henderson’s predecessor. 
As regards the 2013 and 2014 viability appraisals, Councillor Gottlieb pointed out that 
the 2013 appraisal estimated the profitability of the development based on the existing 
required elements, as agreed between WCC and Thornfield.105 The 2014 viability appraisal, 
Councillor Gottlieb explained, had estimated profitability based on the variations that 
Henderson sought to the required elements.106 He observed, however, that the profit margin 
derived from the existing required elements was the same as the profit margin derived from 
the amended required elements, a figure that he found to be ‘not plausible’107 and possibly 
contrived to enable the developer to avoid any obligation to contribute to the construction of 
affordable housing.108  
Councillor Gottlieb’s report, however, was critical not of Henderson’s directors or their 
consultants for the ‘tricks’109 that they used when producing these figures. He seems, instead, 
to have treated these things as part of the commercial reality of property-led development. 
Instead, he directed his criticism at the Council’s officers for failing to understand the advice 
that their consultants provided and for asking the wrong questions of those consultants.110 For 
Councillor Gottlieb, the Council’s unwillingness or inability to ask the ‘appropriate’ questions of 
its own consultants had allowed Henderson’s directors and their consultants to manufacture 
these appraisals without challenge. Underlying this view was an assumption that, if the Council 
had acted more like a developer, it would have obtained a larger profit share. Councillor 
Gottlieb’s litany of criticisms did not, therefore, challenge the existing paradigm of viability-led 
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property development but provided his version of the ‘rules’ of viability modelling while 
pointing to gaps in officers’ understanding.  
Aspects of Councillor Gottlieb’s report do, nonetheless, raise compelling points about 
the way that WCC was ill-equipped to partake in a viability-led development process. They are 
also illustrative of the imbalance in expertise between local authority officers and developers 
to which I have been referring throughout this thesis. Some of the points that Councillor 
Gottlieb raised also emerged in my interviews, particularly when CON3 gave me his 
perspective on the proficiency of local authority officers in this area. For example, when I 
asked about the way that local authorities he had worked with had scrutinised some of his 
clients’ viability appraisals, CON3 told me: 
I’ve seen officers read them upside down. And I don’t mean any disrespect to 
them. It’s simply not their core expertise or experience. It really isn’t. But people 
assume enormous authority on these models. You know, “That’s the answer. It’s 
come out of the computer. It must be right.”’ 
While CON3’s statement that he had seen ‘officers read them upside down’ should presumably 
be taken figuratively rather than literally, it points to important issues concerning viability 
modelling, particularly the faith placed in computer-generated outputs. LA4 expressed this 
faith in the comment that I quoted in chapter five, in which he referred to spreadsheets ‘the 
size of a snooker table’ and the ‘huge big matrices that work all this out.’ He was talking about 
the initial feasibility exercises that developers and local authority officers use to decide 
whether or not to enter into a DA. CON3 made his comments in relation to the viability 
appraisals that a developer might deploy to determine the time to move from conditionality to 
unconditionality or, alternatively, to determine whether or not to continue on a specific 
development trajectory. At both times, and in both circumstances, there is a childish naivety to 
the assumption that the size of these spreadsheets equates to their utility and LA4’s naivety 
chimes with CON3’s more cynical observation that people place ‘enormous authority’ on these 
appraisals. 
At least LA4 and the officers CON3 described attempted to read the appraisals in 
question, however. LA2 recalled his experience of arriving at a local authority to take up a new 
role as the officer responsible for a large property-led development project that was hovering, 
because of viability concerns, in a state of suspension. He explained that, soon after arriving at 
the local authority, he had asked to see the latest copy of the developer’s viability appraisal. 
His account, which was critical of the local authority, also revealed his unease about sharing 
this information in an interview111 and his watchfulness when revealing what he felt was 
behind-the-scenes information: 
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share information about property-led development practices in chapter three. 
267 
 
[O]ne of the things that surprised me [PAUSE]. How confidential is this [LENGHTY 
PAUSE]? Ahh, what the heck [PAUSE]. I mean, one of the things that surprised me 
was, under the arrangement with DevCo [PAUSE], there were obviously meetings 
and there were, they had to update us but we weren’t really around the same 
table in any sense, I don’t think, as a joint venture. Because we said, “We need a 
developer to do this. We’ve chosen a developer. There you are. You go and do it, 
and come and tell us how you’re getting on.” So, to my knowledge, the first time 
we saw DevCo’s development appraisal was about 18 months ago. I might be 
wrong but I believe that that is the first time that it was ever asked for and 
produced. And I was a developer in a former life, so it’s kind of [PAUSE]. The 
starting point is always the development appraisal. How’s that looking. So, you 
know, to enter into such a long-term commitment where you have ceded control 
[PAUSE], you haven’t wanted to or haven’t had the ability to ask for that key bit of 
paper until 13 years after the event?112 
In these comments, LA2 expressed his exasperation with the haplessness of colleagues who, 
he felt, understood too little about property-led development and so placed too much trust in 
the developer to act in the Council’s best interests. He acknowledged that a local authority 
allows a developer to control the pace of a property-led development process by entering into 
a DA but felt that his local authority’s powerlessness had been worsened by its officer’s 
inability or, as he put it, ‘unwillingness,’ to challenge the developer’s viability assumptions. 
LA2 was not an officer at WCC but there are marked similarities in his account and the 
criticisms that Councillor Gottlieb directed towards WCC. Councillor Gottlieb argued that it was 
‘almost certain’ that if he had not challenged Henderson’s viability assumptions, nobody else 
in the Council would have done so.113 Both accounts thus lamented the respective local 
authorities’ failure to understand ‘the deal-centred configuration of work and decision-making’ 
in this property-led development context, and a corresponding failure to act ‘like a deal-maker, 
deal-seller or deal-consumer.’114 These criticisms supplement the points that I have been 
making about the projectisation of property-led development because LA2 and Councillor 
Gottlieb both argued that, if the local authorities in question had been more able to act like a 
developer, they would have been better able to challenge developer and consultant 
assumptions regarding profit-sharing and rental proceeds.  
But LA2’s comment on the unwillingness of local authority officers to challenge these 
assumptions raises a more important issue. My findings suggest that some local authorities, 
including WCC, have been in awe of a developer’s access to finance, ability to attract 
                                                          
112 The ‘event’ in question here was the signing of the DA. According to LA2’s account, 13 years elapsed 
between the date of the DA and the local authority’s first sight of the developer’s viability appraisal. 
113 Winchester City Council, OS104. Silver Hill Development Proposal. Report of Cllr Kim Gottlieb. 7 July 
2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.36), 6. 




prospective tenants and proficiency with spreadsheets to such an extent that they dare not 
disrupt a developer’s script for property-led development. 
Councillor Gottlieb’s ability to access and scrutinise Henderson’s viability appraisals 
enabled him to ‘turn them against’115 WCC and Henderson. His efforts represented an attempt 
to open the ‘black box’ that had been formed around Henderson’s viability modelling 
techniques. Callon has pointed out that opening a black box can ‘give rise to a swarm of new 
actors’116 and can lead to a loss of control over those black boxed processes. Councillor 
Gottlieb’s challenge did introduce a ‘swarm of new actors’ to the Winchester Development, in 
that other opponents to the development process seem to have combined their criticisms with 
his.117 As I will show in chapter 10, Councillor Gottlieb’s actions also drew a range of legal 
actors into the Winchester Development when he sought legal advice on the possibility of a 
judicial review of the Council’s failure to obtain ‘best consideration.’ Finally, Councillor 
Gottlieb’s challenge was also an attempt to make viability modelling techniques ‘visible’118 in a 
development process. As I have shown, viability is ever-present as a partially concealed actor 
in property-led development. Councillor Gottlieb’s challenge made that action plainer. 
In response to Councillor Gottlieb’s challenge, WCC’s officers insisted that the profit-
sharing and rental calculation methodology in the DA would enable the Council to obtain ‘best 
consideration’119 and presented the Council’s Cabinet with a confidential report detailing the 
advice received from their consultants, the current valuations of the development and the 
return to be generated from them.120 These were, of course, different issues to those that 
Councillor Gottlieb had raised because he argued that the methodologies deployed for 
calculating viability were not, of themselves, problematic. The issue, from his point-of-view, 
was that the inputs into the appraisals, and the Council’s interrogation of those inputs, was 
                                                          
115 Hull, Government of paper: the materiality of bureaucracy in urban Pakistan, 128. 
116 Michel Callon, 'The Sociology of an Actor-Network: The Case of the Electric Vehicle' in Michel Callon, 
John Law and Arie Rip (eds), Mapping the dynamics of science and technology: sociology of science in the 
real world (Macmillan 1986), 29. 
117 As most clearly evidenced in the criticisms addressed towards councillors and officers in Council and 
Cabinet meetings in July and August 2014, referred to earlier in this chapter (see Winchester City 
Council, Minutes of the special meeting of the Cabinet held on 10 July 2014 (Appendix B, Document 
1.38); Winchester City Council, Minutes of the meeting of the Council held on 16 July 2014 (Appendix B, 
Document 1.39) ; and Winchester City Council, Minutes of the special meeting of the Cabinet held on 6 
August 2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.40)). 
118 Valverde, Everyday law on the street: city governance in an age of diversity, 193. Valverde refers 
specifically to making capital ‘visible’ in local government processes. 
119 Winchester City Council, CAB2607. Silver Hill Affordable Housing Review. Report of Head of Estates 
and Head of Legal & Democratic Services. 6 August 2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.41), paragraph 6.1. 
120 Winchester City Council, CAB2603. Silver Hill Regeneration. Report of the Silver Hill Officers Project 
Team. 7 July 2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.37). The report is referred to in exempt appendix 7, 




insufficiently robust to ensure that the Council would receive the profit and rental proceeds to 
which it was entitled.  
Following Councillor Gottlieb’s criticisms, Henderson’s directors did agree to increase 
the annual licence fee payable to the Council during the construction period for access to the 
development site from £240,000 to £295,000.121 Henderson’s directors also agreed to increase 
the minimum annual rent that would be payable to the Council following grant of the lease of 
the development site from £250,000 to £305,000.122 As I explained in chapter eight, 
Henderson’s directors also offered to make a share of the company’s profits from the 
development available in lieu of an affordable housing contribution.123 These manoeuvrings on 
the licence fee, the annual rent and the profit-sharing proposals indicate that WCC’s officers 
may have been able to obtain a better financial deal from Henderson. This suggests that there 
may exist circumstances in which local authorities such as WCC fail to obtain best 
consideration when they struggle to challenge a developer’s viability assumptions, or to act 
upon advice from their own consultants. 
The Temporality of Viability Assessments 
The points I have raised so far in this chapter have developed themes that have 
emerged throughout this thesis. In particular, I have discussed processes of ‘highly moderated 
change’124 in property-led development processes, the manner in which legal technologies 
depend for their effects on the emergence of a web of connections and associations, and the 
imbalance of expertise between developers and local authority officers that underpins 
property-led development. In the final analytical section of this chapter, I turn my attention to 
one of the other key themes of this thesis and analyse the temporality of viability assessments. 
My examination of viability modelling techniques illustrates how a viability appraisal 
enables developers, consultants and local authority officers to ‘glimpse the future’125 and to 
assess their movement towards a ‘desired future state.’126 Viability appraisals are, as these 
points demonstrate, inherently forward-looking. But the temporality of viability modelling is 
                                                          
121 As discussed in R (Gottlieb) v Winchester City Council (n76) at [22], [38]. See also clause 9.3 of the DA. 
122 R (Gottlieb) v Winchester City Council (n76) at [22], [38]. See also Winchester City Council, CAB2603. 
Silver Hill Regeneration. Report of the Silver Hill Officers Project Team. 7 July 2014 (Appendix B, 
Document 1.37), paragraph 6.7. I can find no references to these increases in published WCC 
documents. 
123 Winchester City Council, Minutes of the special meeting of the Cabinet held on 6 August 2014 
(Appendix B, Document 1.40), item 6, resolution 1(ii). 
124 Johns, 'Financing as Governance', 401. 
125 Richard Harper, Inside the IMF: an ethnography of documents, technology, and organisational action 
(Routledge 1998), 134. 
126 Steven R. Henderson, 'City centre retail development in England: Land assembly and business 




more complex than this. Earlier in this chapter, I quoted part of a report that WCC’s Head of 
Estates and Head of Legal Services jointly presented to a meeting of the Council’s Cabinet. In 
the section of that report that I quoted, these senior officers discussed viability appraisals 
produced during the Winchester Development and noted that: 
While appraisals might have been produced in the past demonstrating that on site 
affordable [sic] provision was possible, in reality they were only illustrative and in 
the absence of funding came to nothing.127 
This statement refers to viability appraisals produced during the conditional phase of the 
Winchester Development. It is also a statement that constructs that ‘time-in-between’ the 
date of the DA and the anticipated moment on which unconditionality would occur as an 
episodic period consisting of a sequence of ‘nows,’128 beginning and ending with the 
production of a new viability appraisal. In this rendering of the action of viability modelling, 
there is a ‘rush to turn the page’129 and to consign each ‘old’ viability appraisal to history. On 
the other hand, each ‘new’ viability appraisal provides a ‘new point of origin.’130 
I have already shown how the time-in-between the various viability appraisals provides 
opportunities for a developer to use viability outputs as an instrument of change, with the 
effect that Thornfield’s directors and Henderson’s directors each used viability appraisals to 
secure changes to the Long Stop Dates131 and the required elements132 written into the 
Winchester DA. Local authority officers and councillors, however, seem to have approached 
this aspect of property-led development by doing things to enhance a developer’s viability 
case while simultaneously avoiding difficult questions and waiting for a developer to produce a 
positive appraisal. As I noted earlier, research into property-led development has suggested 
that a profitable development is very often a product of luck133 and a consequence of 
constructing the development ‘at the right time.’134 Waiting for ‘the right time’ thus produces a 
more ‘ambiguous state’135 for these officers and councillors who must either anticipate or wait 
to be told what a developer will want. Moreover, and regardless of the existence of negative 
                                                          
127 Winchester City Council, CAB2607. Silver Hill Affordable Housing Review. Report of Head of Estates 
and Head of Legal & Democratic Services. 6 August 2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.41), paragraph 3.1. 
128 Michelle Bastian, 'Political Apologies and the Question of a "Shared Time' in the Australian Context' 
(2013) 30 Theory Culture & Society 94, 110. 
129 ibid, 113. 
130 ibid, 104. 
131 As discussed in chapter six. 
132 As discussed in chapters seven and eight, and in this chapter. 
133 Adams, Disberry and Hutchison, 'Still vacant after all these years - Evaluating the efficiency of 
property-led urban regeneration', 520. 
134 Henderson, 'Developer collaboration in urban land development: partnership working in Paddington, 
London', 180. 
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viability appraisals, local authority officers and councillors must continue to act ‘as if’136 a 
positive viability appraisal will emerge later in the process. Consequently, a local authority 
must proceed with securing land assembly for a development during this time-in-between 
even if it has no assurance that unconditionality will ever occur. 
Viability appraisals are, therefore, both one-off, take-it-or-leave-it outputs and 
‘unceasing’137 technologies of power used by repeat players138 to impose control at a 
distance.139 The outcome of the use of viability modelling techniques is, invariably, that a 
developer gets what they want. D1 told me that, in ‘every single scheme I’ve been involved in,’ 
the inputs to the viability appraisal produced before signing a DA had been different to the 
inputs during the conditional phase, which had been different to the inputs after 
unconditionality. The reasons for these differences might range, he explained, from fluctuating 
land valuations to changes to the incentives to be paid to anchor tenants to variations in the 
anticipated price of the raw materials to be used in the construction of the development. But, 
in terms of the developer’s ability to hit its board benchmark for profitability, he remarked that 
‘you’ve invariably got there or thereabouts.’ This last point is a significant one, and reflects the 
theme of travel running through this thesis. For a developer, it would appear, getting to the 
point at which a DA becomes unconditional is important but a DA will not become 
unconditional unless a developer has first got ‘there or thereabouts’ on viability. 
Conclusion 
Chapters four and five of this thesis showed how viability modelling formed both part 
of Thornfield’s pitch enrolling WCC as a development partner and the basis for a set of 
required elements for what Thornfield believed would be a profitable development. 
Thereafter, chapters six, seven and eight demonstrated how viability modelling legitimised 
changes to the required elements when first Thornfield’s and then Henderson’s directors 
sought to remove less profitable parts of the proposals for the Winchester Development. This 
chapter has examined that trend in more detail. Setting out a series of required elements in 
the Winchester DA presented something literally and figuratively concrete that would come 
out of the development process. But these required elements were subject to intangible, 
poorly understood and abstract concepts such as ‘anticipated profit’ and ‘anticipated 
Development Costs.’ The way that WCC’s officers and Henderson’s directors presented the 
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required elements in the DA as a basis for a viable development before refuting those 
conclusions soon afterwards exposes the way that viability modelling often appears to be 
insufficiently interrogated and can be made to measure viability in a way that suits a 
developer. 
Alongside the fluidity of the required elements, the profitability figure in the 
Winchester DA was an unchanging, invariant principle underpinning the process. The 
contractual entitlement to a profit that the DA bestowed on Henderson in the viability 
condition compelled WCC to assent to changes that moved the Council away from its earlier 
expectations for the development. But I have also revealed how it is not just local authority 
officers who look to consultants to tell them what to do, because private sector development 
directors often use consultants in the same way. An imbalance seems to exist, however, in the 
way that developers and local authority officers use the outputs that viability modelling 
generates, with evidence of local authority officers who are either unwilling or unable to 
challenge viability appraisals that developers and their consultants present as objective, 
trustworthy and rigorous demonstrations of the financial prospects of a development 
proposition. 
Investigating the way in which developers, property development consultants and 
local authority officers use and scrutinise viability modelling techniques has raised some classic 
ANT issues. In particular, I have examined the interplay between human actors and nonhuman 
actors. In developing an understanding of the working of viability appraisals, I have scrutinised 
the way in which consultants monitor the lines in a spreadsheet, the inputs to and the outputs 
from complex calculations, and the figures in mathematical formulae. While these things point 
to the ‘complex inner workings’140 of viability modelling, I have demonstrated how a skilled 
outsider can open the ‘black box’ formed around these workings and disrupt orderly progress 
along a development trajectory. In the Winchester Development, the individual who brought 
this challenge was Councillor Kim Gottlieb, and I consider the consequences of his challenge in 
more detail in chapter 10. 
 
  
                                                          




Legal ‘action’ as a strategy of property-led development 
In the final analytical chapter of this thesis, I ask if the preoccupation with ‘viability’ in 
the Winchester Development1 led Winchester City Council’s2 officers to agree to change their 
Development Agreement3 with Henderson UK Property Fund4 in a way that exceeded the 
limits that EU procurement law set on the scope of the variations permissible to this type of 
agreement. WCC had first entered into the DA with Thornfield Properties (Winchester) 
Limited,5 but Henderson had taken the development forward following the administration of 
Thornfield’s parent company.  
An underlying point of analysis in this chapter is how ‘law and legality emerge’6 in a 
property-led development project. In referring to ‘legality,’ I start from the approach that 
Silbey advocates, and analyse ‘the meanings, sources of authority, and cultural practices that 
are commonly recognised as legal, regardless of who employs them and for what purpose.’7 
The emergence of law and legality has been a theme throughout this thesis and, here, I 
examine the uses made of legal processes and legal technologies by different parties and at 
different times.  
I take a chronological approach, first examining the way that EU procurement law 
requirements affected progress by WCC and Thornfield towards unconditionality. In doing so, I 
discuss case law from the European Court of Justice,8 and its effect on the Winchester 
Development. I scrutinise legal advice that WCC’s officers obtained from external solicitors and 
                                                          
1 The ‘Winchester Development’ is the phrase that I have been using to refer to the property-led 
development project that forms the basis of my case study in this thesis. 
2 Throughout this chapter I refer to Winchester City Council as ‘WCC.’  
3 Throughout this chapter I abbreviate this term to ‘DA.’  
4 As I noted in chapter six, after Thornfield Properties plc was placed into administration, Henderson UK 
Property Fund became the guarantor of ‘the developer’s’ obligations in the DA. The developer in the DA 
became a wholly owned subsidiary of Henderson UK Property Fund. For the sake of brevity, I refer to 
the developer after Thornfield Properties plc’s administration as ‘Henderson.’ Where it is necessary to 
distinguish between the Henderson entity acting as developer and the Henderson entity acting as 
guarantor, I make the distinction clear. 
5 Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited was a special purpose company set up by Thornfield 
Properties plc to enter into a DA with WCC and carry out the Winchester development. Thornfield 
Properties (Winchester) Limited was, initially, ‘the developer’ for the purposes of the Winchester DA 
until later 2010. I have referred to Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited throughout this thesis as 
‘Thornfield’ and continue to do so in this chapter. There it is necessary to refer to Thornfield Properties 
plc, I make the distinction clear. 
6 David Cowan, 'Housing and Property' in Peter Cane and Herbert M. Kritzer (eds), The Oxford handbook 
of empirical legal research (Oxford University Press 2010), 332. 
7 Susan S. Silbey, 'After legal consciousness' (2005) 1 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 323, 347. 




barristers to confirm that proposed changes to the Winchester DA satisfied these procurement 
requirements. I then examine various threatened and actual court challenges to the 
Winchester Development trajectory, and explain how these challenges affected the trajectory 
that WCC’s officers and Henderson’s directors adopted after Henderson replaced Thornfield. 
Finally, I analyse two different types of ‘legal technology,’9 the ‘script’10 that the Winchester DA 
contained for the exercise of WCC’s compulsory purchase powers after the DA became 
unconditional11 and the ‘time pressure’12 that a statutorily-imposed deadline for exercise of 
the CPO created.  
My analysis here considers documents produced for WCC’s committee meetings13 and 
the High Court judgment in R (Gottlieb) v Winchester City Council,14 a judicial review claim 
brought by Councillor Kim Gottlieb15 to challenge a decision by WCC’s Cabinet to approve 
variations to the DA. Alongside these documents, I examine the Independent Review16 that the 
Council commissioned following the High Court’s decision in Gottlieb.17 The Independent 
Review helps me piece together details related to the legal advice that the Council’s officers 
obtained throughout the development process. Finally, I call upon my interviews18 with local 
authority officers, councillors, developers and property development consultants to examine 
the factors that a local authority might consider when facing legal proceedings and trying to 
determine whether or not to terminate a DA. 
  
                                                          
9 Emilie Cloatre, Pills for the poorest: an exploration of TRIPS and access to medication in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Palgrave 2013), 45. 
10 Madeleine Akrich, 'The De-Scription of Technical Objects' in Wiebe E. Bijker and John Law (eds), 
Shaping technology/building society: studies in sociotechnical change (MIT Press 1992), 208. 
11 In chapter six, I explained that the DA anticipated an ‘Unconditional Date’ that would mark the 
moment at which the developer’s conditional obligation to commence construction converted into an 
unconditional duty. 
12 Emily Grabham, 'Governing Permanence: Trans Subjects, Time, and the Gender Recognition Act' 
(2010) 19 Social & Legal Studies 107. 
13 Appendix B to this thesis is a list of the primary source documents produced during the Winchester 
Development that I use in this thesis. 
14 [2015] EWHC 231 (Admin), [2015] ACD 74.  
15 As I pointed out in chapters eight and nine, Councillor Gottlieb was a Conservative member of WCC 
and a property developer who was opposed to the proposals for the Winchester Development based on 
their architectural merit. He also, as I particularly explained in chapter nine, criticised WCC’s officers for 
failings he perceived in relation to the officers’ scrutiny of the viability assumptions underpinning the 
Henderson development proposals. 
16 Claer Lloyd-Jones, A Perfect Storm - Report on Silver Hill (Appendix B, Document 2.08). 
17 R (Gottlieb) v Winchester City Council (n14). 
18 I refer to material obtained in interviews with D1, D4, CON2, LA4, PS1 and COU1. Appendix D contains 
some limited biographical details explaining who these interviewees are and when I met them. 
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Bending without breaking: did changing the required elements create a new DA? 
Table 10.1 illustrates the key legal ‘events’ in the Winchester Development between 
2008 and 2016, illustrating, among other things, the changes proposed to the DA during that 
period and the legal advice that WCC’s officers obtained in relation to those changes. 
Table 10.1 Legal ‘events’ during the Winchester Development between 2008 and 2016 
Date Source Issue 
March 2008 




Effect of recent ECJ jurisprudence on decision to award DA to 








Confirmation that the changes Thornfield proposed to the 
Winchester DA in 2008 and 2009 would not trigger the need 
for a tendering competition 
March and 
November 2010 
WCC seek legal 
advice from 
Nigel Giffin QC 
Implications of the administration of Thornfield Properties plc 
and the possibility that Henderson become the developer and 
the guarantor for the purposes of the Winchester DA 
June – July 
2012 
David Elvin QC represents WCC at the inquiry held to consider the CPO made for 
the Winchester Development 
May 2013 
WCC seek legal 
advice from 
David Elvin QC 
Advice on John De Stefano’s judicial review challenging the 
Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government’s 
confirmation of the Winchester CPO 
November 2013 
John De Stefano agrees to discontinue his judicial review action challenging 
confirmation of the CPO 
January 2013 
WCC seek legal 
advice from 
David Elvin QC 
Planning strategy following Henderson’s application for a new 
planning permission for the Winchester Development 
June 2014 
WCC seek legal 
advice from Paul 
Nicholls QC 
Confirmation that changes Henderson proposed to the 
Winchester DA in 2013 would not trigger the need for a 
tendering competition. WCC’s officers initially sought to 




Councillor Kim Gottlieb seeks permission to commence judicial review of WCC’s 
Cabinet decision to approve Henderson’s 2013 changes to the Winchester DA 
August 2014 
WCC seek legal 
advice from 
David Elvin QC 
Strategy to defend WCC’s decision-making following Councillor 
Gottlieb’s judicial review action 
October 2014 
Dove J refuses to grant Councillor Gottlieb permission to pursue his judicial 
review action at the High Court 
October 2014 
WCC seek legal 
advice from 
David Elvin QC 
Further advice on planning strategy following Henderson’s 
application for a new planning permission for the Winchester 
Development 
November 2014 
Lindblom J grants Councillor Gottlieb permission to pursue his judicial review 




WCC seek legal 
advice from 
Nigel Giffin QC 
Procurement points to be raised in the judicial review action in 
defence of WCC’s decision-making following Henderson’s 
proposed changes to the Winchester DA 
February 2015 
Lang J delivers her judgment in the High Court in Gottlieb19 and deems that the 
proposed changes to the Winchester DA amounted to ‘material’ variations that 
should have triggered a tendering competition 
March 2015 
WCC seek legal 
advice from 
Nigel Giffin QC 
Likelihood of a successful appeal against Lang J’s decision 
Status of the Winchester DA following Lang J’s decision 
1 June 2015 Final Long Stop Date in the Winchester DA passes and triggers termination rights 
November 2015 
Hogan Lovells LLP (solicitors acting on behalf of Henderson) obtain permission 
from Lewison LJ to appeal Lang J’s decision 
10 February 
2016 
WCC’s Cabinet decides to terminate the Winchester DA 
19 March 2016 CPO Exercise Date passes without WCC exercising the Winchester CPO  
                                                          




The changes that Henderson’s directors sought to the DA after Henderson replaced 
Thornfield, in circumstances that I discussed in chapter nine, were the latest in a sequence of 
changes to the ‘required elements.’20 I have tracked these changes throughout this thesis, and 
briefly considered the circumstances in which WCC’s officers sought external legal advice to 
confirm if the changes would cause the Council to breach the requirements of EU procurement 
law. But, as I pointed out in chapters four, five and six, the effect of EU procurement law on 
the award of DAs and variations to DAs was somewhat uncertain between the date of the 
Winchester DA and the date on which Henderson replaced Thornfield as developer in the DA. 
Case law from the ECJ had ‘emerged’21 that suggested that the Winchester DA was a type of 
‘public works contract’ subject to EU procurement rules.22 Further ECJ jurisprudence had also 
indicated that variations to a DA of this type might create a duty, imposed upon a local 
authority, to carry out a tendering competition if changes proposed to the DA would alter the 
agreement so substantiality as, in essence, to amount to the formation of an entirely new 
agreement.23 This might happen if, for example, variations to a DA altered the ‘economic 
balance’ of the agreement in favour of a developer.24 
This ECJ jurisprudence emerged while WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s directors were 
negotiating amendments to the planning permission and variations to the DA that I discussed 
in chapter seven. These negotiations took place between 2004 and 2009, so the Winchester 
DA provides a case study of the way that an organisation responds to an emerging area of 
law.25 WCC’s internal legal team and its appointed external solicitors, Berwin Leighton Paisner 
                                                          
20 The DA listed the required elements in clause 5.3. These constituted the baseline specifications, 
agreed between WCC and Thornfield, when they entered into the DA, for such things as the retail floor-
space, the number of residential units, the number of parking spaces and the other built components of 
the development, including a new bus station and the number of ‘affordable housing’ units to be 
constructed. Henderson sought the removal from the required elements of the bus station and the 
affordable housing, an overall increase in the retail area of the development, the incorporation of 
additional land into the development site, the removal of the requirement for a ‘Shop Mobility Centre,’ 
‘Dial a Ride’ premises and a ‘Market Store,’ reductions to the car parking and residential provision, and 
authorisation to procure construction of the development ‘from a construction company with a house 
building subsidiary’ (see Winchester City Council, CAB2603. Silver Hill Regeneration. Report of the Silver 
Hill Officers Project Team. 7 July 2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.37), paragraph 2.4). 
21 Cowan, 'Housing and Property', 332. 
22 Case C-220/05 Auroux v Commune de Roanne [2007] ECR I-385. 
23 Case C-454/06 Pressetext Nachrichtenagentur GmbH v Austria [2008] ECR I-4401. 
24 Regulation 72 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015, SI 2015/152 (implementing Directive 
2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement 
and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (2014) OJ L94/65) states the current law in this area, partly 
replicating the Pressetext (ibid) principles on contract modification. The Public Contracts Regulations 
2006, SI 2006/5 (hereafter referred to as ‘the PCR 2006’) contained no equivalent provisions related to 
contract modification. 
25 Between 2004 and 2009, the PCR 2006 was the domestic legislation relevant to the procurement of 
‘public works contracts.’ The 2006 Regulations revoked the Public Works Contracts Regulations 1991, SI 




LLP,26 agreed in March 2008 that the Council’s Head of Legal and Democratic Services27 should 
seek advice on these points from James Goudie QC, a barrister specialising in EU procurement 
law.28 In obtaining that advice, WCC’s Head of Legal and BLP both sought to address concerns 
that they had identified given that WCC’s officers had not advertised their intention to enter 
into a DA for the purpose of the Winchester Development, invited proposals from developers 
other than Thornfield, or carried out a competitive tender when they awarded the DA to 
Thornfield.29 The recent ECJ jurisprudence30 meant that each of these omissions might have 
amounted to a breach of EU procurement law that might have exposed the Cabinet’s decision 
to enter into the DA to the risk of challenge.  
This was not, however, the only point on which WCC’s Head of Legal and BLP sought 
Mr Goudie’s advice. They also sought confirmation, in October 2008 and March 2009, that the 
variations to the required elements in the DA, agreed between WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s 
directors, did not alter the DA so substantially as to amount to the formation of an entirely 
new agreement.31 Following receipt of Mr Goudie’s advice, WCC’s Head of Estates justified 
Thornfield’s proposed variations to the Winchester DA on the basis that ‘the turmoil that has 
affected financial markets and property values’ meant that the Winchester Development 
would not go ahead unless the Council’s Cabinet agreed to the proposed changes.32 The Head 
of Estates report made no reference to the content of Mr Goudie’s advice but he had advised 
that the variations would ‘probably’ not amount to the creation of a new agreement, so would 
‘probably’ not trigger the requirement for a competitive tender. He did note, however, that 
‘there is a contrary view’ and that there was a realistic chance of a procurement challenge 
following confirmation of the variation if no competitive tender took place.33 He advised that 
                                                          
PCR 2006 transposed into domestic law Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, 
public supply contracts and public service contracts OJ [2004] L134/14. That directive was itself 
superseded by Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (2014) OJ L94/65. 
26 Hereafter abbreviated to ‘BLP.’ 
27 Referred to hereafter as the ‘Head of Legal.’ 
28 Lloyd-Jones, A Perfect Storm - Report on Silver Hill (Appendix B, Document 2.08), Appendix 4, 1-3. Mr 
Goudie’s profile refers to his experience in dealing with public procurement cases (see 
<https://www.11kbw.com/barristers/james-goudie/> accessed 2 March 2018). I have already discussed 
aspects of Mr Goudie’s advice in chapter six, where I noted that he advised that the DA was, for the 
purposes of the PCR 2006, a ‘public works contract’ that should have originally been awarded on the 
basis of a competitive tender. 
29 ibid, Appendix 4, 1. 
30 Case C-220/05 Auroux v Commune de Roanne (n22). 
31 Lloyd-Jones, A Perfect Storm - Report on Silver Hill (Appendix B, Document 2.08), Appendix 4, 2. 
32 Winchester City Council, CAB1739. Silver Hill Winchester - Compulsory Purchase Order. Report of Head 
of Estates. 18 November 2008 (Appendix B, Document 1.20), paragraph 2.4. 




WCC’s officers should avoid further variations to the DA that exceeded a ‘de minimis’ level 
without first carrying out an open market tendering process to enable other developers to bid 
for the contract.34 The Independent Review suggests that the Council’s Cabinet received a 
summary of Mr Goudie’s advice in closed proceedings of a Cabinet meeting on 18 November 
2008,35 meaning that there is no public record of the discussion available. WCC’s officers 
appear to have made no recommendation to the Cabinet advising it to commence a tendering 
process so the Cabinet duly approved the proposed variations to the DA.36 
I have discussed this phase of the Winchester Development here, and revisited 
changes to the DA that I have already analysed, because the use of legal advice as a property-
led development strategy is an important theme of this chapter. The way that both WCC’s 
Head of Legal and WCC’s Head of Estates used Mr Goudie’s advice raises important questions 
about continuity and discontinuity in property-led development. WCC’s officers presented Mr 
Goudie’s legal advice as an indication that the changes to the DA did not undermine the 
essence of the original agreement. There is a tension, however, between this concept and the 
apparent need for a document that can endure if its contents are, using Brothman’s phrase, 
‘quickly replaceable.’37 Another way of expressing this is by returning to the point I made in 
chapter seven that a DA must be ‘plastic enough’38 to respond to the changing wants and 
needs of a local authority and a developer. Such plasticity is often necessary, as I showed, if a 
DA is ever to become a ‘legally binding’ agreement. But a team of local authority officers and 
their private sector development partners must limit their desire to bend the contents of a DA 
to ensure that the agreement remains ‘robust enough’39 to satisfy an external set of legal 
requirements. It was, therefore, important for WCC’s officers to ask if the changes that they 
proposed to make to the Winchester DA were part of a necessary ‘ripening’40 process or 
amounted to a ‘disavowal’41 of the original DA. If two contracting parties use a DA as a device 
to enable themselves to become more aware of what they are trying to express in a set of 
                                                          
34 ibid, Appendix 4, 1. 
35 ibid, Appendix 4, 1-2. 
36 Winchester City Council, Minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 18 November 2008 (Appendix 
B, Document 1.19), item 17. 
37 Brien Brothman, 'Perfect present, perfect gift: Finding a place for archival consciousness in social 
theory' (2010) 10 Archival Science 141, 148. 
38 Susan Leigh Star and James R. Griesemer, 'Institutional Ecology, Translations and Boundary Objects - 
Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley's Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907-39' (1989) 19 Social 
Studies of Science 387, 393. 
39 ibid, 393. 
40 Bruno Latour, The making of law: an ethnography of the Conseil d'Etat (Polity 2010), 82. 




development proposals, ‘rewriting’42 that DA is a perilous task. Balancing flexibility with 
external rules governed by ECJ jurisprudence proved problematic for WCC, created recurring 
challenges and locked stresses into the DA. The legal advice that WCC’s officers had obtained 
from Mr Goudie had short-term benefits, however, because the variations to the DA and the 
subsequent grant of planning permission on 9 February 2009 enabled Thornfield to discharge 
the planning condition in the DA.43 
An actual or a threatened legal action? John De Stefano’s challenge to confirmation of the 
Winchester CPO 
While WCC’s planning committee granted planning permission to Thornfield in 
February 2009, Thornfield’s bank placed Thornfield’s parent company into administration in 
January 201044 and Henderson replaced Thornfield as ‘the developer’ in the DA from 10 
December 2010.45 In chapter six, I explained that WCC’s officers instructed Nigel Giffin QC46 
during this period to advise if either Henderson’s acquisition of Thornfield or its replacement 
of Thornfield’s parent company as guarantor of the developer’s obligations in the DA 
amounted to a material variation of the DA.47 Mr Giffin’s advice was that this change was not a 
material variation,48 but this was another episode in the Winchester Development during 
which WCC’s officers, including the Council’s Head of Legal, and BLP, the Council’s external 
solicitors, sought reassurance that their actions did not infringe EU procurement law 
requirements.  
But WCC’s Head of Legal and BLP’s solicitors did not only instruct barristers to provide 
expert legal advice when they were concerned that variations to the Winchester DA might 
have caused a breach of procurement law and might thus have led to a risk of a challenge to a 
Cabinet decision to approve those variations. They also sought legal advice from a barrister 
                                                          
42 Michel Callon, 'Writing and (Re)writing Devices as Tools for Managing Complexity' in John Law and 
Annemarie Mol (eds), Complexities: social studies of knowledge practices (Duke University Press 2002), 
192. 
43 As discussed in chapter seven. 
44 As discussed in Winchester City Council, CAB2085. Silver Hill Regeneration Project - Latest 
Developments. Report of Chief Executive. 24 November 2010 (Appendix B, Document 1.23). 
45 Martin Robert Perry, Proof of Evidence. Silverhill, Winchester. 6 June 2012 (Appendix B, Document 
3.06), paragraph 6.1. 
46 Mr Giffin’s profile refers to his specialisms in local government law and public procurement law (see 
<https://www.11kbw.com/barristers/nigel-giffin/> accessed 3 March 2018). 
47 Winchester City Council, CAB2085. Silver Hill Regeneration Project - Latest Developments. Report of 
Chief Executive. 24 November 2010 (Appendix B, Document 1.23), paragraph 4.1. 




when John De Stefano49 issued a challenge to the Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government’s 20 March 2013 decision to confirm the Winchester CPO.  
Section 23(1) of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 enables ‘any person aggrieved’ to 
apply to the High Court to challenge the confirmation of a CPO. De Stefano was advised in 
bringing this action by Dentons, a firm of solicitors, who issued this challenge in the name of 
the five companies that De Stefano controlled that held land interests to be acquired by the 
exercise of the CPO.50 The Council instructed BLP and David Elvin QC51 to represent it.52 None 
of the documents that I have seen state the basis on which De Stefano sought to challenge 
confirmation of the CPO, although it seems likely his grounds were similar to those raised on 
his behalf at the CPO inquiry.53 It is possible that De Stefano’s challenge may have been 
designed to compel WCC’s officers and Henderson’s directors to strike a swift and potentially 
expensive deal for the former’s land. Alternatively, it is possible that De Stefano was adamant 
that he would not sell his land and wanted to pursue every option available to him to 
challenge the CPO. I can find no evidence to prove either supposition, however. 
While De Stefano’s challenge to confirmation was in progress, WCC’s officers, 
Henderson’s directors and De Stefano’s representatives had continued the negotiations for the 
transfer of De Stefano’s land, which I analysed in chapter eight. The three parties agreed terms 
for the transfer in November 201354 but, during the ‘time-in-between’ De Stefano’s challenge 
                                                          
49 John De Stefano owned a group of companies that held interests on the earmarked Winchester 
Development site. In chapters four and five, I discussed negotiations between Thornfield and De Stefano 
in which Thornfield sought to acquire De Stefano’s land as a precursor to entering into a DA with WCC. 
In chapter seven, I explained that Henderson had carried these negotiations forward after it replaced 
Thornfield as developer, and that De Stefano’s land formed a significant component of the land to be 
acquired through the exercise of WCC’s CPO. 
50 London & Henley (Middle Brook Street) Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government [2013] EWHC 4207 (Admin). 
51 Mr Elvin’s profile refers to his specialisms on planning, environmental and compulsory purchase law 
(see <http://www.landmarkchambers.co.uk/david_elvin> accessed 2 March 2018). The Inspector’s 
report produced at the conclusion of the CPO inquiry states that Mr Elvin had represented the Council at 
the inquiry (Christine Thorby, CPO Report to the Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government; SUO Report to the Secretary of State for Transport. 17 December 2012 (Appendix B, 
Document 3.03), Annex A). 
52 As noted in the law report of London & Henley (Middle Brook Street) Ltd v Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government (n50). 
53 The principal grounds were that the DA had been procured in contravention of EU procurement law 
and rules on state aid. I consider the state aid point briefly later in this chapter. In addition, De Stefano’s 
representatives had argued at the CPO inquiry that WCC had made insufficient efforts to acquire land on 
the development site by negotiation and that the proposals set out in the DA would not form the basis 
of a ‘viable’ development. For a summary of the grounds raised on behalf of De Stefano at the CPO 
inquiry, see Thorby, CPO Report to the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government; SUO 
Report to the Secretary of State for Transport. 17 December 2012 (Appendix B, Document 3.03), 
paragraphs 5.26-5.49. 
54 As discussed in London & Henley (Middle Brook Street) Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and 




and the date that the parties agreed the transfer, De Stefano had maintained his challenge to 
confirmation of the CPO. This shows that local authority officers and private sector developers 
are not the only participants in property-led development who deploy legal resources as a 
strategy. De Stefano’s challenge was disruptive for both WCC and Henderson because it meant 
that confirmation of the CPO did not, of itself, discharge the site assembly condition in the 
Winchester DA. The site assembly condition would only be discharged when De Stefano’s 
action concluded and no further challenge to confirmation of the CPO was possible.55 More 
fundamentally, of course, a challenge to the legitimacy of the CPO threatened the usefulness 
of the principal instrument of land assembly. 
To alleviate this threat, WCC’s Head of Legal instructed Mr Elvin on 20 May 2013 to 
advise on the likelihood that De Stefano’s challenge would be successful.56 The Independent 
Review states that the Council’s legal team did not report the details of Mr Elvin’s advice to the 
Council’s Cabinet but there are various possibilities as to how officers used his advice. If his 
advice had indicated that De Stefano had a good prospect of successfully challenging 
confirmation of the CPO, the Council’s officers and Henderson’s directors would have been 
compelled to strike a bargain for De Stefano’s land on whatever terms were available. 
Alternatively, if Mr Elvin had indicated that De Stefano had a poor prospect of success, WCC’s 
officers and Henderson’s directors would have able to hold out for a bargain for as long as they 
felt able to do so before needing to proceed with exercise of the CPO.  
I have no information to indicate how Mr Elvin rated De Stefano’s prospects of 
success, and do not want to dwell on this point because De Stefano eventually withdrew his 
challenge. A landowner who stands to lose their land following the confirmation of a CPO 
automatically qualifies as a person able to challenge confirmation,57 although Denyer-Green 
suggests that there is ‘considerable doubt’ whether an individual who does not stand to lose 
any land can challenge confirmation.58 It is therefore unlikely that, having agreed terms for the 
sale of his land,59 De Stefano would have been successful had he continued his High Court 
action. The solicitors acting for De Stefano thus applied to the High Court on 29 October 2013 
seeking an order adjourning his challenge.60 Lindblom J, the High Court judge appointed to 
                                                          
55 Schedule 2, paragraph 2.3 of the DA stated that the site assembly condition would be discharged 
when a CPO enabling the purchase of all the land interests required for the development had been 
confirmed and with ‘any judicial challenge having been Finally Determined.’ 
56 Lloyd-Jones, A Perfect Storm - Report on Silver Hill (Appendix B, Document 2.08), Appendix 4, 5. 
57 Barry Denyer-Green, Compulsory purchase and compensation (10th edn, Routledge 2014), 46. 
58 ibid, 46. 
59 As discussed in chapter eight. 
60 London & Henley (Middle Brook Street) Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local 




consider the application for an adjournment, initially rejected the application because of the 
proximity in time between the date of the application and the hearing of the matter, which 
was scheduled to take place on 14 and 15 November 2013.61  
WCC’s solicitors renewed the application for adjournment, however, supported by De 
Stefano’s solicitors, at which point Lindblom J agreed to the adjournment62 because: 
There are now draft sale and purchase agreements involving all of the parties. In 
those draft agreements both the principles of settlement and the relevant 
amounts of money have been agreed. The drafts are all in circulation. There is also 
a draft option agreement. That too is circulating between the parties.63 
The ‘circulation’ of these drafts is, therefore, indicative of a ‘repeated pattern’64 to the use of 
‘nearly legal’ contractual documentation in the Winchester Development. The notion that 
these drafts were circulating is another example of a ‘vehicular idea’ that moves a process 
forward.65 But Lindblom J was critical of the way that the three parties had used the court’s 
resources. He pointed out that WCC’s officers, Henderson’s directors and De Stefano’s 
representatives had concluded terms for the sale and purchase of De Stefano’s land ‘virtually 
at the last minute’ before the court proceedings began66 and that the adjournment would be 
‘damaging’ to other parties with proceedings before the court because the court would be idle 
during the time set aside for the De Stefano challenge.67 This suggests a ‘sense of racing 
against the clock’68 to get the transfer agreement into a state in which it was ‘robust enough’ 
to travel69 to WCC’s Cabinet and Council and to the court.  
In addition, WCC, Henderson and De Stefano were racing against the clock to convince 
Lindblom J that travel from a ‘nearly legal’ state to a ‘legally binding’ state would be 
sufficiently likely to ensure that the parties would not seek to reopen proceedings. There was a 
clear financial imperative for WCC, Henderson and De Stefano in doing so because the costs of 
a court hearing, including the attendant costs of paying for barristers and solicitors to appear 
at court, would have escalated rapidly had court proceedings commenced. This provides 
                                                          
61 ibid at [2]. 
62 ibid at [18]. 
63 ibid at [8]. 
64 Cloatre, Pills for the poorest: an exploration of TRIPS and access to medication in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
107. 
65 David Cowan and Daniel Wincott, 'Exploring the 'Legal'' in David Cowan and Daniel Wincott (eds), 
Exploring the 'Legal' in Socio-Legal Studies (Palgrave 2016), 26. 
66 London & Henley (Middle Brook Street) Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government (n50) at [15]. 
67 ibid at [14]. 
68 Annelise Riles, '[Deadlines]: Removing the Brackets on Politics in Bureaucratic and Anthropological 
Analysis' in Annelise Riles (ed), Documents: artifacts of modern knowledge (University of Michigan Press 
2006), 86. 
69 Star and Griesemer, 'Institutional Ecology, Translations and Boundary Objects - Amateurs and 
Professionals in Berkeley's Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907-39', 393. 
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another perspective on the way that ‘law’ creates time pressure in property-led development. 
Lindblom J’s emphasis on the circulating drafts evokes a sense of the contracting parties 
moving closer to a legally binding agreement but those parties were also using the draft 
documents to move the court to adjourn proceedings before the scheduled hearing took 
place. 
Legal advice: Continuum or difference? 
In this section, I revisit the changes to the Winchester DA that Henderson’s directors 
and WCC’s officers were negotiating while John De Stefano’s challenge to the CPO was in 
progress. In doing so, I examine how WCC’s preoccupation with achieving unconditionality on 
Henderson’s terms in time for the CPO Exercise Date exposed it to the threat of judicial review 
proceedings. I analyse the legal advice that WCC’s Head of Legal obtained to legitimise the 
proposed changes, and the grounds for the judicial review brought to challenge the changes.  
The fear of litigation is an underlying theme of this chapter. At the first meeting of the 
‘Silver Hill Informal Policy Group,’70 on 12 April 2013, WCC’s Corporate Director informed the 
councillors present that ‘[l]egal advice will be sought at every stage to ensure that these 
[proposed changes] do not prejudice the Development Agreement.’71 The first external legal 
advice that WCC’s officers sought in relation to the proposed changes came from David Elvin 
QC on 13 January 2014.72 Mr Elvin’s advice did not refer to procurement issues but instead 
instructed the Council’s officers on the planning strategy to be adopted to enable the Council 
to support Henderson’s application for a new planning permission for the Winchester 
Development.73 This advice did not, therefore, relate specifically to variations to the DA, so I do 
not propose to dwell on it here. 
Of more interest here is advice that the Council obtained on procurement issues 
arising in relation to those variations. When WCC acquired De Stefano’s land, WCC’s officers 
and Henderson’s directors had agreed that the former would submit its official proposals for 
the variations to be made to the DA to the Council by 14 June 2014.74 Cameron Fraser, one of 
Henderson’s directors, duly submitted those variations to Howard Bone, WCC’s Head of Legal, 
                                                          
70 I introduced the Silver Hill Informal Policy Group in chapter eight. It was a group of WCC councillors 
appointed to advise on the Winchester Development. I refer to the group as ‘the Policy Group’ 
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71 Winchester City Council, Note of Silver Hill Members Informal Policy Group held on 12 April 2013 
(Appendix B, Document 1.26). 
72 Lloyd-Jones, A Perfect Storm - Report on Silver Hill (Appendix B, Document 2.08), Appendix 4, 6. 
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on 12 June 2014.75 WCC’s Head of Legal then sought external advice from a barrister on the 
legal ramifications of these proposals, focussing upon questions whether the variations 
created ‘any issue over state aid,’76 would enable the Council to receive ‘best consideration’77 
for the transfer of the development site to Henderson or, if the Council’s Cabinet approved the 
variations, there would be a claim that the Council had contravened EU procurement law 
requirements.78 
When seeking that advice, as the Independent Review points out, WCC’s Head of Legal 
had initially sought to instruct Nigel Giffin QC, the same barrister they had asked to advise 
them in 2010 when Henderson replaced Thornfield as developer and Thornfield Properties as 
guarantor in the DA.79 But the author of the Independent Review raised concerns about the 
timeliness of the 2014 request that WCC’s officers made to Mr Giffin.80 I have already 
mentioned that, when WCC acquired De Stefano’s land, WCC’s officers and Henderson’s 
directors agreed that Henderson would submit its proposals for variations to the DA by 14 June 
2014.81 They had been discussing the variations necessary to the DA in advance of that 
submission but WCC’s officers did not seek legal advice from Mr Giffin on the procurement law 
implications of the proposed variations until 25 May 2014.82 Mr Giffin was not available at such 
‘short notice,’83 however, so WCC’s officers turned to Paul Nicholls QC84 instead and received 
his advice on 9 June 2014,85 three days before Henderson submitted its finalised proposals for 
the Council’s Cabinet to approve.86 It is possible that WCC’s officers left the moment at which 
they sought Mr Giffin’s advice until late in the process because they were waiting for 
                                                          
75 Winchester City Council, CAB2603. Appendix 1. Letter from Cameron Fraser to Howard Bone (12 June 
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(Appendix B, Document 1.33), paragraph 23. Article 107(1) of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty of 
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77 ibid. 
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80 ibid, 32. 
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(Appendix B, Document 1.31), item 4. 
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83 ibid, 32. 
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Henderson’s directors to clarify aspects of their proposition. In such circumstances, it might be 
understandable to wait to ensure that the questions asked of a barrister are as comprehensive 
as possible. On the other hand, the sense of pressure before an impending deadline is not a 
novel idea and, in these circumstances, WCC’s officers seem to have lost control of time, with 
the consequence that they also lost the opportunity to obtain advice from a barrister with 
detailed knowledge of the Winchester Development. 
Regarding the state aid and best consideration points on which WCC’s officers sought 
advice, Mr Nicholls advised that, ‘provided appropriate consultants could certify that the 
scheme continued to provide “best consideration” […], there was no issue over state aid.’87 In 
doing so, Mr Nicholls was speaking the language of ‘projectisation’ that I have been analysing 
throughout this thesis. He did not examine the questions that WCC’s officers asked of their 
consultants, or the way in which they used their consultants’ advice, because, he explained, 
legal precedent merely required the Council’s officers to have sought advice from specialist 
consultants.88 As I pointed out in chapter nine, however, these were aspects of the Winchester 
Development to which Councillor Kim Gottlieb addressed strong criticism.89 From Mr Nicholls’ 
perspective, though, WCC’s officers had discharged their duty to obtain best consideration and 
had not provided unlawful state aid to Henderson because they had a consultant’s report 
certifying these things.  
While Mr Nicholls’ advice to WCC on the best consideration and state aid points was 
clear, his advice was more complex on the need for a competitive tender if WCC approved 
Henderson’s required elements. Mr Nicholls advised that the removal of the bus station and 
affordable housing component from the DA would constitute ‘material changes’ for the 
purpose of procurement law90 and so might trigger the need for a competitive tendering 
process by altering the original DA so substantially as to create an entirely new contract.91 
Despite the materiality of the removal of the bus station and the affordable housing required 
elements, however, Mr Nicholls informed the Council that no tender was necessary because 
                                                          
87 Winchester City Council, CAB2665. Appendix 5. Notes of Conference with Leading Counsel. 9 June 2014 
(Appendix B, Document 1.33), paragraph 23. 
88 As I pointed out in chapter nine, the recent High Court judgment in R (Faraday Development Limited) v 
West Berkshire Council [2016] EWHC 2166 (Admin), 168 Con LR 131 has indicated that a local authority 
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89 Winchester City Council, OS104. Silver Hill Development Proposal. Report of Cllr Kim Gottlieb. 7 July 
2014 (Appendix B, Document 1.36). 
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chapter six. 
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the variations clause, written into the DA at the time that the agreement was made, envisaged 
the possibility of this type of change to the required elements.92 Any such changes would, in 
Mr Nicholls’s view, be deemed to be part of the performance of the DA, rather than an act 
creating a new DA.93  
On the specific question of the removal of the bus station from the required elements, 
Mr Nicholls advised that ‘[i]t would clearly be absurd to require the developer to provide 
something that the end-user did not want.’94 Here, the end-user that Mr Nicholls had in mind 
was Stagecoach (South) Limited,95 which had previously stated that it would operate a new bus 
station from the development site. Stagecoach had, however, subsequently informed 
Henderson’s directors that it no longer wished to do so.96 Mr Nicholl’s reached these 
conclusions notwithstanding Henderson’s earlier statement that removing the bus station, and 
so freeing space for a new anchor retail store, clearly made the DA more economically 
favourable to Henderson.97  
The author of the Independent Review has pointed out that Mr Nicholls’s advice was 
‘out of step’ with earlier advice that WCC’s officers had received.98 For example, when James 
Goudie QC advised WCC’s legal team in relation to variations proposed in 2008 and 2009,99 his 
advice did not present ‘the variations clause as the savior [sic] of the variations issue for the 
Council.’100 The phrase here is taken from the Independent Review and is awkwardly expressed 
but the point seems to be that Mr Goudie felt that the variations clause provided only limited 
scope for variations. If my interpretation is correct, this is in keeping with the tone of the 
advice that Nigel Giffin QC, in 2010, provided when he recommended that WCC and 
Henderson should ‘standstill’ for six months following Henderson’s acquisition of Thornfield.101 
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93 Winchester City Council, CAB2665. Appendix 5. Notes of Conference with Leading Counsel. 9 June 2014 
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99 ibid, 20 and Appendix 4. This advice referred to the variations that I described in chapter seven. Using 
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In doing so, Mr Giffin noted that the lack of any tendering exercise before the selection of 
Thornfield as developer ‘might make it harder to rely upon contract change mechanisms […] in 
the original DA.’102  
The advice that WCC’s officers obtained between 2008 and 2010 indicated that the 
bolt-ons and adjustments then proposed to the DA would not trigger a tendering exercise 
because the changes did not amount to the formation of an entirely new agreement. In those 
circumstances, the ineffectiveness of the variations clause as a mechanism governing the 
changes had little practical significance if the changes amounted only to ‘immaterial’ 
amendments to the original DA. By contrast, the advice the Council received in 2014 from Paul 
Nicholls QC was that the changes proposed to the DA would create a new contract that would 
trigger a tendering competition but for the operation of the variations clause as a legitimising 
device.  
Discontinuity in the legal advice that WCC received introduces a new and unexpected 
temporality to the Winchester Development. The lack of a competitive tender was, as I have 
indicated, a stress locked-in to the DA by the circumstances of its production. Procurement law 
requirements produced additional, episodic tension whenever WCC sought to rewrite the DA. 
WCC’s officers had, therefore, been repeatedly forced to open the content of the DA and 
changes proposed to it to external inspection. It is important to ask, therefore, why officers 
waited before obtaining advice on Henderson’s proposed changes, why they overlooked 
inconsistency in the 2014 advice compared with that obtained between 2008 and 2010, and 
how they used the advice to move the development process forward.  
While the author of the Independent Review felt that WCC should have maintained 
the continuity of advice that it received in relation to the DA, WCC’s officers sought to preserve 
the continuity of its relationship with Henderson. At the special meeting of the Cabinet held to 
consider Henderson’s proposals, the Council’s Head of Legal made it clear that Henderson 
‘would not go ahead’ with construction unless the Cabinet approved the changes.103 BLP, the 
Council’s external solicitors, who were also present at that Cabinet meeting, advised that, if 
Henderson did not go ahead, WCC would have to ‘go back to the drawing board,’ tender for a 
new developer and make a new CPO.104 Preserving the continuity of its relationship with 
                                                          
102 Lloyd-Jones, A Perfect Storm - Report on Silver Hill (Appendix B, Document 2.08), Appendix 4, 4. I take 
the reference to ‘contract change mechanisms’ to refer to the variations clause. 
103 Winchester City Council, Minutes of the special meeting of the Cabinet held on 10 July 2014 (Appendix 
B, Document 1.38), 12. 
104 ibid, 11. The rationale for this statement was that a local authority must exercise a CPO within three 
years of the confirmation of a CPO (section 4, Compulsory Purchase Act 1965). If WCC had chosen to 
reject Henderson’s proposals and sought to terminate the DA on 1 June 2015, the Council would then 
have had only until March 2016 to find another developer to fund the exercise of the CPO. 
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Henderson was important to WCC because the DA was carrying around a significant 
investment of time and money as well as the mechanism for the exercise of the hard-won CPO. 
But it was also carrying around the burden of a set of required elements that Henderson 
deemed unworkable, a flawed procurement process and a deadline for WCC to consider and 
approve Henderson’s proposed changes. This was the context in which WCC’s officers sought 
Paul Nicholls QC’s advice. These officers opened the proposals out to external expert analysis 
to confirm the legitimacy of proposals that Henderson’s directors informed them would make 
the DA ‘workable.’  
Once Mr Nicholls’s advice could be seen to confirm the ‘legitimacy’ of the Council’s 
approach, WCC officers had an artefact105 that they believed that they could use to move the 
development process forward. Despite the discrepancy between the earlier advice and that 
obtained in 2014, WCC’s officers presented the latest advice as part of an assemblage106 that, if 
taken together, justified changes to the DA and legitimised their recommendation that the 
Cabinet should approve Henderson’s proposed variations.107 But while the officers’ 
emphasised the continuity in their recourse to legal advice, they did not acknowledge the 
discontinuity in the content of that advice. Given the time pressure created by seeking that 
advice close to the date on which the Cabinet would meet to consider Henderson’s proposals, 
however, and given that WCC’s officers were concerned not to lose the time and money 
invested in the Winchester Development to that point, it is not surprising that those officers 
recommended that the Cabinet should follow the advice that appeared most advantageous. 
Falling foul of procurement law 
In chapter nine, I provided a detailed analysis of the ways in which Councillor Kim 
Gottlieb sought to challenge the decision-making that led to WCC’s officers recommending 
that the Council’s Cabinet should approve the Henderson-led variations to the DA. Prior to 
Cabinet approval, granted on 6 August 2014,108 Councillor Gottlieb’s opposition had been 
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voiced in internal Council proceedings,109 the local press110 and online through the website his 
campaign group had established. Following Cabinet approval for the Henderson-led variations, 
however, Councillor Gottlieb’s opposition became a ‘legal’ action. 
There were two unusual features of Councillor Gottlieb’s legal action. The first was 
that he was a representative of the majority group of councillors in WCC but challenged the 
decisions of a Cabinet led by his party colleagues.111 The second, more significant, feature of 
Councillor Gottlieb’s legal action was that he instructed the same solicitors as John De Stefano 
had used in his challenge to confirmation of the CPO.112 These solicitors were, therefore, 
‘repeat players’ in the Winchester Development, able to draw upon work previously carried 
out in challenging the WCC-Henderson development trajectory.113 Councillor Gottlieb’s use of 
these solicitors was ‘opportunistic’114 and enabled him to challenge non-compliance with 
procurement law as a means to prevent what he saw as a poorly negotiated deal for a 
development lacking architectural merit.115 His solicitors’ ability to call upon existing work 
meant that they could revive pre-prepared arguments, with significant financial advantages for 
Councillor Gottlieb, who funded the costs of his legal action himself.116 
This legal action took the form of an application to the High Court for a judicial review 
of the Cabinet decision of 6 August 2014, based on three grounds. Councillor Gottlieb was the 
claimant in the proceedings, WCC was the defendant and Henderson was joined to the 
proceedings as an ‘Interested Party.’117 Councillor Gottlieb’s application argued, mirroring the 
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criticisms he presented to the Council’s Overview and Scrutiny Committee on 7 July 2014118 
and contrary to Paul Nicholls QC’s advice,119 that the Council had not obtained ‘appropriate’ 
advice from its consultants and could not, therefore, show that the proposed variations 
enabled it to obtain best consideration for the transfer of its land.120 If the Council could not 
show that the variations enabled it to obtain best consideration, Councillor Gottlieb agued, 
there was also a possibility that the contractual arrangements constituted state aid.121 These 
two grounds were founded on his personal criticisms of the decisions that WCC’s officers had 
made. His third ground seems to have been the work of Dentons, his solicitors, and 
concentrated on procurement issues arising from the Cabinet decision of 6 April 2014.122 
A judicial review application consists of two stages. The second stage addresses the 
substantive issues raised in an application. The first stage, by contrast, involves a 
determination as to whether or not an applicant has ‘permission’ entitling them to have their 
application heard in the High Court.123 Such permission will usually be granted or refused ‘on 
the papers,’124 meaning that a High Court judge will usually ‘consider the question of 
permission without a hearing.’125 The grounds for declining permission are generally that the 
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claim has no ‘realistic prospect of success,’126 the claimant does not have ‘sufficient interest’ or 
standing to bring a claim127 or that the claimant has filed their claim too late.128 
In August 2014, immediately after Councillor Gottlieb initiated proceedings, BLP, the 
Council’s external solicitors, obtained advice from David Elvin QC on the Council’s ability to 
defend its decision-making if Councillor Gottlieb’s claim reached a substantive hearing.129 The 
Council’s Head of Legal reported the contents of that advice to Cabinet members in a meeting 
on 10 September 2014 and informed the members that a ‘robust response, drafted by Leading 
Counsel, had been given by the Council to […] Councillor Gottlieb’s solicitors.’130 
Dove J, a High Court judge, considered the documents submitted pursuant to 
Councillor Gottlieb’s application and, on 8 October 2014, refused to grant him permission to 
continue his application at a substantive hearing.131 Dove J did so because the documents 
submitted to the High Court indicated that WCC’s officers had obtained ‘professional advice’ 
that was sufficient to discharge their duty to obtain best consideration and there was ‘no 
identified evidential basis’ that suggested that the variations to the DA amounted to state aid 
in favour of Henderson.132 On the procurement point advanced by Councillor Gottlieb, Dove J 
took a similar view to Paul Nicholls QC and concluded that the documents submitted to the 
High Court indicated that the variations agreed to the DA did substantially alter the original DA 
but were variations of a type that had been envisaged when WCC and Thornfield entered into 
the DA and were within the ambit of the variations clause in the agreement.133 
Consequentially, Dove J concluded that the variations did not trigger the need for a tendering 
exercise and that Councillor Gottlieb’s claim had a low prospect of success.134 
On 15 October 2014, after Dove J had refused to grant Councillor Gottlieb permission 
to continue with his High Court action, BLP sought further advice from Mr Elvin to determine 
how the Council should proceed with the Winchester Development in light of a new 
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application for planning permission from Henderson.135 Dove J’s conclusion did not, however, 
defeat Councillor Gottlieb’s application because CPR 54.12(3) allows an applicant who is 
refused permission ‘on the papers’ to request that the decision on permission be reconsidered 
in an oral, face-to-face hearing with a High Court judge. At that hearing, which took place on 
24 November 2014, Lindblom J confirmed Dove J’s refusal to grant Councillor Gottlieb 
permission to pursue his best consideration and state aid points but did grant Councillor 
Gottlieb permission to pursue the procurement point in a substantive hearing.136 The 
substantive hearing of the procurement grounds raised in Councillor Gottlieb’s application for 
judicial review were considered by Lang J in the High Court on 28 and 29 January 2015.137 Lang 
J delivered her judgment on 11 February 2015.138 
The advice that Mr Elvin provided following Councillor Gottlieb’s application for 
judicial review does not appear to have addressed the procurement issue that Councillor 
Gottlieb’s application raised.139 Following Lindblom J’s decision to grant Councillor Gottlieb 
permission to pursue his judicial review action at a substantive hearing on the procurement 
point, BLP, the Council’s external solicitors, recommended that the Council’s legal team should 
seek the advice of Nigel Giffin QC, in his capacity as a procurement specialist.140 WCC’s Head of 
Legal did so, first on 5 December 2014 and secondly on 9 January 2015. In his advice, Mr Giffin 
warned that the case on the procurement ground was ‘finely balanced’ but that the Council 
‘still [had] an arguable case.’141 WCC’s Head of Legal and BLP’s solicitors had chosen to seek Mr 
Giffin’s advice despite having instructed Paul Nicholls QC on the procurement point earlier in 
the year. Although they treated Mr Giffin as their preferred procurement adviser, however, 
the Council instructed Mr Elvin to represent them at the judicial review hearing,142 with Mr 
Giffin’s advice intended to supplement the case that Mr Elvin would present to the court.143  
In her judgment following the High Court hearing, Lang J deemed that the Winchester 
DA was, at the time that WCC and Thornfield had entered into the DA, a ‘public works 
contract’ and a ‘public works concession contract.’144 Regarding the substitution of a 
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department store for the provision of a bus station, Mr Elvin had submitted on behalf of the 
Council that this change would actually produce a ‘negative’ financial outcome for Henderson 
as a result of the costs of incentives to the likely tenant and so should not, therefore, be 
deemed to be a material variation to the original DA.145 In dismissing this point, Lang J 
concluded that, notwithstanding the inducements that a developer pays to attract an anchor 
store, which I discussed in chapter eight, substituting a large department store for the bus 
station would have been likely to have had commercial advantages for a developer, and so 
constituted a material change to the DA.146 As to the proposed changes to the affordable 
housing required elements, Mr Elvin submitted that these changes were a result of a request 
from planning officers in the Council rather than a developer-led change.147 Lang J rejected this 
assertion and concluded that: 
These terms were not varied at the behest of the planning authority. In reality, 
the position was that the Developer negotiated a reduction in the affordable 
housing requirements with the Council, both in its capacity as contracting party 
and planning authority.148 
Given that the removal of the required elements contributed to a reduction in Henderson’s 
anticipated costs and an increase in its forecast profits, Lang J concluded that the change 
amounted to a material variation.149  
When asked to consider the ‘materiality’ of the extension to the Final Long Stop Date 
from 31 August 2014 to 1 June 2015,150 however, Lang J differentiated between extensions 
bolted-on to a DA to move a Long Stop Date and rewritings of a DA to alter a ‘terminations 
clause.’ She noted that, while WCC’s officers and Henderson’s directors had moved the Final 
Long Stop Date in a way that undoubtedly ‘benefited’ Henderson by giving it more time to 
discharge the conditions, because the termination clause remained unamended, WCC retained 
a theoretical right to terminate the DA.151 My analysis of property-led development practice, 
as set out in chapter six, demonstrates that local authority officers and developers do agree 
Long Stop Dates with the expectation that those dates will change so, in that sense, Lang J’s 
understanding of the operation of Long Stop Dates seems consistent with practice. However, 
the optional nature of the right to terminate means that a local authority must weigh the 
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implications of severing a longstanding relationship against the costs of starting again. That is a 
balancing act to which I will return in the final section of this chapter. 
Notwithstanding the ‘non-materiality’ of the extension to the Final Long Stop Date, 
Lang J stated that the combined effect of the Henderson-led variations to the DA meant that, 
while ‘the subject-matter of the contract remains the same, […] the varied contract is 
materially different in character to the original contract.’152 On the scope of the variations 
clause as a mechanism justifying such extensive changes, she explained that a variations clause 
would only obviate the need for a tendering exercise if the clause in the original DA was 
sufficiently precise as to delineate the circumstances in which changes could be made and the 
range of possible modifications that were possible.153 A variations clause of this type would, 
Lang J pointed out, enable a hypothetical bidder to understand the options that were available 
to it in the event that it was awarded the contract and it then sought to rewrite the terms of 
the original agreement. Even if the variations clause in the Winchester DA had provided for 
precisely defined adjustments, however, Lang J noted that variations that changed ‘the nature’ 
of an agreement would require a ‘fresh procurement process.’154 In the absence of any such 
procurement process, Lang J determined that the Cabinet’s approval for Henderson’s 
variations was ‘unlawful.’155 
The time limits of technicalities: The CPO Exercise Date, the Gottlieb decision and the pursuit 
of unconditionality 
A few weeks prior to the Gottlieb judicial review hearing, WCC’s planning committee 
had granted planning permission authorising construction of a development incorporating 
Henderson’s required elements.156 WCC’s officers had, therefore, been continuing along the 
Henderson-led development trajectory notwithstanding the imminent hearing and Nigel Giffin 
QC’s warning that the case was ‘finely balanced.’ After Lang J’s decision, however, the Leader 
and the Deputy Leader of the Council resigned157 and the new Leader, on 10 March 2015, 
commissioned the Independent Review into WCC’s decision-making processes.158 At the same 
time, BLP, the Council’s external solicitors, sought Mr Giffin’s advice again, at which point he 
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advised that the prospects of a successful appeal were between 30-40%,159 which led the 
Council’s Cabinet to decide not to seek to reopen proceedings.160 Mr Giffin also advised, 
however, that the original DA remained in force despite the Gottlieb decision. This was 
because, Mr Giffin explained, the effect of Lang J’s Gottlieb judgment was confined to the 
Cabinet’s August 2014 decision to approve Henderson’s variations.161  
WCC’s full Council passed a motion on 1 April 2015 recommending that the Cabinet 
instructed officers to terminate the DA on the passing of the Final Long Stop Date on 1 June 
2015162 but Cabinet instead, on 15 April 2015, instructed the Council’s officers to work with 
Henderson to make the pre-existing DA unconditional.163 As a result, WCC’s officers and 
Henderson’s directors chose to act ‘as if’164 the DA in existence prior to those variations 
contained a programme of action enabling unconditionality to occur before the CPO Exercise 
Date. In justifying this approach, Cabinet members noted that Henderson’s directors had 
informed officers that, following the Gottlieb judgment, it had reviewed its plans for the 
development and now felt that the 2009 planning permission and the required elements in the 
original DA did, after all, form the basis for a viable development.165 
Various statutorily-imposed deadlines, as well as deadlines internal to the DA, 
complicated the movement from the conditional phase of the development into 
unconditionality. The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government had 
confirmed the Winchester CPO on 20 March 2013,166 and WCC completed the acquisition of 
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John De Stefano’s land167 on 30 January 2014.168 At the same time, WCC’s officers and 
Henderson’s directors agreed to move the Final Long Stop Date in the DA from 30 August 2014 
to 1 June 2015.169 While I have argued that a Long Stop Date in a DA functions less as a 
deadline and more as a moveable guideline for the desired Unconditional Date, I will now 
show that the date on which the Secretary of State confirmed the CPO created a different kind 
of time pressure.170  
The imposition of this deadline reveals some of law’s temporalities, illustrating the way 
that legal rules might control the way local authority officers, councillors and developers 
experience the passage of time. The time limit for exercise of the CPO171 was, like the CPO 
itself, an ‘artefact’ of a legal process172 and a ‘technicality.’173 Its statutory underpinnings, 
however, meant that there was no scope for WCC’s officers and Henderson’s directors to bolt 
extensions on to the time limit for the exercise of the CPO.174 By comparison, WCC and 
Henderson had agreed various extensions to the conditional phase of the Winchester 
Development, each effected through changes to the Final Long Stop Date in the DA. The time 
pressure of a statutory deadline fed the forward-facing temporal orientation175 of the 
Winchester Development and generated actions from WCC’s officers and Henderson’s 
directors following Lang J’s decision in Gottlieb.176 
In thinking through the temporality of the exercise of a CPO, it is helpful to recall 
Ricoeur’s discussion of a narrative as a mechanism that guides ‘complex action from an initial 
situation to a terminal one by means of rule-governed transformations.’177 The CPO Exercise 
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Date loomed over the action following Lang J’s decision as a ‘terminal’ event that was both 
unrepeatable and governed by rules both internal to and outside the Winchester DA. This 
meant that WCC’s officers and Henderson’s directors could not ‘decouple activities’178 from 
the passing of time in the way that they had done when extending the conditional phase or 
when initiating the ‘standstill period’ that followed Henderson’s replacement of Thornfield as 
‘the developer’ for the purposes of the DA. 
A local authority that chooses to exercise a CPO, must use one of two methods for 
doing so. Separate ‘rules’ govern each method. The first method is through service of a ‘Notice 
to Treat’ on each owner or occupier of the land to be acquired,179 asking the owner or occupier 
to commence negotiations for compensation. Clause 10.2 of the Winchester DA ‘carried 
around’180 a script for the exercise of the CPO, favouring the second method, which is through 
a ‘General Vesting Declaration.’ The internal rules in the DA thus mingled with the statutory 
requirements for the making of a GVD. 
The effect of the statutory rules is that a local authority seeking to acquire land by 
making a GVD must first serve notice of its intention to do so on all owners and occupiers of 
the land to be acquired.181 After a period of two months has elapsed from the date of service 
of the notice, the local authority can then make a GVD, at which point it must serve notice of 
the making of the GVD on all owners and occupiers.182 The GVD can then take effect no earlier 
than 28 days from the service of notice.183 This requirement for pauses between the 
production of documents constructs the GVD procedure as a sequence of ‘passing phases’ 
designed to guide the GVD process to maturation.184 If WCC and Henderson made a GVD, 
these hesitations would have had to be factored in to calculations around the exercise of the 
CPO before the CPO Exercise Date because there is conflicting case law as to whether or not a 
notice of intention to make a GVD will amount to the exercise of a CPO within the three year 
time limit imposed in section 4 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965.185 On the basis of this 
inconsistency, it would appear to be prudent for a local authority to make a GVD before the 
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passage of three years from the date of confirmation of the CPO. The Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government confirmed the Winchester CPO on 20 March 2013186 so, if 
WCC assumed that the service of notice did not amount to exercise of the CPO, the Council 
needed to serve notice no later than 19 January 2016, before making the GVD in time for the 
19 March 2016 deadline. If it failed to do so, the power to exercise the CPO would lapse. 
Clause 10.2 of the Winchester DA was also important here, however, because it stated 
that Henderson could not compel WCC to make a GVD until the DA had become unconditional 
and, even if the Unconditional Date had occurred, until Henderson had deposited with the 
Council the funds required for the purchase of the land. The CPO Exercise Date was thus 
another of the ‘unceasing’ disciplinary techniques187 at work during the Winchester 
Development. A CPO Exercise Date presents the possibility of a ‘moment of accession’188 at 
which WCC could take possession of the entire development site and, by the operation of the 
DA, at which Henderson could enter the site to commence construction.189 To avoid the 
possibility that the CPO Exercise Date would pass, with the consequent loss, on that date, of 
the power to compulsorily purchase the land, Henderson’s directors and WCC’s officers had 
sought to revive the pre-existing required elements as the basis for a viable development 
proposition. 
There was an element of farce to this performance, however. In advance of the judicial 
review hearing, three months prior to the Cabinet decision on 15 April 2015 to pursue 
unconditionality based on the pre-existing required elements, WCC’s officers and Henderson’s 
directors had insisted that those required elements were out-of-date and offered no workable 
basis for a completed development. Presenting a new and alternative view of the ‘viability’ of 
the pre-existing required elements served a short-term purpose for both WCC’s officers and 
Henderson’s directors, however. For Henderson’s directors, a positive viability appraisal might 
have worked pre-emptively to stall any action by WCC to terminate the DA on the passing of 
the Final Long Stop Date, which stood at 1 June 2015. In addition, Henderson’s directors 
sought to assure officers and councillors that they were proceeding with unconditionality 
based on the pre-existing DA.  
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In chapter seven, I explained that the ‘last’ condition to be discharged prior to 
unconditionality was the viability condition.190 Prior to that, however, the developer could 
waive any other outstanding conditions,191 with the exception of the affordable housing and 
funding conditions.192 In July 2015, Henderson’s directors thus informed the Council of their 
intention to enter into a ‘legally binding’ agreement with a housing association193 and a ‘legally 
binding’ agreement with a funder194 as precursors to discharge of both conditions. To support 
this assertion, Henderson’s directors provided documents detailing the agreed heads of terms 
for the prospective agreements and exemplifying the ‘nearly legal’ status of them.195 
Henderson’s directors sought to strengthen their newly-adopted position further by obtaining 
a ‘draft letter’ from Stagecoach, the intended operator of the bus station now being planned, 
stating that Stagecoach would, notwithstanding contrary evidence submitted to the Gottlieb 
hearing,196 run its services out of the bus station required in the original DA.197 Alongside these 
submissions, Henderson’s directors also informed the Council that the pre-existing DA offered 
a workable basis for unconditionality because a viability appraisal obtained in May 2015 now 
indicated that a development incorporating the affordable housing, no department store and a 
smaller retail area would generate the requisite level of profitability to satisfy the viability 
condition.198 
The impending CPO Exercise Date caused a sense of time compression and a hint of 
desperation, forcing Henderson’s directors to attempt to pack a series of actions into a short 
timeframe.199 WCC’s Cabinet had already ruled out an extension to the Final Long Stop Date as 
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politically impossible200 but considered Henderson’s submissions in relation to the affordable 
housing, funding and viability conditions and the bus station in a meeting on 13 July 2015, over 
six weeks after the passing of the Final Long Stop Date. Henderson had, therefore, successfully 
stalled any decision to terminate the DA. Given the enhanced scrutiny of Henderson’s viability 
assumptions generated by Councillor Gottlieb’s actions201 and Councillor Gottlieb’s own 
ongoing scepticism,202 WCC’s Cabinet agreed to appoint two consultancy firms to examine 
Henderson’s viability appraisals.203 WCC documents suggest, however, that officers only asked 
these consultants to confirm that the appraisals demonstrated that the viability condition 
would be discharged.204 In such circumstances, there was little to be gained by instructing two 
consultants rather than one. Despite the obvious inconsistency in Henderson’s positions on the 
question of viability, both consultants confirmed that the appraisal demonstrated potential 
profitability that would enable discharge of the viability condition.205 
In addition to these submissions, from WCC’s point of view a variety of factors 
mitigated against termination, particularly the inevitable passing of the CPO Exercise Date 
before the Council could find a new development partner, the loss of income from the licence 
fee that would follow unconditionality, the cost of maintaining buildings that the Council had 
acquired and a prolonged delay to regeneration of the development site.206 To gain an insight 
into a local authority’s decision-making after the passing of a Long Stop Date, I asked some of 
my interviewees about termination of a DA. COU1 told me about a development that his local 
authority had worked on in which a developer had sought more time and the input of the local 
authority’s money to alleviate viability concerns and to enable unconditionality to occur. The 
local authority had, COU1 explained, first sought to accommodate the developer by 
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assembling the necessary funds and extending the Long Stop Date but it then obtained the 
viability appraisal that the developer had cited as justification for the ongoing delay. The local 
authority instructed a consultant to review the developer’s viability appraisal and that 
consultant concluded that the assumptions underpinning the developer’s appraisal were 
unnecessarily pessimistic and designed to buy the developer time before unconditionality 
occurred. COU1 explained that officers challenged the developer on its assumptions and, when 
the developer refused to alter its conclusions, the local authority decided to terminate the DA. 
According to PS1, termination is, however, always a ‘brave decision’ for a local 
authority. CON2, D1 and D4 each indicated that they would expect a local authority, using D4’s 
phrase, to ‘work very hard’ to preserve an existing development relationship because most 
local authorities are reluctant to restart a development process that is already underway. 
COU1’s description of termination stood out as an instance in which a local authority had 
decided, as he put it, that it had become ‘unacceptable to wait.’ By comparison, LA4 expressed 
incredulity in response to a question about termination and described a hypothetical exchange 
that might follow a decision to terminate: 
When you’ve got a big developer, are you really going to actually insist that 
they’ve breached a condition and challenge them? Because you’re going to be in 
court and you’re going to spend a lot of lawyer’s money and then the developers 
who might come in are going to think, “I’m not going to touch that    
site because look what happened to DevCo.” You won’t get a developer if they 
know that the Council is going to be aggressive. So there’ll be situations where 
you’ve got a breach but the harsh reality is that you won’t enforce that. 
WCC’s officers had already spent ‘a lot of lawyer’s money’ on the Winchester Development but 
warnings from BLP, the Council’s external solicitors, outlined this ‘harsh reality’ to the Council’s 
Cabinet. The minutes of the Cabinet meeting at which councillors considered Henderson’s 
submissions on the viability of the pre-existing required elements record that one of BLP’s 
solicitors advised that ‘termination would be a significant and serious step’207 and that: 
In light of the time and monies already invested in the scheme, his assessment 
was that the risk of litigation was high. Any litigation was likely to take a 
considerable period of time and involve significant costs.208 
There is an interesting repetition of both time and money in this warning. Investing time and 
money in the Winchester Development was, according to WCC’s solicitor, a desirable course of 
action unless that time and money was directed towards litigation challenging a developer’s 
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failure to progress with development according to a pre-agreed temporal framework. The 
same sense of foreboding about excessive cost and loss of an opportunity ran through LA4’s 
cautionary tale, coupled to alarm about the prospects of restarting a development if the 
Council challenged its existing development partner. These factors all played into WCC's 
Cabinet’s decision to support Henderson’s promise to make the DA unconditional.  
Out of time: termination of the Winchester DA 
Before the Winchester DA could become unconditional, however, there was one more 
twist in the development trajectory. The Civil Procedure Rules enable an individual or 
organisation to seek permission to appeal a High Court judgment in a judicial review action.209 
Earlier in this chapter, I mentioned that Henderson, through its ownership of Silverhill 
Winchester No1 Limited, was an ‘interested party’ to the Gottlieb judicial review.210 Before the 
deadline for appeal, which fell on 4 March 2015,211 Hogan Lovells LLP, Henderson’s solicitor, 
applied for and, on 11 November 2015, received permission to commence an appeal against 
Lang J’s decision in a substantive Court of Appeal hearing.212 In granting permission, Lewison 
LJ, a Court of Appeal judge, noted that the practical consequences of Lang J’s decision were 
‘obscure, to say the least.’213 Amongst other things, Henderson’s legal representatives had 
argued in their application to the Court of Appeal that Lang J’s judgment had made it 
impossible for them to ascertain the extent of the changes to the DA that would be permissible 
if, for example, compliance with minimum standards for the design and construction of new 
buildings compelled alterations to the development proposals.214 In addition, Lewison LJ noted 
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that the question as to ‘whether Mr Gottlieb has a sufficient interest to bring the challenge at 
all is a serious point and is worthy of consideration by the full court.’215 I discussed this 
sufficient interest issue earlier in this chapter and, following R (Wylde) v Waverley Borough 
Council,216 Henderson’s legal representatives may have been successful in overturning Lang J’s 
decision in Gottlieb on that basis.217 
The possibility of a successful appeal placed the Cabinet decision of 6 August 2014, 
which had been overturned in the High Court, in a state of suspension but assisted Henderson 
because its directors had been unable to secure discharge of the affordable housing, funding 
and viability conditions in the DA. After presenting its proposals for discharge of the affordable 
housing and funding conditions to WCC in July 2015, Henderson’s directors had sought to 
maintain the currency of the DA by informing officers that it would take ‘6-10 weeks’ to 
convert the arrangements they had with the housing association and the funder into legally 
binding agreements capable of satisfying the conditions.218 By the time Henderson obtained 
leave to appeal the Gottlieb decision, on 11 November 2015, those conditions had still not 
been discharged.219 Henderson’s directors did, nonetheless, inform the Council that the 
affordable housing agreement was in a nearly legal state, requiring only the input of ‘lawyers 
[…] to finalise.’220 By comparison, however, getting the funding agreement to a nearly legal 
state had proven ‘more difficult,’221 meaning that Henderson’s directors then informed WCC’s 
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officers that ‘they weren’t sure that they would be able to go unconditional in the near future’ 
on the basis of a DA containing the pre-existing required elements.222  
With this in point in mind, and apparently hoping that its appeal would succeed, 
Henderson’s directors had effected another change in position and stated that it intended now 
to construct a development in line with the variations it had proposed to the required 
elements223 that Lang J had ruled unlawful.224 To facilitate this, in December 2015, Mike Sales, 
Henderson’s Managing Director, requested another pause or standstill in the Winchester 
Development, in the form of confirmation that WCC’s officers would agree not to recommend 
termination for a period of nine months while the Gottlieb appeal ran its course.225 A pause for 
nine months would have meant that unconditionality would not occur until August or 
September 2016. In addition, however, this would mean that unconditionality would not 
happen before the CPO Exercise Date, scheduled to fall on 19 March 2016. To prevent the loss 
of the opportunity to exercise the CPO, Mr Sales offered to enter into a series of agreements 
supplemental to the DA and the existing Compulsory Purchase Order Indemnity Agreement226 
through which Henderson would agree to ‘underwrite all the costs and claims’ that the Council 
incurred in exercising the CPO, even if the Council incurred these costs prior to the 
Unconditional Date.227 
The CPO Exercise Date, and the actions required to exercise the CPO before this cut-off 
point, was a legal technology that played a significant role in guiding decision-making at this 
point in the Winchester Development. On 10 February 2016, WCC’s Cabinet, however, took 
what PS1 called the ‘brave decision’ and resolved to terminate the DA on the grounds that 
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unconditionality had not occurred by 1 June 2015228 and that there was ‘no guarantee’ that 
either Henderson’s appeal would succeed or that the development would go ahead after the 
conclusion of the appeal.229 In addition, the Council had again sought and obtained legal advice 
from BLP, its external solicitors, suggesting that the risk of successful legal action challenging 
its decision to terminate was low because the Council had acted in ‘good faith’ in allowing 
Henderson additional time after the Final Long Stop Date to make the DA unconditional.230 On 
the basis that the Council had obtained land valuations indicating that the cost of exercising 
the CPO would be in the region of £35million and because it felt unable to fund the necessary 
compensation,231 the Cabinet resolved also to allow the CPO to lapse.232 In response, Hogan 
Lovells, Henderson’s solicitors, wrote to WCC’s solicitors threatening legal proceedings against 
the Council if the Council failed either to withdraw its notice to terminate the DA or to exercise 
the CPO before 19 March 2016.233 WCC did not, however, revoke its notice to terminate and 
did not exercise the CPO. After the CPO Exercise Date had passed, Henderson’s directors 
withdrew their challenge to the Gottlieb decision and their threat to seek a judicial review of 
WCC’s Cabinet decision to terminate the DA.234 
Conclusion 
The title of this chapter plays on the concept of legal action and I have considered the 
ways that individuals and groups acted with, and were acted upon by, ‘law.’ The role of law 
and legality is an undertheorized aspect of property-led development. My examination of legal 
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processes in this chapter has shown how law and legality instil and sustain a sense of a 
development trajectory and are a component of the ‘projectisation’ of a development process.  
At each stage in the Winchester Development at which the Council’s development 
partner proposed changes to the Winchester DA, WCC’s officers sought advice to confirm the 
legal consequences of the proposals. As the development progressed, WCC’s officers 
presented that advice as, if taken together, a legitimising assemblage that validated their 
decision-making. There is a comparison that can be drawn here between the use of legal 
advisors and the use of property development consultants. In chapters seven and nine, I 
pointed out that a developer might use a consultant to produce a report legitimising changes 
proposed to a DA based on ‘viability concerns.’ My analysis in chapter nine also suggested that 
there might be circumstances in which developers and local authority officers seek advice from 
consultants when they want somebody to tell them what to think about property-led 
development. Legal advice in this chapter can be seen to serve a similar purpose, illustrated 
most clearly in the way that WCC’s officers instructed third-party experts to provide assurance 
that they were doing the ‘appropriate’ thing and that their decisions would not face an 
external challenge. I noted, however, that these officers did not act upon inconsistencies in the 
legal advice that they received, and appear to have been unwilling to use legal advisors to 
challenge a developer’s proposed development trajectory.  
This chapter has also shown that some local authority officers struggle to determine 
the extent to which change in a property-led development process is permissible. But my 
research has demonstrated that expert legal professionals also struggle to specify the extent of 
permissible change. It appears that some developers might seek to exploit that uncertainty to 
secure changes to a development proposition that might amount to ‘material’ changes. In 
addition, and perhaps more unexpectedly, the Winchester Development shows how the role 
of law can be governed, at least in part, by the actions of outsiders. While Councillor Gottlieb’s 
judicial review interrupted progress along the Henderson-led development trajectory, for 
example, Lang J’s decision merely suspended Henderson’s pursuit of unconditionality on its 
own terms. It did, however, preclude unconditionality before the CPO Exercise Date and this, 
eventually, rendered the DA useless for WCC and Henderson. No matter how much WCC and 
Henderson sought to reorder the content and temporal framework of their contractual 
arrangements prior to the CPO Exercise Date, the inevitable passage of time unravelled the 
cumulative acts of tightening that had preserved and perpetuated the currency of the DA. 
The aftermath of the Gottlieb decision showcases the unravelling of a property-led 
development proposition. It reveals how a well-resourced, well-informed outsider, like 
Councillor Gottlieb, can challenge the assumptions underpinning a development process. But 
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the unravelling of the Winchester Development is also a case study of uncertainty. Following 
confirmation that the Henderson-led changes to the DA were unlawful, WCC had to choose 
whether to terminate the DA on the passing of the Final Long Stop Date, or to carry on with 
the pre-existing DA regardless of the attempts that the Council and Henderson had made to 
undermine its terms. WCC’s officers again sought legal advice on this point, and that advice 
recommended that the pre-existing DA offered a ‘lawful’ basis on which to continue with the 
Winchester Development. However, the Council’s eventual decision not to terminate, while 
simultaneously refusing to extend the Final Long Stop Date in the DA, laid bare the uncertainty 
that beset the Council.  
Henderson, on the other hand, sought to preserve the DA and the land acquisition 
mechanism that it was carrying around and to recover the costs it had expended on the 
development.235 This suggests that Henderson’s directors were desperate to proceed and 
anxious about the loss of a potentially profitable opportunity, and goes someway to 
overturning the assumption, most clearly demonstrated in their control over viability 
modelling techniques, that all the power in property-led development lies with the developers. 
Preserving the Winchester Development opportunity required a scarcely believable reversal of 
opinion by Henderson’s directors that exposed the malleability of viability modelling. This 
change of direction involved a short-lived revival of the pre-existing required elements and, 
ultimately, a scrambling for position. After reaffirming their preference for the still unlawful 
variations to the DA, Henderson’s directors sought to mobilise their company’s ability to fund 
the land acquisitions required for the development to steer WCC towards exercise of the CPO. 
These manoeuvres occurred after the passing of the Final Long Stop Date in the Winchester DA 
but it was the passing of the CPO Exercise Date that triggered termination, not the highly fluid 
temporal arrangement of the DA. The passing of the CPO Exercise Date meant that, for both 
WCC and Henderson, the costs of preserving the currency of the DA exceeded the costs of 
terminating it. In a property-led development process driven by land acquisitions, viability 
concerns and the prospect of cost recovery, this meant that the Winchester DA was out of 
time. 
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In this chapter, I draw my thesis to a close by answering the research questions that I 
raised in chapter one. When I began this research, I aimed to examine the contractual 
arrangements that local authorities and private sector developers deploy to facilitate property-
led development. During my research, I refined my research design, methodology and research 
questions while retaining the same overall aim. The Actor-Network Theory (ANT) inspired 
research design1 that I followed entailed a mixing of methods, incorporating a case study of a 
property-led development project in Winchester,2 a small city located in the southeast of 
England, alongside 18 semi-structured interviews with property development professionals 
and local authority councillors.3 My case study involved an examination of the text of the 
Development Agreement4 that Winchester City Council5 entered into with its private sector 
development partner, an analysis of the wider network of contractual arrangements within 
which the Winchester DA was situated, extensive archival research and detailed documentary 
analysis of WCC committee meeting minutes and reports, correspondence and other materials 
produced in conjunction with the Winchester Development.6 
I eventually settled upon four specific research questions, which were: 
1. How did the contracting parties use the Winchester DA and the other contractual 
arrangements to assemble a development site, and what does this tell us about the role of 
law and legal technologies in property-led development? 
2. Does ‘time’ function as an ordering device in property-led development and to what 
extent did the temporal framework set out in the Winchester DA and the other contractual 
arrangements shape the relations between the developer, the local authority and third-
parties involved in or affected by the development process? 
3. Were there other ways in which the Winchester DA plotted a trajectory for or otherwise 
scripted actions in the development process, and what does this reveal about the 
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development partner earmarked for the Winchester Development. 
3 Appendix D is a table containing brief biographical details of my interviewees and the dates on which I 
met with them. 
4 I have been abbreviating the term, Development Agreement, to ‘DA’ and continue to do so here. 
Appendix A explains how I obtained a copy of the Winchester DA. 
5 Hereafter abbreviated to ‘WCC.’ 
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approaches that developers, local authority officers, councillors and property development 
consultants take to property-led development?  
4. How do developers, local authority officers, councillors and property development 
consultants regulate change within a property-led development project, and how did the 
development trajectory anticipated in the Winchester DA, and the temporal framework 
that the DA purported to impose, change during the development process? 
I have presented the answers to these questions throughout this thesis, and have 
demonstrated why a developer and a local authority might use a DA to assemble a 
development site, and how a development trajectory anticipated in a DA might change.  
The points that I discuss in this chapter offer a form of summation of the research 
project. The sections of this chapter revisit contractual arrangements, property-led 
development practices and socio-legal concepts discussed throughout this thesis. It is 
impossible, however, to recapture the complexity or the richness of the interactions, 
associations and connections formed, reshaped or severed during property-led development. 
What this chapter seeks to provide, therefore, is a brief restatement of the key findings. What 
this chapter seeks to avoid is too great a simplification of the complexities inherent to the 
network of contractual arrangements deployed in property-led development. 
With these important caveats in mind, the first three parts of this chapter thus provide 
a succinct summary of the answers to the research questions. The fourth part then discusses 
my contributions to knowledge related to property-led development, ANT-inspired work on 
law and legal technologies, socio-legal research and law and time. The final part of this chapter 
considers the way that I carried out my research, explains why it was important to have carried 
out the project and discusses an agenda for future research. 
Legal technologies in property-led development 
My first research question asked how the Winchester DA and the other contractual 
arrangements deployed during the Winchester Development functioned as instruments of 
land assembly and what this tells us about law and legal technologies. The first issue to 
consider concerns land assembly, and my research has shown that, while the Winchester DA 
was an essential component of land assembly, the DA was merely one of a ‘succession of a 
deals.’7 This network of contractual arrangements involved a complex interplay between both 
‘nearly legal’ and ‘legally binding’ agreements. Although the purpose, content, form and effect 
of nearly legal and legally binding agreements varies greatly in property-led development, an 
                                                          





example from the Winchester Development of each type of contractual arrangement is helpful 
to offer a flavour of my findings. 
The land assembly process for the Winchester Development began with a ‘binding 
commercial agreement’8 between Thornfield Properties plc9 and Stagecoach (South) Limited,10 
a major landowner on the site eventually earmarked for development. I obtained no definitive 
evidence indicating what it was that made this agreement ‘binding’ but took this to mean that 
the parties believed that it contained reciprocal obligations that would be enforceable in court. 
An examination of the way that Thornfield’s directors used its agreement with Stagecoach 
formed part of my discussion in chapters four and five, where I explained how this type of 
purportedly legally binding contractual arrangement might form part of a ‘pitch’ from a 
developer to a local authority to move the local authority first towards an Exclusivity 
Agreement11 and then towards a DA with a developer. In those chapters, I referred to the 
theatricality of some of these pitches, and the points that I made highlighted the importance in 
property-led development of performances sustained through ‘signs and other discursive 
means.’12  
Conceptualising legal technologies as part of a performance illuminates aspects of the 
role of a network of contractual arrangements. The sense of various performances taking place 
simultaneously was one of the recurring themes of my discussion, and provides an important 
insight into the way that local authority officers, private sector developers, councillors and 
property development consultants understood their role. Particularly striking was the way in 
which CON2 suggested that a developer must act like a ‘juggler,’ coordinating various moving 
parts and arranging their synchronised arrival at a chosen destination or event. CON4 
conceptualised these moving parts slightly differently, and suggested that a developer is a 
‘conductor’ tasked with arranging the performance of an entire orchestra.  
Thinking about property-led development in these ways is helpful because it shows 
the importance of attending to the performance of the components of the property-led 
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development assemblage, including the network of legally binding and nearly legal contractual 
arrangements I described and analysed in this thesis. By examining this network of contractual 
arrangements, I demonstrated that some nearly legal land acquisition agreements operate as a 
type of ‘vehicular idea’13 introduced to move a local authority towards an EA and a DA. This 
was a key finding because I repeatedly encountered imagery mixing temporal and spatial 
metaphors that invoked the concept of a ‘journey’ and the notion that property-led 
development involves ‘transit’ from one moment in property-led development to the next. 
Underpinning this imagery was another recurring theme, revealed in comments from some of 
my interviewees indicating that the developer is the ‘driver’ of the process, with nearly legal 
and legally binding contractual arrangements functioning both as stopping off points, 
moments for reappraising past actions and catalysts for further movement. By referring to 
interviews with D1, CON2 and LA4, I showed that this approach to generating actions from a 
local authority by lining up nearly legal and legally binding contractual arrangements is 
commonplace in property-led development practice. 
In addition to the images of performance and movement that I discussed in the 
previous paragraphs, the impression of a developer and a local authority ‘lining things up’ 
appeared repeatedly during my research. For example, LA4 told me that an EA is simply ‘the 
way you get to your Development Agreements’ and D1 explained that an EA is a way of filling 
time between a decision to work with a local authority and the moment that the local 
authority agrees to a DA. Some of these interactions were initially hidden from view while I 
was conducting my research, like the phase of the Winchester Development during which 
Thornfield’s directors repeatedly presented WCC’s officers with nearly legal land acquisition 
agreements relating to land on the development site in the ownership of John De Stefano. Part 
of the reason for this performance was that Thornfield’s directors appeared to have believed 
that these nearly legal agreements might provide the basis from which WCC’s officers could 
obtain approval from the Council’s Cabinet for a legally binding EA between WCC and 
Thornfield, to be entered into ‘with a view to [then] entering into a Development 
Agreement.’14 
The concept of a nearly legal agreement was thus important in this thesis. It was a 
term that I introduced in chapter four to refer to a contractual arrangement that has been the 
subject of negotiations and that one or other of the parties to the negotiations has presented 
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as on the threshold of becoming legally binding. The way that WCC’s officers and Thornfield’s 
directors used nearly legal agreements to instil a sense of an emerging development trajectory 
was striking, as was the way that they lined up nearly legal agreements to preserve that 
development trajectory later in the development process. Each new nearly legal or legally 
binding agreement that I encountered in this research was the product of land assembly 
efforts, as well as an instrument used to move land assembly efforts forward, and the 
Winchester DA was part of this continuum.  
The Winchester Development and my interviews with D1, D4, CON2 and LA4 illustrate 
that a local authority and a developer will often only enter into a DA if parts of a planning 
framework are in place for development and if the developer has made some progress on land 
acquisitions. In addition, my analysis of the Winchester Development has demonstrated that a 
DA is usually a legal technology deployed both to compel a local authority to make a 
Compulsory Purchase Order15 and to enable that local authority to obtain confirmation at a 
public inquiry of the validity of that CPO. Consequently, a local authority intending to make 
and seek confirmation for a CPO needs, prior to entering into a DA, to be assured of a 
developer’s commitment to fund the exercise of a CPO and either to commence or to fund the 
costs of construction on a development site. 
However, interviews with D1, D2, D3, D4, CON2, CON3, LA2, LA4 and PS1 informed me 
that most DAs impose only a conditional obligation on a developer to fund the exercise of a 
CPO and either to commence or to fund the costs of construction. This conditional 
arrangement also existed for the purposes of the Winchester Development. The Winchester 
DA arranged the conditions to be discharged to enable these obligations to become ‘binding’ 
in a sequence necessitating, first, that the developer obtained a planning permission 
authorising the construction of various ‘required elements.’16 To move through the sequence 
of conditions in the Winchester DA, WCC needed then to complete the land acquisitions 
deemed necessary to create a development site. To that end, the DA stipulated that the 
obligation to be imposed upon the developer to fund exercise of the CPO and either to 
commence or fund the costs of construction would not become unconditional until WCC had 
obtained confirmation for its CPO and could guarantee that it could transfer ‘good title’ to the 
land bundled together as the development site.17 Thereafter, the obligation on the developer 
to fund the exercise of the CPO and either to commence or fund the costs of construction was 
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conditional on the developer producing a viability appraisal confirming that the development 
proposition would attain an agreed level of profitability.18 In between discharging these 
conditions, the developer needed to obtain a sufficient quantum of agreements for lease with 
prospective retail tenants of the retail units to be constructed,19 an order enabling the 
stopping up or rerouting of highways crossing the development site,20 site surveys from 
consultant engineers confirming that no geological or environmental impediments existed on 
the site21 and agreements with a funding institution and an affordable housing provider to the 
effect that the former would finance parts of the costs of development and that the latter 
would manage the affordable housing to be constructed as part of the required elements.22 
D1 indicated that conditions such as the pre-letting condition in the Winchester DA 
would be included in a DA at the behest of a developer and are not always an essential 
component of a DA. He also explained that the quantum of retail space to be ‘pre-let’ would 
be determined by the developer and I showed that this figure is one that a developer often 
guards closely. Unless the pre-letting and other conditions had been discharged, however, the 
Winchester DA would not become unconditional, although it was open to the developer to 
waive the pre-letting, road closure, site survey, land appropriation and title conditions as 
precursors to unconditionality. 
D1, CON2 and CON3 each discussed similar conditional DAs, and CON2 told me that 
these conditions mean that a DA ‘is a bit of an option’ for a developer in that the developer 
chooses whether or not to waive these conditions and can utilise the content of the conditions 
to control the rate of progress towards unconditionality. CON3 explained that most DAs are 
‘hugely conditional’ and these comments revealed a lop-sidedness in the way that the 
contracting parties use the conditions in a DA. For the purposes of the Winchester 
Development, Thornfield’s directors obtained a planning permission that Henderson UK 
Property Fund’s23 directors used, after their company replaced Thornfield as developer, to 
signify discharge of the planning condition and to help WCC’s officers obtain confirmation for 
the Council’s CPO. This was a significant finding because it enabled me to show the sense of 
progression through a succession of deals and pre-arranged actions that WCC’s officers and 
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Henderson’s directors used to give the Planning Inspector appointed to confirm the CPO an 
important assurance. This assurance took the form of a series of statements to the effect that 
the Inspector could assume that the Winchester DA meant that construction would begin and 
that she could act ‘as if’24 Henderson’s directors would both fund the exercise of the CPO and 
either commence construction or fund the costs of construction, despite the ‘hugely 
conditional’ nature of the DA. 
My research shows, however, that Planning Inspectors should not always treat a 
conditional DA as a guarantee either that a local authority will exercise a CPO or that a 
developer will commence, or fund the costs of, construction. WCC did not complete the land 
assembly process in Winchester, and Henderson did not commence construction. Instead, 
what my analysis has revealed is that the movement towards unconditionality is something 
that a developer often seeks to delay if unconditionality would create expensive commitments 
to land assembly and construction that the developer judges to be excessively onerous.  
What this also shows is that documents like planning permissions, CPOs and the 
viability appraisals used to measure likely profitability are a type of ‘quasi-legal’ technology in 
the sense that they are ‘capable of producing law.’25 By extension, the individual agreements 
for lease with individual tenants necessary to discharge the pre-letting condition, as well as the 
site survey reports to be produced in conjunction with the site survey condition, were ‘quasi-
legal’ technologies. This is notable because a conditional DA will not generate a set of legally 
binding commitments unless ‘suitable’ planning permissions, CPOs, viability appraisals, and so 
on, have been produced. This demonstrates that the process through which a conditional DA 
becomes legally binding is contingent upon a developer’s choices. A DA like the Winchester DA 
does not automatically become unconditional if a developer has obtained a suitable planning 
permission or if the local authority has obtained confirmation for a CPO, for example. Instead, 
my research has shown how a developer might exploit a pre-letting condition or manipulate a 
viability appraisal to delay the moment at which unconditionality occurs. This provides a new 
perspective on the ‘emergence’ of law and legality.26 
To what extent is ‘time’ a device used to order property-led development? 
In the previous section, I addressed some of the metaphors that emerged in my 
analysis of property-led development. These metaphors help to illustrate how some local 
authority officers, councillors, developers and consultants understand property-led 
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development, and what they perceive to be the best way to do property-led development. 
One of those metaphors is the idea of ‘transit.’ In addition, my thesis has addressed ideas 
related to ‘transition.’ The concept of transit suggests a journey from one point to another, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter, while ‘transition’ suggests a process of change. In this thesis, I 
explained how local authority officers, councillors, developers and consultants understood the 
phases of property-led development as interlinked periods of transition during which aspects 
of a development proposition ‘matured.’ These findings applied particularly to the form, 
purpose and effects of the type of DA deployed for the Winchester Development. 
Despite the inherent flexibility in the conditional nature of the agreement, which I 
discussed in the preceding section of this chapter, the Winchester DA anticipated the 
transition from conditionality to unconditionality through the concept of ‘the Unconditional 
Date.’ By incorporating a reference to a moment at which unconditionality would occur, the 
Winchester DA acquired some of ‘the qualities’ of time,27 constructed the period between the 
date of the DA and the anticipated Unconditional Date as a ‘passing phase,’28 generated a 
‘sense of the forthcoming’29 and promised imminent ‘arrival.’30 While my research has 
challenged the extent to which a DA actually does these things, these points relate to my 
second research question, which referred to the temporal framework in the Winchester DA 
and the function of ‘time’ as an ordering device.  
My research showed that the temporal framework in the Winchester DA was complex, 
merging the sense of expectation surrounding the Unconditional Date and the function of a 
series of Long Stop Dates. These Long Stop Dates ostensibly served an instrumental purpose, 
confirming, for example, that the planning condition in the DA, to be discharged through the 
grant of a planning permission, was the ‘first’ condition to be discharged in that it needed to 
be discharged before the passing of a ‘Planning Long Stop Date.’ If the developer had not 
discharged the planning condition by the Planning Long Stop Date, the passage of time would 
have triggered a right in favour of both WCC and the developer to terminate the DA.  
The Planning Long Stop Date was not the only Long Stop Date in the Winchester DA. 
The Winchester DA also contained a Final Long Stop Date, and the passing of that date would 
have triggered a right, in favour of both WCC and its development partner, to terminate the 
DA if the Unconditional Date had not occurred. D1, D2, D4, CON2 and CON3 each talked about 
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DAs containing this type of Long Stop Date, and CON2 made comments that revealed the 
inherent inexactness to the way in which developers, local authority officers and their 
respective consultants set these Long Stop Dates. In chapters six to 10, I also examined the 
numerous circumstances in which WCC’s officers, Thornfield’s directors and Henderson’s 
directors changed the Final Long Stop Date in the Winchester DA, with the effect that the Final 
Long Stop Date moved from 22 December 2009 to 1 June 2015. This suggests that the 
impression that some local authority officers, developers and consultants might try to convey 
of a carefully ordered process might not match the reality. In particular, these findings suggest 
that, rather than lining things up, the participants in a property-led development project are 
often making things up as they go along.  
These points illustrated several important issues. First, my interviews with D1, D2, D4, 
CON2 and CON3 demonstrated that this form of fluid temporal framework is a common 
feature of this type of DA. Secondly, my examination of WCC committee meeting minutes and 
reports, and my discussions with D1, D4, CON2 and CON3 showed how willing some local 
authorities are to allow a developer more time to discharge conditions in a DA. This willingness 
seems often to arise out of a fear, expressed in some of WCC’s committee meeting documents 
and in my interviews with LA4 and PS1, that a local authority that chooses to terminate a DA 
will thus present itself as unsympathetic to business and an investment risk. My analysis of the 
Winchester Development and my interviews with D1, D4, CON2 and CON3 revealed that 
developers and property development consultants consequently often assume that a 
developer will be allowed more time to make a DA unconditional because they know that most 
local authorities will be willing to wait.  
Despite the fluidity inherent to the concept of being allowed more time, my findings 
have also shown that the temporal framework ‘carried around’31 in a DA is an outcome of the 
tendency to perform property-led development in the ‘image of projectness.’32 This is the idea 
that most types of development project should follow a sequence of chronologically chained 
actions and a predefined, linear trajectory encompassing segments and intervals during which 
important actions play out. As a function of this, some of my interviewees used engineering or 
mechanical metaphors to explain property-led development processes. For example, CON3 
talked vividly about a DA as ‘a governor on change,’ which I understood to mean that a 
developer can use a DA to control the pace of the transition from conditionality to 
unconditionality. The impression of mechanical and automatic processes was strong 
throughout my analysis, and LA4 talked about ‘a sort of standard template’ for property-led 
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development. The network of contractual arrangements that I encountered in this thesis was a 
component of these mechanical processes and a device to instil a sense of an ‘autonomous 
logic’33 to property-led development practice.  
The contractual arrangements deployed in the Winchester Development also 
ostensibly divided these processes into a series of segments. The first segment consisted of an 
initial phase of feasibility testing and land acquisition before the parties signed an EA. The 
signing of an EA then initiated a ‘legally binding’ exclusivity period, the negotiation of a DA and 
further land acquisitions. A conditional phase followed the signing of the DA and an 
unconditional phase, during which construction took place, would have followed the 
Unconditional Date had that event occurred. This ordering produces an impression of 
property-led development arranged according to a sequence of milestones and ‘monumental’ 
events.34 
This neat subdivision is, however, only a partial reflection of what happens in property-
led development. During the Winchester Development, there were significant overlaps in the 
action taking place before and after these apparent dividing lines, which suggest that it makes 
little sense to attempt to separate a property-led development into neat segments. For 
example, I explained that some of WCC’s officers considered Thornfield to be ‘the developer’ 
before the two parties signed their EA. Similarly, I noted that WCC’s officers had sought and 
obtained Cabinet approval for the use of compulsory purchase powers in support for the 
Winchester Development before they entered into their DA with Thornfield. Moreover, at the 
CPO inquiry in 2012, WCC’s officers explained that the planning permission that Thornfield had 
obtained in 2009 provided the basis for a viable development project and presented that 
planning permission as if it had discharged the planning condition in the DA. This suggested 
that negotiations around the planning framework for the development had closed. After the 
CPO inquiry concluded, however, Henderson’s directors sought to reopen that segment of the 
conditional phase. These points reflect the discrepancy between appearance and reality that 
ran through the Winchester Development. 
Despite this discrepancy, the Winchester DA, the grant of a planning permission, 
confirmation of the CPO, and so on, did each offer a type of temporal marker signifying both 
the progress that had been made on the Winchester Development and the action that was still 
to come. Each of these sequential events had a ‘ratcheting’ effect35 by making a reversal of 
progress through the phases seem impossible, although I have alluded to some of the ways 
that a developer might loosen that ratchet if they deemed it to be beneficial to do so. 
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Nonetheless, this sequential alignment of contractual arrangements and quasi-legal 
technologies helps to address aspects of my third research question, which asked about the 
ways in which a DA ‘plots’36 or ‘scripts’37 action during property-led development. My 
observations in this thesis have shown that the Winchester DA reproduced the ‘autonomous 
logic’38 to which I have already referred and that the nearly legal and legally binding precursors 
had generated. D1 told me that a developer will seek to set the ‘ground rules’ for a DA and a 
property-led development process before entering into a DA, and these preliminary 
agreements help to do that. Thereafter, however, the temporal framework in a DA, 
heightening the sense of an ‘all-encompassing flow’39 and generating actions directed towards 
land acquisitions and the commencement of construction, can exacerbate the lop-sidedness 
inherent to property-led development. This could be seen most vividly in this research in the 
way that a developer can use the positioning of a viability condition as the ‘last’ condition to 
be discharged. In the Winchester Development, Henderson’s directors used ‘viability concerns’ 
and their control of viability modelling techniques to threaten that unconditionality would not 
occur and so compel WCC’s officers to seek Cabinet approval for the removal of affordable 
housing and a new bus station as a required element in the Winchester DA.  
To complete my answers to the first, second and third research questions, I want to 
address another lop-sidedness apparent in the way that a DA like the Winchester DA plots or 
scripts action. This relates to the way that a DA might require a local authority to obtain 
confirmation of a CPO before unconditionality occurs. This arrangement enables a developer 
to gain the assurance that it will be able to assemble the land that it requires so long as it 
successfully obtains the funding needed to finance the exercise of a CPO. Confirmation of a 
CPO might thus be expected to function as a ‘vehicular’40 event, in the sense that it could be 
expected to move the development process forward. But my research has shown that this is 
not the case. After securing confirmation of a CPO, a local authority must often wait for a 
developer to assure itself that the development proposition is viable. At that point, a 
developer will tell its local authority partner whether or not to exercise the CPO. Until then, 
third-party landowners whose land will be taken through the operation of a CPO must also 
wait for the developer to decide if, and when, the local authority should exercise the CPO. 
These points illustrate the toothlessness of local authorities that are either unable to use their 
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own funds to finance land acquisitions or unwilling to take what PS1 called the ‘brave decision’ 
to terminate a DA. But these points also show how a DA can provide a form of comfort for a 
developer that is seeking to control the pace of property-led development processes. 
Law and legal ‘action’ 
My fourth research question asked specifically about change in a property-led 
development process, and how developers, local authority officers, councillors and property 
development consultants ‘regulate’ change. The discussion in the preceding paragraphs set out 
some of my findings in this regard, although this question also speaks to the interplay between 
internal and external rules. One aspect of ‘change’ in property-led development that I 
encountered in this thesis emerged in the way that a DA might be designed to allow the 
contracting parties to vary the terms of their contractual arrangements. Such changes have a 
clear temporal dimension when they involve the rewriting of past agreements and the 
rerouting of expected actions. But the perceived need for mechanisms enabling ‘change’ can 
produce a conflict between a DA that is ‘plastic enough’41 to be adapted and ‘robust enough’42 
to fulfil the requirements of EU procurement law. A variations clause in the Winchester DA 
envisaged the possibility of adaptation but, when Thornfield’s directors and then Henderson’s 
directors sought to deploy these change mechanisms, WCC’s officers had to instruct external 
lawyers to advise them on the extent of the adaptation that the clause allowed. 
PS1 confirmed that the scope of change permitted by a variations clause is something 
that he would ‘get the lawyers’ to resolve. My research has shown, however, that ‘legal 
action,’ in whatever form it manifests, is protracted and expensive. One of the ways in which 
‘legal action’ emerges in property-led development involves the interventions of human legal 
actors. In the Winchester Development, these interventions included reports that WCC’s Head 
of Legal and Democratic Services presented to Council committee meetings, the 
correspondence related to land acquisitions between solicitors acting for Thornfield and John 
De Stefano, the advice that QCs provided to WCC’s officers on EU procurement law, and the 
decisions of High Court judges in relation to court challenges in R (Gottlieb) v Winchester City 
Council43 and London & Henley (Middle Brook Street) Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities 
and Local Government.44 Alongside these instances of law and legality emerging, there were 
various other outcomes of legal action, including, for example, the pauses that a QC 
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introduced to the Winchester Development trajectory to reduce the perceived threat of a 
potential court challenge to the Winchester DA based on a possible breach of EU procurement 
law. 
This previously unscripted pause reveals one of the ways that legal action can have a 
temporal dimension. A different but equally notable temporality emerged in the way that 
WCC’s officers were forced continually to return to specialist lawyers to advise on the legality 
of changes to the DA that Thornfield’s directors and Henderson’s directors repeatedly 
proposed. WCC’s officers also sought and obtained ongoing advice on the seriousness of 
‘stresses’ locked into and carried around in the DA. There was a marked discontinuity, 
however, in the content of the advice that different QCs gave to WCC’s officers and, in chapter 
10, I explained how that discontinuity may have exposed the Council to the High Court 
decision against it in Gottlieb.45  
Legal action, and legal outcomes, did not flow solely from the interventions of human 
legal actors, however. The statutorily-imposed ‘CPO Exercise Date,’ which I discussed in 
chapter 10, was a form of ‘legal action’ and produced significant effects in the Winchester 
Development.46 The CPO Exercise Date was the date by which WCC had to exercise its CPO. If it 
had not done so, it would lose its capacity to do so. This created a different temporal dynamic 
to that created by the Long Stop Dates in the Winchester DA because it was a deadline 
imposed by external statutory rules. Many of my findings have shown how a developer seeks 
to control a property-led development process but the action of these statutory rules and the 
concept of a CPO Exercise Date reveal why a developer is not omnipotent. In combination with 
the court-based ‘legal action’ initiated by Councillor Kim Gottlieb, a well-resourced 
‘opportunist’47 and ‘repeat player,’48 the passing of the CPO Exercise Date rendered further 
progress on the Winchester Development unworkable. This suggests that successful disruption 
to an established development trajectory often depends on an alignment of circumstance and 
an opponent’s capacity to marshal an unusual array of resources. But it also shows that a DA is, 
after all, predominantly an instrument that enables, and relies upon, the prospect of land 
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assembly. The Winchester Development reveals that, if land assembly is no longer possible, a 
development opportunity encapsulated in a DA is no longer worth fighting for. 
Contributions to knowledge: new encounters with a network of contractual arrangements 
The findings summarised in the preceding section offer contributions to existing 
literature on property-led development, ANT and socio-legal studies. The most important 
contribution that my research makes is by addressing a gap in those literatures. In chapters 
one and two, I discussed socio-legal, town planning and urban studies research that has 
analysed property-led development. That scholarship has considered the processes through 
which a local authority and its private sector development partner go about assembling a 
development site out of the disparate land interests that exist in a given location.49 My study 
of the Winchester Development, as well as the observations of my interviewees, adds a new 
perspective on land assembly.  
Existing work on property-led development has also demonstrated how a local 
authority might collaborate with a private sector developer to instil ‘a developer-led’ sense of 
place upon a development site by granting planning permission, agreeing to exercise its 
compulsory purchase powers and transferring a long leasehold title to the land on a 
development site to a developer.50 My research confirms that this model is still prevalent and, 
by analysing the Winchester Development and interviewing local authority officers, 
councillors, developers and property development consultants, I examined the interplay 
between planning permissions and CPOs, in particular. In doing so, I obtained novel findings 
about the way in which a planning permission functions as a precursor to a CPO and about the 
performance of both these things as ‘quasi-legal’ technologies. 
Of more importance, however, is the way that my research scrutinised the expanding 
network of contractual arrangements, including a DA, brought into existence during property-
led development. Opening these contractual arrangements to scrutiny offers a contribution to 
existing knowledge because I conducted a detailed analysis of a DA in a way that has not been 
done before. Valverde has called for scholars to devise strategies to ‘pry’ details of these 
contractual arrangements from local authority officers and developers.51 My research shows 
that a mixed methods research design can be effective in analysing the content of the network 
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of contractual arrangements commonly deployed in property-led development and in 
interrogating the way these contents work in practice.  
My research offers more than just an examination of the content of a DA or an 
example of a strategy for conducting research into property-led development, however. I also 
examine the ‘multilateral negotiations, trials of strength and tricks’52 that take place before 
and after a local authority and a developer enter into a DA. These elements of my research 
have enabled me to analyse the connections, associations and interactions that go into 
producing a ‘legal’ agreement. In doing so, my work supplements existing work in socio-legal 
studies, inspired by ANT, that has shown that law, and manifestations of law, are often 
contingent outcomes of gatherings of connections.53  
One of the connections to which I have pointed in my research is the connection 
between a conditional DA and a viability appraisal. I have examined the way that a DA is 
dependent for part of its ‘legal’ effect on documents such as viability appraisals and I have thus 
been able to add to the currently topical discussion on viability-led property development.54 I 
have also used the work of John Law55 to introduce the concept of ‘projectisation’ to explain 
the role of property development consultants in determining both when a property-led 
development project is ‘viable’ and when a DA is ready to become unconditional. This notion 
of a DA that becomes legally binding though a series of staged adaptations, bolt-ons, ‘plug-
ins’56 and rewritings provides a new slant on Latour’s examination of the way that ‘legal’ 
documents must sometimes be left to ‘ripen.’57  
In addition to providing a greater understanding of the role of the viability appraisal 
and the transition from a conditional DA to an unconditional DA, this research has also 
                                                          
52 Michel Callon, 'Some elements of a sociology of translation - domestication of the scallops and the 
fishermen of St-Brieuc Bay' in John Law (ed), Power, action, and belief: a new sociology of knowledge? 
Sociological Review Monograph (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1986), 211. 
53 See, particularly, Cloatre, Pills for the poorest: an exploration of TRIPS and access to medication in Sub-
Saharan Africa, 29. 
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explored the general acceptance, seen most clearly in accounts of the manipulation of viability 
modelling techniques, that all the power in property-led development lies with the developers. 
Many of my findings have shown how developers might exert control over property-led 
development processes, and how the network of contractual arrangements might compel a 
local authority to project a ‘can do’ attitude towards a developer’s requests. However, and 
somewhat unexpectedly, my examination of the Winchester Development revealed that there 
are moments that a developer becomes anxious, fears the loss of a development opportunity 
and becomes desperate for unconditionality to occur. My discussions with developers and 
property development consultants suggest that this loss of control, or at least a sense of a loss 
of control, might manifest more often than is expected.  
My other contribution to existing literature is through my examination of temporal 
dynamics in property-led development. Anthropological and ANT-inspired studies of time have 
explained that the ‘Western notion of time’ rests upon an assumption that time flows from 
some form of originating moment and a complementary sense of humanity’s progression 
towards a specific though temporally undefined endpoint.58 I have studied the ways that the 
Winchester Development replicated a conception of linear progress from an originating 
moment along a carefully plotted development trajectory, encompassing a series of 
anticipated events, and culminating, at an undesignated future moment, in a constructed 
development. One of my contributions to research into property-led development and socio-
legal studies comes from challenging the sense of a single originating moment in the 
Winchester Development, opening the ‘time-in-between’ anticipated events on the 
development trajectory, and questioning the extent to which progress along that trajectory is a 
matter that a developer or a local authority can control through the strategic deployment of 
legal technologies.  
Another contribution that these findings offer to knowledge regarding law and time 
has been my demonstration that the network of contractual arrangements deployed in a 
property-led development process might produce a temporal scheme into which events can be 
absorbed through a series of scripted and, where necessary, unscripted pauses designed to 
allow contingencies, unexpected circumstances and actual or perceived threats to play out. A 
factor in this management of messiness was the way that the Winchester DA, in common with 
other DAs, enacted unresolved issues as a set of conditions to be addressed during a 
designated phase of the development process. Significantly, however, I showed that it will not 
always be possible for developers and local authorities to harness ‘time,’ conditionality, 
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transition and change to their advantage. The Winchester Development shows that a network 
of contractual arrangements will break apart when the passing of time triggers events that 
neither a developer, a local authority or their legal technologies can contain. 
Reflections on an ANT-inspired research approach 
In the final section of this chapter, I reflect on the methods that I chose and on the 
benefits of an ANT-inspired approach. The most notable feature of my approach was that my 
research involved a single case study. Moreover, the Winchester DA did not become 
unconditional and the Winchester Development did not culminate in a completed 
development. My focus on a single case study of a failed property-led development project 
might thus be perceived as a shortcoming of my approach. However, a detailed examination of 
a development that was not completed provided an opportunity to study the ways that human 
actors might attempt to keep a property-led development project moving. In addition, 
studying a failed development project meant that I could analyse the fluidity and capacity for 
change inherent to the legal technologies often deployed in property-led development as a 
matter of routine. 
An ANT-inspired research approach requires in-depth scrutiny of the connections, 
associations and interactions out of which ‘action’ emerges. At the outset of my research, I 
intended to consider two case study examples and the DAs deployed in those settings. As I 
pointed out in chapter three, however, the richness and complexity of the nearly legal and 
legally binding contractual arrangements that I encountered while studying the Winchester 
Development meant that an analysis of the Winchester Development alongside another 
property-led development project would have exceeded the temporal and spatial constraints 
of a PhD thesis. This was partly a consequence of the detail available in relation to the 
Winchester Development. It was also partly a consequence of an ANT-inspired approach that 
compelled me to ‘follow the actors’ by examining the many and various inputs that went into 
the way the Winchester DA worked, what people did with the Winchester DA, and how the 
Winchester DA affected the materials, devices and processes active in the Winchester 
Development. 
In chapters two and three, I explained that an ANT-inspired methodology favours an 
empirical approach to research questions, and I sought to achieve ‘generalisable’ findings 
through combining the knowledge that I gained from studying the Winchester Development 
with insights drawn from the transcripts of interviews that I carried out with property 
development professionals. This meant that the findings from my case study could be placed 
within a broader context. I was able to mine the data obtained from my interviews for 





behaviours of human actors. These interviews also complemented my case study because, 
even though the Winchester Development was a failed property-led development project, the 
developers, local authority officers, councillors and property development consultants who I 
interviewed had all been involved in projects in which the local authority and its development 
partner had completed the construction and land assembly process. This meant that the things 
I discovered about the Winchester Development could be compared with and analysed 
alongside practitioner accounts of standard property-led development practice. 
The findings that I discussed throughout this thesis demonstrate that my mixed 
methods approach was successful in enabling me to draw out original contributions to 
knowledge about property-led development, the emergence of law and legality, the role of 
viability appraisals and the interplay between nearly legal and legally binding contractual 
arrangements. It is important to note, however, that the particular circumstances of the 
Winchester Development played a role in the extent to which information was available about 
that project. If Councillor Kim Gottlieb had not voiced his criticism of WCC’s decision-making in 
Council meetings and, ultimately, in the High Court, it is unlikely that there would have been 
such rich information available to a researcher without access to the ‘backrooms.’59 Councillor 
Gottlieb’s judicial review claim against the Council led directly to the commissioning of the 
Independent Review60 into the Council’s decision-making throughout the entire development 
process. That Independent Review proved to be a valuable source of information unlikely to be 
available in relation to all property-led development projects. 
While serendipity thus undoubtedly played a part in this research, a realistic agenda 
for future research might involve a case study of a property-led development project that has 
recently concluded with a built development. This type of case study could serve a 
comparative purpose and provide an opportunity for further analysis of the temporal 
dynamics, the interplay of a network of nearly legal and legally binding contractual 
arrangements and the use of law and legal technologies to produce, perpetuate and sustain a 
development trajectory. An alternative, but nonetheless complementary, avenue for further 
research would be to conduct a more detailed analysis of the role of consultants in ordering 
relations between local authority officers, councillors and private sector property developers. 
This might examine the ‘projectisation’ of parts of a property-led development process in more 
detail. The findings that would be generated from either a case study of a completed 
development or a detailed examination of the role of consultants would add to the insights 
generated in this research because the interplay of human and nonhuman actors in property-
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led development is an under-researched and under-theorised aspect of a highly topical issue. 
My case study is the only work of which I am aware that offers a detailed analysis of the 
temporal dynamics, the interplay of a network of nearly legal and legally binding contractual 
arrangements and the uses of law and legal technologies that form the underpinning for this 











Accessing copies of the Winchester Development Agreement 
In chapter three of this thesis, I explained that I originally obtained a copy of the 
Winchester Development Agreement (‘DA’), two deeds of variation and a supplemental deed 
used to amend the text of the DA from a webpage on Winchester City Council’s website. That 
webpage provided a link to the Compulsory Purchase Order that the Council had made to 
facilitate land assembly for the Winchester Development. It also provided links to the 
documents that the Council submitted to the public inquiry held to consider the validity of that 
order. This included a link to the DA, the deeds of variation and the supplemental deed that I 
mentioned above. 
The Council has since removed that webpage. However, the DA and the deeds of 
variation are still available for public access because the Council disclosed the documents in 
response to a request from a member of the public. That request, made on 12 August 2014, 
can be seen using the following link 
(https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/a_copy_of_the_contract_between_h), which I 
last accessed on 27 March 2018. The DA, each of the deeds of variation and the supplemental 
deed can be accessed through clicking links on that webpage. Details of the agreements and 
the URLs of the webpages on which they are available are set out in Appendix A. I have 






List of webpages providing copies of the Winchester DA, two deeds of variation and a 
supplemental deed [all last accessed 27 March 2018] 
Development Agreement between (1) Winchester City Council (2) Thornfield Properties 

















Deed of Variation to Development Agreement between (1) Winchester City Council (2) 





Deed of Variation to Development Agreement between (1) Winchester City Council (2) 
Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited (3) BNP Paribas Jersey Trust Corporation Limited 




Supplemental Deed to Development Agreement between (1) Winchester City Council (2) 
Silverhill Winchester No 1 Limited (3) BNP Paribas Jersey Trust Corporation Limited and 











List of Winchester City Council committee meeting minutes and reports, other Winchester 
City Council documents and Compulsory Order documents referred to in this thesis 
Table B.1 Winchester City Council committee meeting minutes and reports 
Document 
Number Document Title 
Date 
produced 
1.01 ‘WDLP15. Broadway Friarsgate Planning Brief. Report of Director Development Services’ 
15 January 
2003 
1.02 ‘WDLP21. Broadway Friarsgate Planning Brief. Report of Director of Development Services’ 29 May 2003 
1.03 ‘Minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 1 October 2003’ 
1 October 
2003 
1.04 ‘Minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 11 February 2004’ 
11 February 
2004 
1.05 ‘Minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 25 May 2004’ 25 May 2004 
1.05A ‘Minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 27 July 2004’ 27 July 2004 




1.07 ‘Minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 6 October 2004’ 
6 October 
2004 
1.08 ‘CAB938. Broadway Friarsgate Development. Report of the Chief Estates Officer’ 
6 October 
2004 
1.09 ‘Minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 15 December 2004’ 
15 December 
2004 
1.10 ‘CAB984. Broadway Friarsgate – Extension of Exclusivity Agreement. Report of Chief Estates Officer’ 
15 December 
2004 
1.11 ‘CAB1030. Broadway Friarsgate – Development Agreement. Report of Chief Estates Officer’ 
8 February 
2005 
1.12 ‘Appendix to CAB1030. Broadway Friarsgate – Development Agreement. Report of Chief Estates Officer’ 
8 February 
2005 







1.14 ‘Minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 12 December 2005’ 
12 December 
2005 




‘Minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 13 April 
2006’ 13 April 2006 
1.17 
‘Minutes of the meeting of the Planning Development 
Control Committee held on 27 March 2007’ 
27 March 
2007 
1.17A ‘CAB1534. Silver Hill Winchester – Proposed Use of Compulsory Purchase Powers. Report of Head of Estates’ 
17 October 
2007 
1.18 ‘PDC768. Report of Head of Planning Control’ 21 October 2008 








1.21 Blank Blank 








1.24 ‘Minutes of the meeting of the Overview and Scrutiny Committee held on 18 March 2013’ 
18 March 
2013 
1.25 ‘Minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 10 April 2013’ 10 April 2013 
1.26 ‘Note of Silver Hill Members Informal Policy Group held on 12 April 2013’ 12 April 2013 
1.27 ‘Note of Silver Hill Members Informal Policy Group held on 9 July 2013’ 9 July 2013 
1.28 ‘Note of Silver Hill Members Informal Policy Group held on 24 October 2013’ 
24 October 
2013 





1.30 ‘Minutes of the meeting of the Council held on 6 November 2013’ 
6 November 
2013 




‘Note of Silver Hill Members Informal Policy Group held on 9 
April 2014’ 9 April 2014 
1.33 
‘CAB2665. Appendix 5. Notes of Conference with Leading 
Counsel’ 9 June 2014 
1.34 ‘CAB2603. Appendix 1. Letter from Cameron Fraser to Howard Bone’ 12 June 2014 
1.35 ‘Minutes of the meeting of the Overview and Scrutiny Committee held on 7 July 2014’ 7 July 2014 
1.36 ‘OS104. Silver Hill Development Proposal. Report of Cllr Kim Gottlieb’ 7 July 2014 
1.37 ‘CAB2603. Silver Hill Regeneration. Report of the Silver Hill Officers Project Team’ 7 July 2014 
1.38 ‘Minutes of the special meeting of the Cabinet held on 10 July 2014’ 10 July 2014 
1.39 ‘Minutes of the meeting of the Council held on 16 July 2014’ 16 July 2014 
1.40 ‘Minutes of the special meeting of the Cabinet held on 6 August 2014’ 
6 August 
2014 
1.41 ‘CAB2607. Silver Hill Affordable Housing Review. Report of Head of Estates and Head of Legal and Democratic Services’ 
6 August 
2014 




1.42 ‘CAB2665. Appendix 1. Order of Mr Justice Dove. CO/41500/2014’ 
October 
2014 




1.43A ‘Minutes of the meeting of the Planning Committee held on 11 December 2014’ 
11 December 
2014 
1.44 ‘PDC1012 – Item 1 – Section 73 Application – 14/01912/FUL’ 11 December 2014 
1.45 ‘PDC1012 - Item 2 - Drop-In Application - 14/01913/FUL’ 11 December 2014 
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1.45A ‘Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Cabinet held on 3 March 2015’ 
3 March 
2015 









‘CAB2675. Silver Hill – Review of Project Position. Report of 
Corporate Management Team, Head of Estates and Head of 
Legal and Democratic Services’ 
18 March 
2015 
1.49 ‘Minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 15 April 2015’ 15 April 2015 
1.50 ‘CAB2688. Silver Hill – Notice of Motion from Council of 1 April 2015. Report of Corporate Director’ 15 April 2015 
1.51 ‘Minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 21 May 2015’ 21 May 2015 
1.52 ‘CAB2695. Silver Hill Update – Submission by Developer. Report of Silver Hill Project Team’ 21 May 2015 
1.53 ‘CAB2700. Appendix 3A. Letter from Dentons LLP to Howard Bone’ 10 July 2015 
1.54 ‘Minutes of the special meeting of the Cabinet held on 13 July 2015’ 13 July 2015 
1.55 ‘CAB2700. Silver Hill Update – Submission by Developer. Report of Silver Hill Project Team’ 13 July 2015 
1.56 ‘Minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 2 December 2015’ 
2 December 
2015 
1.57 ‘CAB2752. Silver Hill, Winchester – Situation Report and Assessment. Report of Corporate Director’ 
2 December 
2015 




‘OS137. Silver Hill Regeneration – Status Report. Report of 
Silver Hill Project Management Team. Appendix B. Letter 
from Hogan Lovells LLP to Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP’  
12 January 
2016 
1.59 ‘Minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 13 January 2016’ 
13 January 
2016 





1.61 ‘Minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet held on 10 February 2016’ 
10 February 
2016 




‘Minutes of the special meeting of the Cabinet held on 29 




‘Minutes of the Central Winchester Regeneration Informal 






Table B.2 Other Winchester City Council documents and miscellaneous documents 
Document 
Number Document Title Date produced 
2.01 ‘Central Winchester Study. Final Report’ (referred to as ‘the Llewelyn-Davies Report’) November 1997 
2.02 ‘Draft Broadway Friarsgate Planning Brief’ 2003 
2.03 ‘Adopted Broadway Friarsgate Planning Brief. Part 1 – Development Objectives’ 
Undated 
(published 2003) 
2.04 ‘Adopted Broadway Friarsgate Planning Brief. Part 2A – Background and Analysis’ 
Undated 
(published 2003) 
2.05 ‘Adopted Broadway Friarsgate Planning Brief. Part 2B – Background and Analysis Cont’d’ 
Undated 
(published 2003) 
2.06 ‘Adopted Broadway Friarsgate Planning Brief. Part 3 – Design Framework’ 
Undated 
(published 2003) 
2.07 ‘Grant of Planning Permission. Case: 06/01901/FUL’ 9 February 2009 
2.08 ‘A Perfect Storm – Report on Silver Hill’ (referred to as ‘the Independent Review’) January 2016 
2.08A 
‘Withdrawal of Silver Hill appeal by developer. Press 
release: 07/04/2016’ 7 July 2016 
2.09 
‘Constitution of the City Council – Part 1 – Summary 
and Explanation’ 26 February 2018 
2.10 ‘Constitution of the City Council – Part 2 – Articles of the Constitution’ 26 February 2018 
2.11 ‘Constitution of the City Council – Part 3A – Responsibility for Functions’ 26 February 2018 
2.12 ‘Constitution of the City Council – Part 3B – Scheme of Delegation to Officers’ 26 February 2018 
2.13 ‘Constitution of the City Council – Part 4 – Overview and Scrutiny Procedure Rules’ 26 February 2018 
2.14 ‘Constitution of the City Council – Part 7 – Management Structure’ 26 February 2018 




Table B.3 Documents produced in conjunction with the Winchester Compulsory Purchase 
Order 
Document 




‘The Winchester City Council (Silver Hill) Compulsory 




‘Map referred to in the Winchester City Council (Silver Hill) 
Compulsory Purchase Order 2011’ 
21 November 
2011 




‘CPO Report to the Secretary of State for Communities and 




3.04 ‘The Winchester City Council (Silver Hill) Compulsory Purchase Order 2011 – Confirmation Letter’ 
20 March 
2013 
Proofs of Evidence presented to the CPO Inquiry 
3.05 
‘The Winchester City Council (Silver Hill) Compulsory 
Purchase Order 2011. Proof of Evidence of Steve Tilbury, 
Corporate Director, Winchester City Council’ 
30 May 2012 
3.06 ‘Proof of Evidence of Martin Perry. Silverhill, Winchester’ 6 June 2012 
3.07 ‘Proof of Evidence of Martin Perry. Appendices. Silverhill, Winchester’ 6 June 2012 
3.08 ‘Proof of Evidence of Martin Perry. Financial Viability Rebuttal. Silverhill, Winchester’ 15 June 2012 
3.09 ‘Proof of Evidence of Matthew Bodley. On matters related to compulsory purchase’ 25 May 2012 
3.10 
‘Proof of Evidence of Matthew Bodley. Appendix 10. Extracts 
of correspondence relating to London and Henley group of 
companies’ 
25 May 2012 
3.10.01 Letter from John De Stefano to Karen Hawes (22 May 1998) 
3.10.02 Letter from Karen Hawes to John De Stefano (26 August 1998) 
3.10.03 Letter from Karen Hawes to John De Stefano (2 December 1998) 
3.10.04 Letter from Karen Hawes to John De Stefano (26 February 1999) 




Letter from Bond Pearce Solicitors (on behalf of Thornfield Properties plc) to 
John Summers, John Summers & Co Solicitors (on behalf of John De Stefano) 
(31 March 1999) 
3.10.07 Letter from John De Stefano to Andrew Sanderson (15 December 2000) 
3.10.08 Letter from Andrew Sanderson to John De Stefano (20 July 2001) 
3.10.08A Letter from Michael Capocci to John De Stefano (9 May 2002) 
3.10.09 
Email from Peter Dempster, Dempster Binning LLP (on behalf of Thornfield 
Properties plc) to John Summers, John Summers & Co Solicitors (on behalf of 
John De Stefano) (28 May 2002) 
3.10.10 Letter from Michael Capocci to Steven Bee (28 May 2002) 
3.10.11 
Letter from John Summers, John Summers & Co Solicitors (on behalf of John 
De Stefano) to Peter Dempster, Dempster Binning LLP (on behalf of 
Thornfield Properties plc) (6 June 2002) 
3.10.12 Letter from Steven Bee to Michael Capocci (6 June 2002) 
3.10.13 Note to File by Mike Capocci (6 June 2002) 
3.10.14 
Letter from John Summers, John Summers & Co Solicitors (on behalf of John 
De Stefano) to Peter Dempster, Dempster Binning LLP (on behalf of 
Thornfield Properties plc) (5 July 2002) 
3.10.15 Letters from Nigel Wright to Michael Capocci (24 December 2005, 19 January 2006 and 12 April 2006) 
3.10.16 Letters from Michael Capocci to Nigel Wright (11 January 2006, 8 February 2006 and 13 April 2006) 
3.10.17 Letter from Karen Hawes to Jason Marcus (25 September 2007) 
3.10.18 Letter from Jason Marcus to Karen Hawes (9 October 2007) 
3.10.19 Letters from Riccardo Mai to Karen Hawes (26 November 2007, 17 December 2007, 12 February 2008, 7 March 2008 and 16 April 2008) 
3.10.20 Letters from Karen Hawes to Riccardo Mai (21 December 2007 and 8 April 2008) 
3.10.21 Letters from Riccardo Mai to Rob Hobson (16 May 2008, 30 June 2008 and 25 July 2008) 
3.10.22 Letter from Rob Hobson to Riccardo Mai (11 July 2008) 
3.10.23 Emails exchanged between Martin Perry and John Strachan (21 June 2011) 
3.10.24 Note of telephone conversation between Matthew Bodley and Karen Hawes (30 March 2012) 
3.10.25 Letter from Matthew Bodley to Karen Hawes (25 May 2012) 
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3.10A Stuart Jenkins, ‘Proof of Evidence of Stuart Jenkins’ 31 May 2012 
3.10B Nick Symons, ‘Proof of Evidence. Proposed Silver Hill Development, Winchester’ June 2012 
3.11 
‘The Winchester City Council (Silver Hill) Compulsory 
Purchase Order 2011. Proof of Evidence of Bruce Hartley-
Raven’ 
6 June 2012 
3.11.01 
‘The Winchester City Council (Silver Hill) Compulsory Purchase Order 2011. 
Proof of Evidence of Bruce Hartley-Raven. Appendix 2.’ Letter from John De 









Plan illustrating the approximate footprint of the Winchester Development site and showing 
significant landholdings 
The plan on the following page shows an approximation of the site earmarked for the 
Winchester Development and significant landholdings referred to throughout this thesis. The 
outline roughly corresponds to the outline marked on the map that Winchester City Council 
produced to accompany the Compulsory Purchase Order (‘CPO’) it made for the purposes of 
the Winchester Development. That map marked the land to be acquired using the Council’s 
compulsory purchase powers, and included the Council’s own land. The CPO included the 
Council’s own land because, as I pointed out in chapter five of this thesis, a developer will 
expect to obtain a ‘clean’ title to the land and a CPO enables a local authority to ‘cleanse’ its 
land of potentially onerous third-party interests, such as easements or restrictive covenants.  
The map accompanying the Winchester CPO contained numerical cross-references to a 
appended table. That table listed the owners of individual plots. I have a copy of both the map 
(see Appendix B, Document 3.01A) and the Compulsory Purchase Order on file (see Appendix 
B, Document 3.01). 
The key to the plan on the following page is as follows: 
Key 
Land shown edged purple Approximate outline of the Winchester 
Development site 
Land in the ownership and control of 
Winchester City Council 
Plots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 (Coitbury House) 
Land in the ownership and control of John De 
Stefano and his companies 
Plots A, B and C 
Land in the ownership of Stagecoach (South) 
Limited 












List of interviewees consulted during this research 
Interviewee Background Date of Interview Taped 
 Consultants    
CON1 
Property development consultant with experience 
working for local authorities on land assembly, 




Property development consultant with experience 
working for developers on tendering, land assembly, 
contract negotiation, discharge of conditions, contract 
variation, negotiation with prospective retail tenants, 






Property development consultant with experience 
working for developers on tendering, land assembly, 
contract negotiation, discharge of conditions, viability 




Property development consultant with experience 
working for developers on contract negotiation, 
discharge of conditions, contract variation, 







Property development consultant with experience 
working for developers on contract negotiation, 
contract variation and viability modelling 
7 October 
2016  
 Councillors   
COU1 
Councillor representing the majority political party in a 
metropolitan local authority. Cabinet member 
responsible for property development and 
regeneration. Discussed experience of working on two 




Councillor representing the majority political party in a 
metropolitan local authority. Formerly Cabinet 
member responsible for property development and 
regeneration. Discussed experience of working on a 




Councillor representing an opposition political party in 
a metropolitan local authority. Discussed experience 
scrutinising the Cabinet on decisions made in relation 







Interviewee Background Date of Interview Taped 
 Developers   
D1 
Development director at a national property 
development company with experience working on 
property-led development projects in a number of 






Managing director at a national property development 
company with experience working on property-led 




Development director at a regional property 
development company with experience working on 
property-led development projects in a number of 




Development director at a regional property 
development company with experience working on 
property-led development projects in a small number 





 Local authority officers   
LA1 
Senior officer in a metropolitan local authority who 
discussed experiences of a major property-led 




Senior officer in a metropolitan local authority who 
discussed experiences of two major property-led 






Senior officer in a metropolitan local authority who 
discussed experiences of two major property-led 
development projects in her area. Recommended that 






Officer for a metropolitan local authority who 







Senior officer in a metropolitan local authority who 
discussed experiences of various property-led 






Former officer at a metropolitan local authority who 
discussed experiences of a major property-led 
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